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Abstract 
This thesis undertakes a critical comparative examination of the protection of religious 
minorities under Islamic law and international human rights law. Perhaps no subject 
epitomises the perceived incompatibility between Islamic law and human rights law than the 
protection of religious minorities. Often viewed through the lens of the classical notion of ahl 
al-dhimma (protected people), the treatment of religious minorities under Islamic law has 
been portrayed as oppressive, degrading and discriminatory. Scholarship thus far has sought 
either to affirm this negative perspective, convey only positive aspects or declare its 
inapplicability to the present context of international relations.  
The relevance of the study goes beyond the conventional question of Muslim-majority States 
navigating between their international human rights obligations and their self-imposed 
commitment to Islamic law principles. Two important contemporary phenomena that take the 
question beyond that traditional premise are the emergence of Islamically inspired non-State 
actors seeking to apply rigid and literalist interpretations of Islamic law and the rapid rise of a 
wave of opinion attempting to portray Islam in a negative and retrograde light motivated by 
the far-right politics of xenophobia and Islamophobia. Ironically, the alleged intolerance 
within Islam is used as justification for the instigation of hateful sentiments against Muslim 
(immigrant) minorities in different parts of the world today.  
Hitherto the topic has seldom been analysed by reference to the doctrinal frameworks that 
accompany international law and Islamic law, as undertaken in this study. Cognisant of 
contextual factors, the study demonstrates that the depth, flexibility and principles of Islamic 
law may be far more amenable to the protection of religious minorities than popularly 
thought and that, similarly, that religious minority rights under international law may be 
subject to a range of interpretations and not universally adhered to or agreed by States. The 
main purpose of the thesis is to derive and compare, what it calls the ‘spectrums of validity’ 
under both systems on two distinct issues, namely: (i) the concept of the scope of religious 
minorities and (ii) their right to freedom of religion.   
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I. General Context of Study 
A general motivation for undertaking this research is the post-September 11
th
 context and the 
oft-cited thesis of “The Clash of Civilizations” first posited by Samuel Huntington in his 
seminal 1993 essay, which was later elaborated in a monologue by the same name.
1
 
Huntington’s hypothesis was that:  
“[T]he fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily 
ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the 
dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most 
powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur 
between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will 




He went on to specify religion and in particular Islam as the most important differentiator 
between civilisations as compared to history, language, culture or tradition: “people of 
different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the 
individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as 
well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and 
authority, equality and hierarchy.”
3
 Huntington observed and predicted a trend towards the 
local identity derived from the nation-State being eroded accompanied by an unsecularisation 
of the world: “In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of 
movements that are labelled ‘fundamentalist’” and “provides a basis for identity and 
commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilisations.”
4
  
Certainly, Islam provides a source of identity, which is manifesting itself in a number of 
contemporary tensions and conflicts globally. Further still, along the lines Huntington 
described, the confrontation is increasingly between nations and groups as opposed to 
between nations. Such Islamically defined non-State actors include Al Qaeda, Taliban 
(Afghanistan and Pakistan), Al Shabab (Somalia), Boko Haram (Nigeria), ISIS (Iraq and 
Syria) and Ansar Dine (Mali). However, the nation-group conflict dynamic is also born out in 
                                                          
1
 Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
2
 Huntington, S., “The Clash of Civilizations?”  Foreign Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3, (1993). 
(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations), 22.  
3
 Ibid. at p. 23. 
4
 Ibid. at p. 24. 
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the tension and relations between the nation-State and (religious) minority groups and the 
extent to which their identity is tolerated and accommodated. 
Religion may provide a source of identity and, for Huntington, also often violent conflict for 
some time still: “[Religious] differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does 
not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations 
have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.”
5
 This thesis explores 
whether the content accompanying Islamic identity comparatively with the existing 
international mechanism of human rights can contribute to preventing identity-based conflicts 
by appropriately managing religious diversity. What does Islam tell us about how a non-
dominant religious group should be dealt with and what should be the basis and ultimate aim 
of that interaction? This extraction of moral and legal substance from Islam rather than its 
framing as purely a marker of identity encompassing non-religious elements such as political 
grievances and cultural, ethnic and linguistic facets provides a counter-narrative to 
Huntington’s thesis. It will do this by drawing out the common humanity, morals and ethics 
that, it is presumed, any compassionate socio-political system would engender when 
governing over diverse populations. As such, this thesis opts for a constructivist approach 
rather than the realism adopted by Huntington. A mere description of world affairs and 
predicting its trajectory makes one a mere spectator on the sidelines of historical and future 
events. Rather as an active and concerned participant in world events, it is the objective of 
this thesis to identify impasses and offer proactive solutions to the minimisation of conflict 
and the maximisation of the rights of religious minorities.  
Huntington’s lead has been followed by a number of academics, commentators and 
politicians
6
 since, seeking to pit Western Christian civilization, values and beliefs against the 
‘other’ of Islamic civilisation. There are, nonetheless, notable inconsistencies at inception, 
not least, as neither “the West” nor “Islam” represents well-defined monolithic entities, in 
terms of belief or geography. This research, from a general perspective, seeks to contribute to 
this debate about the perceived antithetical nature of Islam and the West.  As such, given that 
one is principally a cultural identity, while the other a religious one, it is plausible, in theory 
and practice, that there is no inherent incompatibility. Both can and do coexist.  
A striking feature in the concept of a clash of civilizations has been the deployment of 
emotive, polemic and subjective arguments working towards proving a predetermined 
conclusion. As such, neither what is attributed to the ‘West’ is grounded in any objective or 
normative basis, nor the full spectrum of views available within Islam acknowledged or 
proper attention given to their validity according to Islam’s own exegetical framework. 
Instead, issues and facts are often presented selectively to illustrate and preempt a particular 
outcome. This thesis asserts that both systems of Islamic law and international law can be 
objectively defined by reference to their own accompanying explanatory literature.  
                                                          
5
 Ibid. at p. 23. 
6
 E.g. Spencer, R. (ed.) The Myth of Islamic Tolerance: How Islamic Law Treats Non-Muslims (Prometheus 
Books, 2005); and Ali, A. H., Infidel (Simon and Schuster, 2008).   
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The values, beliefs and principles upheld in the ‘West’ cannot be left to the subjectivity of 
individuals with varying agendas.
7
 If claims are posited as to Western society’s unparalleled 
respect for minorities, women and the rights of all humans, then support must be drawn from 
objectively determined evidences. The current international human rights system can provide 
such a litmus test. It is where such claims can be tested in relation to legal rights as well as 
the practical granting of those rights by individual States. At this juncture, the complexity 
should be acknowledged that the United Nations (UN) system and its accompanying 
international human rights framework cannot be said to be wholly Western given that a 
number of non-Western States, including Muslim-majority States, were party to the 
development and formation of international law generally.
8
 Despite this, the perception is 
held by commentators on both sides that the effect of the ‘South’ and developing world on 
the international law-making process was disproportionate to their number.
9
 
For Islamic law too, it does not suffice for critics and proponents to selectively quote from an 
extremely expansive cornucopia of source material spanning over 1400 years of scholarship 
and juristic discussions. Islam too must be objectively defined in terms of the law that derives 
from it. For the sake of precision and unambiguity, we will be referring to Sunni classical 
Islamic law. Sunni Islam is the most predominant reading of Islam, in terms of proportion of 
followers globally, amounting to an estimated 90% of the Muslim population globally.
10
 In 
most Muslim countries the Shi’ah sect form numerical minorities with the exception of Iran, 
Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. The prevailing trend is also for State authorities to be aligned 
with the majority sect apart from in Bahrain and Syria.
11
  
We will be focusing on classical Islamic law as it exhibits a rigorous scientific methodology 
to interpretations and derived legal principles. Compilers such as Bukhari and Muslim went 
to extraordinary lengths to verify and authenticate ahaadith not to mention that each of the 
four schools of Sunni law (madhahib or madhab) had some diverging opinions on the 
reliability or interpretation of certain ahaadith, resulting, at times, in variant rulings and legal 
                                                          
7
 See e.g Haddad, “Ahl al-dhimma in an Islamic State: the teaching of Abu al-Hasan al Mawardi’s Al-ahkam al-
sultaniyya”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1996), 169-70: “A negative assessment of the 
dhimmi system was published in 1985 by the Jewish writer Bat Ye’or, in which she compared the dhimmis to 
European serfs of the Middle Ages in an effort to justify the Zionist insistence on establishing a Jewish state.”  
8
 E.g The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), was passed 
with no dissenting votes but 8 abstentions from Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 6 communist countries. 
9
 In 1948, there were a number of states yet to undergo decolonisation or were newly formed. Furthermore 
through the now defunct Commission on Human Rights, Security Council and the Permanent five, the balance 
of power was clearly weighted in favour of the West. Voices of Islamic countries were not as pronounced or 




 Bahrain is ruled by a monarchy that is linked to the Saudi Arabian monarchy as well as being politically and 
financially propped up by them. Saudi Arabia cannot tolerate for there to be Shi’ah majoritarian rule in Bahrain 
for fear of undue influence of Iran on its borders. For a detailed monologue on this dynamic vis-à-vis the Arab 
Spring, see Matthiesen, T., Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t (Stanford 
University Press, 2013). Syria until the recent civil war was ruled by President Bashar al-Assad and prior to him 
Hafiz. They belong to the Alawite sect (10%) while the majority is Sunni (90%). For further reading see Landis, 
J., “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad Regime is Likely to Survive to 2013”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 
19, No. 1 (2012).  
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views. Furthermore these views were themselves looked at cumulatively by later jurists to 
conclude as a whole the strength of certain views. As such, a scale of strength and reliability 
developed encompassing unanimous consensus (ijma’), majority opinion, significantly 
prominent opinion, minority opinion, weak and finally aberrant (shaad) views. Hence 
contestations and differences of opinions will only be considered within this classical ambit. 
As the collective source of Islamic law is not merely textual but also temporal, that is, 
emanating in the past at the time of the Prophet, then we cannot seriously endeavour to 
understand or apply Islamic law to the present in a vacuum and divorced from that temporal 
and textual reality and how it was understood over time.  
A further cardinal reason for opting to analyse classical Sunni Islamic law is that the vast 
majority of Muslims do not only ascribe to Sunni Islam, but further refer to and rely on 
classical views as a starting point to determine the position of the rulings of their religion on a 
whole range of issues. Granted those who are conveying such views and adapting them to 
present day realities are contemporary scholars and jurists. However, it is in the expression or 
at least acknowledgement of classical Islamic juristic views that the vast majority of Muslims 
seek to find their religious norms. Therefore following this methodology will result in the 
greatest level of legitimacy and credibility amongst Muslim masses worldwide. 
Contemporary views will only be mentioned to show how they comply, in process or 
substance, with classical views. As such the logical methodology to pursue would be to find 
solutions using existing juristic tools and sources from within Islamic law. When the 
solutions come from without, the Muslim audience ceases to be the target or beneficiary of 
such works. It becomes purely an academic and theoretical offering, read and aimed largely 
at non-Muslim intellectuals.
12
 We want to tailor solutions to the present but stay true to the 
sources and methodology of classical Islamic law. Thus when contemporary views are 
disregarded or challenged, it is not on the basis of abstract philosophical or logical 
considerations, but rather that they are at odds with classical Sunni Islamic legal scholarship, 
thus untrue to original principles. Resultantly reform or development cannot be a realistic 
prospect. In summation there needs to be a fine balance between departing from the roots and 
early development of Islamic law and failing to explore in depth in accordance with those 
principles whether the same, different or new ruling is necessary for contemporary problems 
in contemporary contexts.  
This is the reason that even unpalatable options, possibilities or interpretations should be 
highlighted and analysed. On the one hand, it may be possible to show how such views may 
not be the best way to proceed and that other valid options exist. It may also be that an 
uncomfortable view is the only valid and bona fide view in front of us. In this case we must 
challenge our own preconceptions and attempt to analyse and explain the reason for that 
                                                          
12
 Critiquing Abdullah An-Na’im’s monologue, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a’ 
(Harvard University Press, 2008), John Esposito states: “[t]his reliance on theory rather than on textual sources 
or theology is flawed, if one expects to foster broad-based reform rather than be read and celebrated by a 
small elite Muslim and non-Muslim readership”, in ‘Islam and the Secular State: The challenge of creating 
change’ The Immanent Frame: Secularism, religion and the public Sphere, SSRC Blogs, The Social Science 
Research Council (http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/08/25/the-challenge-of-creating-
change).  
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difference as opposed to feeling the necessity to make value-laden judgements.  This is the 
only way one may make a compelling case for being objective, comprehensive and even-
handed. Such an analysis would also equip those actors who seek engagement with 
Islamically motivated entities to know more precisely the views they may be dealing with, 
their genuine parameters of engagement and the underlying reasoning. Such an approach is 
also necessary to avoid being perceived as patronising and telling adherents of a certain faith 
what their religion says and what they should believe.  
As such, two fundamental principles are of paramount importance; that evidences or adilla 
(sing. daleel) from the Qur’an and ahaadith must be considered holistically after considering 
all the relevant information at hand and that all divergent views on a particular issue be 
recognised before any preference is stated. The two principles are interlinked: the former 
demands that no evidence be taken in isolation and at the exclusion of other evidences in 
arriving at a ruling, while the latter requires that if following this exercise there is a difference 
of opinion, then that should form a ‘spectrum of validity’, from which we may deduce if there 
is consensus (ijma’) on a particular issue or otherwise its relative strength. It goes without 
saying that this also applies to international human rights law but is less of a problem due to 
the existence of quasi-judicial bodies that oversee the observance and development of 
international human rights law. With Islamic law there is no authoritative body globally that 
has the final say on what is correct law. Instead, the jurisprudential principles are known to 
all and it is left to jurists to determine the legality and substance of certain rulings and 
pressing issues.  In this regard, we could posit that the sources are finite but the derived 
rulings non-exhaustive. This would be in consonance with Qur’an 16:89 which states: “And 
We have sent down to you the Book as clarification for all things and as guidance and mercy 
and good tidings for those who submit.” 
It is expected that the above-stated approach of analysing both systems of law will render a 
spectrum of valid rulings or what will be referred to in this thesis as a ‘spectrum of validity’ 
to ascertain overlaps and divergences. The coinage of the term within Western academia may 
be novel but the idea within Islamic law is both fundamental and well established. It revolves 
around a nuanced understanding of ijma’ or unanimous consensus of the jurists. Ordinarily, 
the term is only discussed in the context of the presence or absence of ijma’ on a certain 
issue. In Islamic law, the use of the term of ‘difference’ (ikhtilaf or khilaf) rather than 
‘conflict’ or ‘disagreement’ is important as it denotes that there may be differing, non-
conflicting yet simultaneously valid views.
13
 Secondly and most crucially while there is no 
ijma’ on an issue, this does not automatically imply that it now becomes open to an infinite 
number of possible solutions based purely on independent reasoning. In fact the ijma’ that is 
overlooked by academics and modernists is the implicit one, on the finiteness of views on a 
certain issue given the effective elements of the circumstances and context remain 
unchanged. It is this finite range of juristic views on issues of difference in light of specific 
contextual factors, that we will be referring to as the ‘spectrum of validity’. 
                                                          
13
 See Kamali, M. H., “The Scope of Diversity and ‘Ikhtilaf’ (Juristic Disagreement) in the Shari’ah”, Islamic 
Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1998).  
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A spectrum of validity in international law may also arise when considering various regional 
systems alongside the international UN system of human rights, most notable among them 
the European Court of Human Rights, African Commission and Court of Peoples’ and 
Human Rights and Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights. Relating to 
some areas of human rights law, States have been given considerable leeway relating to their 
cultural and historical context, known as the ‘margin of appreciation’ specifically under the 
ECtHR. Conversely areas of the law where no compromise may be made and allowances 
permitted due to there being consensus on their normative and underogable nature, such as 
torture or racism, no such margin is applicable. It will also be unavoidable, given the nature 
of International law, as source and product of national laws and State practices, to refer at 
times to the practice (and compliance) of international law by States.
14
 It is a primary 
objective of the present thesis to ascertain the extent of the overlap between Islamic law and 
international law, as indeed it is one of the assertions of this research that the overlap may be 
far greater than imagined or claimed by most previously. This will be to counter those who 
limit their analysis to divergent views to show a clash and conversely those who seek to 
discuss only the compatible and agreeable issues - both give an inaccurate and unproductive 
picture of the objective reality. As to the divergent parts, we would need to asses if one offers 
a higher standard than the other and seek to explain the differences. 
  
II. Specific Context of Study 
The substantive specific point of focus for this research is the protection of religious 
minorities. There are a number of reasons for delving into this topic. Firstly it is where the 
supposed clash of civilizations is seen to be most acute. A number of books by protagonists
15
 
as well as some academics
16
 have been penned attempting to show the prejudice and 
discrimination inflicted on religious minorities under Islamic law or in Islamic States often 
referred to as dhimmis. However their omission of any reference to the treatment of ethnic 
and linguistic minorities under Islamic law is quite telling of the true motivations of such 
critiques. An ostensible reason could be the absence of any discernible discrimination 
coupled with the celebration of such diversity.  
Even in relation to how non-Muslim religious minorities are treated under Islamic law, the 
correct and fair way to frame the question would be to ask how does a system of law and 
authority treat a group that stands in ideological opposition to the centre of that authority? 
Similar questions could be for example how a democratic system takes to undemocratic 
forces
17
 or how a communist system takes to anti-communist movements. This would be a 
                                                          
14
 See Art.38 of the ICJ Statute. 
15
 E.g. Spencer (ed.) The Myth of Islamic Tolerance. 
16
 E.g. Ye’or, B., The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985). 
17
 E.g. Arts. 9-11 of ECHR: “...necessary in a democratic society”. See ECHR case of Refah Partisi (the Welfare 
Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 123, ECHR 2003-II, 
where democracy could not be used to dismantle a democratic system. See also Shaikh, M., “Islam, Democracy 
and Dissolution of Political Parties at the ECtHR”, Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2011). 
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fairer test for gauging tolerance and accommodation. This could arguably be the reason why 
nation-states have issues with ethnic minorities, that is other nations. Thus the antithesis to 
the identity that occupies the centre of the metropolitan authority is what is often 
differentiated and the group(s) that is sought to be assimilated or discriminated against. 
From an international law and relations perspective, the issue of minorities has caused much 
consternation amongst policy makers, law makers and leaders throughout history. In fact the 
mismanagement of minorities and their needs and aspirations has often proven to be at the 
root of major upheavals throughout history
18
, not least recent and ongoing ones.
19
 Such a 
track record only shows essentially how we have failed to effectively address and manage 
religious, linguistic and ethnic differences and ultimately distinct cultural identities and 
fundamental beliefs that go to the core as to the purpose of our existence and our resulting 
response. Similarly in a number of situations the volatile consequences of stoking tensions 
between minority and majority have been manipulated and abused to consolidate and solidify 
power, and ultimately justify aggression.
20
  
It would be an important contribution to knowledge to explore how both Islamic law and 
International human rights law  seek to address this recurrent problem and what solutions are 
offered. A comparison between principles and practices can indicate what is agreed and thus 
possibly the ideal means by which to manage diversity as well as alternate models where 
there is disagreement.  This can either cast doubt as to the absoluteness of a certain principle 
or show that one may offer a higher standard of protection. It is also noteworthy to elaborate 
on why the research chooses to focus on religious minorities rather than the treatment of 
minorities more broadly under Islamic law and international law. As far as Islamic law is 
concerned, it is by far the most contentious issue and under international law it has been and 
continues to be the most contentious issue when compared to other types of minorities; to the 
point that no binding instrument yet exists at the international level protecting against 
religious discrimination
21
 or endows minority rights on to religious minorities.
22
 Even, as far 
as the individual clauses in other instruments
23
 and State practice are concerned, the 
definitions
24
, meanings, recognition and resultant rights of religious minorities are unsettled. 
                                                          
18
 E.g. Bangladesh, Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Kosovo. 
19
 Ongoing at the time of writing: Crimea, Burmese Rohingya and Central African Republic. 
20
 Kosovo, Hitler in Sudetenland, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. See Voronkova, A., Understanding Ethnopolitical 
Conflict: Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia Wars Reconsidered by Emil Souleimanov (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015) and Tierney, S., “Sovereignty and Crimea: How Referendum Democracy Complicates Constituent Power 
in Multinational Societies”, German LJ, Vol. 16 (2015).  
21
 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 
G.A. res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981). 
22
 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. 
res. 47/135, annex, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 210, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1993) and Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, adopted on 1 February 1995, entered into force on 1 February 1998, 
ETS No. 157.   
23
 Art. 27 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 (ICCPR) and Art. 14 of 
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While this study seeks to establish the extent of compliance of Islamic law with international 
law on this specific subject matter, that is not the overall purpose of the research. Instead 
what is sought is an exercise to ascertain the existence and extent of common ground between 
the two systems. The logic states that if a principle is undisputed and agreed by two systems 
from different eras, geographies, cultures and arenas (religion v. post-WWII legal rights) then 
there must be some objective truth or the most proximate position to it thus far. This pre-
necessitates that Islamic law be opened to reasoned criticism, while international human 
rights law not be upheld as sacrosanct. The fact that religious systems are considered divine 
by their adherents is the reason to stay within their self-defined bounds to propose effective 
solutions that have a realistic prospect of working. With international law, there is no 
immutable objective textual source, but rather textual codifications of recurring and common 
human experiences.  As such it is problematic to also treat international human rights law as 
definite, static and in some extreme cases sacrosanct. 
On the other hand, while the issue of minority rights broadly is a contested one in 
international law, in Islamic law, linguistic or ethnic minorities do not attract much attention 
due to the emphatic and unequivocal equality accorded to them.
25
 They are not differentiated 
and are given room to express and have their culture respected. Religious minorities, on the 
other hand, need to be addressed as they often stand in theological opposition to the religious 
ethos of the Muslim-majority State. To explore too deeply the Islamic law position on 
linguistic and ethnic minorities would be to stress and elaborate on a point that is not 
contested. But for the sake of illustration a few examples are necessary. 
Qur’an 30:22
26
 states: “And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the 
diversity of your languages and your colours. Indeed in that are signs for those of 
knowledge.” In this verse, God is said to direct the reader to his signs to cause wonder and 
affirm that they could not have just come into existence randomly or by chance. As such 
‘heavens and earth’ here refer to the entirety of the physical universe, what is within and 
beyond are knowledge and comprehension. Such an example of the power and creativity of 
God is followed by creation of countless languages and colours. In classical commentary it is 
understood when God mentions two things together, it is to compare them in importance and 
often to raise the status of something that would normally be disregarded. For example, in 
numerous places Muslims are enjoined to worship God and be kind to parents. Similarly the 
command for the prescribed prayer is often followed by the command to pay the zakat 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1953 (ECHR). 
24
 See Hannum, H., “The Concept and Definition of Minorities”, in Weller, M. (ed.) Universal Minority Rights, A 
Commentary on the Jurisprudence of the International Courts and Treaty Bodies (Oxford University Press, 2007)  
and Packer, J. “Problems in Defining Minorities”, in Fottrell, D. and Bowring, B. (ed.), Minority and Group Rights 
in the New Millennium (London, 1999). 
25
 Baderin, M., “Islamic Law and International Protection of Minority Rights in Context” in Frick and Muller, 
(ed.) Islam and International Law: Engaging Self-Centricism from a Plurality of Perspectives (Brill, 2013), 320-3. 
26
 The Qur’an is believed by Muslims to be a divine revelation containing the exact words of God and to be the 
principal source of Islamic law. 
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(obligatory charity for the poor).
27
 In this way linguistic diversity should be marveled at and 
command similar respect, awe and admiration as the creation of the entire universe. It could 
then be said that both elements of human identity are examples of how God is able to 
combine diversity and unity. The reference to colours is not just the various races or 
ethnicities but even extends to the appearance of people. And according to commentators, 
humans who are essentially the same in terms of physiological make up as well as features, 
that is, two eyes, two eyebrows and one nose, but still each and every group, race, ethnicity 
and individual has been created differently with unique appearances.
28
 Similarly the sheer, 
unfathomable and apparent infinite diversity of languages convey essentially the same 
meanings, emotions and thoughts.  
This is in contrast to Christianity where the diversity of languages is explained in the Bible 
through the story of the Tower of Babel, where a fearful and jealous God seeks apparently to 
disunite and stem the progress of humanity.
29
 Furthermore in both the Qur’anic and Biblical 
perspectives on linguistic diversity, it is seen as inextricably linked to ethnic identity. The 
Qur’an mentions language and colour, while the Bible refers to one people with one 
language, who were dispersed and confused. In relation to the management of minorities and 
their diversity, some nation-states have not had an issue with the linguistic identity of 
minorities per se, but rather that it indicated or was representative of a broader ethnic identity 
in opposition or outside the centrally defined dominant State identity. 
Also Qur’an 49:13 states: “O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female 
and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of 
you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you. Indeed, God is Knowing and 
Acquainted.” This verse gives the Islamic rationale for all diversity. As such, it emphasises 
the underlying commonality which encompasses everyone that the origin of all human life is 
from a male and a female. It then acknowledges and states the purpose of diversity in 
allegiances, affiliations and any grouping sharing a common defining factor. The purpose 
deduced from the verse could be the encouragement not to be in perpetual conflict but to 
perpetually engage in inter-cultural, inter-religious dialogue and exchange. Lastly in front of 
God, one will only be judged on their righteousness and not their tribal (group) affiliation. 
This was affirmed in the Prophet’s last sermon before his demise where he stated: “All 
mankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab 
                                                          
27
 E.g. Qur’an 2:83 contains both injunctions: “And [recall] when We took the covenant from the Children of 
Israel, [enjoining upon them], ‘Do not worship except Allah; and to parents do good and to relatives, orphans, 
and the needy. And speak to people good [words] and establish prayer and give zakah.’ Then you turned away, 
except a few of you, and you were refusing.” The thesis will henceforth utilise the following translation unless 
otherwise stated: The Qur’an, English Meanings, English Revised and Edited by Saheeh International (A-
Muntada al-Islami, 2004). 
28
 Mubarakpuri, S. R. (Abridged) Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Dar us-Salam, 2003), 3885. 
29
 Bible, Genesis 11:5-8 (English Standard Version), “And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, 
which the children of man had built. And the Lord said, ‘Behold, they are one people, and they have all one 
language, and this is only the beginning of what they will do. And nothing that they propose to do will now be 
impossible for them. Come, let us go down and there confuse their language, so that they may not understand 
one another’s speech.’ So the Lord dispersed them from there over the face of all the earth, and they left off 
building the city.” 
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has any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over black nor a black has 
any superiority over white except by piety and good action.”
30
 
Logically and practically when discussing Islamic law in the context of a Muslim-majority 
State, the issue of religious minorities is the pertinent one as minority groups are in fact 
formed in opposition to the ideology at the centre of the State. As for the most part of the 20
st
 
century, we have seen the emergence of nation-States, ethnic identity has been the key 
defining element of belonging. Hence the most acute problems that arose were related to 
ethnic minorities and subsequently when the international human rights framework evolved; 
it did so to cater for this fundamental problem in Western societies. Religion was not an issue 
in Europe at the early stage. The purpose of looking at linguistic and ethnic minorities in brief 
is to briefly evaluate how Islam perceives of those who have a distinct culture generally. 
There are even hints of not just recognition but encouragement of celebration of linguistic, 
ethnic and cultural diversity as shown in the textual source of Islam above. So the question of 
how does Islam treat those who stand in ideological opposition to its tenets or its 
understanding of the ultimate truth, that is non-believers in that perspective, and believers in 
other systems of faith and belief, is the focus of the thesis.  
Conceptually, Islamic law deals with religious minorities as group entities by entering into 
treaties with them. Haykal has noted in his account of the Prophet’s life that in addressing the 
Jewish communities in Madinah after ratifying the Constitution of Madinah
31
, the Prophet is 
recorded to have said: “your flesh is our flesh and your blood is our blood.”
32
 As such in 
Islamic law, collective group rights have always provided the point of departure for any 
rights regime for non-Muslim minorities.
33
 Such group rights and treaty making capacity 
would today be construed as exercising autonomy. Ahmad Yousif has noted that: “[i]n the 
Islamic world-view…collective rights and freedoms are given priority over individual rights 
and freedoms.”
34
 Similarly some authors comment that the rights of the dhimmi were more 
                                                          
30
 The Final Sermon in Pooawala, The History of al-Tabari, 112-113.  
31
 Legitimate questions have been raised regarding the authenticity of the Constitution of Madinah due to its 
principal sources being the accounts by Ibn Ishaaq and Abu Ubayd written two centuries after the Prophet’s 
death. However as Emon points out: “Nearly unanimously, scholars have held that the document as presented 
by the later sources is in fact authentic. The methods by which they arrive at this conclusion, however, reveal 
less about the inherent authenticity of the document than the biases and methodological limitations that the 
authors bring to their historical evaluation of the Constitution.” See Emon, A., “Reflections on the ‘Constitution 
of Medina’: An essay on methodology and ideology in Islamic Legal History”, UCLA J. Islamic & Near E.L., Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (2001-2002), 107.   
32
 Haykal, M., The Life of Muhammad, trans. I. R. A. al-Faruqi (Islamic Publications Bureau, 1982), 183. 
33
 Arzt, D., “The Role of Compulsion in Islamic Conversion - Jihad, Dhimma and Rida”, Buffalo Human Right Law 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 15 (2002), 32: “One needs to stop thinking in twentieth century terms, that is, from an 
individualistic perspective, which tends to interpret religious creed as an entirely personal matter.” This does 
not preclude the notion of individual rights under Islamic law for members of religious minorities, but is a point 
about approach.  
34
 Yousif, A., “Islam, Minorities and Religious Freedom: A Challenge to Modern Theory of Pluralism”, Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 20, No.1 (2000), 39. 
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generous in the early Islamic state
35
 especially in the private religious sphere where a high 
degree of autonomy is provided for groups. Such underlying precepts of the management of 
religious minorities in the early unitary Islamic State is strikingly similar to recent normative 
developments of international law towards positive discrimination, group entitlement and the 
emerging right to autonomy in certain spheres.
36
    
The contemporary general word in Arabic for minorities is said to be ‘aqalliyat’.
37
 However 
nowhere can a reference be found where the classical Islamic scholars or jurists referred to 
non-Muslims as such. Instead they are referred to as ahl al-dhimma, which translates to 
‘protected people’. Hence they are seen as collective entities automatically entitled to the 
enjoyment of their culture and beliefs, which must be respected and recognised. This is 
remarkably similar to the concept and distinction in international human rights law between 
‘minorities’ and ‘peoples’. The former needs protection from aggression and imposition of 
the majority culture and identity, whereas the right to self-determination is artificially limited 
to the latter. Artificial because the reasoning of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) in 
making the distinction is more about safeguarding future perceived threats to state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity rather than coherent legal reasoning. The latter approach 
could only arrive at one conclusion that both terms are interchangeable but were conceived of 
with differing contextual backdrops, one in the face of assimilation and imposition of a 
national identity and other in response to rapid decolonisation of pre-existing nations, or the 
creation of completely new ones. However when petitioned, the HRC has held that Art. 1 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
38
 refers to the collective 
rights of peoples and not of minorities. The HRC seems to be of the opinion that individuals 
belonging to minorities may not lay claim to collective rights. As such, they have rendered 
complaints under Article 1 inadmissible on grounds that they lack the competency to hear 
collective complaints by means of an individual petition.
39
 Such an either/or approach to the 
relationship between the rights of minorities and the self-determination of peoples is 
unnecessary and has proved counterproductive to the articulation of an effective and coherent 
international minority rights regime.
40
 
We must also keep in mind that the term ‘minority’ across all discourses, but especially in 
legal and political discourse, has been riddled with controversy. States have sought to 
narrowly define or wholly reject the term in order to exclude some groups within their 
                                                          
35
 Hamidullah, M., Muslim Conduct of State (7th ed. Lahore, 1987), 112. While disagreement can be found in 
Khadduri, M., War and Peace in The Law of Islam (1955), 177 & 195-8. Both cited in Baderin, M., International 
Human Rights Law and Islamic Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 166. 
36
 See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res A/61/L.67, 7 September 2007. 
37
 This is recent terminology used specifically to refer to Muslim minorities in the West. See below for further 
discussion.  
38
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
39
 The HRC thus saw it fit in Lubicon Lake Band v Canada (Communication 167/1984) to deny the enforcement 
mechanism for common Article 1, instead opting to deal with the complaint under Article 27 of the ICCPR.  
40
 Brownlie, I., “The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law” in Crawford, J (eds.), The Rights of Peoples 
(Oxford University Press, 1988), 16. 
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 While some groups have sought to seek recognition as minorities in the face of 
such resistance, others have actually seen such recognition as disadvantageous.
42
 For 
example, those seeking secession have often rejected the label of minorities fearing that their 
right to external self-determination could be compromised. In other contexts when a group 
wishes to hold on to the idea of being a distinct nation, albeit with no State to call their own, 
they perceive the label of minorities as denoting and accepting a position of inferiority to the 
majority. However international lawyers see the indeterminacy of the definition which to this 
day is yet to be formally agreed and codified, as advantageous for advancing a broad range of 
rights subject to progressive interpretations. 
The pertinent point to draw here is that the term ‘minority’ clearly carries a connotation of 
weakness and vulnerability as compared to ‘people’. So Islam’s categorisation of religious 
minorities as ahl al-dhimma or ‘protected peoples’ rather than aqalliyat al-dhimma or 
‘protected minorities’ is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, the starting point is not 
that of antagonism and opposition. Secondly and most significantly, it not only indicates 
prospective cultural and religious autonomy, but also potential territorial autonomy. 
Developing this further we observe the word ‘aqalliyat’ is used particularly in relation to 
Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim-majority States.
43
 Hence it is possible to deduce that 
Islam perceives that Muslims under the authority of others will be in an inferior position as 
opposed to the position accorded to non-Muslims if under Muslim rule. It could indicate that 
Islam’s claim to being a religion of high morality by aspiring to treat divergent groups within 
its power in compassionately and leniently. It also shows that a tit for tat approach is not 
encouraged. Even in relation to the section on why the concept of dhimma is employed in the 
research below, the Qur’an notes that if Muslims were to be under the non-Muslims, that is, 
the enemies of the Muslims at the time, they would not be afforded protection as dhimmis, 
ensuring integrity of lives, property and religion.
44
      
                                                          
41
 Turkey and France are not members of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
adopted on 1 February 1995, entered into force on 1 February 1998, ETS No. 157; and have entered 
reservations to Art. 27 of ICCPR to the effect that they have no minority groups within their territory. The UK is 
a party to both, but with an interpretive declaration limits the scope of both Conventions to only ‘ethnic 
groups’ and ‘racial discrimination’, whereas both Conventions’ scope explicitly encompasses ethnic, national, 
religious and linguistic minorities with associated rights extending far beyond just ‘racial discrimination’. A 
number of signatories have sought through declarations or application to limit the FCNM to only ‘old’ 
minorities as opposed to ‘new’ minorities who originate from post-1945 immigration. See generally Shaikh, M., 
“Immigration to the UK from Commonwealth countries and the issue of ‘New Minorities’ defined by religion: 
between their group rights and integration,” in Hoffman and Caruso (ed.), Minority Rights in South Asia (Peter 
Lang, 2011). 
42
 E.g. Tamils, Tibetans and Basque. The discourse and narrative of ‘minorities’ is also perceived by some as 
promoting exceptionalism and a victim mentality. See Packer, J., “On the content of minority 
rights”, International Studies in Human Rights (1996): and Goldmann, G., “Defining and observing minorities: 
An objective assessment”, Statistical Journal of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2001). 
43
 See Al-Haddad, H., A Critical Analysis of Selected Aspects of Sunni Muslim Minority Fiqh with Particular 
Reference to Contemporary Britain (PhD Thesis, SOAS, 2010), 12; and March, A., “Sources of Moral Obligations 
to non-Muslims in the ‘Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities’ (Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat)”, Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 
16, No. 1 (2009).  
44
 Qur’an 9:8 & 10. 
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III. Utility of the Study 
As to the academic utility of this study, the problem of minorities has been often been 
addressed from a linear Western historical, legal, political and social science perspective; 
seldom comparatively with a religious, in particular, Islamic perspective of management of 
diversity. It is expected that those entities, State or non-State, seeking to conceive of political 
or legal positions, while being Islamically motivated may draw on the thesis to gain a better 
understanding of the issues from a study that draws from classical Islamic sources but offers 
solutions which are relevant for the present context. This would not only include Muslim-
majority States, who give Islamic law the constitutional status of being a source of national 
law,
45
 but also non-State actors who may have formed a distorted view of how non-Muslims 




Furthermore, Islamically motivated political movements whose formation and emergence in 
the Middle East and North Africa following the so-called Arab Spring
47
, appear to be a 
recurring trend.
48
 It is also hoped that international and non-governmental organisations 
would benefit from the Islamic perspectives advanced herein when engaging Islamically 
motivated actors, whether they be political movements, governments or non-State actors in 
different parts of the Muslim world. Furthermore an Islamic perspective on the protection of 
religious minorities could contribute to the positive development of international law on the 
protection of minorities. In affirming some elements of minority rights, advancing higher 
standards in some and challenging others, international law stands to be enriched and 
reflected upon. It could even encourage some Muslim-majority States to support and further 
strengthen existing international law as well as offer paths of advancement for the 
international community. 
 
IV. Conceptual Clarifications  
There are a number of conceptual discussions around terminology relating to the present 
thesis that need to be elaborated and clarified. One of the central issues and problems is the 
                                                          
45
 E.g. The Islamic Republics of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
46
 See Ansar Dine (Mali), ISIS (Syria and Iraq) and Al-Qaeda. 
47
 Meaningful change and the people’s aspirations have been stalled and in some cases regressed – 
Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, former Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation stated: “‘the Arab 
Spring’ fails to reflect the reality that has swept over the Middle East and North Africa, and that a more 
accurate metaphore, in his view, should be: ‘The Fall Season of the Despots’,” speech delivered at the 
Brookings Institute in Doha, Dec 2011. Tariq Ramadan also takes issue with the term ‘Arab Spring’; see his 
monologue, Islam and the Arab Awakening (OUP, 2012). 
48
 Islah (Yemen), Hizb al Adala wal Tanmiya and Hizb al Watan (Libya), Enhada (Tunisia) and the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Egypt). 
PhD: Protection of Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and International Law   Murtaza Shaikh  
  
Page 20 of 222 
 
use of the terms ‘Islamic State’, ‘Islamic law’ and ‘Shari’ah’
49
.  While the research began by 
seeking to establish how religious minorities would be treated in an Islamic State, the wide 
range of understandings of what the term ‘Islamic State’ means (or does not mean) poses 
considerable difficulties and distracts from the main objective of the research, namely what 
models of management, rights and treatment are offered to non-Muslim religious minorities 
under Islamic law.  
It is arguable that as a minority can only come about when preceded by the existence of a 
State and a dominant majority, and further that a State which would seek to realise its 
political and legal system through its reading of Islam would be then an Islamic State. 
However, for some, the term itself is oxymoronic. How can a State have a religion, they 
argue.
 50
 Could merely the fact that a State self-identifies as an Islamic State be enough to be 
seen as such? No they argue, not if it does not implement Islam fully and in every sense and 
beyond that can we be sure that it is adhering to the correct interpretations of how a State 
should behave according to Islam. Then others note that the Islamic State can only be referred 
to with regards to the first and original entity established by the Prophet in Madinah and 
subsequently governed by his successive companions, Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali. 
Once that preponderance of early Islamic rule ended (632-661)
51
 there cannot be an Islamic 
State thereafter.
52
 A parallel argument has also been that an Islamic State must be a unitary 
entity with one overarching leader, the Caliph (khalifah). A plurality of entities ascribing 
Islamic statehood to themselves cannot thus lay claim to such a description.
53
 They are 
merely then ‘would be Islamic States’. 
However it should be mentioned in brief that this may be countered by the example of what 
took place with Abu Baseer in the period following the Treaty of Hudaibiya. One of the terms 
of that peace treaty between the Muslims and the Makkan Quraish, was that if any of the 
Quraish were to accept Islam and flee to the Prophet, they would have to be returned. 
However if any of the Muslims defected to the Quraish, they would not be returned. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Treaty, while the agreement was still being written, the term was 
tested with Abu Jandal, who arrived having escaped from Makkah. The Prophet however 
                                                          
49
 Shari’ah appears once at Qur’an 45:18 and as a derivative thrice at 42:13, 42:21 and 5:51. 
50
 An-Na’im, A., UKCLE Teaching and Learning Islamic Law Meeting, Warwick University, July 2008. 
51
 “The assassination of ʿUthman and the ineffectual caliphate of ʿAli that followed sparked the first sectarian 
split in the Muslim community. By 661 ʿAli’s rival Mu’awiyah, a fellow member of ʿUthman’s Umayyad clan, 
had wrested away the Caliphate, and his rule established the Umayyad Caliphate that lasted until 750”, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (http://www.britannica.com/place/Caliphate). See also Madelung, The Succession to 
Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (Cambridge, 1998).  
52
 Hamza Yusuf stated: “The Prophet sal allahu wa alaihi wasalam stated very clearly that the political tradition 
of his faith would dissipate very rapidly after 30 years and I think Muslims tend to forget that this so-called 
Islamic State has not existed in the history of Islam and I think it’s a political fantasy a lot of Muslims hold,” The 
Rethinking Islamic Reform Conference, convened by Oxford University Islamic Society (May 2010). 
53
 E.g. the khilafa movement in the Indian sub-continent in the pre-decolonisation period consisted of Muslims 
who were opposed to a homeland for the Muslims of India, but rather a khilafa or to become a part of a pan-
Islamic entity. The recent in-fighting between rebel groups in Syria, Jahbat al-Nusra (the official al-Qaeda 
affiliate) and the Islamic State of Iraq in Syria (ISIS) is emblematic of al-Qaeda’s desire for centralised authority 
the challenge to this by the lack of subservience by ISIS and their use of the term ‘Islamic State’. 
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turned him away to honour the term of the treaty.
54
 Later when the Muslims had returned to 
Madinah, they were met with the arrival of Abu Baseer, who had also fled Makkah after 
accepting Islam. When two men were sent by the Quraish for him, the Prophet once again in 
accordance with the agreement handed him over. While returning to Makkah, Abu Baseer 
managed to escape, killing one of his captors. When he returned to Madinah, he said to the 
Prophet: “Your obligation is over and Allah has freed you from it. You duly handed me over 
to the men, and Allah has rescued me from them.”
55
 According to Ibn Ishaaq, the Prophet 
responded: “Woe is his mother, he would have kindled a war had there been others with him” 
or “The firebrand! Would that others had been him!”
56
 According to this translation, the 
response appears to be disapproving and Mubarakpuri in his contemporary seerah, notes also 
that owing to the negative response of the Prophet, Abu Baseer fled to a place called Saif al-
Bahr.
57
 The relevant excerpt from the lengthy hadith in Bukhari states the following: 
“When the Prophet returned to Medina, Abu Basir, a new Muslim convert from Quraish 
came to him. The Infidels sent in his pursuit two men who said (to the Prophet), ‘Abide 
by the promise you gave us.’ So, the Prophet handed him over to them. They took him 
out (of the City) till they reached Dhul-Hulaifa where they dismounted to eat some 
dates they had with them. Abu Basir said to one of them, ‘By Allah, O so-and-so, I see 
you have a fine sword.’ The other drew it out (of the scabbard) and said, "By Allah, it is 
very fine and I have tried it many times.’ Abu Basir said, ‘Let me have a look at it.’ 
When the other gave it to him, he hit him with it till he died, and his companion ran 
away till he came to Medina and entered the Mosque running. When Allah's Messenge 
saw him he said, ‘This man appears to have been frightened.’ When he reached the 
Prophet he said, ‘My companion has been murdered and I would have been murdered 
too.’ Abu Basir came and said, ‘O Allah's Messenger, by Allah, Allah has made you 
fulfill your obligations by your returning me to them (i.e. the Infidels), but Allah has 
saved me from them.’ The Prophet said, ‘Woe to his mother! What excellent war 
kindler he would be, should he only have supporters.’ When Abu Basir heard that he 
understood that the Prophet would return him to them again, so he set off till he reached 
the seashore. Abu Jandal bin Suhail got himself released from them (i.e. infidels) and 
joined Abu Basir. So, whenever a man from Quraish embraced Islam he would follow 
Abu Basir till they formed a strong group. By Allah, whenever they heard about a 
caravan of Quraish heading towards Sham, they stopped it and attacked and killed them 
(i.e. infidels) and took their properties. The people of Quraish sent a message to the 
Prophet requesting him for the Sake of Allah and kith and kin to send for (i.e. Abu 
Basir and his companions) promising that whoever (amongst them) came to the Prophet 
would be secure. So the Prophet sent for them (i.e. Abu Basir's companions) and Allah 
revealed the following Divine Verses: ‘And it is He Who Has withheld their hands 
from you and your hands from them in the midst of Mecca, After He made you the 
                                                          
54
 Ibn Ishaaq, The Life of Muhammad, 505; and Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar, 343-4. 
55
 Ibn Ishaaq, The Life of Muhammad, 507-8. 
56
 Ibid, at p.507 
57
 Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar, 347.  
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victorious over them. ... the unbelievers had pride and haughtiness, in their hearts ... the 
pride and haughtiness of the time of ignorance.’ (48.24-26) And their pride and 
haughtiness was that they did not confess (write in the treaty) that he (i.e. Muhammad) 
was the Prophet of Allah and refused to write: ‘In the Name of Allah, the most 
Beneficent, the Most Merciful,’ and they (the mushriks) prevented them (the Muslims) 
from visiting the House (the Ka`bah).”
58
  
It is not clear whether the Prophet’s response was unequivocally negative or ambiguous in 
light of ensuing events. This is because firstly, Abu Baseer was able to flee, which could be 
because the Muslims did not have the chance to recapture him to be returned to the Quraish, 
or it was an implicit acceptance of his view that the Muslims were not bound to return him as 
they had already done so once. Secondly, Ibn Ishaq states: “The Muslims who were confined 
to Mecca heard what the apostle had said of Abu Basir so they went out to join him in al-‘Is. 
About seventy men attached themselves to him”.
59
 What that initial group understood was 
that Prophet had implicitly permitted, through omission, the establishment of a second 
Muslim community by Abu Baseer not bound by the terms of Hudaibiya, which only the 
main body of the Muslims in Madinah were bound by. It also provided a safe haven for those 
who converted or wanted to flee, but were trapped due to the Treaty of Hudaibiya such as 
Abu Jandal. This also meant that there was no peace treaty between the new community and 
the Quraish, allowing them to utilise their strategic position to disrupt and sabotage the trade 
caravans of the Quraish heading towards Syria. So much was the Quraish’s loss that 
eventually they begged the Prophet to cancel that term of the Treaty and ask the exiles to join 
the main body of Muslims in Madinah.
60
 This in part supports, why jurists such as Ibn 
Taymiyyah had observed in the 14
th
 century that although the caliphate was a single political 
entity at the time of the early ancestors, “it had become fragmented during the course of time 
into a number of independent states” and he thus concluded that it was not obligatory to insist 
on a single political authority within the Islamic polity.
61
        
Such semantic and conceptual obstacles could be circumvented by defining more precisely 
that what is under discussion are State entities with Muslim majorities, which cite Islamic law 
or the Shari’ah as a or the source of law. However an  attempt to draw lessons from Muslim-
majority State practices relating to religious minorities and then ascribing such practices to or 
not to Islamic law, was too vast and imprecise an exercise of research. Therefore a conscious 
decision was made, in order to produce concrete conclusions and meaningfully contribute to 
the field, to limit the research purely to the doctrinal aspect of Islam rather than its various 
forms of (non-)implementation and manifestation in modern Muslim-majority States. 
Towards the end of the thesis certainly suggestions will be made as to how they could be 
implemented.  
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When discussing the viability and meaning of the term ‘Islamic law’, there are once again a 
range of views available. On a literal reading of the term it would be assumed that it refers 
simply to law derived from Islam, which is textually sourced from the Qur’an and ahaadith. 
Schacht in his seminal work, ‘An Introduction to Islamic Law’, posits sunnah as a source of 
divine law associated purely with the Prophet expressed as ahaadith were a later 
‘innovation’: “Hardly any of these traditions, as far as matters of religious law are concerned, 
can be considered authentic; they were put into circulation, no doubt from the loftiest of 
motives, by the Traditionists themselves from the first half of the second century onwards.”
62
 
For him, the Prophet and early Islam only concerned themselves with religious matters and 
largely did not interfere with legal ones: “It was the first legal specialists themselves who 
created the system of Islamic law; they did not borrow it from the pre-Islamic sources which 
provided many of its material elements.”
63
 The notion of the four sources of law as Qur’an, 
sunnah (sayings and actions of the Prophet expressed as ahaadith), qiyas (analogy) and ijma’ 
(unanimous scholarly consensus) were only created by al-Shafi’i.
64
 Thus while Schacht 
disputes the order of the various elements of Islamic law and their authenticity as been divine 
due to their link to the Prophet, following the development of the law in the second and third 
centuries, he concurs that Islamic law began from that point to be drawn from these four 
principal sources and through the works of the four prominent schools of Islamic law.
65
 
Schacht’s most robust criticism emanated from Coulson
66
, who pointed to clear Qur’anic 
injunctions that had law making quality as well as evidence that ahaadith had been preserved 
and transmitted rigorously from the time of the Prophet.
67
   
While one may think ostensibly that Islamic law and Shari’ah are synonymous, for some they 
are distinct and for others incompatible. An-Na’im following on from his views on the idea of 
the non-viability of an Islamic State lies at one end of the spectrum. He argues that the terms 
‘Islamic’ and ‘law’ cannot coexist. Islam is from God, and law is man-made for specific 
contexts and times and actualised through the coercive State and its positivist legal 
framework.
68
 He instead makes a case for replacing the term Islamic law with 
jurisprudence
69
, as in his view, all pronouncements from classical Islamic jurists are 
examples of jurisprudence, that is, examples of how to deal with a particular situation that 
was and remains closely tied with the unique context and as such for him unbinding and thus 
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lacking a vital ingredient of law, its precedent-setting quality. Of course these suppositions 
are by no means novel. Vessey-Fitzgerald states that the Qur’an was not meant to be a law 
book and the Prophet not the law giver.
70
 Hashemi states in a similar vein that the Prophet 
was adapting the divine.
71
 There are clearly a number of counterarguments to this approach. 
We will mention a few of the main ones.  
It is submitted that An-Na’im is correct, in part, up to the point he states that all ‘rulings’ 
from classical jurists and scholars are tied to context. However where he goes from there is 
problematic. It cannot be that merely due to this factor that such rulings become inapplicable 
to our present day context. Under classical Islamic law, the issue was already explored and a 
comprehensive framework formed to address the context of a ruling. Each ruling is said to 
have an effective cause or illah, if the context changes but the illah remains, then the ruling 
still applies, if conversely the illah is not present then the ruling does not apply. This juristic 
exercise of applying the effective causes of old rulings to new similar situations is what is 
referred to as qiyas or analogy. Hallaq notes that that the practice of analogous deduction was 
already widespread prior to it being given the label and formal ascription as ‘qiyas’. It was 
used most by the Kufans (in Iraq), but also extensively by the Medinese and Syrians during 
the second century AH.
72
 He summarises the concept succinctly visavis al-Shafi’i’s 
understanding and position on the matter:  
“Shafi’i appears to have been the first jurist consciously to articulate the notion that 
Islamic revelation provides a full and comprehensive evaluation of human acts. The 
admittance of qiyas (ijtihad) into his jurisprudence was due to his recognition of the 
fact that this divine intent is not completely fulfilled by the revealed texts themselves, 
since these latter do not afford a direct answer to every eventuality. But to Shafi’i, 
acknowledging the permissibility of qiyas does not bestow on it a status independent of 
revelation. If anything, without revelation’s sanction of the use of this method it would 
not have been allowed, and when it is permitted to operate it is because qiyas is the 
only method that can bring out the meaning and intention of revelation regarding a 
particular eventuality. Qiyas does not itself generate rules or legal norms; it merely 
discovers them from, or brings them out of, the language of revealed texts.”
73
 
For example, recreational drugs do not feature in classical Islamic law, whereas alcohol does. 
The prohibition of alcohol has been deduced to have the effective cause of intoxicating and 
affecting human judgment.
74
 As such, recreational drugs by way of qiyas are also forbidden.
75
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A counter example is where similar drugs and alcohol are used for medical purposes.
76
 
Furthermore the verse in question forbade khamr (wine) and not alcohol per se. So qiyas was 
made to extend the prohibition to alcohol generally and again to recreational drugs.
77
 Also, 
when intoxicating agents are not present in quantities large enough to intoxicate, then they 
are not deemed to be forbidden.
78
                                                                                      
On the whole it appears that An-Na-im is against the law making quality of Shari’ah. This 
may be linked to his mentor Mahmood Taha, who posited that the Makkan verses from the 
Qur’an abrogated the Madinan verses.
79
 This was a highly controversial claim, as the Makkan 
verses are principally concerned with belief, the hereafter and surviving as a minority under 
extreme pressure and oppression, whereas the Madinan verses, once the Muslims had 
assumed political authority, were mostly more specific and legal in nature, prohibiting and 
enjoining numerous fundamental aspects of what is today considered as the Shari’ah or 
Islamic law. By suggesting that the Makkan parts of the Qur’an should abrogate the Madinan 
verses, Taha was suggesting stripping Islam of all its legal rulings and starting from scratch in 
terms of law.
80
 This understanding went against the notion that the Madinan period took 
place later than the Makkan period and that there was nothing necessarily contradictory in the 
verses – they went hand in hand and responded to different contexts.
81
 To Western jurists too, 
it would make sense that firstly abrogation can only occur if there is a conflict, secondly 
where there is a conflict the common sense and logical legal principles of lex posterior 
derogat priori
82
 and lex specialis derogat legi generali
83
 would apply. Textual credence may 
be attached to the latter principle by reference to Qur’an 3:7, which states: “It is He who has 
sent down to you, [O Muhammad], the Book; in it are verses [that are] precise – they are the 
foundation of the Book – and others unspecific. As for those in whose hearts is deviation 
[from truth], they will follow that of it which is unspecific, seeking discord and seeking an 
interpretation [suitable to them]. And no one knows its [true] interpretation except Allah. But 
those firm in knowledge say, ‘We believe in it. All [of it] is from our Lord.’ And no one will 
be reminded except those of understanding.” 
Baderin offers a more nuanced view on this point, in that he defines the Shari’ah as the 
intended will of God and Islamic law its manifestation by jurists as law, noting specifically 
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that the distinction is needed as the latter is prone to human error.
84
 This differs from An-
Na’im in allowing rulings of Islamic scholars to have binding effect, but desists from 
imbuing the sanctity of terming it God’s law that the term ‘Shari’ah’ denotes. To put it more 
practically, he only considers Qur’anic verses and ahaadith as representing Shari’ah. 
Anything derived from ‘Shari’ah’ or interpreted by jurists, that is, fiqh, in terms of rulings he 
classifies as Islamic law. This is at odds with the linguistic understanding of Shari’ah. While 
the oft cited meaning is given as the well-trodden path, or the path that leads to water, 
practically in Islamic legal discourse the term refers to simply ‘law’. While in Arabic and 
Islamic discourse its religious nature is implicitly understood, for our purposes the most 
accurate translation would be the ‘law of Islam’ or ‘Islamic law’. ‘Shari’ah’ framed as simple 
‘the law’ allows us to see the sources themselves need human endeavor of interpretation, 
through classical Qur’anic commentaries (tafsir) and ahaadith explanations (sharh). 
Furthermore, according to the procedural sources of Islamic law of qiyas and ijma’, would 
inevibly include opinions and discussion by jurists on various matters. This is to say there is 
no distinction between Shari’ah as referred to by classical jurists and ‘Islamic law’ as 
referred to by Baderin. It is submitted that they are synonymous and translations of each 
other, with fiqh included in the meaning of Shari’ah. And the textual sources are given as 
evidences for a particular opinion.  
Another crucial point relating to this issue is the role and importance of understanding ijma’ 
or consensus. It is considered by classical scholars as one of, if not the most important source 
of Islamic law or Shari’ah and is procedural rather than substantive, that is to say it works 
with the textual sources rather than independently of them
85
. So for those who say it is the 
most important, even more so than the Qur’an and ahaadith, they mean in combination with 
the two textual sources.
86
 The fourth source is qiyas, and that too like ijma’, is to be used 
alongside the two textual sources, and is critical to deriving rulings for our present day 
context. The use of consensus or ijma’ to deduce which principles of rulings there is little 
doubt in is logical. The textual evidence advanced in support of ijma’ has been the hadith of 
the Prophet, where he states “my Ummah will not unite upon error”
87
 and “What Muslims 
consider to be good is good in the view of God.”
88
 Qur’an 4:115 is often given as support for 
the principle: “And whoever opposes the Messenger after guidance has become clear to him 
and follows other than the way of the believers – We will give him what he has taken and 
drive him into Hell, and evil it is as a destination.” Al-Juwayni, who was a proponent of the 
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idea of ijma’, found both the above verse and hadith inconclusive in their wording and 
interpretation as compelling and explicit textual bases for ijma’. For the hadith, he further 
raised questions about its authenticity noting its various wordings in different narrations and 
the fact that it was an uncorroborated tradition (khabar wahid), thus disqualifying it as an 
authoritative source of law.
89
 Rather than undermine the immutable authority of ijma’, he 
sought to establish it by drawing on a definitive basis instead of a weak textual one:  
“His aim is merely to highlight that as a source of immutable Islamic teachings, if there 
is hope for Ijma’ to have the compelling authoritativeness that scholars afford it, its 
legality must be justified by standards that are beyond reproach. For this reason, he 




Similarly the principle can be extended to measure the level of agreement where there is no 
consensus amongst the scholars, and ruling and opinions graded as majority opinion, strong, 
valid, weak or odd, that is not considered and discarded. Other conditions of ijma’ to be 
mentioned briefly – that they must be scholars (mujtahid), there may be ijma’ not just on a 
certain view, but that the valid spectrum is limited to a number of views and no new ones 
may be introduced, new rulings may only be hazarded by contemporary scholars, if the set of 
circumstances is fundamentally different, that is, the illah is absent.  
Discussion and disagreement over the precise conditions of ijma’ have revolved around a 
number of technical questions such as: is it the consensus of mujtahid scholars alone or must 
it include usūlis (legal theorists)? Can it include lay scholars, Shi’ah scholars or experts in the 
relevant field? Must the consensus be unanimous, and if not how many disagreements, and by 
whom, negate ijma’? Can ijma’ still be applied to the finiteness of the resulting differing 
opinions?
91
  Subsequently while the conceptual essence of ijma’ was unanimously agreed, its 
technicalities and their varied understanding and applications resulted in a number of scholars 
referring to ijma’ by their own standards and criteria rather than a standardised set of 
conditions, many did not consider that all scholars had to be consulted and more than one 




It is not our purpose at this point to convincingly prove the above perspectives wrong – only 
to briefly note, elaborate and problematise them and show how and why the semantic and 
conceptual approach taken in this thesis is in line with classical Islamic law, Sunni orthodoxy, 
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owing to it having potentially the greatest level of credibility and legitimacy amongst the lay 
masses of Muslims and in turn to affect and benefit that target audience. 
 
V. Why refer to the Dhimma model? 
The present thesis spends considerable time exploring the notion of dhimma as found in 
classical Islamic law to better understand the status and rights to be attributed to non-Muslim 
minorities under Islamic law. This may attract criticism at the outset as the term dhimma for 
the most part has had attached to it highly negative connotations. Those seeking to paint 
Islam as a regressive, oppressive and violent religion have attempted to posit that the dhimma 
model represents an acutely prejudicial and discriminatory system that renders non-Muslims 
under Islamic rule second class citizens.
93
 On the other hand academics in the field have 
argued that the system is outdated and inapplicable to the current system of nation-States and 
the accompanying international organisational infrastructure as well as being discriminatory 
in some respects.
94
 We will leave the issue of whether certain differences in treatment can 
constitute bona fide cases of discrimination to the substantive sections of the thesis to follow. 
However conceptual flaws in the above two perspectives are identifiable at inception with the 
realisation of the following nuances.  
Firstly at its origins, its initial context and its linguistic and theological meanings, the term 
dhimma may have positive connotations attached to it. Literally the term, dhimma has two 
meanings. The first is that of ‘covenant’ or ‘pact’. The second is ‘protection’.
95
 With the 
appendage of ahl meaning ‘people’, the full term ahl al-dhimma can be understood as 
‘covenanted people’ or ‘protected people’. Both are relevant and explain each other in 
discussion of the intended status attributed to non-Muslims. The term covenant denotes an 
agreement or treaty reached amounting to a covenant. However the specific and explicit 
purpose of the covenant or pact was to offer and more so guarantee protection for religious 
minorities. This is supported and substantiated by the second meaning which is in fact 
‘protection’. As such the two meanings can be taken independently or as being interrelated. It 
could be said that dhimma is a covenant for the purpose of or one that results in protection. 
Alternatively it could also be said that it is an offer of protection, which must be formalised 
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through a covenant, with specific terms agreed. Consequently we can deduce that the end 
result is that it refers to a covenant for the purpose of and the guarantee of protection.     
‘Protection’ has been at times negatively connoted as referring to protection of blood (life), 
property of the religious minority and associated rights such as the freedom of religion.
96
 
Hence the impression given has been that in the absence of a covenant and the recognition of 
a religious minority as dhimma, that the Muslims themselves would have the right to kill and 
appropriate from the non-Muslims in the territories controlled by them as opposed to 
protection from other aggressors. However this is a mischaracterisation of the context as 
during the initial period of Islam, the status quo was of a constant state of hostilities between 
competing tribes, factions and groups in the Arabian Peninsula. This default state of conflict 
could only be altered with the entering into of pacts and treaties of alliance as was the case 
against the Muslims during the early Madinan period and treaties of peace entered into by the 
Muslims with the Makkans. It can be said to be the opposite of the present contemporary 
situation where there are international and regional agreements of peace and non-aggression. 
Therefore protection was offered from the default situation of risk from attack and non-
attribution of rights. Furthermore, the above accusation would only become a consideration in 
situations where the prospective dhimma surrendered or were defeated by the Muslims 
having only prior to that been engaged in direct hostilities.  There are also examples of 
Muslims offering dhimma status when there were no direct hostilities against the Muslims, in 
which case the protection is from those who previously governed them or who could threaten 
them in the future.  
Beyond this the term protection is not merely a reference to physical security but extends to 
the identity of the religious minority. In fact the term most commonly used in international 
law in relation to the rights of individuals belonging to minorities is ‘protection’ and in some 
aspirational documents is coupled with ‘promotion’. The term ‘protection’ as employed in 
international law is quite positive, but its use is deemed necessary because the very existence 
of a minority is understood to attract an inherent threat or exposure to risk, carrying with it an 
equally inherent need for ‘protection’. Thus it is completely logical for the Islamic framework 
to develop in the same manner and deliver the same results, that is, to consider religious 
minorities as ‘protected people’. The question may arise as to if such protection was to be 
extended to all religious minorities under Islamic law. The issue of scope of included and 
excluded groups is central to the present research and will be discussed extensively in 
Chapter 2.   
Another compelling argument for dhimma to have a positive connotation is the use of the 
term in the Qur’an itself. The common perception has been that Qur’an 9:29 carries the 
commandment that allows non-Muslims to exist in the territory of the Muslims on the 
condition of the payment of jizya. Such religious minorities are given the status of dhimma, 
although the term does not appear in the verse itself. However the term does appear twice in 
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the same Surah (Tawbah, the ninth chapter), but in relation to Muslims rather than non-
Muslims: 
“How [can there be a treaty] while, if they gain dominance over you, they do not 
observe concerning you any pact of kinship or covenant of protection (dhimma)? 
They satisfy you with their mouths, but their hearts refuse [compliance], and most 
of them are defiantly disobedient […] They do not observe toward a believer any 




A cursory examination of the two verses reveals two crucial points. First that the term as used 
in the Qur’an is generic and secondly that the only time it appears in the Qur’an, it does so in 
relation to Muslims, further establishing its potential positive connotation. Moreover there is 
a strong indication of the elaboration of a general rule of how religious minorities should be 
treated, regardless of which is the majority and which the minority. In this vein, the verse 
conveys the unlikelihood of Muslims being recognised as protected people owing to repeated 
violation of pacts entered into by the polytheists of Makkah and the lack of precedence of 
them accepting the Muslims as a minority group, which could co-exist with precise terms 
defined in a covenant. 
Two additional powerful points in favour of the positive nature of dhimma status worth 
mentioning in brief are some of the ahaadith extolling the value placed on observing the pact 
of protection by the Prophet and the difference of opinion that exists in relation to the 
meaning of Qur’an 9:29. One of the most striking and well known traditions is where the 
Prophet, states: “Whoever killed a person having a treaty with the Muslims, shall not smell 
the smell of Paradise though its smell is perceived from a distance of forty years.”
98
 Another 
tradition regarding Umar states “We said to ‘Umar bin Al−Khattab, O Chief of the believers! 
Advise us.’ He said, ‘I advise you to fulfill Allah's Convention (made with the Dhimmis) as it 
is the convention of your Prophet and the source of the livelihood of your dependents’ (i.e. 
the taxes from the Dhimmis).”
99
  
In relation to Qur’an 9:29, the translation often referred to states “…until they give the jizyah 
willingly while they are humiliated.”
100
 However another translation of the final word has 
been instead ‘humbled’ referring to the fact they have suffered defeat in the conflict. The 
term ‘saghiroon’ at the end of Qur’an 9:29 has been interpreted by some as denoting that 
non-Muslims should be “maltreated and humiliated in the course of receiving the capitation 
tax from them.”
101
 According to al-Suyuti, saghar referred to their submission to the rule of 
                                                          
97
 Qur’an 9:8 and 10. 
98
 Bukhari, 4:391. 
99
 Bukhari, 4:388. 
100
 Friedmann, Y., Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 77. He nonetheless acknowledges “This verse has been subject to numerous attempts 
at interpretation”. 
101
 Muhibbu-Din, M. A., “Ahl Al-Kitab and Religious Minorities in the Islamic State: Historical Context and 
Contemporary Challenges” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 20, No.1 (2000), 120. 
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 Sayyid Qutb similarly understood saghar as “humbleness referred to their 
willingness to pay the jizyah, a practical sign of their submission to the rule of Islam and a 
token of loyalty to the Islamic state. By their submission, Muslims would be free from any 
attack, he opined.”
103
 Ibn Taimiyyah acknowledges the view of Iqrimah as “saying that the 
protected person should give it while standing and the collector receive it sitting; another 
group of commentators said that the dhimmi or protected person should bring the jizyah on 
foot, not riding; and then he should be dragged with harshness to the place of payment, and 
his hand should then be pulled and treated roughly.”
104
 Ibn Taimiyyah concludes:  
“there is no evidence whatsoever for such a meaning. It was never reported or related 
that the Prophet or his companions ever did that, and such a meaning was not the 
injunction contained in the verse; its right meaning is that humbleness is brought about 
by the undertaking to be ruled according to the prescription of Islam and their consent 
to pay the jizyah. Taking that upon themselves is the humility.”
105
  
Furthermore ahl al-dhimma are exempt from zakat
106
 (obligatory charity of 2.5% per annum 
paid to the State). Jizya
107
 is the only financial obligation imposed upon them. The amount 
was not fixed and thus at the discretion of the Imam. It was limited by a means-tested system 
exempting women, children, elderly, poor, disabled, priests and monks. This meant that only 
men who were physically capable of joining military were obliged to pay it.
108
 Ibn Juzayy al-
Kalbi opined similarly that only the Imam has the capacity to enter into contract with the ahl 
al-dhimma
109
 and only the adult male kafir (non-believer) must pay. He must also be one 
‘whose confirmation of his debt is valid, who is not insane or overwhelmed in his intellect, 
nor a monk who is secluded in his dwelling. As for women, slaves and children, they are 
exempt as are the poor and the unemployed. Children are eligible once they reach puberty. 
For the people that it was charged, it was means-based and was high for the prosperous and 
low for the poor.
110
 Maududi says jizya is only for those who have fought against the 
Muslims or are able bodied. He excludes all of the same categories as above. Umar fixed 
different amounts for the rich and the poor.
 111
 A second type of jizya is of a tenth of all trade 
                                                          
102
 A. U. al-Baidawi, Anwar al-Tanzil (Cairo: no publisher, 1902), 111. Read J. Mahalli Suyuti, 
Tafsir al-Jalalain in the margin, notes of Baidawi, 289, cited in Muhibbu-Din, M. A., “Ahl Al-Kitab”, 120. 
103
 Qutb, S., Fi Zilal al-Qur’an, Vol. IV (Beirut: no publisher), p. 167, cited in Muhibbu-Din, M. A., “Ahl Al-Kitab”, 120. 
104




 See Islahi, A. A., “Economic thought of Ibn al-Qayyim (1292–1350)” (1982). 
107
 See e.g. Ziauddin, A., "The Concept of Jizya in Early Islam", Islamic Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1975). 
108
 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ahkam Ahl Al-Dhimma, 356, cited in Ahmad, A., “Extension of Shari'ah in Northern Nigeria”, 
15.  
109
 Maududi, A. A., The Islamic Law and Constitution (Islamic Publications Ltd, 1960), 302. 
110
 Ibn Juzayy al-Kalbi cited in Doi, A. R. I., revised by Clarke, A., Shari’ah Islamic Law (Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd, 
2008), 649; and see Alshech, E., “Islamic Law. Ptactice, and Legal Doctrine: Exempting the Poor from the Jizya 
under the Ayyubids”, Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2003).  
111
 Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, 303. 
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outside the land in which they reside and the third is that by treaty in which case there are no 
prescribed limits.  
Another strong argument against those who posit that the dhimma concept is outdated and 
thus redundant or lacks textual basis and hence is something appended by later generations of 
jurists, is that Islamically there is no other term to refer to non-Muslim religious minorities 
under the governance of Muslims. Notable potential exceptions to this general concept could 
be the Jewish tribes of Madinah and polytheists of Makkah. Neither had jizya imposed on 
them once the Muslims were the governing authorities. Ibn al-Qayyim explains this simply 
by the fact that both situations had pre-dated the revelation of Qur’an 9:29. Read and 
interpreted more broadly, it may be possible to show these relations to be akin to treaties of 
non-aggression rather than complete submission to the authority of the Muslims. 
Furthermore a more convincing argument presented for the non-applicability of the dhimma 
system in relation to religious minorities is to posit that it was a specific system for a specific 
time. The context has transformed dramatically since and a new model is required which is 
relevant and meets the needs of the current context. Factors of differentiation that are pointed 
out include, the emergence of international organisations and international peace treaties, the 
emergence of nation-states, many of which are multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-
religious and that religious minorities do not result from conquest or conflict, but rather often 
precede the existence of the State itself. Notwithstanding these salient points and proponents 
urging the consideration of the rights of religious minorities through the lens of the 
contemporary notion of citizenship, it remains of the utmost importance not to prematurely 
jump to preferable conclusions that appease all sides without thorough examination of the 
sources of Islamic law and the proper methodologies present within Islamic law to meet such 
challenges of shifting contexts.  
Firstly such a perspective clearly accepts by implication that the original view is that the 
dhimma system is inherently Islamic and was the original model of treating non-Muslim 
religious minorities. Once this is established we may then work rigorously through the 
principles of usūl al-fiqh (principles or philosophy of deriving rulings) to assess if any of the 
illal (effective causes) that give rise to the need to consider non-Muslims as dhimmi have 
ceased to exist. If so, a case may be made for its complete or partial inapplicability grounded 
in and emanating from Islamic law itself. On the contrary the reverse may also be true, in 
that, we may deduce that though the context has altered substantially, the effective causes that 
gave rise to the need for the model are still present albeit in a different form and thus the 
dhimma model must be applied partially or in full to the present context.  
A related point of note is also who is qualified to perform such an intricate exercise of 
extrapolating rulings for our present day reality from classical sources, which no doubt carry 
significant religious authority. Clearly classically and practically to have legitimacy, it must 
be a scholar or jurist of suitably high caliber with a grasp and specialisation of deriving 
rulings. Classical Islamic law lays out a number of criteria for who may engage in ijtihad (a 
mujtahid). We can nonetheless begin to look into the potential outcomes of such an exercise 
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for theoretical purposes of assessing the range of possibilities, while concurrently 
ascertaining preference of views by those who may be seen to qualify as mujtahid. 
 
VI. Methodological Considerations 
The principal methodological constraint applicable to the present research has been the 
author’s lack of Arabic proficiency in order to access primary sources of Islamic law and 
classical texts of commentary and jurisprudence that accompany them. Foremost in 
importance to the study have been works of classic commentary and works of ahaadith. As 
such for these and the Qur’an
112
, English translations were referred to. Where classical or 
contemporary treatises did not have English translations, then in the first instance an Arabic 
speaker was relied on to gain access to the most relevant sections of the text. In all other 
cases, English language journal articles and publications were relied on as secondary sources 
of those Arabic texts. 
Therefore significant reliance on a limited number of texts in some parts of the research was 
unavoidable. Crucial texts in Arabic that the author was able to acquire limited indirect 
access to include Ibn al-Qayyim’s Ahkam Ahl al-Dhimma
113
, Zaydan’s Ahkam al-Dhimmiyun 
wa al-Must’aminun fi Dar al-Islam
114
, al-Tariqi’s al-T’aamul ma’a Ghayr Muslimeen.
115
 As 





 were relied on extensively. Finally Friedmann’s 
work
118
, in particular on classification of non-believers with reference to classical Arabic 
texts is unparalleled and aided the research in Chapter 2 greatly. 
  
VII. Structure of Thesis 
The thesis will undertake analysis of two overarching themes relating to religious minorities: 
i) the scope of the concept of religious minorities and ii) the right to freedom of religion. 
Hence the next six chapters will be divided into two sections accordingly and followed by a 
concluding chapter.    
                                                          
112
 The thesis will be utilising The Qur’an, English Meanings, English revised and edited by Saheeh International 
(al-Muntada al-Islami, 2004), unless otherwise stated. 
113
 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ahkam ahl al-dhimma (Ramadi Publishing, 1997). 
114
 Zaydan, A. K., Ahkam al-Dhimmiyin wa al-Must’amin fi Dar al-Islam (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risalah, 1982).  
115
 Al-Tariqi, A., Al-T’aamul ma’a Ghayr Muslimeen (Dar al-Fadeelah, 2007) 
116
 Ibn Ishaaq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah, with introduction and notes 
by A. Guillaume (OUP, 1955). 
117
 Al-Ghazali, M., Fiqh-us-Seerah, Understanding the Life of Prophet Muhammad (International Islamic 
Publishing House, 1999). 
118
 Friedmann, Y., Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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Section I will begin with Chapter 2, examining the issue of scope by reference to the notion 
of ahl al-dhimma under Islamic law. Which types of or specific religious groups may be 
included within the scope of ahl al-dhimma and the bases and consequences of exclusion of 
others. It will be argued that the spectrum of validity under Islamic law offers three possible 
views on the issue of scope. The most restrictive only allowing for the inclusion of the People 
of the Book exclusively, the most expansive allowing for the inclusion of the People of the 
Book and all polytheists and finally a compromise view that allows the People of the Book 
and non-Arab polytheists. In depth discussion will ensue around the basis for the inclusion of 
the Magians within the scope of ahl al-dhimma and how it results in the three aforementioned 
views on scope under Islamic law.  
Chapter 3 will delve into the scope of religious minorities under international law by asking 
similarly whether certain groups may be excluded. The notions of ‘religion’, ‘minority’ and 
‘national minority’ will be taken separately and explored to identify limits of scope. The 
supplementary discussion around collective rights to self-determination (internal and 
external) and autonomy will also be touched on. Chapter 4 will compare the spectrums of 
validity under both systems of law identified in the previous two chapters in order to draw on 
whether they are comparable, compatible or even if one offer greater protection than the 
other. We will also elaborate on whether the Islamic framework, which appears limited to 
only three types of group: People of the Book, Arab polytheists and non-Arab polytheists, is 
comparable to an international system of minority rights, which caters for all religions and 
other beliefs such as atheism.   
Section II will focus on the wider issue of the rights of religious minorities under both 
systems with special attention paid to freedom of religion. This comparison will be to an 
extent asymmetric, in that the depth of discussion on certain topics under each system of law 
will reflect their historical context and development. As such, Chapter 5 will begin with an 
assessment of whether Islamic law grants and guarantees the internal aspect of freedom of 
religion based on various interpretations of Qur’an 2:256: “There is no compulsion in 
religion”. Numerous debates that take issue with whether forced conversion and other forms 
of coercion are permissible under Islamic law owing to a failure to disaggregate verses from 
the context of war and hostilities. Those claims, whether polemic or interpretative, must be 
examined and unpacked so as to understand within their proper contexts, claims of religious 
coercion pitted against the idea of non-compulsion in religion.  
This will be followed by Chapter 6, which will explore generally the rights of religious 
minorities under international human rights law looking in particular religious non-
discrimination, manifestation of religion with regards to preservation of the nature of the 
State and scope of permissible limitations. There will be a focus on the issue of non-
discrimination under international law. This is because it has been a right that has been 
fundamental and a foundation of the international human rights system and one which always 
predicates any discussion on the rights of religious minorities or their freedom of religion. It 
has also been first and most basic rights relied on minorities gain equality under the law. 
Conversely it has also been minorities, who have been disproportionately and systematically 
been made targets of structural discrimination. Section II will be concluded with Chapter 7, 
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which will compare the two previous chapters but also venture further regarding the 
manifestation of religion. The final Chapter 8 will seek to provide a conclusion for the 
research as a whole by mainly drawing on the two comparative chapters. 
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Chapter 2:  
Scope of the Concept of Ahl al-Dhimma 
(Protected Peoples) under Islamic Law 
 
I. Introduction 
Linguistically, the term ahl al-dhimma can literally be translated as ‘people of protection’ or 
‘people of covenant’. While ahl is easily translated as ‘people’, dhimma can also connote “a 
compact, a covenant, a contract, a league, a treaty, an engagement, a bond or an obligation; 
because the breaking thereof necessitates blame.” As to its sacrosanctness it is “a thing that 
should be sacred, or inviolable; or which one is under an obligation to reverence, respect, or 
honour, and defend; everything that is entitled to reverence, respect, honour, or defence, in 
the character or the appertenances of a person.” As for the purpose or aim of dhimma it 
signifies also aman meaning “security, or safety; security of life and property; protection, or 
safeguard; a promise or an assurance, of security, safety, protection, or safeguard.”
119
 
Similarly according to Awang: 
“Al-Dhimma literally means al-aman (peace) and al-ahd (covenant/pact), thus ahl al-
dhimma, in the legal sense, are those non-Muslims, normally Jews, Christians and 
others who have concluded a permanent agreement with a Muslim authority, They 
pledge loyalty to the State, pay jizyah and become subjects of the Islamic state. In 
return, the state, by virtue of the agreement, affords them positive protection and 
security as to their lives (and family), property, and religion. The beneficiaries of the 
dhimma are collectively called dhimmis, and are collectively referred to as ahl al-
dhimma or simply dhimma.”
120
 
Hence the elaborated meaning of the two words taken in conjunction with Awang’s definition 
can said to be referring to a religious minority with whom an agreement or covenant has been 
entered for protection with associated rights, allowing them to remain and reside permanently 
in a territory controlled or ruled by Muslims
121
 in exchange for a special tax called the jizya. 
                                                          
119
 Ungar, F., Arabic-English Lexicon [Repr.]: In 8 Parts (1956), 976. 
120
 Awang, A. R., The Status of the Dhimmi in Islamic Law (International Law Books, 1994), 16 cited in 
McKinney, S. J., “Echoes of the Dhimma: Discriminatory Vestiges of an Ancient Islamic Covenant”, Regent 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 6 (2008), 239. 
121
 Such a political scenario is often referred to as dar al-Islam literally translating as ‘house/abode of Islam’. A 
term coined in the context of Muslim expansionism through military conquests following the death of Prophet 
Muhammad to refer to a region or territory where Islam has ascendance or more specifically where Islamic law 
is applied and Muslims are able to practice their religion. See Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(http://www.britannica.com/topic/Dar-al-Islam) and Oxford Islamic Studies Online 
(http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e491#). Awang uses the term ‘Islamic state’ and 
‘Muslim authority’ above instead. This usage is preferred by this author as the term dar al-Islam may distract 
and confuse in relation to the aim of the research, which is concerned more with Islamic law applied through a 
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They were protected minorities “allowed to follow their own laws and modes of worship, 
provided this would not impinge on the Muslim community. The term dhimma refers to a 
pact drawn up with the people of the book which the believer agrees to respect, the violation 
of which makes him liable to blame (dhamm).
122
 
A critical analysis of the scope and definition of ahl al-dhimma is pivotal in discussing the 
protection of religious minorities in Islamic law for a number of reasons. There are other 
related categorisations such ahl al-aman, which referred to ‘people guaranteed safety’ and 
was specifically used for non-Muslim temporary residents in Dar al-Islam given the 
guarantee of safety for specific time-limited purposes to persons as merchants, refugees, 
envoys and any other form of visitor. Hence another term used for this category of people 
was mustamin which is derived from aman i.e. the person who has been given aman. Another 
term, ahl al-hudna meaning ‘people of armistice’, was used for non-Muslims who were not 
resident in Dar al-Islam but had entered a treaty of non-aggression with the Muslims. What 
these terms have in common with ahl al-dhimma is that they refer to non-Muslim groups at 
peace with the Muslims and fall under the more general category of ahl al-ahd (people with 
whom there is an agreement) in opposition to ahl al-harb (people with whom there are 
hostilities).
123
 Mustamin and ahl al-dhimma are the only two groups over whom the Muslims 
exercise territorial jurisdiction and thus are obliged to provide protection.  
However ahl al-dhimma were the only group that were required to pay the controversial poll 
tax for non-Muslims known as the jizya, whereas it was inapplicable for mustamin and ahl al-
hudna. Thus it was the only general juristic categorisation possible for non-Muslim 
permanent residents under classical Islamic law. Whether this then meant their status was 
tantamount to that of citizens, in the modern or in any sense, is an ongoing and unresolved 
discussion. Qaradawi opines that “[D]himma means…a pledge to provide security for the 
People of the Book. It is the covenant of God, of the Prophet, and of the Muslims…[Like] 
citizenship in the modern state…People of the Book, in contemporary terms, carry an Islamic 
citizenship. This covenant is eternal in nature, affirming the non-Muslims in their religion 
while they abide under Islamic law except in matters pertaining to their faith.”
124
 Therefore it 
is clear that in drawing parallels and comparing with the notion of religious minorities under 
international law it would be the most relevant category non-Muslims that should be looked 
at. Nevertheless as minority rights under international law extend beyond citizens and accrue 
to the rights of religious identity and manifestation while within the jurisdiction of a State,
125
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
modern State-entity rather than issues of jurisdiction and territoriality. The term dar al-Islam was meant to 
reflect the realities of international relations rather than a theological categorisation sourced from primary 
textual sources. Its consideration would also then necessitate a survey of parallel categorisations such as dar 
al-kufr, aman, hudna, bidah, harb, etc. 
122
 Takim, L., “Peace and War in the Qur’an and Juridical Literature: A Comparative Perspective”, Journal of 
Sociology & Social Welfare, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2011), 143. 
123
 See Ibn al-Qayyim’s  Ahkam ahl al-dhimmah, Vol. 2, p. 873. See also Mawardi, al-Hawi al-Kabir, Vol. 9, p. 
306 and Ibn Qayyim, Ahkam ahl al-dhimma, p. 475-476, cited in Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion, 55. 
124
 Qaradawi, Y, Al-Hall al-Islami: Faridatun wa Darura (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1977), cited in McKinney 
“Echoes of the Dhimma”, 267. 
125
 HRC GC 23, para. 5.1. 
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the category of mustamin will also have to be looked at as a corollary of the discussion 
around religious minority rights under Islamic law. Ahl al-hudna is of less relevance to the 
topic at hand but may provide a useful lens to analyse the status and relationship of certain 
Jewish tribes with the fledgling Madinan State. 
Secondly there is a breadth of difference amongst Islamic jurists regarding which religious 
groups were entitled for dhimma status based on the textual sources and developing practice 
of Islamic law over time that accompanied the expansion of territories under Muslim rule. 
Consequently there should be clarity on the bases relied on for such distinctions allowing us 
to explore their application to the present context. It is necessary to address this issue from 
the beginning, particularly in relation to the potential exclusion of certain groups from the ahl 
al-dhimma, such as the mushrikeen (polytheists) and consequently their status being 
tantamount to that of unrecognised religious minorities, to avoid rendering the entire 
discussion of exploring rights and protections for religious minorities under Islamic law 
redundant.  
Conversely, it would be counterproductive to overlook such classical Islamic juristic opinions 
on the subject due to their continued relevance to the discussion of the protection of 
minorities in most modern Muslim-majority states today and more topically to Islamically 
motivated non-State actors, most notably ISIS.
126
 While the debates may be perceived as 
highly theological, it serves as an important foundation for the legal understanding of the 
issues and will be discussed in greater depth below. Muslims generally believe that such 
juristic opinions were derived by the classical jurists from sound bases. In-depth exploration 
also reveals that juristic consensus existed on some issues while on others there was a 
plurality of valid opinions, hence providing a spectrum of validity.
127
 Furthermore, clarifying 
the scope of application of these juristic opinions and appreciation of the contexts from which 
they emerged adds much needed clarity to understanding the rationale behind the rulings. The 
final result is that we conclude at one end of the spectrum of validity lies the opinion that all 
non-Muslims have the right to exist under Islamic rule, while at the other that polytheists are 
to be excluded. In between these two, according to another strain of juristic reasoning, 
exclusion and non-recognition was specific to only Arab polytheists. We will also discuss 
briefly opinions other than these that were considered weak, fringe or aberrant.  
It is noteworthy that the crux and the main point of divergence for the above views is the 
classical classification of the Majus (Magians or present day Zoroastrians). Their eligibility 
                                                          
126
 ISIS required Christians to pay jizya in Raqqa, Syria (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wc8Ks0AiduQ) as 
compared to Jaysh al Fath who “announced that Christians will not be asked to pay Jizya (a tax that is paid by 
non Muslims just as Muslims pay Zakat), as Mujahideen leadership realizes that it is not suitable that the Jizya 
is paid to them while they cannot guarantee the security as of yet of their Christian residents”, 3 Things we 
Learned from the Liberation of Idlib, Syria  (http://www.bilalabdulkareem.com/idlibrev/).  
127
 This is an original term coined by this author. The closest comparator may be found in Emon’s use of the 
notion of an Islamic ‘rule of law’, which rather than focusing on specific rulings attempts to derive the 
principles behind them and also to acknowledge a plurality of possible interpretations and rulings under 
Islamic law to any given issue: See Emon, Religious Pluralism and Islamic law Dhimmis and Others in the Empire 
of Law (Oxford Islamic Legal Studies, 2012), 16. 
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as ahl al-dhimma is undisputed owing to ijma’
128
, yet their inclusion in the category of the 
People of the Book is only advocated by a minority of jurists, most notably al-Shafi’i and his 
subsequent school of Islamic law.
129
 If they are classified as People of the Book,
130
 then the 
opinion to limit dhimma status to only Jews, Christians and Magians is strengthened, whereas 
if they are classified as polytheists, it opens the door for rulings to be reached by way of qiyas 
(analogy) to include other types of polytheists, such as present day Hindus or Buddhists. The 
latter is the stronger opinion of the two due to a number of reasons elaborated below. 
However the exclusion and non-recognition of Arab polytheists is less easy to contend with, 
and while there are opinions against it, in favour of recognition of all religious groups as ahl 
al-dhimma, there are numerous reasons why a number of jurists came to the view that Arab 
polytheists were to be excluded from dhimma status. As a result, substantial time will be 
spent to decipher and understand the difference of opinion on either side of the fence on the 
important question of classifying Magians. 
Notwithstanding this wide spectrum of validity, a constructive approach would be to 
tentatively suggest that at the very least, the right of all non-Muslim groups to exist as 
dhimma or religious minorities is one of the available valid opinions. Further still, 
examination of the rationale behind why some jurists found it difficult to accord dhimma 
status to the Arab polytheists or polytheists more generally as well as its practical 
significance should prove instructive. Finally in examining the rights of minorities, 
specifically religious minorities under international law, in a later chapter should show that 
the issues of scope and definition are not at all clear either under international law. Similar 
questions arise as to recognised minorities or religions before any rights can be ascribed in 
international human rights law. 
 
II. Are ahl al-dhimma limited to only People of the Book (ahl al-kitab)?  
On the issue of the scope of dhimma status or which religious groups can be included or 
excluded, there is consensus amongst classical jurists that the People of the Book are to be 
availed dhimma status.
131
 This is based on Qur’an 9:29, which states:  
“Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider 
unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the 
religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture – until they give the jizyah 
willingly while they are humbled.” 
                                                          
128
 Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion, 55.  
129
 Ibid. at p. 74. 
130
 People of the Book or ahl al-kitab refers to those religious groups who had received messengers mentioned 
in the Qur’an. In practice, it clearly includes the Jews and Christians as followers of Moses and Jesus and 
adherents of the Torah and Bible respectively. In theory, it can include any group that may have been sent a 
heavenly book through a messenger mentioned in the Qur’an. Discussion around other groups possibly being 
included have centred around Magians (Qur’an 34:15) and the Sabians (Qur’an 2:62, 5:69, 22:17). 
131
 Freidmann, Tolerance and Coercion, 55. 
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This famous verse has been at the centre of controversy generally and debates within Islamic 
scholarship as well as a cause of consternation amongst dhimmis themselves
132
 around the 
issue of religious minorities or the treatment of non-Muslims. Among the debated issues are 
the command to ‘fight’ the People of the Book, the taking of jizya and the correct 





 However for the immediate purposes of this section, that is, 
scope of inclusion, the crucial issue is the object of this command. The verse clearly and 
explicitly refers to “those who were given the Scripture”. Here the word ‘kitab’ has been 
translated as ‘Scripture’
135
, but is interchangeable and has the same meaning as ‘Book’
136
. 
Nonetheless the reference is undoubtedly to the People of the Book. Furthermore while it is 
understood that the term practically refers to Jews and Christians, Qur’an 9:30-31 confirms 
this by referring to Jews and Christians specifically.   
Beyond this common agreement, there are a range of valid opinions on whether religious 
groups other than the People of the Book can be given the dhimma contract or exist as 
recognised religious minorities under Islamic rule. These differences emanate from two 
possible interpretations of the verse owing to the treatment of Magians as dhimma by the 
Prophet.
137
 This meant that while there was consensus that Jews, Christians and Magians 
were to be eligible for protection as dhimma,
138
 the basis for the inclusion of the Magians was 
not ostensible. The majority opinion holds that they were not People of the Book while the 
minority opinion, most notably of al-Shafi’i and his subsequent school of thought, that they 
must be People of the Book chiefly due to the explicit and exhaustive nature of Qur’an 9:29. 
This interpretation held that the reference to the People of the Book meant that the taking of 
jizya and the offer of protection was exclusively for the People of the Book and no other 
groups. This line of reasoning then meant that the Magians had to be categorised as People of 
the Book to explain the Prophet’s attribution of dhimma status to them. This was the view of 
al-Shafi’i and Ibn Juzay al-Kalbi, who noted that Ibn al-Majishun said there is no dhimma 
contract except for the People of the Book.
139
  
An alternate interpretation sought to reconcile the inclusion of the Magians, by interpreting 
the mention of People of the Book as an example of a group to whom protection may be 
offered, as opposed to an exclusive category or an exhaustive list. Thus the Magians, while 
not being monotheistic nor having a heavenly text revealed to them, were offered protection 
and recognised as a religious minority.  This was the view of the three other major schools of 
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 , Hanafi and Malaki.
141
 They did not consider the Magians as People 
of the Book but included them as recognised religious minorities. This is quite a crucial 
distinction because if the Magians are included within the scope of ahl al-dhimma without 
being recognised as People of the Book, then it raises the possibility of extending dhimma 
status beyond the People of the Book. However if they are included as People of the Book, 
then it would preclude the inclusion of any religious group that could not show itself to be a 
People of the Book. As to which groups may be considered ahl al-dhimma beyond these three 
groups, it is critical to the whole discussion if the Magians, in addition to being excluded 
from being People of the Book, are then classified as polytheistic and/or Arab. A related 
question then arises, in case the Magians are included as People of the Book, as to whether 
other religious groups may also fall into the category of People of the Book beyond just Jews 
and Christians.  
As to the other end of the spectrum of religious groups that may be excluded from dhimma 
status, implicitly deduced from the above explicit inclusions, the opinions also logically vary. 
A number of classical scholars derived from the inclusion of the People of the Book that this 
then excluded polytheists from being recognised as religious minorities. This was only the 
view of those, such as al-Shafi’i, who considered that the Magians were to be included in ahl 
al-dhimma as People of the Book. Those who considered the Magians as non-People of the 
Book naturally categorised them as polytheists due to the centrality of worshiping fire in their 
religious belief as opposed to the idolatry of the polytheists of Makkah. They also took note 
that the Majus were different from the polytheistic Quraish of Makkah in that they were 
Persian in their ethno-linguistic identity as opposed to Arab. From this, two views emerged; 
one specifying their polytheistic belief and ethno-linguistic identity as the basis for inclusion, 
and a second relying on the Majus’ polytheistic belief only, that is their religious identity as a 
basis for inclusion for eligibility as ahl al-dhimma. The first line of reasoning led to opening 
of the ahl al-dhimma eligibility to any polytheist group as long as they were not Arab. This 
was the most prominent view amongst classical scholars held by the Hanafis, Malikis
142
 and 
attributed to Ibn Hanbal
143
, while the Shafi’is and some Hanbalis were against it. The second 
line resulted in opening eligibility to all polytheistic religions or to rephrase it, not having it 
limited to just the People of the Book and the Magians. Thus the potential of extending the 
status of dhimma to all non-Muslims regardless of being Arab or polytheistic became a 
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possibility. This was the view of al-Awza’i, Ibn Taymiyyah,
144
 his student Ibn al-Qayyim and 
one of the views attributed to Malik.
145
 
At this stage it is useful to highlight the depth of the discussion and the breadth of views 
around it, in particular related to definitions of certain terms. These include the meaning of 
‘Arab’, whether it referred to ethnicity, language, geography or a combination of two or 
three. Another nuance to raise at this stage is that there is a separate but connected discussion 
on the ruling that there should be no non-Muslims permanently resident in the Arabian 
Peninsula imparted by the Prophet not long before he died. In a hadith narrated by Umar al-
Kattab, the Prophet said: “I will expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula 
and will not leave any but Muslim”.
146
 According to another, the Prophet said: “Two deens 
shall not co-exist in the Arabian Peninsula.”
147
 What has been discussed in this regard are the 
exact bounds of the specified territory. These issues will be explored in greater depth below. 
 
III. Can only the Children of Israel be considered as People of the Book?  
We should begin by noting that the term mushrik (polytheist) and kaafir (disbeliever) are 
used interchangeably in the Qur’an. Thus linguistically they can refer to the same 
phenomenon. In relation to Islamic belief, shirk literally means ‘association’ of partners with 
God, the anti-thesis to Islam’s core message of pure monotheism, while kufr literally means 
to cover or hide something
148
 and refers to denial
149
, rejection and disbelief in the Islamic 
message of pure monotheism. As such, the ahl al-kitab or People of the Book, by 
disbelieving in Islam, can be said to be both.
150
 However given that the People of the Book 
are one sub-group of ‘polytheists’ who have some elements of monotheism in their religions, 
the term mushrikeen, especially when used with ahl al-kitab, is exclusive of them and may 
even be specific to idolaters. Idolatry in many ways epitomised shirk or polytheism due to the 
presence of multiple gods made of inanimate statues with a complete absence of any 
monotheistic elements. As per the broad meaning of mushrik, not for the purposes of 
categorising People of the Book, the implication clearly is that while the People of the Book 
are to be distinguished as a separate category with aspects of their belief commendable and in 
close proximity to Islam, they nonetheless have polytheistic elements in their belief systems. 
Accordingly some jurists raised questions as to the monotheistic credentials of certain groups 
of Christians and Jews who claimed to be People of the Book.
151
 This could quite evidently 
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be drawn from the concept of the Trinity in Christianity and the attribution of Uzair as the 
son of God in Judaism.
152
 
From one perspective, all non-Muslims may be viewed as polytheistic, with the People of the 
Book as a special categorisation amongst polytheists entitled to dhimmi status. Two possible 
justifications arise here: i) People of the Book and other polytheistic beliefs should be 
distinguished based on their origins. The People of the Book according to Islam were clearly 
purely monotheistic in their original messages; or ii) to be considered as People of the Book, 
they should be on the religion of their forefathers who had received the divine message from 
their respective prophets (Moses or Jesus). Subsequently, those who had inherited or adopted 
these religions, but in a form different from its original and thus corrupted with polytheistic 
elements, should not be considered People of the Book. 
Those who held the second opinion continued with their reasoning that the time of conversion 
of these groups would then inadvertently have a bearing on recognising genuine Banu Israil 
(Children of Israel). Banu Israil were the original people to whom both Moses and Jesus were 
sent. Hence if a group was deemed ethnically Banu Israil, it would be more likely that they 
were still adhering to the original unaltered message safe from change (tabdil) or distortion 
(tahrim). On this basis some scholars ruled that the categorisation of People of the Book 
could only be accorded to the descendents of Banu Israil and not to other ethnic groups who 
later converted to Judaism and Christianity.
153
 
While it is possible to appreciate the reasoning employed to arrive at such a conclusion, there 
are a number of inconsistencies in the argument. The most glaring of these is that whenever 
the alteration is said to have taken place, it was clearly before the Messengership of 
Muhammad.  As such, the Jews and Christians of his time were not on pure monotheism in 
line with their origins, as per Islam. The Qur’an refers to these Jews and Christians as People 
of the Book. In fact one of the purposes of Muhammad’s Prophetic mission was to purify
154
 
the polytheistic and altered monotheistic messages of Christianity and Judaism. Furthermore 
the Qur’an states in Qur’an 98:1-2: “Those who disbelieved among the People of the 
Scripture and the polytheists were not to be parted [from misbelief] until there came to them 
clear evidence - A Messenger from Allah, reciting purified scriptures”. As such the 
presumption is the impossibility of having truly monotheistic groups of Jews and Christians 
after the revelation of the Qur’an.  
Hence it is also notable that it was never claimed or possible to identify Jews and Christians 
existing at the time of Muhammad, who ascribed to the original messages of their respective 
prophets. This would mean despite the Jews and Christians of the time being descendents of 
Banu Israil, they could not have been categorised as People of the Book. Interestingly the 
Qur'an does not just use the term Banu Israil
155
 to describe Jews but also yahud
156
 and 
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. Linguistically the former indicates hereditary lineage and ethnicity while the latter 
two religious belief and identity. It has also been suggested that Banu Israil has been used in 
to refer to the historical original people to whom not just the Jewish message was conveyed 
but also the same people to whom the Christian message was delivered. As has already been 
highlighted, both Moses and Jesus were sent to the Banu Israil. Therefore in highlighting the 
religious identity by shifting to the use of yahud is indicative of the religious belief rather 
than an ethnic identity but more so also refers to the Jews at the time of the Prophet. Another 
irregularity with the opinion is that it precludes the possibility of the original Jewish and 
Christian beliefs being passed to other ethnicities. Similarly just the lineage in itself is not 
enough to insure that their religion has not undergone changes to corrupt it. Furthermore it 
was established that many of the Jewish and Christian groups in the Arabian Peninsula were 
of Arab ethnicity. 
For these reasons, it was the opinion of a great majority of jurists that the time of conversion 
of one’s ancestors and their ethnicity (affiliation to Banu Israil) should not be a factor in 
reaching a determination of whether or not certain Jews and Christians could be treated as 
People of the Book and thus ahl-al-dhimma.
158
 It is based on the fact that the Prophet treated 
the following groups as People of the Book: Jews of Yemen, Tayma and Wadi al-Qura as 
well as Christians of Najran and Dumat al-Jandal. These tribes were wholly or partially of 
Arab lineage and further the Prophet did not pay any consideration to the time of conversion 
or their ethnicity.
159
 Ibn al-Qayyim stated that the law here is rooted in religion and not 
genealogy
160
, while his teacher Ibn Taymiyyah put it rather more starkly in that to bring 
genealogical considerations in the realm of religion would be contrary to the principles of 
Islam and a regression into jahiliyyah
161
 (the era of ignorance and darkness prior to the 
coming of Islam – a reference to the morally corrupt state of the Arabs in the immediate 
period preceding the Message of Islam).  
 
IV. Does ahl al-kitab only refer to the original Jews and Christians prior to the 
alteration of their beliefs? 
Scholars such as al-Shafi’i were concerned primarily with establishing if the people referred 
to in the Qur’an as being given the Book were in fact the Jews and Christians of his time. 
While he and others sought to make this distinction by observing when their ancestors had 
converted and whether they were descendents of Banu Israil, others sought to examine the 
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substance of their belief.
162
 As such there is some confusion in the literature covering this 
issue about whether polytheistic elements had entered the religions of the People of the Book. 
If so, then which categorisation they should be given. This is important as it has a bearing on 
whether they can be eligible to dhimmi status or not.  
Some have suggested that there is a discussion to be had around whether Christians and Jews 
are People of the Book or mushrikeen (polytheists), while maintaining there is no difference 
of opinion about whether they, even with their altered beliefs, can be considered ahl al-
dhimma. The confusion around this matter apparently derives from a misunderstanding of 
linguistic and theological nuances relating to whether the term mushrikeen is inclusive or 
exclusive of the People of the Book. In fact the question itself is based on an unsound 
presumption that there is a conflict between the two categorisations. The answer simply is 
that the Jews and Christians are both polytheistic and People of the Book. Ibn Kathir, 
possibly the most renowned commentator of the Qur’an, explained the non-existence of an 
apparent conflict quite succinctly. In his commentary of Qur’an 5:5, which states the 
permissibility of marrying women from the People of the Book, he refers to Abdullah Ibn 
Umar’s advice against marrying Christian women saying: “I do not know of a worse case of 




He goes on to cite Ibn Abbas’s view that Muslims did not marry non-Muslim women until 
the revelation of Qur’an 5:5. Following this, they married women from the People of the 
Book including some of the companions. Thus he concludes that Qur’an 5:5 provides the 
specific exception to the general prohibition in Qur’an 2:221. The latter’s reference to 
mushrikeen, by implication including the People of the Book. Ibn Kathir states: “there is no 
contradiction here, since the People of the Book were mentioned alone when mentioning the 
rest of the idolaters in Surah Bayyinah.”
164
 Al-Tabari supports this view in his commentary of 
Qur’an 2:221, where he includes idolators, Jews, Christians, Magians within the meaning of 
mushrikeen and any other type. He further also sees Qur’an 5:5 as providing an exception for 
a certain kind of polytheistic group(s), that is, the People of the Book.
165
 Corroboration of the 
view can be found with Qatada, Umar bin Abd al-Aziz, al-Shafi’i and Mawardi.
166
 
Qur’an 9:29, which is the basis for the unequivocal inclusion of the People of the Book in ahl 
al-dhimma, is followed in Qur’an 9:30 by specific reference to Jews and Christians’ belief in 
Uzair (Ezra) and Jesus being sons of God. This establishes two facts. The first, that Jews and 
Christians are conclusively People of the Book as ostensibly 9:30 is an elaboration of the 
“those who were given the Book” in Qur’an 9:29. The second, that they are believers in 
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elements of shirk. Their polytheistic beliefs are further reinforced in Qur’an 9:31: “They have 
taken their rabbis and monks as their lords besides Allah, and [also] the Messiah, the son of 
Mary. And they were not commanded except to worship one God; there is no deity except 
Him. Exalted is He above whatever they associate with him.”
167
 While Qur’an 9:30 is self-
explanatory in how the ascription of an offspring to God and an attribution of Godliness to 
the ‘son’ is a negation of monotheism, it may still be asked as to how the Christians and Jews 
took ‘their scholars and rabbis as their lords besides Allah’. This is explained by Ibn Kathir in 
his commentary via the story of Adi bin Hatim who had converted to Christianity in the pre-
Islamic period. When the Prophet met him with a view to invite him to Islam, he recited 
“they have taken their rabbis and monks as their lords besides Allah”. Adi’s response was 
that they were not worshipped by his fellow Christians. To this the Prophet responded: “Yes 
they did. They (rabbis and monks) prohibited the allowed for them (Christians and Jews) and 
allowed the prohibited, and they obeyed them. This is how they worshipped them.”
168
 
Furthermore Umar in his treaty with the Christians of Al-Sham, stipulated that they refrain 
from inviting anyone to or publicising practices of shirk.
169
 
In conclusion to this discussion, it can be observed that there is overwhelming consensus or 
ijma’ that classical scholars understood the term mushrikeen as a general category to include 
the Christians and Jews, principally due to polytheistic elements that had altered their original 
belief systems, most notably attribution of a son to God or even more specifically in 
Christianity to conflate a messenger of God, Jesus, with God Himself. At the same time 
Christians and Jews are understood to be referred to in the Qur’an as “those who were given 
the Book” through their prophets, Moses and Jesus, at their respective times, the true 
monotheistic message from God. Thus the Christians and Jews can be legitimately referred to 
as mushrikeen, while at the same time as People of the Book. This is despite the alteration or 
polytheistic elements that have entered their belief systems. As such the differentiation 
between the People of the Book and the other mushrikeen is the presence of some 
monotheistic elements within their religions or that their religions are based on or are in their 
origin monotheistic or at their inception were in their entirety from God. This then implies 
that the belief of the People of the Book is an intermingling of both polytheistic and 
monotheistic elements. Ibn Taymiyyah’s opinion then is the most precise and conveys the 
complexity of idea succinctly. He rules the Shi’ah are wrong to prohibit marriage to Christian 
and Jewish women as the basis of Christianity and Judaism is sound, but polytheism has been 
introduced thereafter. Hence their polytheism is not absolute or definitive (shirk mutlaq). 
Instead it is partial or limited (shirk muqayyad).
170
 
The depiction of this issue as an inconsistency within Islamic law, with at times Christians 
and Jews referred to as mushrikeen and at others as People of the Book, is rather misleading. 
This is due to the conflation of the differing meanings of mushrik when used independently 
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and when used in conjunction with kufaar or People of the Book. Furthermore for there to be 
any confusion on whether the Jews and Christians could be mushrikeen, in the same sense as 
the idolaters, is clearly not reflected in the coinciding opinions of the vast majority of 
classical jurists with the exception of Abdullah ibn Umar, who considered the women of the 
People of the Book as idolatresses and therefore not permissible for marriage.  
 
V. Are the Magians People of the Book or polytheists?  
The issue of whether Zoroastrians or Magians can be considered eligible for dhimma status 
and by implication its rationale is crucial to the present discussion of the scope of ahl al-
dhimma and also the People of the Book. As a result it is central to this entire thesis as it 
ultimately determines the basis of qiyas (analogy) upon which we must depend to derive 
rulings for various groups of non-Muslims not referred to specifically in the sources of 
Islamic law on this subject. As discussed above, classically there is ijma’ that the Magians 
can be given dhimma status.
171
 However classical views diverge as to whether this was 
because they were to be included as People of the Book or instead as outright polytheists or 
to borrow from Ibn Taymiyyah, ascribers to shirk mutlaq (absolute polytheism) to be 
included within those eligible for dhimma status. If so, then was their meat permissible and 
could their women be married as per the exemption in Qur’an 5:5? The opinion that they 
were not People of the Book, but nevertheless were entitled to dhimma status seems to be the 
considerably stronger opinion, with al-Shafi’i being its principal opponent asserting that they 
were to be given dhimma status by virtue of being People of the Book. The Magians are 
referred to in the Qur’an only once as Majus at Qur’an 22:17: “...those who have believed 
and those who were Jews and the Sabeans and the Christians and the Magians and those who 
associated with Allah...”, where they are mentioned as a distinct group from the polytheists. 
This could lend support to them being considered as People of the Book as they are 
mentioned with Jews and Christians as well as Sabeans. The Prophet and thus nascent Islam’s 
exposure to them was minimal explaining the scarcity of ahadith concerning them. The legal 
problem of their classification and treatment became an increasingly prominent issue due to 
expanding boundaries of the Islamic empire, initially in relation to Oman and Bahrain and 
later especially when it encompassed Persia.
172
 The predominantly Persian ethnicity of the 
Magians will also be analysed in terms of its role in their categorisation. 
The pertinent tradition in this regard is that of Umar, who did not take jizya from the Magians 
until Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf testified that the Prophet had taken jizya from the Magians of 
Hajar and commanded the Muslims to treat them the same as they would treat the People of 
the Book.
173
 This is further corroborated by a letter by the Prophet to Mundhir ibn Sawa, who 
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had authority over Hajar, offering them the retention of their religion and payment of jizya.
174
 
Friedmann points out the apparently conflicting tradition of Ibn Abbass that following a 
meeting of a Magian leader with the Prophet, the former informed Ibn Abbas that he had 
been given a choice between conversion or to be killed by the Prophet.
175
 However Ibn Abbas 
himself retracted his report in light of the conflict with Ibn Awf’s tradition as his own had 
originated from the Magian leader as opposed to a companion of the Prophet.
176
 Therefore on 
the primary issue of whether Magians can be given dhimma status, there seems to be no 
discernible opposition and there is as we already mentioned ijma’ on the matter according to 
Ibn Qayyim. Furthermore Umar’s own hesitancy could possibly have been due to Ibn 
Abbas’s report and according to some versions of the tradition above he expresses: “I do not 
know how to treat these people who are neither Arabs nor People of the Book.”
177
 This 
appended statement has significance, if considered as authentic, as it equates Arabs with Arab 
idolaters and is indicative that Umar did not consider them as People of the Book. This could 
weaken the position that they were People of the Book. Although we do not know whether 
after the testimony he considered them as ahl al-dhimma due to being People of the Book or 
not Arab polytheists.  
On the secondary issue of whether the Magians can be considered as People of the Book, the 
views are more diverse. However the prevalent view appears to be that they were not. The 
main reasons advanced are that Umar hesitated before making his determination. The Prophet 
according to Ibn Awf said to treat them like or as the People of the Book as opposed to 
explicitly saying they were People of the Book.
178
 Furthermore it is the ijma’ amongst 
classical scholars that even as dhimma, their women cannot be married nor the meat 
slaughtered by them consumed
179
 indicating the inapplicability of Qur’an 5:5 to them, which 
permits these from People of the Book.
180
 Only jizya may be taken from them and they may 
retain their religion. 
This could be said to be based on the content of their beliefs themselves as Ibn Hanbal called 
it foul and Ibn Abbas attributed its origins to Satan.
181
 Such views were based on their 
practice of idolatry, worshipping fire and marrying their mothers and daughters. As already 
discussed above the presence of some elements of polytheism in their religion would not per 
se exclude them from being considered as People of the Book as the Christians and Jews can 
be accused of the same. However the Christians and Jews are not considered to be idolaters 
like the Magians. Additionally no particular book is mentioned in the Qur’an or any 
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Prophetic tradition to have been given to the Magians. Furthermore Qur’an 6:156 refers to 
only two groups as People of the Book: “Lest you should say: ‘The Book was sent down to 
only two sects before us’”, who are axiomatically understood to be Jews and the 
Christians.
182
 Nonetheless while this verse strengthens the view that the Magians were not 
People of the Book, at the same time it is not conclusive as God anticipates an excuse from 
the non-Muslims and so could be offering their perception of who were given the Book as 
opposed to a statement of fact. Furthermore there is strong basis to argue that the Sabians 
may have been from the People of the Book.
183
 
Hence if Magians are not considered People of the Book but are eligible for dhimma status, 
the subsequent question that arises is as to the rationale for inclusion. Friedmann alludes on 
the basis of a version of a tradition attributed to Hasan al-Basri that they were only allowed to 
practice their shirk for the sake of jizya.
184
 Another version of the same tradition mentions no 
particular reason why the Magians were allowed to keep their fire-temples, practice idolatry 
and indulge in incest, but only states the fact that it was the decision of al-Khadrami on 
assuming authority over Bahrain.
185
 However this is based on one of the versions of a 
reported statement from one companion. If we solely follow the tradition of Ibn Awf as to the 
statement of the Prophet, we would only be able to deduce that the Magians are not People of 
the Book but can be considered ahl al-dhimma. It may also be that if we observe the 
statement of Umar in another version of the tradition, we would conclude their inclusion in 
ahl al-dhimma was owed to being non-Arab. Umar was reported to have said “I do not know 
how to treat these people who are neither Arabs nor People of the Book”. It could also be said 
to be evident due to the resentment of the munafiqeen (hypocrites) in Tafsir Muqatil at the 
inclusion of the Magians and exclusion of their ‘kith and kin’.
186
 Furthermore the Prophet is 
reported to have said to his uncle Abu Talib, while he was ill, that if the Quraish would 
accept Islam, then God would give them charge over the non-Arabs and the receipt of jizya 
from them.
187
 This confusion or uncertainty alone could have meant that the Magians were 
afforded more leniency than the Arab polytheists due to the doubts over their status.  
The alternate view that Magians were eligible for dhimma status owing to being People of the 
Book was most notably held by al-Shafi’i. His underlying basis was that Qur’an 9:29 limited 
the taking of jizya to “those who were given the Book”. As such relying on the principle that 
the Sunnah (prophetic traditions) cannot abrogate the Qur’an according to al-Shafi’i usūl al-
fiqh, he dismissed the apparent evidences against his position. Following from this, al-Shafi’i 
deduced that the Magians must have had a revealed book in order to reconcile his 
interpretation of Qur’an 9:29 and the extension of dhimma status to the Magians. According 
to one tradition, Ali also held the view that they at one point had a revealed Book. However 
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the reliability of this tradition attributed to Ali has been questioned and Ibn al-Qayyim noted 
that it was weak.
188
 Even if it was taken as authentic, the Magians have lost any knowledge of 
that Book.
189
 Friedmann also draws attention to al-Shafi’i’s apparently contradictory 
positions in some places, categorising the Magians as People of the Book and in others with 
those who had a semblance of a Book.
190
 However even if these differing views were 
expressed at different times by al-Shafi’i, they do not necessary imply a contradiction. For 
example he could have understood any semblance of a Book as enough to qualify a group as 
People of the Book. It would seem that even those about whom there is no doubt about being 
People of the Book, have lost some elements and retained others. As a result Christians and 
Jews can also be said to only have a semblance of their Book.  
Another explanation could be that the mere possibility to at the least having a semblance of a 
Book introduced enough doubts about their potential credentials as People of the Book that 
they could not be conclusively classified as absolute polytheists. Furthermore it should be 
noted that al-Shafi’i’s determination was not based on an apparent baseless presumption of a 
Book, but rather principally on the logical deduction emanating from his interpretation of 
Qur’an 9:29. Abu Thawr and Ibn Hazm seem to have held the same view.
191
 Therefore if we 
applied the test developed above, drawing on Ibn Taymiyyah’s understanding, if it could be 
shown that the Magians were monotheistic in the essence, origins or basis of their belief, we 
could consider them as People of the Book. However the only substantiation for such a view 
is an interpretation of Qur’an 9:29, which holds that dhimma status is strictly restricted to the 
People of the Book.  
 
VI. Can polytheists be considered as ahl al-dhimma?  
The inclusion of the polytheists other than the People of the Book amongst those eligible for 
dhimma status is a divisive issue and crucial to this study. At one end of the spectrum, 
polytheistic groups are not recognised under classical Islamic law as religious minorities or as 
ahl al-dhimma. Subsequently this must be reconciled with the fundamental Islamic principle 
that “there is no compulsion in faith”
192
 and the equivalent in international law of freedom of 
religion, particularly the internal freedom to hold a belief. At the other end of the spectrum, 
all polytheists are entitled to dhimma status and freedom of religion with the payment of 
jizya. In between these two opinions is one which makes a distinction between polytheists 
who are Arab and those who are not – it not being clear whether ‘Arab’ should be understood 
to refer to ethnicity, language or geography. The core of this issue and its resultant range of 
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opinions revolve around the understanding of one crucial factor: that the Prophet mainly 
came into contact with Arab polytheists, specifically idolaters, and that these were ethno-
linguistically Arab. They were also for most of his life engaged in perpetual armed hostilities 
against the Muslims. Furthermore the use of the term Arab polytheist only referred to the 
Arabs present in the Arabian Peninsula.  
It is also important to state from the onset that all the opinions to be presented around this 
issue are theologically valid and based on interpretation of the authentic sources in Islamic 
law. However given that the Prophet’s actions only related to this specific group and 
following his death Islam spread and thus the territory under its control expanded 
exponentially, the treatment of polytheists in other nations depended on the qiyas (analogy) 
extracted from the original treatment of the Arab polytheists of the Arabian Peninsula. Were 
those other polytheistic groups analogous to Arab polytheists or were they to be distinguished 
as being analogous to some other religious group from the lifetime of the Prophet such as the 
Magians? The variety of opinions here hence is due to what different jurists and rulers 
considered to be the illah or ilal (effective cause or causes) for the rulings of the Prophet. 
Was the harsh approach taken towards the polytheists of Makkah and the Arabian Peninsula 
down to them being Arab, existing within the territory of the Arabian Peninsula, speaking the 
Arabic language, being close to the Prophet in affinity, their idol worship – an antithesis to 
Islam - or their inherent enmity to the Prophet? 
Let us begin with the most controversial opinion, which would be uncomfortable for 
international lawyers and something omitted by Muslim apologist writers: the blanket non-
inclusion of all polytheists from dhimma status. As such they would have no right to be 
domiciled in Muslim lands, to practice their religion or to seek protection of the law for their 
personal security. As already stated, this is a valid opinion held by a number of prominent 
classical jurists over time. It was held by the majority of the al-Shafi’i
193
 and Hanbali 
schools
194
, as well as by Ibn Hazm.
195
  
Before we proceed to explain this view, it is useful to reflect on the necessity of including it 
in the present study. If such a view is omitted or raised superficially but then dismissed, it 
would not be conducive to addressing the issue genuinely and frankly. Its omission invites 
those who seek to rely on it for their actions and policies to inadvertently promote it as the 
only correct or even the strongest view. Inevitably others may be accused of being apologists, 
thus gaining greater legitimacy and credibility amongst the Muslim mass laity. To not give it 
its proper value and to dismiss it in an unconvincing manner invites similar accusations of 
being dishonest and biased. The correct approach has to be to acknowledge the existence of 
the view and engage with it to determine its proper status, even if one does not agree with the 
opinion themselves. Other valid opinions must also be cited and then one can seek to analyse 
and understand the reasoning and context behind the various positions. As such, to be 
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systematic, impartial and methodological is the only way that one earns the right to then, as a 
conclusion, suggest why one of the numerous valid views should be given prominence given 
the prevalent and specific context under question.  
Jurists who argued for taking jizya from only non-Arab polytheists thought that Arabs should 
have no option but to accept Islam in order to live under Islamic rule.
196
 The rationale offered 
for the distinction is that the Qur’an is considered to be a literary miracle in itself. In light of 
the fact that it was revealed in Arabic, and as such its miraculous nature would be more 
evident to Arabs than any other group of people. Hence their rejection of Islam, despite 
probably appreciating its divinity was down to arrogance rather than ignorance. Given that 
the Arab polytheists of Makkah were the kith and kin of the Prophet, there was a greater 
expectation and obligation to accept the message akin to an extended family or tribe. At the 
same time it was thought that they would be more inclined for these two reasons (language 
and ethnicity) to accept Islam, so harshness would help them move closer to convert.
197
 
This was the view of Abu Hanifa, his student Abu Yusuf, Qatada bin Di’ama
198
 and one of 
the views attributed to Malik ibn Anas as well as to Ibn Hanbal. It can also be considered as 
the view of the Hanafi school of law
199
 as a whole. Malik was said to be willing to accept 
jizya from various faithless Turks and Indians.
200
 Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani said jizya 
cannot be taken from Arab polytheists because God knew that they would accept Islam.
201
 
Al-Jassas and Abd al-Razzaq al-San’ani, narrate a hadith, where the Prophet made peace with 
and took jizya from polytheists excluding those who were Arab.
202
 It is not known who the 
non-Arab polytheists under question are. One possibility is that it refers to Magians, who 
were common at the time of Prophet. However, given that they were often referred to 
specifically as Magians, it may be possible that this refers to some other non-Arab 
polytheistic religious group. While this remains a possibility, it should also be kept in mind 
that the Prophet was not reported to have encountered non-Arab polytheists other than the 
Magians. This is further plausible as the term mushrik is even used at times to refer to a 
general category all inclusive of non-Muslims that include Christians and Jews. Such a use of 
the word would also of course include the Magians. In any case this tradition was used to 
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Malik’s reading of the hadith of the Prophet commanding the Muslims to treat the Magians 
like the People of the Book was to make qiyas with all other religious groups ruling that all 
communities have the status of the Magians. According to a hadith, Malik considered it 
permissible to take jizya from various kinds of polytheists and deniers, Arabs and non-Arabs, 
Taghlibis and Quraishis
204
 It is not clear however if the qiyas is with non-Arab polytheists 
generally or all polytheists. Nonetheless the examples given are all of non-Arabs, but this 
does not preclude the possibility that he was referring to all polytheists. Certainly the wording 
suggests this interpretation. He included Fazazina of Libya, the Slavs, the Abrar, the Turks 
and other non-Arabs who were not People of the Book. In a conflicting hadith, Malik
205
  
The final view to consider is that all polytheists including Arab may be included in the 
dhimma category. The reasoning advanced rests on a number of factors, the most compelling 
we have already discussed: the inclusion of Magians in the category of dhimma and 
subsequently the determination that the situation of the Arab polytheists is analogous to them.   
Additionally the hadith of Burayda
206
 is central to this discussion, which contains guidance 
from the Prophet on what options a Muslim commander should offer on the battlefield to his 
enemies “from amongst the polytheists…”. These include conversion to Islam or payment of 
jizya. The hadith per se does not conclusively support the inclusion of Arab polytheists, 
mainly because, as already discussed, the terms mushrikeen and kuffaar are used 
interchangeably in the Qur’an. While mushrikeen can be understood specifically to refer to 
polytheists, it is also used generally to refer to the wider category of non-Muslims, which 
include the People of the Book. As such, the hadith could be referring to Jews, Christians or 
even Magians. This view is supported by the assertion that the hadith of Buraydah 
specifically relates to the battle of Mu’ta. According to Waqidi’s description of the battle, the 
enemy was predominantly constituted of Byzantine Christians along with Bedouins whose 
religious affiliation was not known.
207
 Mention is also made of Christian Arabs. While 
Christians can be described as both People of the Book or mushrikeen, the former carries a 
positive connotation and the latter negative. As such, given that the Christians at Mu’ta had 
assumed the role of the enemy, it is understandable why they would be referred to more 
readily as mushrikeen in such a context. This is supported by Waqidi’s description of the 
battle who often describes the enemy as mushrikeen.  
The alternate view relies on the apparent wording of the hadith, which indicates general 
Prophetic advice and does not specify the ‘enemy’ as such. The implication is that it may 
only be directed at Arab polytheists on the basis, as Ibn al-Qayyim points out, that most 
battles were in fact against Arab polytheists or more specifically at first against the Quraish 
of Makkah.
208
 Even if we take mushrikeen here to refer to the wider category of all 
disbelievers and thus inclusive of Christians and Jews, then still on the basis that this is 
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general advice, it would include all polytheists, which would mean all non-Muslims and in 
turn Arab polytheists. Furthermore taking the hadith of Buraydah as specifically relating to 
the battle of Mu’ta, in itself does not negate the possibility that it was issued prior to that 
battle, but still served as a general instruction for subsequent battles. According to Waqidi’s 
account, another aspect to consider is that even the enemy at Mu’ta was not homogenous in 
religion, ethnicity or geographical origin, and it remains likely that the Bedouins were Arab 
polytheists. In summation, such a reconciliation between Waqidi’s description, the generality 
of the wording of the hadith and the prevailing context of perpetual conflict with Arab 
polytheists cannot all be negated without proving conclusively that the hadith of Buraydah 
was specifically and only intended for the battle of Mu’ta as well as showing the Bedouins 
mentioned in Waqidi’s description were not Arab polytheists. 
Ibn al-Qayyim reconciles his view regarding the eligibility of Arab polytheists for dhimma 
status with Qur’an 9:29 adducing that the Qur’an orders the jizya to be taken from the People 
of the Book, but that the Sunnah expanded that group to all other non-Muslims.
209
 Another 
important factor is whether we see the applicability of jizya specifically to the People of the 
Book as a closed or open list. This may seem immediately inconsequential but it has some 
bearing on whether what is being suggested here is an abrogation or elaboration of the Qur’an 
through the Sunnah of the Prophet, especially when one considers that al-Shafi’i reads Qur’an 
9:29 as a closed list and thus rejects the possibility of the Sunnah as an abrogation.  Ibn al-
Qayyim continues with his reasoning to connect his understanding of the hadith of Buraydah 
with his observation about the Magians, in that there was no difference between them and the 
Arab polytheists in the nature or category of belief.
210
 Still for Ibn al-Qayyim’s assertion to 
stand true, the Prophet’s inclusion of the Magians should be on the basis of the polytheistic 
identity rather than that specifically relating to non-Arab polytheistic identity. Ibn al-
Qayyim’s view of the inclusion of all non-Muslims including Arab polytheists is supported 
by al-Awza’i and one of the views attributed to Malik, where he is reported to have said: 
“jizya is to be taken from all kinds of polytheists and deniers, Arabs and non-Arabs, Taghlibis 
or Qurashis, whoever they may be”.
211
 
To conclude the discussion on the inclusion of polytheists within the category ahl al-dhimma, 
it is pertinent to raise two additional points, which should give a more nuanced view to 
reconcile the wide range of views present on this issue.  
The first; Ibn al-Qayyim notes that by the time Qur’an 9:29 was revealed in 9 A.H., there 
were no polytheists left on the Arabian Peninsula.
212
 As such there was no need for their 
mention in the Qur’an and nor was any discussion around the inclusion of Arab polytheists of 
any consequence as none existed in the Arabian Peninsula. Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani held a 
similar view that the Arab polytheists were not included due to Allah knowing that all 
polytheists in the Peninsula would accept Islam, implying that according to him, this is 
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 Ibn al-Jahm also cited as one of the reasons for the Quraish to be 
the only group excluded as they had all accepted Islam following the conquest of Makkah.
214
  
There may be a counter argument relating to the presence of polytheists in Arab nations in 
what is today considered the Middle East and North African region. Two points arise in 
response. The first and crucial, as already raised, is that references in the sources to ‘Arab’ 
are restricted to those residing in the Arabian Peninsula.  Also it is problematic to define 
Arabs ethnically and in fact what constitutes the core of the Arab identity in the modern 
world is language and if we were to observe ethnicity as having a strong link with physical 
appearance, then the breadth of possibilities between the members of the Arab League
215
 are 
extremely diverse. This point in itself is conclusive and definitive. However if we are to say it 
was not, then the second point relates to the precise definition of mushrikeen, the meaning of 
which might be clear but whether such groups existed in that region is far from certain. 
Therefore if we accept that the group that is being denied the right to dhimma status, the 
polytheists of the Arabian Peninsula ceased to exist after 9 A.H., then the discussions and 
conclusions arrived by, in particular the Hanafis and some Malikis become, to an extent, 
theoretical. The more practical discussion as a result, especially given the context of modern 
day societies, becomes that relating to non-Arab polytheists and whether they should be 
excluded or included amongst those eligible for dhimma status – the Hanbalis and Shafi’is 
being against it, while some Malikis and the opinions of Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn 
al-Qayyim arguing in favour, breaking from the prominent view amongst their fellow 
Hanbalis. 
The second; how to reconcile the view of only excluding Arab polytheists from dhimma 
status and that of excluding all polytheists with a core underlying principle of Islam 





 rely on this principle to argue that no non-Muslim should be forced to embrace 
Islam through their non-eligibility to pay jizya. The principle is key and fundamental to the 
Islamic creed as belief inherently emanates from and resides in the heart. So while having 
belief in Islam is not enough without the corresponding outward manifestation of that belief; 
at the same time, outward actions are rendered futile as a result of and become nullified if the 
internal element in one’s heart is absent. Such a person is a munafiq, (hypocrite in the 
religious sense), who while seemingly Muslim to his fellow Muslims, inwardly lacks an iota 
of belief.  
Within this framework, it is clearly not a productive or feasible exercise to coerce others to 
what one believes to be the ultimate truth – not for the imposee nor for the imposer. Such a 
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spiritual transformation must happen naturally, genuinely and at one’s own volition. Hence 
the idea that the exclusion of some groups from the right to recognition under Islamic law, 
whether Arab or non-Arab polytheists, is difficult to justify especially if the position of the 
Shari’ah is expressed in terms of compulsion and coercion. For example, Qatada ibn Di’ama 
stated “The Arabs had no (legitimate) religion and were, therefore, forced into embracing 
Islam by the sword”.
218
 Others understood it as acceptance of Islam being more incumbent 
and a greater obligation on Arab polytheists than on the non-Arab ones due to closer affinity 
to the Prophet. Ibn al-Jahm held the view that the Quraish should only be excluded, but also 
for the same reason of affinity, due to which their humiliation should be avoided.
219
 To frame 
the acceptance of Islam in strong terms, which could be explicitly or implicitly perceived as 
compulsion, would appear to be difficult to reconcile with Qur’an 2:256.  
However a possible explanation is feasible. The motivation behind the exclusion of any 
particular religious group from a territory under Islamic rule can never be to compel them to 
accept Islam, but rather to protect the Muslims from any threat from them. Such a risk to the 
personal safety and security of the subjects under Muslim rule would of course always trump 
the risk posed from those excluded. For such groups, they could only remain in the territory 
through either accepting Islam or entering into a peace accord agreeing to cease any 
hostilities and draw terms for mutual respect. As such the most plausible illah (effective 
cause) for not including polytheists of any or specific type could potentially hinge on the 
security threat they posed to the Muslims. If that threat desisted, they became eligible to exist 
in Muslim lands with associated rights. Ibn Taymiyyah attributes a view to Abu Hanifa at 
seeming odds with views in other sources
220
, which states the acceptability of taking jizya 
from Arab polytheists on condition that they do not fight the Muslims.
221
 
To continue this line of reasoning, it may be possible to hypothesise that the illah (or 
effective cause) for including some groups and excluding others, is based on if they are 
enemies engaged in active hostilities against Muslims. It may be as simple as the fact that at 
the time of the Prophet, those holding greatest enmity and in perpetual conflict with the 
Prophet and the Muslims were the Arab polytheists. So apart from the theological 
dimensions, in terms of political context, it was this particular group that was constantly 
pitted against the Muslims. The difference of views could then just reflect the range in 
opinions based on how the enemy was construed. It could be that being engaged in hostilities 
is required for some to exclude them from eligibility as dhimma and for others if too great a 
threat was posed by those within Muslim lands, who had the closest affinity to those that 
were being fought. As such the decisive issue could be that they are enemies engaged in 
hostilities or belong to a group with whom the Muslims are engaged in armed conflict.  
In summation, the purpose of exclusion cannot be to compel anyone to accept Islam but 
rather possibly to defend Islam and Muslims from those determined to attack them. Where no 
                                                          
218
 Tabari, Jami al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 16.  
219
 Qurtubi, al-Jami’ li-Ahkam al-Qur’an, Vol. 8, pp. 45-46. 
220
 Baji, Muntaqa, Vol. 2, 172, cited in Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion, 76. 
221
 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu’ fatawa, Vol. 20, p. 101. Friedmann, 80 
PhD: Protection of Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and International Law   Murtaza Shaikh  
  
Page 58 of 222 
 
such threat exists then the bar on eligibility to dhimma status ceases to be a necessity. It was 
incidental that if they accepted Islam, they would cease to be enemies. The fact remains that 
“there is no compulsion in religion” is an absolute statement. This view could be 
corroborated by the fact that international humanitarian law in Islam makes no distinction on 





This chapter provided an overview of the discussion around scope of ahl al-dhimma, by 
which some groups are included and others excluded. The aim of the chapter was to show the 
diversity, richness and plurality of opinions that populate the spectrum of validity on the issue 
of scope under Islamic law. Another underlying purpose was to lay the foundations for one of 
the most critiqued aspects of Islamic law relating to religious minorities to be relied on to 
frame the discussion of minority rights in a manner comparable to international law. The 
chapter illustrated the preponderance of three views on the topic. The first that held only the 
People of the Book to be eligible for dhimma status, the second the People of the Book and 
non-Arab polytheists and the third the People of the Book and all polytheists. We concluded 
that the first view was a minority view as the evidence for the Magians to be considered as 
People of the Book was scant. We unpacked the two remaining opinions to show that their 
practical effect would be the same in the present context. With regards to their reasoning, the 
view that Arab polytheists should be excluded was specific to the geographical and 
demographic context of the time. Clearly the view that made the most juristic sense and 
offered greatest practical applicability to the present context was the view that the People of 
the Book and all polytheists should be included within the scope of dhimma.  
Two further views, which are weak opinions not be considered, were nonetheless discussed 
in brief to further broaden the variety of views offered on the issue. They were that the People 
of the Book may be limited to only the original Jews and Christian and that only the Children 
of Israel could be considered as People of the Book. In other words one view sought to limit 
the scope of the People of the Book temporally, while the other ethnically. We also touched 
upon the potential bases, implications and consequences of being excluded from dhimma 
status. In particular that the availability of two options for a group; to be fought or accept 
Islam, implied neither an attempt to forcibly convert nor the inflicting of harm owing to 
religious difference. It instead indicated the perpetual hostility with a group, namely the Arab 
polytheists of the time, which resulted in the mutual impossibility of coexistence. The 
reference to their religion was the principal element and means to identify them as a group.   
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Chapter 3: 
Scope of the Concept of ‘Religious 
Minorities’ under International Law 
 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we engaged with the spectrum of validity within Islamic law in 
relation to the scope of dhimma.  The research will now move on to engage with the 
corresponding concept of scope of ‘religious minority’ under international human rights law, 
so as to provide a basis for the comparison of the concept of scope under both systems of law 
in the following chapter, where areas of overlap, conflict and divergence will be assessed. It 
is hoped that the findings resulting from this analysis will form the foundation of asserting 
that the areas of overlap are greater than normally perceived or characterised by providing an 
objective point of comparison in the guise of international law on the protection of religious 
minorities. By subjecting international law to exhaustive analysis and critique, we may have a 
better idea as to its full breadth of virtues and flaws.    
With regards to the possible interpretations as to the scope of dhimma, we found that some 
classical jurists exclude all groups from its scope except Christians, Jews and Magians; others 
allowed for Christians, Jews and any non-Arab polytheists; and a final group extended it to 
all including non-Arab polytheists. This variance in interpretation being dependent on how 
one perceived the inclusion of Magians within the scope of dhimma; as People of the Book, 
Arab or polytheists. Nonetheless these three prominent views provide a comparator with 
international law of included and excluded groups within the scope of dhimma or recognised 
religious minorities. Does international law provide an unequivocal and unified answer on 
bases for inclusion? Is a spectrum of validity under international law also discernible and if 
so what is the broadest interpretation and how does it juxtapose with the narrowest? What is 
the extent of State compliance and does the spectrum of interpretation and State practice 
differ greatly from that of Islamic law?  
Before engaging with these definitional questions, which inevitably impact on scope, we will 
first seek to establish the scope of the term ‘religion’ itself, under international law, which 
appears in two main contexts; that relating to discrimination and that of freedom of religion. 
We will then look in detail at the highly contested definition of ‘minority’ and subsequently 
hone our analysis on the specific weaknesses in the protection of and problems faced by 
‘religious minorities’ owing to the applicable scope under international law. Special attention 
will also be paid to the age-old intractable problem of acknowledgement of the very existence 
of minorities and their subsequent recognition. It is particularly noteworthy that the 
observable aversion amongst states, ostensibly owing to the advanced rights attached to 
minorities and specifically those to religious minorities, has been principally through these 
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two means of non-acknowledgement of existence and non-recognition. This at times has an 
objective basis derived from international law and at others from the context of specific 
States and their discretion. Of particular relevance are the emerging problems in State 
compliance on ‘new’ and ‘old’ minorities which can be and are used as a conduit for 
excluding religious minorities from recognition and protection.  
 
II. Scope and Definition of ‘Religion or Belief’ 
Religious groups may fall foul of the scope of ‘religious minority’ rights in a number of 
ways. If at inception what they subjectively identify as their religion is deemed not to be a 
sufficient religious belief and falls under some other category of belief or ideology. There is 
no legally agreed definition as to what precisely constitutes a ‘religion’, nor is a case being 
made that there should be one.
223
 The question nonetheless is pertinent in light of 
understanding whether it can act as a means of excluding some groups through some 
objective basis from accessing the rights to religious freedom.  
Most importantly, international law decides the scope of ‘religion’ differently depending on 
which body of rights is at stake. Similarly States take less interest in narrowing the scope 
when discrimination is being discussed. As such the scope and recognition of that identity is 
highly deferential to self-identification. States take far more interest in narrowing the scope, 
when addressing rights related to religious freedom and minority rights as they both concern 
the attribution of specific, special and culturally unique rights. Broadly speaking, the former 
deals with equality in the sense of a “difference in the treatment of persons in analogous, or 
relevantly similar, situations”
224
 and the latter when “without an objective and reasonable 
justification, fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different".
225
 
The scope is narrowest in relation to minority rights as additionally group rights are made 
available to the religious minority, not just in relation to cultural and religious life but also 
potentially territorial, political, judicial and educational. In some cases this clearly entails an 
allocation of State funds. The attribution of specific rights related to freedom of religion, the 
group dimension to which States are averse and the framing of fiscal commitments as a right, 
all combine to make the scope of minority rights in relation to religious groups the narrowest 
and the realisation of associated rights an arduous practical challenge to overcome.  
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 Wilson. B. C., “From the Lexical to the Polythetic: A Brief History of the Definition of Religion”, in What is 
Religion?, 141–42 (Thomas A. Indinopulos & Brian C. Wilson eds., 1998): “dozens, if not hundreds of proposals 
have been made, each claiming to solve the definitional problem in a new and unique way. Needless to say, no 
one definition of religion has garnered a consensus, and the definitional enterprise, as well as the debate over 
the very need for definitions, continues in full vigor.”, cited in Gunn, “The Complexity of Religion and the 
Definition of ‘Religion’ in International Law”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 16 (2003), 191. 
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 Burden v. the UK [GC], no. 13378/05 (2008), para. 60; and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. UK, 
no. 7552/09 (2014), para. 27. 
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v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00 (2007), para. 175; Runkee and White v. UK, nos. 42949/98 and 
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In this regard the earliest and most established reference to ‘religion’ in international 
instruments was in the context of a head of potential discrimination. This was the case in the 
UN Charter
226







The first instance where ‘religion’ was referred to in reference to religious freedom was in 
Article 18 of the UDHR:  
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.” 
Article 18 of ICCPR elaborates further:  
“1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” 
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 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 
24, 1945, Article 1.3: “To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.  See also similarly 
worded Articles 13.1, 55(c) and 76(c). 
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 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), Article 7: “All are 
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled 
to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to 
such discrimination.” 
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 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, Art 26: “All persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, 
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.” See also Article 2. 
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 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, Article 2.2: “The States 
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant 
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” See also Article 10.3. 
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However the discussion about what constitutes a religion is not straightforward. The main 
reason that it does not present a huge problem in the application of law, is that the religions 
commonly under discussion are well-known, established and often adhered to by millions, if 
not billions. To deny the validity of such systems of belief as religions would be untenable, in 
particular if our own sense of what religion is emanates from the major religions of the world 
such as Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism as opposed to these belief 
systems fitting into a preconceived definition of what a religion should be. Nonetheless it is 
useful to briefly explore this issue to understand all limits and parameters of international 
law, which may or may not be immediately apparent. Due to the lack of contention and the 
practicality that the same religions are under discussion, there is little elaboration or 
discussion as to the definition of religion.  
The first step is to infer from the wording of the above provisions themselves and what may 
be derived as principal facets of a ‘religion’.
230
 With regards to the non-discrimination heads 
of which ‘religion’ is one, not much can be deduced as no particular content or substance is 
referred to. Instead it is referred to as a head of ‘identity’ emanating from a belief or way of 
life.
231
 This is because when dealing with discrimination and identity, two elements are key, 
both being subjective. The first is the self-identification of the victim as belonging to a certain 
religious group and second the perception of the discriminator that the victim belongs to a 
certain group (other-perception as opposed to self-identification). 
However when we come to the provisions relating to freedom of religion in common Article 
18 of UDHR and ICCPR, we observe that they identify the following common facets of 
‘religion’. Firstly the rights to freedoms of ‘thought, conscience and religion’ are mentioned 
alongside each other. In subsequent references to the right, the phrase is replaced with 
‘religion and belief’ implying that the term belief encompasses ‘thought and conscience’. It 
also indicates that religion may be private or public and individual or in community with 
others. Furthermore the language shifts from the UDHR of allowing for the ‘change’ of 
religion to that of ‘adopting’ a religion in the ICCPR. It is also not stated explicitly in either 
of the provisions whether ‘atheism’ is included or not. However given that ‘belief’ is 
distinguished from ‘religion’ and is a very broad term, it could presumably encompass non-
religious beliefs, of which atheism would be the most prominent. 
Similarly it may be deemed useful to see how the Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Declaration on 
Religious Discrimination) frames the scope of freedom of religion. It conceptualises ‘religion 
or belief’ to be “one of the fundamental elements in his conception of life”.
232
 It also states 
that the context which gave rise to the dire need for the right to be protected is the “disregard 
and infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular of the right to 
                                                          
230
 This is in line with the ‘polythetic’ approach to defining concepts as opposed to the ‘essentialist’, in Gunn, 
“The Complexity of Religion”, 194. 
231
 Gunn as per the ‘polythetic’ approach identifies three particularly important facets of religion in lieu of a 
definition of ‘religion as “religion as belief, religion as identity, religion as way of life”, Ibid. at p. 200.  
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freedom of thought, conscience, religion or whatever belief, have brought, directly or 
indirectly, wars and great suffering to mankind, especially where they serve as a means of 
foreign interference in the internal affairs of other States and amount to kindling hatred 
between peoples and nations”.
233
 Like the UDHR and ICCPR, the Declaration makes no 
explicit mention of atheism, except for it to be implicitly included within the ambit of 
‘belief’.  
While the right to freedom of religion was widely a matter of general consensus amongst 
States, its content, precise elaboration and scope were and remain highly contested. This is 
reflected not only in the fact that a Declaration is only that; an expression of international law 
with no legally binding force or enforcement mechanisms, but that even after its agreement, 
reservations were entered by numerous States. The former U.S.S.R., Romania, 
Czechoslovakia and Syria objected to the lack of attention paid to atheism. Romania, Syria, 
Czechoslovakia, and the U.S.S.R. also made a general reservation regarding incompatibility 
with national legislation. Iraq on behalf of the then 56 member-State Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) raised the issue of applicability of those provisions which may be contrary 
to Shari’ah or Islamic law.
234
 This was, in part, due to the fear by some Muslim-majority 
states that it would extend the right to those who wished to change religion away from Islam.  
Despite the OIC-bloc’s reservation as well as the shift in language in the UDHR of changing 
religion to adopting religion in the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee nonetheless 
affirmed that Article 18 includes the right to change and adopt a religion or belief. Its General 
Comment 22 also illuminates what the reference to ‘thought or conscience’ and ‘belief’ could 
be. In the absence of the elaboration one might be left with the idea that the terms would be 
too general and subjective and could potentially include almost any idea.         
The UN Human Rights Committee in its commentary on ICCPR Art. 18 states:  
“Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to 
profess any religion or belief. The terms ‘belief’ and ‘religion’ are to be broadly 
construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to 
religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of 
traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to 
discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they 
are newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of 
hostility on the part of a predominant religious community.”
235
 
In terms of the applicable law then the result could be one of two, either the criteria is wholly 
subjective, that is to say at the complete discretion and self-identification of the concerned 
individual, or there is an objective criteria inferable but not yet fixed or crystallised into a 
formally agreed legal definition. The deployment of the word ‘religion’ as opposed to 
‘ideology’ or ‘identity’ must carry an objective element closely associated with its commonly 
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understood linguistic meaning. Similarly the fact that it is mentioned as a sub-species of 
thought and conscience also denotes its overlap as well as its distinction from the former two. 
The indication nonetheless appears to be in Article 18 and the HRC GC 22 that ‘belief’ is 
interchangeable with ‘thought and conscience’ and that religion represents an example of 
‘belief’, thus implying belief is a wider category. At the same time, it would seem that the 
broader non-religious terms are in turn limited by ‘religion’ in that they are in some way 
related to ‘religion’. The mention of the terms ‘theistic’ (religious belief), ‘non-theistic’ (non-
religious belief), ‘atheistic’ (belief against religion) and ‘not to profess any religion or belief’ 
(no belief) in the General Comment confirm this.  Furthermore the rights related to 
manifestation are closely related to religious beliefs and a number are exclusively religious 
such as ‘worship’, ‘observance’ and ‘practice.’ 
The context too plays a role in our understanding. In relation to the UDHR, the overarching 
background was the aftermath of the Second World War and the Holocaust was still fresh in 
the psyche of the victors and defeated as well as the drafters. The persecution and 
extermination of more than six million Jews, in part due to their religious identity must have 
informed the drafting process. This was certainly the case with the inclusion of religion as 
one of the protected indicators of identity in the Genocide Convention. Art. 2 begins “In the 
present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”.
236
 At the 
time, the Western World and in particular Western Europe held a pronounced Christian 
identity, while in the remainder of the East and South, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Sikhism were the major religions. As such, few did or would now object to the classification 
of any of the above as religions. Thus we could deduce that a ‘religion’ as per its commonly 
occurring examples refers to a belief in one or more deities or gods. with a number of Godly 
attributes, chief amongst them, the creation, design and ordering of the universe, who convey 
to humanity a message to be followed and rules/laws to be obeyed and hence to be 
worshipped. 
However applying Gunn’s approach, such a definition would be highly essentialist and would 
inevitably exclude a number of other beliefs, religious or non-religious, ignore the idea of 
how a victim is perceived by the perpetrator, and be highly partial in some instances to the 
personal subjective beliefs of those adjudicating these matters whether at the UN Human 
Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights or consideration of refugee 
applications owing to religious persecution. A more inclusive approach adopting the 
polythetic approach would seek to identify the relevant facets of religion and these are readily 
observable in Art. 18 and the Declaration on Religious Discrimination, such as worship, 
community of adherents and leaders, places of worship and assembly, days of celebration, 
identity, way of life and freedom from discrimination. The polythetic approach would only 
require that the presence of even one of these facets could qualify a belief system as a 
religion. Such an understanding is in greater harmony with the view of the Human Rights 
Committee, which forewarns against limiting Article 18 “in its application to traditional 
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Jan. 12, 1951. 
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religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to 
those of traditional religions [...] including the fact that they are newly established.” 
As already stated, presence of a commonly understood meaning of religion which has not 
really been the subject of contention has resulted in no formally sanctioned definition of 
religion. As is often the case, a term understood by its common usage meaning is no 
guarantee or strong indication for its eventual legal meaning, though it may provide a start 
and have some link to the linguistic equivalent – at times loosely and at others strongly. 







Regardless, what remains constant is that a legal term is given meaning by legal definition 
either entrenched in text or case-law, and may be related to a narrower specific meaning or 
completely removed from its parallel linguistic meaning. Commonly understood terms 
lacking legal definition are subject to challenge and modification through the same two 
means. For example the understanding of ‘ethnicity’ has undergone considerable evolution 
over time, from a trait inherent and objectively discernible to something quite subjective and 
related to cultural identity.
240
 Hence why the meaning of ‘race’ now includes ‘ethnicity’ and 
in other instances even potentially ‘religious identity’.
241
 
The European Court of Human Rights has had to deal with the notion under Article 9 of the 
ECHR:  
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
In various cases brought to the Court, ideologies not conventionally conceived of as religions 
were tested such as environmentalism, magic and spirituality. In this regard, the Court has 
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 In English contract law, it refers to what is given exchange for the receipt of goods or services without which 
a contract may be void. 
238
 Under international law, discrimination may only refer to a differentiation of treatment which objectively 
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239
 Under international law, there is yet to be an agreed definition. However it denotes more the non-
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affirmed that the scope or ambit of Article 9 is not completely subjective and there are 
objective criteria applicable. It has stated that Article 9 does not protect every act motivated 
or inspired by a religion or belief
242
, elaborating further that the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, 
cohesion and importance
243
 with practices such as assisted suicide falling outside its scope.
244
 
At the same time the Court has sought to balance this objective test and stressed that, in a 
pluralist democratic society, the State's duty of impartiality and neutrality towards various 
religions, faiths and beliefs is incompatible with any assessment by the State of the 
legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed.
245
 Hence: 
 “Finally, in this connection, the Court recalls that, but for very exceptional cases, the 
right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion 
on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to 
express such beliefs are legitimate.
246
 The State therefore has a duty to remain neutral 
and impartial in exercising its regulatory power in the sphere of religious freedom and 
in its relations with different religions, denominations and beliefs.”
247
 
This is evidence of Courts having to implement this common sense or commonly understood 
definition and as such giving it some form of legal certainty, which may be emulated or even 
evolve in future case-law. With the shifting and ever changing societal attitudes and beliefs in 
the context of rapid technological advances and globalisation, these presumed bounds are 
being challenged and stretched. Nonetheless, the tendency remains that of recognising as 
legitimate religions that are established and have large bodies of followers despite the much 
broader view of the Human Rights Committee on ICCPR Art. 18 and specifically the scope 
of ‘religion’. The tense boundaries of what constitutes religion was evident in the array of 
unconventional religious beliefs submitted to the UK Census in 2001 and 2011, with a 
substantial number of people self-identifying their religious belief/identity as Jedi Knights.
248
 
While this may have been in humour, the case of the Church of Scientology has presented 
some testing predicaments in recognising such a new and unconventional belief system as a 
religion. In particular, there are indications as to the dubious nature of the movement as a 
church or religion as it may have been initially motivated by an attempt to avert the payment 
of large tax arrears in the US. Other States too, including the UK, have tax breaks for some 
religious purposes.  
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Another perceived exception or difficulty to this principle may arise when discussing the case 
of atheists, who have increasingly been explicitly protected from being forced to accept a 
religion or persecuted due to having no religion. The right of an atheist not to have a religion 
is included in the freedom of religion only so far as refraining from compelling him/her is 
concerned. However this does not automatically lead us to conclude that atheism is a religion. 
It has no belief in deities or invokes any acts of worship or rituals specifically associated with 
the belief. Rather it is an antithesis to religion and is in many ways an ‘anti-theism’ as 
opposed to merely apathy or indifference towards religion as ‘atheism’ would imply. A 
person with such a belief would likely cringe at the thought of being identified as a religionist 
when their primary aim is to show the concept of religion itself to be a fallacy, incoherent and 
beyond rationality or logic. Hence while such people’s freedom to non-belief in religion is 
protected under Art. 18, they themselves often stand against the attribution of a freedom or a 
special status specifically for religious belief and practice. It may be countered, albeit not 
religious, theirs is nevertheless a ‘belief’ and if they are not covered under the notion of 
‘freedom of religion’ they would be covered under the notion of “freedom of belief”. 
However this would overlook that the principal premise of Art. 18 was to protect religious 
belief and practice and the insertion of ‘belief’ was a subsidiary corollary of the right meant 
specifically to cover non-religious beliefs and prevent persecution by religious States of non-
religious beliefs and practices, arguably most notably atheism. It is also feasible that there 
would be an outcry from religious groups, were a right to be too general by focusing on belief 
and omit the specific reference to religion completely.   
Atheists are not oblivious to this double edged sword either. However as legal and political 
subjects in liberal Western democracies, members of the atheist movement feel they have 
nothing to fear from the non-existence of Art. 18 as their beliefs and expression would be 
equally protected under Art. 19 with no added value from Art. 18. It is likely their approach 
would be different if they were subjects in a theocratic State, where a weak atheist minority 
would find Art. 18 invaluable in protecting their right not believe or adhere to any religion.  
Furthermore due to its reactionary nature, there is not much in terms of manifestation of 
religion that can be claimed, such as acts of worship, observance, rituals or a way of life. 
Comments made by outspoken atheist, Richard Dawkins, on the decision of a police 
commissioner in Northamptonshire (UK) to appoint a Faith Director are quite telling of the 
sentiment:  
“No doubt he'll also be liaising with leaders of the 'community' of stamp collectors, the 
'community' of bird twitchers, and the 'community' of chub fuddlers (a fishing 
term)...Sarcasm aside, what is so special about religious 'communities' that they need, 
or deserve, a special liaison officer, any more than the rest of us?”
249
 
Apart from the general sentiment, it could argued that Dawkins is perhaps misconstruing and 
conflating faith with religion, when they can be rather distinct despite obvious overlap. Faith 
is tantamount to strong conviction and can be employed for anything not necessarily being 
limited to a belief in God or other metaphysical phenomenon. Faith can be in people, ideas, 
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emotions, oneself or the future, to name a few. In that sense, ‘faith’ is closer in meaning to 
‘belief’ than religion, implying that should atheists have understood and interpreted the 
appointment of ‘faith director’ as distinct from a ‘religious director’ and as including 
relations and issues concerning atheists within his professional remit, they would have had a 
compelling case to do so. Further introspection would also be useful for ascertaining reasons 
for creating such a post. The underlying basis for having relations with religious or faith 
communities must be related to crime; its prevention, punishment and dealing with its 
victims. In that context, the necessity for reaching out to certain religious communities may 
arise such as certain religious adherent being targeted with religiously aggravated incitement 
or even violence. Other examples may also include the prevention of radicalisation and 
terrorism working from within certain communities. Lastly by dealing with certain 
community and religious leaders it may be possible to get a message to all adherents in a 
particular community with the view of the leader holding considerable sway over community 
members. By analogy then, if atheists were prone to attack or hatred, extremist and violent 
tendencies from certain elements within and were organised in communities and held the 
views of their leaders in high esteem giving them considerable sway, then there would be an 
even greater impetus for the Faith Director to include atheist organisations amongst the 
groups he engaged and liaised with.    
Consequently in essence, atheists seek protection from coercion and discrimination in relation 
to their atheistic belief and identity. To conclude, there is no agreed legal definition for what 
constitutes a religion, though it is commonly understood and there is a body of case-law, 
which imbues the term with some legal certainty. Thus it is objective and seldom the subject 
of severe contention. However there have been occurrences of challenges in relation to 
unconventional belief systems or those that are perceived as evil or disruptive to society. 
These include Nazism, Fascism, Sadism, Masochism, Racism
250
, Paedophilia and devil 
worship. While all of these ideologies with the exception of the last have used the basis of 
freedom of expression, to argue for the protection of their right of belief, they serve the 
purpose to show how certain apparently absolute rights are inevitably and inherently 
limited.
251
 Such limits are inbuilt to all human rights treaties and exist on the basis of the 
protection of the rights of others
252
 and under the ECHR system articulated often as 
‘necessary in a democratic society’.
253
 Consequently even if we understand religion to be 
informally, linguistically and through common sense and experience loosely defined, there 
may still be instances where some religious beliefs are considered to be a priore excluded 
from the scope of the right as it could lead to the destruction of the rights of others, which 
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 R. (on the application of E) v JFS Governing Body Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 25 June 2009. 
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includes activities that would be considered as criminal such as murder, rape or bodily harm 
or even contrary to the interests of the State. 
  
III. Difficulties in defining  ‘Minority’ 
a. Definition – Points of Exclusion  
We have examined above what the definition of ‘religion’ may be and thus which belief 
systems are included and which are excluded from protection under Art. 18 of the ICCPR. 
We have also touched on the bases upon which a belief system may be recognised as a 
‘religion or belief’. With this in mind, let us presume that the closest comparator in 
international law to non-Muslims under Islamic law would be that of the religious minority 
under international law as was stated in Chapter 2. While the legally indeterminate meaning 
of ‘religion’ has been nominally disputed, to the contrary the definition of ‘minority’ under 
international law has been intensely contested and protections offered under it remain weak 
and related instruments non-binding.
254
 As such the aversion of States to group and collective 
rights
255
 is reflected in the fact that all current binding international human rights treaties vest 
their rights in the individual as opposed to the group entity.
256
  
The reason behind this current state of international human rights law is in part discernible 
through a historical perspective, which shows that minority rights were given greater 
prominence prior to the establishment of the United Nations. Evidence of treaties for the 
protection of minorities can be found as far back as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
prior to the peace of Westphalia of 1648.
257
 Reflection and introspection in the aftermath of 
the First World War left little doubt that the protection of minorities was essential to 
maintaining international peace and security. Nonetheless the subsequent treaties for the 
protection of minorities under the supervision of the League of Nations were flouted too often 
by the great powers. This undermined the centrality of minority rights to sustaining 
international peace and therefore eroded the already fragile legitimacy of the League. 
Furthermore Hitler’s reliance on the purported mistreatment of the German-speaking 
minority in the Sudetenland to justify his initial act of aggression, accentuated the failings of 
the national minority discourse as fundamental to preventing the recurrence of conflict. In the 
minds of the bruised and battered victors of the Great War, the attempt, once again to bring 
sovereign States around one table, would this time focus firmly on individual rights. 
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In the absence of a legally binding instrument, the principal and only legally binding 




“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.” 
The immediately ostensible points regarding scope are the limitation of minority rights to 
only three types of minorities ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ and ‘linguistic’. Each term’s precise 
meaning and, in turn, scope may also be problematised and bounds tested. As we have 
already observed, while common sense and standard linguistic usage may point strongly in a 
certain direction, the term ‘religious’ may be understood differently by different people in 
different contexts. Similarly the term ‘ethnic’ is contested with regards to shifting from a trait 
visually discernible
259
 and biological in nature to one that is more related to self-identification 
and culture.
260
 Bengoa in his UN Working Paper states: “In anthropology, ethnic values come 
somewhere between purely racial and entirely cultural values, between the physical, genetic 
features of human populations and characteristics derived from cultural activity, history and 
the imaginative and constructive behaviour of human beings.”
261
 Likewise ‘linguistic’ may 
seem the least problematic, but there may also be situations where the line between dialects 
and language are highly blurred.  
Where belonging to one of these three types of groups is established, the pertinent question 
may arise as to the exact meaning of ‘minority’ and whether it refers to purely a numerical 
minority in some other respect. The use of the word ‘exist’ rather than ‘are recognised’ is of 
significance. With regards to all these points, the common additional question also arises as 
to who holds the decisive authority to determine these matters, the individual belonging to the 
minority, the State or a third-party. Connected to this, and lastly, the right has a clear group 
dimension with the use of the words ‘in community’ and all three heads of identity requiring 
in large part a community of members or adherents. Despite this, the right is solely vested in 
individuals and not any group entities.  The only examples of collective rights that we have 
are the right to self-determination found in common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR and 
those relating to indigenous people.
262
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Despite ‘religious groups’ being referred to in the Genocide Convention
263
 and the drafting of 
a number of minority specific instruments and institutions in the 1990s
264
, which developed 
and built on Art. 27 of ICCPR, the term has evaded an internationally agreed legal definition. 
The closest we have is Capitorti’s working definition:  
“a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant 
position, whose members – being nationals of the state - possess ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if 
only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, 
traditions, religion or language.”
265
 
Even though common reference to the aforementioned definition, a number of factors not 
mentioned by Capitorti bear significance if a group is to be recognised as any kind of 
minority, such as population, type, period of residence in the State, national/immigrant 
minority. This is to say that the issues that may arise with the above definition include the 
idea that the term refers not so much to numerical inferiority, albeit being a common 
indicator, but rather a position of relative weakness and non-dominance, which may occur 
when the concerned group is even a numerical majority. Examples include “Blacks in South 
Africa under the apartheid regime in South Africa”
266
 and Shia Muslims (65-75%) in Bahrain 
currently and potentially also Shia Muslims (65-70%) in Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
267
 The 
criteria requiring nationality or citizenship of a State is also disputed as being absolutely 
necessary
268
 and continues to be debated between international lawyers, while HRC General 
Comment 23 considers it an invalid ground of excluding certain groups from minority 
recognition: 
“The terms used in article 27 indicate that the persons designed to be protected are 
those who belong to a group and who share in common a culture, a religion and/or a 
language. Those terms also indicate that the individuals designed to be protected need 
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not be citizens of the State party [...] A State party may not, therefore, restrict the rights 
under article 27 to its citizens alone.”
269
 
As we have already stated, minority rights are an expression of the rights of individuals 
belonging to a group, which allow for the enjoyment of one’s culture, religion or language. 
Hence all three aspects are inherently social endeavours. In Art. 27 this is expressed as “... in 
community with the other members of their group” similar to the wording found in ICCPR 
Art. 18 and in Capitorti’s definition as: “...if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language”. Subsequently is 
there and should there be a threshold for the minimum number of people belonging to a 
certain group in order to be recognised as minorities? What if only one person remains of a 
culturally distinct group with their own religion, language or culture? If not, would it change 
if the total number was two? Would it matter if the single individual claims to share a 




The answers to these questions are not straightforward nor settled. However they do pose real 
problems for State-minority relations and management of difference with regards to the core 
issue of recognising identity and the rights that would flow from such recognition. It may be 
that the last remaining member of a minority group should attract more protection and 
promotion of their culture so as to prevent it from disappearing. Additionally in the absence 
of others to share her culture with, she may still be able to teach it or educate others willing to 
learn. She may also be able to continue to enjoy her culture by means of media, such as video 
and audio recordings as well as photographs. If it is her religious identity that is under 
question, then can we really impose such limitations, if part of her religion relates to the 
spiritual and metaphysical relationship between her and possibly a deity or deities and not 
just other adherents?   
Similarly it cannot be said without doubt that two or more individuals belonging to a minority 
would be recognised as a minority just because they are now able to enjoy their culture in 
community with each other. States may and do in fact prescribe minimum numbers of 
members in order to impart recognition; in most situations owing to the practicality or 
financial feasibility of providing a certain service or specific positive right. The selection of 
the minimum threshold may appear arbitrary, but at other times may be an insidious attempt 
to exclude a certain minority that has a population just below the threshold. Nonetheless 
prescribing a minimum number of members for recognition is a legally unsound practice, as 
per the minority rights framework, but common. This is because the right to identity is 
fundamental and tied to the idea of the right to exist and dignity. Its determination is almost 
wholly subjective within broad objective boundaries. Thus while a State may rely on 
infeasibility to deny a certain right due to practical and financial considerations, it may not 
use non-recognition of existence as a means for avoiding the claim from inception.  
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The types of groups that fall within the scope of minority rights may seem unequivocally 
clear in Art. 27 of ICCPR as ethnic, religious and linguistic. Nonetheless all post-1990 
minority rights instruments (the UN Declaration, the FCNM and the HCNM 
Recommendations) introduce the idea of ‘national’ minorities. The notion will be discussed 
in detail below as it is of greater pertinence to the European regional organisations of the 
Council of Europe and the OSCE and relates to a potential narrowing of scope rather than 
broadening through the appendage of an additional type of minority. What becomes clear 
from these three core categories listed in the only internationally binding provision as 
opposed to Declarations or Council of Europe instruments, that they provide an objective 
basis for determining who may lay claim to being a minority or not.  
As such, without delving into the internal tensions within the definitions of these terms as 
raised briefly above, externally other conceptualisations of minorities that may be referred to 
in Standard English use would be inapplicable. For example, oft-labelled ‘sexual minorities’ 
referring to the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transexual) community cannot be seen as 
included within its scope by even an expansive interpretation of minority rights.
271
 Similarly 
women, children and the disabled cannot be said to be included within the scope of minorities 
under international law. All have dedicated international legally binding instruments and 
provisions and none can be said to have a distinct culture, which they only enjoy with people 
from their group in clear unequivocal terms. The term minority also does not denote 
exclusively that the main element to recognition as such is a numerical inferiority. Thus a 
minority of the population holding fringe views such sadomasochism or belonging to a 
political movement are also excluded. In broaching the subject of excluded groups, the UN 
confirms implicitly rather than explicitly, perhaps out of sensitivity and acknowledgment of 
addressing victims of human rights violations albeit not minority rights. It does so by 
affirming they have a claim as victims of double discrimination: 
“The question often arises as to whether, for example, persons with disabilities, persons 
belonging to certain political groups or persons with a particular sexual orientation or 
identity (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersexual persons) constitute 
minorities. While the United Nations Minorities Declaration is devoted to national, 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, it is also important to combat multiple 
discrimination and to address situations where a person belonging to a national or 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minority is also discriminated against on other grounds 
such as gender, disability or sexual orientation. Similarly, it is important to keep in 
mind that, in many countries, minorities are often found to be among the most 
marginalized groups in society and severely affected by, for example, pandemic 
diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, and in general have limited access to health services.”
272
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Subsequently it is expected that a further question may arise as to the core of minority rights 
and whether it can be expressed in vivid terms as to know with greater certainty which groups 
can and cannot be considered a minority under international law. There are two possible 
interpretations of Article 27 in this regard, one literal and rigid and the other taking account 
of its essence, object and purpose and dynamic. We have in part explained the literal and 
most commonly applied interpretation above. It requires that all types of groups except 
ethnic, religious and linguistic are excluded from minority rights. Furthermore we may 
correlate the types of minority and the related rights that follow respectively. As such by 
paraphrasing the text, we may deduce that Article 27 attributes, i) ethnic minorities with the 
right ‘to enjoy their culture’, ii) religious minorities with the right ‘to profess and practise 
their own religion’ and iii) linguistic minorities ‘to use their own language’. The question that 
leads us to an alternative dynamic interpretation of Article 27 is if the three categories of 
minorities and the rights attributed to them are distinct categories or whether there is a 
relationship and overlap between them; hierarchical and/or sub-categorical. A connected 
question that we also attempted to elucidate on is whether the types of minorities are part of 
an exhaustive or non-exhaustive list. 
As referred to already, the classical notion of ‘ethnicity’ was one related to visual observation 
and a biological facet commonly expressed as ‘race’. However with the emerging 
development of the principle of self-identification
273
 and a spectrum of observable shades of 
skin tone due to increasingly exogamous marriages owing to globalisation and mass 
migration flows as well as the absence of any precise and objective scientific method to 
determining race, the term remains practically and legally as a means to describe 
discrimination from the perspective of the perpetrator.
274
 In areas of rights and identification, 
it has largely been replaced by the broader elastic and more neutral notion of ‘ethnicity’. 
Even ‘racism’ or ‘racial discrimination’ has evolved to include a broad range of related heads 
of discrimination which include “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”.
275
 
In contemporary understanding ‘ethnic’ clearly has a number of facets of which ‘race’ can 
only be assumed to be one potential facet, but by no means the most prominent. If it were 
possible to condense an essential meaning at the heart of the notion of ‘ethnic’, which is often 
used interchangeably with ‘foreign’ or even ‘different’, would be a group having a culture 
different from the majority. As such, this is the right foreseeably attributed to them. It also 
remains the prevalent position of international law that religion and language are not included 
within the scope of race. However the same cannot be said as convincingly about ethnicity. 
An ethnic minority, in addition to having a distinct culture may also have their own religion 
and language.
276
 It may also be reframed as saying both the religion and language were 
constituent parts of the culture of the minority. Thus religion and language could be seen as 
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two examples of culture. Therefore the right could be interpreted and rephrased as ‘ethnic 
minorities, including religious or linguistic minorities, shall not be denied the right to enjoy 
their own culture’. Following this, specific profession and practice of religion and the use of 
language are given as specific examples of how two specific types of cultures may be 
enjoyed. In this sense the ‘ethnic’ head could be construed as a general head and religious 
and linguistic as two specific heads, which are in turn two particular examples of an ethnic 
minority. Alternatively ethnic could be seen to cover all minorities with a distinct culture not 




Above we have attempted to raise questions and contested issues as to definition and scope of 
minorities under international law. An aspect of this is not just the blurred lines between 
some categorisations but more so, who decides and determines these matters. Does the State 
have the final say or there is some discretion afforded to it? If so, then to what extent? Or is it 
completely down to the subjective self-perception of individuals belonging to a minority 
group? If it is left completely to the discretion of the State, abuse is likely and inevitable and 
accountability impossible. Conversely making it a wholly subjective matter for the concerned 
minority group, leaves a system with no legal certainty nor any ability on the part of the State 
to regulate and manage minorities in a manner in consonance with wider public interests and 
other competing priorities as a governing authority.  In this regard, international law seeks to 
strike a balance between subjective and objective criteria.
278
 We have discussed the objective 
criteria above in the guise of the types of minorities that may seek access to minority rights 
under principally ICCPR Art. 27. It should be acknowledged that the objective criteria are 




This is a crucial element of minority rights and at its core. This author has posited elsewhere 
that it, along with the idea of group cultural rights, embodies the object and purpose of 
minority rights
280
 whether that be in the form of a provision or dedicated binding and non-
binding instruments.
281
 Furthermore it goes to the heart of a right to identity, which is 
inherently and inseparably tied to the notion of dignity, at the heart and origin of all human 
rights.
282
  This must work both ways. On the one hand, individuals belonging to minorities 
must be able to self-identify as any minority group they wish or they feel an affinity to. It is 
not for official bodies or structures to impose or limit identity from without. On the other 
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hand, those who may ostensibly appear to belong to a minority group cannot be identified as 
such, if they themselves reject such an identity.  
Furthermore, in situations where a minority may have more than one facet to their identity 
and thus be potentially included under more than one category within the scope of ‘minority’, 
as per arguments made by the author elsewhere, due consideration be given to the dominant 
aspect and which they most identify with.
283
 This has certainly been a problematic aspect of 
State practice in relation to Muslims in the UK, who may wish to identify primarily or 
exclusively by their religious identity and lay claim to resulting rights
284
 and Sikh’s in the US 
who are in a converse position seeking recognition as an ethnic minority rather than a 
religious one for the purposes of the US Census.
285
 Thus including a group within the 
minority rights framework, may not be sufficient and in accordance with the principle of self-
identification and the appropriate rights, if the minority is not able to self-identify as the 
particular type of minority that they feel is central to their identify. 
 
c. Existence and Recognition 
If a group self-identifies as a minority and does not fall foul of the objective criteria such as 
the type of minority, which are matters of fact, then the State has no discretion to deny 
recognition to that group as a minority. As already stated, the discretion in relation to 
recognition of minorities is highly restricted while the discretion to deny or grant certain 
rights as a result remains broad. However States continue to rely on non-recognition so as not 
to address the cultural needs of the minority at all. States such as Turkey and France justify 
their refusal to recognise minorities. This has lead to the development of principles and a 
body of academic literature and elaboration of international law around acknowledging the 
mere existence of a minority within the territory of a State.
286
 It is assumed that once this is 
achieved, recognition must follow.  It has been repeatedly stated that existence is a matter of 
fact. As such, Art. 27 of ICCPR states ‘exist’ rather than for example ‘whomever the State 
wishes to recognise’.  
Specifically in relation to religious minorities, States, while seemingly providing for the 
freedom of religion to all individuals who wish to claim it, exhibit an opposite aversion to 
recognising any groups, including religious ones, as religious minorities. To the laity, such 
contrasting attitudes towards potentially the same group of people may seem nonsensical. 
Nonetheless, recognition of a group as a minority brings with it an extra body of rights and 
competencies, which are “distinct from, and additional to, all the other rights which, as 
individuals in common with everyone else, they are already entitled to enjoy under the 
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  States are averse to this as they perceive them as a threat to the national 
identity, territorial integrity and potentially a drain on resources. As such enjoyment of a 
particular culture may entail a “way of life which is closely associated to territory and use of 
its resources”.
288
 Minority rights have inherent within them the rights relevant to individuals 
belonging to minority groups, including mainly the right to non-discrimination and religious 
freedom. In addition, a host of rights may become accessible following recognition, which 
include ensuring the enjoyment of culture and in relation specifically to religious minorities, 
the manifestation of religion, establishment of places of worship, schools, institutions, legal 
systems, reserved seats in parliament and access to public funds in pursuit of all of the above. 
d. Do minorities have the right to self-determination? 
Whether minorities have the right to self-determination is a pertinent question and deals 
specifically with the idea of going beyond purely individual rights for minorities as afforded 
in Art. 27 of ICCPR. Ironically, while its origins are in the recent past, it may be deemed a 
progressive approach to the rights of minorities and other group entities and still some time 
until it is realised. The problem of scope of the right to self-determination and the inclusion of 
minorities arises in relation to context and the subject group entity in whom the right is 
vested. The right to self-determination is found in the UN Charter
289
 and in common Article 1 
of the two International Covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR). It could be said to be the 
codification at the very onset of the UN system of Wilsonian self-determination. However the 
implementation and enforcement of this right proved elusive, for two reasons: its attempted 
confinement to the colonial context and the problems of defining ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’.  
Firstly, while the UN Charter and ICCPR drafters’ codification of the right of self-
determination may have been aimed at subjugated colonial peoples, there is little reason to 
oppose its dynamic interpretation to contemporary contexts where its underlying principles 
remain highly relevant. Progressive academics and jurists have sought to interpret common 
Article 1 and other instruments intended for the colonial context
290
, to show the right of self-
determination may be activated when there is a severe lack of effective representation
291
 and 
is in large part the rationale relied on for justification of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
concept.
292
 This garners further support for the contention that the terms, ‘minorities’ and 
‘peoples’ may be interchangeable and fluid in nature and could attach to the same collectives 
depending on their treatment by the metropolitan power. 
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However, historically and normatively, the right to self-determination has been denied to 
those belonging to a minority, not least as it attached to a ‘people’ and not a ‘minority’. 
While this has been the de jure justification for denying the right to minorities relied on by 
States and endorsed by the HRC, it is not yet clear how much de facto credence such an 
assertion now holds, in light of the precedents of the Kosovan and Bangladeshi secessions. 
When petitioned, the HRC has held that common Article 1 refers to the collective rights of 
peoples and not of minorities. Ironically and surprisingly the HRC seems to be of the opinion 
that individuals belonging to minorities may not lay claim to collective rights. As such they 
have rendered complaints under Article 1 inadmissible on grounds that they lack the 
competency to hear collective complaints by means of an individual petition.
293
 According to 
Brownlie, such an either/or approach to the relationship between the rights of minorities and 
the self-determination of peoples is unnecessary and has proved counterproductive to the 




IV. ‘National’ Minorities and the Problem of ‘New’ Minorities in Europe 
As has been stated, there are often subjective and objective criteria to determine whether a 
certain group comes within the scope of ‘minority’ as construed under international law. 
Once established, the existence of the minority becomes a matter of fact and the State holds 
no discretion to deny the existence nor refuse to recognise the minority. We noted in this 
regard that the main objective factor at play would be to establish whether a group constituted 
one of three types of minority: ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic’. If this was the case, it would 
provide the necessary condition for a claim to minority rights to arise. However they would 
only be activated with the satisfaction of the subjective criteria of self-identification with the 
minority group in question. Of particular interest to the discussion is the addition of ‘national 
minority’ in the latter minority-rights specific instrument and developments post-1990 in the 
aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia. These were the Declaration on Minorities, FCNM 
and the HCNM Guidelines.   
It is useful to differentiate between these three. The Declaration on Minorities is the only one 
of international application and is non-binding. The FCNM is only applicable to those 
members of the Council of Europe who have signed and ratified it numbering 39. Signatory 
States, who have not ratified it, are Belgium, Greece, Iceland and Luxemburg. France, 
Turkey, Andorra and Monaco are the only States who have neither signed nor ratified the 
Convention.
295
 While it is legally-binding, the language is far from prescriptive (and is meant 
instead to be programmatic and achieve a dialogue with States to attain progressive 
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realisation of rights. The OSCE HCNM is a mechanism to prevent conflicts through quiet 
diplomacy and the resolution of minority related problems. Its guidelines are specific ways to 
deal with such problems derived from existing international norms. 
Employing the term ‘national’ in addition to the three existing categories of minorities would 
imply an additional objective criteria. However before discussing the specific effect on the 
application of each, let us begin by assessing its potential general meaning. The term 
‘national minority’ was first used in the post-World War 1 League of Nations’ international 
order and Bengoa refers to those groups that resulted from the break -up of empires as ‘first 
generation minorities’:  
“The nations that were emerging, especially in Europe, were ethnically, religiously and 
in most cases linguistically diversified. They were communities of people constituted 
centuries ago and recognized on the basis of empirical evidence in their places of origin 
and settlement. The break-up of the empires of Central Europe chiefly led to the 
appearance of a mosaic of peoples, ethnic groups, local societies, minorities, etc.”
296
   
The now defunct Working Group on Minorities also discussed the concept of ‘national 
minorities’ and suggested “a national minority was a minority in one country but which 
formed the majority in the mother country” and added: 
“a national minority might mean a particular group which had always been part of a 
nation but, owing to changing borders, had found themselves in a minority situation. 
Such national minorities were present in Europe, Africa and Asia where borders had 
been redrawn either as a result of peace treaties or of colonialism”.
297
  
We may deduce from this that ‘national minority’ may refer to a specific type of minority 
given a specific context. One facet of the phenomenon is the assumption of minority status 
due to redrawing or shifting State boundaries and borders. This could have been where the 
national minority exists wholly in a particular State or where it has ties to and common 
features with the majority population of a neighbouring State, often referred to as ‘kin 
minorities’. Lastly a fundamental aspect of being considered a national minority appears to be 
that they were “constituted centuries ago and recognized on the basis of empirical evidence in 
their places of origin and settlement.” In other words, the borders had shifted and 
multicultural empires had fragmented into a plethora of peoples, but the communities of 
people in question themselves had a historical connection to the places in which they were 
situated and thus were constituted in their places of origin and settlement. They had remained 
stationary while the borders had moved. They were not the result of recent mass-migration 
flows or the result of forced displacement. Furthermore the process had led to re-emergence 
of distinct nations. Some were able to become States while others became national minorities, 
that is, subsumed nations without formal Statehood: “Towards the end of the First World 
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The above does not provide an authoritative legal interpretation nor one that is subject to 
consensus. Rather it is a useful insight into the potential intended meaning when the term is 
used in legal instruments or provisions. This of course does not preclude interpretations that 
meet the needs of a contemporary context and so evolve over time from their intended and 
original meanings. This being the case, how is the term employed in the three instruments 
already mentioned, what is its effect and have specific and independent interpretations 
emerged?  
The OSCE HCNM is a dedicated conflict prevention mechanism, which has developed its 
own body of best practice and guidelines on a number of specific substantive problems. Its 
main focus was intended and continues to be national minorities especially as its main 
geographical focus has been Eastern Europe and recently expanded to Central Asia. 
Nonetheless, due to developing practice, it has sought to address non-national minority-
related issues, but from a human rights perspective, such as combating Islamophobia and 
xenophobia in the form of hate speech. As such, the scope of OSCE work on minorities 
remains limited to only national minorities. This is not to say that the term ‘national minority’ 
cannot be interpreted in an expansive manner so as to include work on ‘new’ minorities who 
may have resulted from migration. This is especially so as it is a political body as opposed to 
a legal body. Additionally the HCNM is a mediation mechanism, so may operate and exercise 
its discretion within the bounds of his broad mandate of conflict prevention through quiet 
diplomacy. 
The UN Declaration on Minorities frames its rights along the same lines as Art. 27 of ICCPR, 
except it frames the enumerated categories of groups as ‘National or Ethnic, Religious or 
Linguistic Minorities’. The addition of ‘national’ here neither seems to expand the types of 
minorities that may be included nor narrow them. This is because a link is implied between 
‘national’ and ‘ethnic’ but at the same time they are distinguished to convey a nuance. This 
also means that religious and linguistic minorities are stated as distinct and separate groups 
and need not be national minorities to fall within the scope of the Declaration. This is in stark 
contrast to the FCNM that vests rights in ‘national minorities’, which in turn may be ethnic, 
religious or linguistic. In this way the use of ‘national’ in the FCNM works as a device that 
limits the scope of minority rights to a narrower ambit than purely ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities. In contrast, the use of ‘national’ in the UN Declaration on Minorities 
seems to point only to a specification of a new type of minority which is nonetheless already 
subsumed by the other three principal categories, in particular ‘ethnic’, but nonetheless has 
particular needs and rights in relation to being a national minority, just as being religious or 
linguistic minorities carries specific rights. These common sense observations are confirmed 
in the Explanatory Note to the Declaration:  
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“The Declaration on Minorities adds the term ‘national minorities’. That addition does 
not extend the overall scope of application beyond the groups already covered by article 
27. There is hardly any national minority, however defined, that is not also an ethnic or 
linguistic minority. A relevant question, however, would be whether the title indicates 
that the Declaration covers four different categories of minorities, whose rights have 
somewhat different content and strength.”
299
 
While it may be axiomatic that the content of rights of religious minorities are that they be 
permitted to practice and profess their religion and those of linguistic minorities that they be 
allowed the use of their language, it may not be so when discussing ‘ethnic or national’ 
minorities. As already mentioned that while the ‘ethnic’ head is considerably more 
indeterminate than ‘religious’ and ‘linguistic’
300
, we may still accrue to it the rights of 
enjoyment of culture. What then of specific rights related to ‘national minorities’? In this 
regard the Commentary on the UN Declaration elaborates that “The category of national 
minority would then have still stronger rights relating not only to their culture but to the 
preservation and development of their national identity.”
301
 The Commentary restricts its 
characterisation of ‘national minorities’ as only having a distinct national identity which 
should be allowed to be preserved and developed. However if we presume that the most 
common understanding of ‘national minority’ is of those groups who have fixed places of 
origin and settlement,
302
 then it is likely that their rights will have a strong territorial 
dimension, where they are found to predominate. More so, where a national minority is 
understood to be a ‘kin minority’ where it shares national and cultural links with a 
neighbouring ‘kin-state’, it would be expected that the minority be allowed to have some 
form of cross-border communication and exchange.
303
 Such a phenomenon continues to 
occupy the heart of recent seemingly intractable conflicts on the Russian border with Russian 
speaking minorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in relation to Georgia and the in Crimea 
in relation to Ukraine. 
The FCNM is rather different from the Declaration on Minorities in relation to identifying its 
scope with respect to substantive categories of minorities. Instead of ‘national minorities’ 
constituting an additional type of minority albeit with overlap with the three traditional 
categories, it is here the principal subject of the treaty and in whom the minority rights are 
vested. As such, ethnic, religious and linguistic are seen as sub-categories of national 
minorities as opposed to co-categories in the Declaration on Minorities. Phrased differently 
‘national’ acts as a qualifier or disqualifier criterion for the inclusion of ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities. Thus theoretically at least, minorities who fulfil the objective and 
subjective criteria to satisfy the scope of Art. 27  of ICCPR and the Declaration on Minorities 
could still be beyond the scope the FCNM, if they were not construed as national minorities. 
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The subsequent and natural question that arises is what then precisely is the legal definition 
and scope of the term ‘national minority’ as found in the FCNM?  
As already discussed above, the commonly referred to understanding of national minority has 
been groups with a national identity
304
 that finds itself in a minority situation with shifting 
borders following WWI and post-WWII post-colonial. Bengoa refers to these two minority 
situations given the circumstances that gave rise to them as, first and second generation 
minorities respectively.
305
 Hence a national minority was said to have a connection to the 
territory in which it resided often stretching back centuries and also having cultural and/or 
national, religious or linguistic commonalities and links with a neighbouring state where their 
kin formed a majority or were predominant. Despite this backdrop and the context in which 
the term had been used by UN officiated bodies and most probably intended by State parties, 
the FCNM refrains from formally defining the term ‘national minorities’. Its Explanatory 
Report clarifies the conscious omission: 
“It should also be pointed out that the framework Convention contains no definition of 
the notion of ‘national minority’. It was decided to adopt a pragmatic approach, based 
on the recognition that at this stage, it is impossible to arrive at a definition capable of 
mustering general support of all Council of Europe member States.”
306
        
Undoubtedly this was in part due to the contested nature of the definition of ‘minority’ under 
international law and as such attempting a formal legally agreed definition for ‘national 
minority’ would have a priore necessitated an attempt to resolve that issue first. The explicit 
reason nonetheless given is the lack of consensus on the interpretation of the term ‘national 
minorities’.
307
 We may deduce from this the possibility that some States favoured a wider 
interpretation of the term, while others a narrower one. Even if this was the case, it is 
surprising that not even a minimalist or essentialist definition, which seeks to draw out the 
essence or common denominator of the various contested proposed interpretations, could be 
achieved.  The absence of such a definition or the identification of any essential facets 
indicates that there was not only no consensus on the interpretation of the term but more so 
none on any particular aspect of it. This is the reverse for the Declaration on Minorities, 
which while not resolving the problem of defining ‘minority’ nonetheless does lay out a 
framework for existence and recognition based on objective and subjective criteria
308
, which 
can be practically applied to test who may and may not fall within its scope.
309
  
Alternatively from a political perspective, the absence of any elucidation on what or who may 
constitute a ‘national minority’ whatsoever also points towards a concerted effort by States to 
allow themselves maximum discretion in refusing to recognise the existence of minorities 
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within their territory. It may be conceived that the elaboration of any form of definition no 
matter how narrow would lead to an objective means of challenging and holding to account 
States in relation to their refusal to recognise the existence of certain minorities. Likewise a 
minimalist or essential definition would also have led to an excessively broad scope as the 
agreed on characteristic would have been the only limiting factor. It should further be noted 
that legal scholars and those belonging to minority groups have sought to use the lack of a 
definition for the term as a means to interpret the term as expansively as feasible. Legally, 
they would have a favourable basis to make such arguments, especially as in the absence of 
explicitly stated objective criteria, reliance and deference would have to be give to the self-
identification of the concerned minority, to the extent that if a minority self-identified as 
having a ‘national’ identity, then it would become difficult to argue that the denial of 
recognition based on a subjective and ad-hoc remit for ‘national minority’ by each State on a 
case by case basis.  
However the political situation is rather different and the gap between it and the legal 
position quite vast. Politically, States have been allowed to avoid defining the term and the 
fact that enough support cannot be ‘mustered’ also implies that each State may do as it 
pleases to an extent, thus undermining the necessity and utility of a multilateral instrument. 
This tension between the political and legal dimensions of the FCNM is a prominent feature 
throughout the text and application of the instrument especially in relation to scope. The 
above is an example and a symptom of this underlying issue. In principle, it is a useful 
approach but in practice misapplied. The FCNM Explanatory Report states:   
“The framework Convention is the first legally binding multilateral instrument devoted 
to the protection of national minorities in general. Its aim is to specify the legal 
principles which States undertake to respect in order to ensure the protection of national 
minorities. The Council of Europe has thereby given effect to the Vienna Declaration’s 
call (Appendix II) for the political commitments adopted by the Conference on Security 




On the one hand, the FCNM purports to be the first legally binding and dedicated instrument 
to minority rights. It is also seen as transforming pre-existing CSCE (now OSCE) political 
commitments into binding legal obligations. Furthermore it is overseen by the monitoring 
mechanism, the Advisory Committee of Experts, whose recommendations are used as a basis 
for the Committee of Ministers to pass a resolution which is of legally and politically binding 
force. However this self-laudatory language is tempered by unavoidable dilution by political 
realities reflected in the necessary compromises necessary in order to arrive at a legally 
binding minority rights instrument. The text of the FCNM adds to the already wide discretion 
afforded to State parties through the indeterminacy of a definition for ‘national minority’. It 
does so through the provisions being highly programmatic with statements encouraging 
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States to meet the obligations therein to the ‘greatest extent possible’
311
 and talks of the 
realisation of general overarching legal principles rather specific commitments. 
“In view of the range of different situations and problems to be resolved, a choice was 
made for a framework Convention which contains mostly programme-type provisions 
setting out objectives which the Parties undertake to pursue. These provisions, which 
will not be directly applicable, leave the States concerned a measure of discretion in the 
implementation of the objectives which they have undertaken to achieve, thus enabling 
them to take particular circumstances into account.”
312
 
We have established that the ‘national minority’ criterion is employed as a restrictive device 
for the recognition of minorities in the context of the European FCNM and thus has a 
narrower scope than under international law as per Art. 27 of ICCPR and the Declaration on 
Minorities, which include national minorities as an additional, but already included type of 
minority under existing heads, implicitly and explicitly respectively. We have also 
highlighted how the conscious lack of a definition in the FCNM itself for national minority 
and the pragmatic, programmatic and aspirational language of the provisions leaves States an 
excessively wide discretion. Therefore, logically the subsequent question that needs to be 
asked is how could and is the term ‘national minority’ interpreted in State practice. 
A useful point to initiate such an analysis are the resolutions that proposed and resulted in the 
decision to adopt a framework convention. Deliberations and decisions pursuant to 
strengthening and developing a stand-alone minority rights instrument for the Council of 
Europe discussed a number of options including an additional protocol to the ECHR. Council 
of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) Recommendation 1134 defined ‘national’ as 
requiring groups to be “established on the territory of a state”
313
 while PACE 
Recommendation 1201 expressed it as “longstanding, firm and lasting ties with that state.”
314
 
Kymlicka has referred to this additional quality as “historical settlement”.
315
 The final text of 
the FCNM desists from defining ‘national minority’ and lacks any such condition, let alone 
the explicit requirement of citizenship. Despite the exceptionally broad scope available, 
member States’ interpretation of the FCNM has been closer to the restrictive definitions 
offered in PACE Recommendations 1134 and 1201.  
Most States have entered interpretative declarations on ratifying the FCNM requiring not 
only citizenship but also the fulfilment of the more abstract notion of “historical settlement” 
as a precondition to recognition as national minorities. This has led to the exclusion of new 
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minorities resulting from immigration, from the FCNM’s scope.
316
 The length of time 
persons belonging to immigrant groups must exist in the territory of a State to be considered 
old or national is difficult to pinpoint. Nonetheless Tanase has observed that States have 
normally excluded new minorities resulting from post-1945 immigration.
317
 Kymlicka has 
added that such settlement would reach the threshold of ‘national’, if it dated back to a period 
prior to the formation of modern nation-States.
318
  
Consequently there has been the emergence of the phenomenon of the discourse around 
‘new’ minorities in the Council of Europe member States relating to compliance with the 
FCNM. Increasingly States have sought to distinguish between minorities indigenous to the 
territory of the State and those who have resulted from immigration. The former are 
recognised as national minorities under the FCNM, whereas the latter limited to rights of 
non-discrimination, as opposed to group and cultural rights found in the FCNM. Some have 
done so overtly, while others have interpreted the FCNM in a manner to exclude them from 
its scope of application. Another strain of reasoning presented related to the issue has been 
that the needs and nature of immigrant communities are different from those who are settled. 
Those who have migrated often wish to and indeed should integrate into their new home. 
However this may be the case most obviously for linguistic identity, which is often weak 
amongst immigrant communities, who only really wish to speak their language in private 
with each other and the demand to seek education or administration in their language is rare. 
Although in some instances due to lack of integration and ghettoisation, it has become 
necessary for non-English signs and material to cater for a first generation, whose English 
competency remains weak despite living in the UK for many years.
319
 
Taking the example of the UK, it has sought to limit the application of the FCNM to such an 
extent almost rendering it redundant. This is peculiar as other States go as far as simply 
refusing the existence of minorities in their territory such as France and not becoming a party 
to the FCNM. The UK on the other hand has ratified the FCNM, but has conditioned its 
applicability by limiting the meaning of ‘national minority’ with the definition of ‘racial 
group’ as understood under the Race Relations Act 1976 of its national legal system.
320
 This 
has a number of ramifications. First, in limiting the scope of ‘national minority’ and thus the 
rights found in the FCNM to ‘racial groups’ (extended to include ethnic groups through 
established case-law) means that the UK would inevitably then also limit the rights it would 
afford to such groups to those of racial groups and ethnic groups. Such groups are 
conventionally only able to and need protection from discrimination on grounds of their 
                                                          
316
 Hofmann, R., “Review of the Monitoring Process of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities”, European Yearbook on Minority Issues, Vol. 1 (2001/2), 447: “Given the 
absence of an internationally agreed definition, many States sought to exclude application to ‘new 
minorities’.”  
317
 Tanase, I., “Defining National Minorities: Old Criteria and New Minorities”, University of Oxford Seminar 
Series: Citizenship and National Minorities in Europe, January 2003 (http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-
lectures/Tanase.htm). 
318
 Kymlicka, ”The Internationalisation of Minority Rights”, 6. 
319
 Somali in Birmingham (Asda Supermarket car parks) and Bengali in Whitechapel (Royal London Hospital). 
320
 See Shaikh, M., “Immigration to the UK from Commonwealth”.  
PhD: Protection of Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and International Law   Murtaza Shaikh  
  
Page 86 of 222 
 
ethnic or racial identity. Their recognition as such does not entail the attribution of rights 
related to cultural expression as would recognition of religious or linguistic groups, which are 
excluded from the scope of the FCNM based on such an interpretation. In sum, they are not 
recognisable identities nor have associated rights granted, which are both explicitly specified 
in the FCNM.  
This author has argued in a submission to the FCNM’s Advisory Committee that such an 
interpretation is invalid owing to its incompatibility with well established principles of 
international law.
321
 However the Advisory Committee has only gone as far as to say that the 
scope needs to be expanded and is inadequate in its current form. In its Third Opinion issued 
in 2011 it did not address the assertions made by this author.
322
 Furthermore the absence of 
any observations related to scope from the Council of Foreign Minister’s Resolution
323
 are 
telling as to the priority and importance or lack thereof placed on this matter. The only 
engagement that took place with the Committee was through oral submission, where the 
response from one of the experts was that it is a matter at the member States’ discretion to 
decide which minorities to recognise or not. The Committee’s failure to properly consider the 
legal questions arising from the UK’s interpretation and whether there are limits to the 
discretion available to States is indicative of the gap between international law and the 
practice of the Committee in an effort to engage in a dialogue and advance the position of 
member States.   
Therefore it is notable that the spectrum of validity for international law is quite wide, 
especially when we take into account States’ interpretation, regional organisational norms (in 
particular European standards) and application of international laws, which in itself plays a 
role in the entrenchment or erosion of certain principles and norms. While it is not intended 
to compare Islamic law to the current varying practices of a plethora of States with their own 
unique contexts and inclinations, it is inevitable that international law not be viewed in a 
sterile vacuum. After all States are responsible for reaching some level of consensus before 
international legal instruments can be drafted and opened for adoption. Furthermore their 
application depends wholly in most cases on their ratification. More importantly, laws must 
be accompanied by interpretation and application. The resultant State practice itself is 
essential and contributes to the development and elaboration of actual international law. 
Additionally it remains important to gauge the official response to interpretations and 
applications that test the boundaries or appear to depart altogether from the law’s apparent 
intent by mechanisms or experts formally charged with oversight, observation, monitoring, 
adjudication and issuing formal recommendations related to compliance of those very 
instruments. 
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In this chapter, we surveyed three separate means to deducing scope of ‘religious minority’ 
under international law, thereby ascertaining who may be included and excluded. This 
commenced by an enquiry into the definition, scope and meaning of ‘religion’ so as to 
understand which beliefs could be protected under various instruments related to non-
discrimination and freedom of religion. Specifically in relation to non-discrimination, we 
found that the essential element was perception of the victim and the perpetrator. As religious 
discrimination was related to the idea of intent and effect, these two factors were the main 
method of establishing scope of religious non-discrimination law. It was also critical to 
understand not only what beliefs were captured as religions but more so where the 
delimitation was for the broader scope of the right of ‘freedom of religion and belief’. Hence 
what was meant by the appendage ‘and belief’?  
With regards to first point, while the scope of religion was expansive and highly deferential 
to self-identification and self-ascription, it did maintain some objective element. For example 
the belief in the legalisation of assisted suicide was considered to fall beyond its scope, while 
the relatively new religion of the Church of Scientology was seen to fall within it. With 
regards to the second issue of ‘and belief’, the inclusion of the right to no belief, that is 
atheism, is explicit and unequivocal. While the indication may be that admissible beliefs 
should be related to religion as is the case with atheism or agnostism, which are views about 
religion rather than in religion, the position of international law remains that the right covers 
all or any personal convictions. The precise meaning of the term itself and examples that go 
beyond religious and atheistic beliefs are seldom discernible.   
The analysis proceeded to discuss in depth the scope of ‘minority’. Unlike ‘religion’, we 
found the scope of ‘minority’ to be highly contested. The issue was delineated into 
discussions around the lack of agreement on a definition and the importance of the principles 
of self-identification, existence and recognition to the international law relating to the 
protection of minorities. We also expanded the discussion by highlighting entities and rights 
which conventionally are thought to be collective rights attaching to group entities such as 
self-determination and autonomy. We found that ‘minorities’ were excluded from the scope 
of self-determination as it was only applicable to ‘peoples’. It was submitted that this was an 
artificial and legally unsound justification for such exclusion, better explained by political 
expediency.   
Finally we discussed the limiting of scope of minority rights under the FCNM and HCNM to 
only ‘national minorities’. Unlike the UN Declaration on Minorities which includes, ‘national 
minorities’ as one of the types of minorities under Art. 27 of ICCPR, the FCNM only vests 
rights in ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, who are first and foremost national 
minorities. The precise meaning and definition of ‘national’ here remains vague. The 
interpretive trend however among State parties shows a practice which seeks to exclude 
minorities resulting from post-1945 immigration from the scope of the FCNM altogether. We 
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observed that this has the indirect effect of excluding mostly religious minorities as the 
national minorities happen to be predominantly of the ethno-linguistic variety.    
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Chapter 4  
Comparison of the Concept of Scope 
I. Introduction 
In the last two chapters, we engaged with the spectrum of validity within Islamic law and 
international law in relation to the scope of dhimma and religious minorities. In the present 
chapter, we will assess the areas of overlap, conflict and divergences between the two 
systems. As noted in the introductory chapter, comparing both systems of law may lead to a 
finite number of possible outcomes depending on the specific issue in question. The first 
possible outcome is that both legal frameworks could carry similar protections; the second is 
that one legal framework could offer greater protection than the other and the third is that 
they could be in direct opposition to one another. In relation to all of these possible outcomes, 
in particular the latter, an analytical framework will be presented through which to 
understand the differences.  
At the same time, the identified areas of overlap should serve to show that the two systems of 
law are not completely at odds as may be popularly perceived. This is partly because critiques 
of Islamic law either may not be derived from a thorough examination of the existing state of 
international law and/or overlook the full breadth of available valid Islamic legal opinions or 
delve deeper into the rationale (usūl) – implicit and explicit - underpinning rulings such as 
their effective causes (illah) and contexts.
324
 At the same time, areas of conflict should not be 
overlooked or understated, where genuinely present. Only through an approach, where 
Islamic law is evaluated within its various contexts and objectively compared to the 
contemporary system of international human rights law, fully cognisant of their deeper 
frameworks and nuances, can the main objectives of the thesis be fulfilled. This is preferable 
to assessing Islamic law in a sterile vacuum or according to subjective notions of morality 
and tolerance devoid of context or the acknowledgement of multiple possibilities rather than 
being selective.  
                                                          
324
 E.g See Arzt, “The Role of Compulsion” and McKinney “Echoes of the Dhimma”. Both seek conduct a stand-
alone critique in isolation without comparison or reference to international or human rights law. Both also 
don’t fully grasp the breadth of discussion on the issue of scope of dhimma in classical Islamic law, 
misunderstanding the crucial nature of the basis of the inclusion of Magians. Arzt considers dhimma to be 
applicable to only monotheistic scriptuaries, p. 25 and McKinney reproduces Elizabeth Mayer’s view that 
dhimmi status was only for the “People of the Book”, p. 240. Furthermore an oversight on drawing out usūl or 
underlying principles is evident in the constant references to the ‘Pact of Umar’ and drawing out general and 
fixed rules from it without asking whether it was intended to be generally applicable law or principle and its 
relationship with its specific context (Arzt, p. 27, McKinney, p. 239). There is also reference made my Arzt and 
in the case of McKinney heavy reliance on polemicists such as Bat Yo’er and Robert Spencer who have been 
accused of presenting biased and skewed perspectives dhimmis under Islamic law. Works that refer to both 
the Islamic law and international law perspective are rare and include Hashemi, Religious Legal Traditions; 
Baderin, “Islamic Law and International Protection of Minority Rights in Context” and Emon, Religious 
Pluralism and Islamic Law.    
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Firstly, the nature and extent of the common ground will be identified. We posit that it is far 
greater than assumed or portrayed, even by academics, who can criticise Islamic law in a 
vacuum of both a superficial understanding of Islamic law combined with lack of reference to 
international normative frameworks, which themselves can show greater flexibility and scope 
than their arguments capture. Second, the apparent conflicts, also less than normally 
presumed, will be identified and their rationale genuinely understood in order to propose 
solutions. Third, it will be ascertained and explored whether either can be enriched, informed 
or improved by the other. The last of these points may not be received well by either those 
who purport devout religiosity or those who hold international human rights law as the 
immutable panacea of morality and ethics; in extreme cases, with an evangelical zeal. Both 
would normally hold their own system as the ultimate and superior system of truth and as 
such immune from improvement and critique.  
Nonetheless, such attitudes can only be based on a narrow and superficial reading of both 
legal systems. As for international law, the only parts which are sacrosanct are due to 
consensus over a considerable period of time in which they were not challenged or 
undermined. These are what are normally classified as jus cogens norms: “certain 
fundamental rules of customary law (rules of jus cogens) which cannot be altered by the 
express agreement of states, even if in treaty form.”
325
 The remainder, which accounts for the 
vast body of international law, remains subject to change and evolution based on fluid and 
dynamic international relations, State practice and judicial interpretation.
326
 In theory, the 
sacrosanct may also be changed, if a consensus is then formed against it. Hence, as a system 
of law recognised by civilised nations,
327
 there is nothing to prevent seeking answers from 
within Islamic law to long standing problems in international law or present a more 
progressive model on some issues leading to a change or improvement in international law.  
The principal difference between international law and Islamic law is the nature of their 
sources. Islamic law’s primary sources, the Qur’an and in principle authenticated Prophetic 
Traditions (ahadeeth), are immutable, sacrosanct and indisputable.
328
 However the law itself 
derived from explicit text and implicitly through several juristic means
329
 has over one and a 
half millennia been subject to ijma’ (juristic consensus) and has also become sacrosanct.
330
 
Issues where there has been no consensus or discussion, as they have not occurred until the 
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 Dixon, M., Textbook on International Law (Oxford University Press, Seventh Edition 2013), 18. See also 
D’Amato, A., “It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens!”, Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, No. 1 
(1999). 
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 Art. 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945). 
327
 Art. 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945). 
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whether a report is authentic or not. Despite this there are collections of Traditions which are undisputed in 
this regard. 
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 Most notably, ijma’ (consensus) and qiyas (analogy), which are often given as the third and fourth sources 
of Islamic law. See Chapter 1, for detailed discussion. 
330
 On the differences about whether ijma’ can change or not, see e.g. Hassan, A., The Doctrine of Ijma’ in 
Islam: A study of the Juridical Principle of Consensus (Kitab Bahvan, 1992). 
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present day, are subject to be informed by the context of the world today, which includes 
aspects of the present reality of international relations and law. The sources of international 
law are most commonly cited as being international conventions, international custom, 
general principles of law and judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations.
331
 They cannot be said to be immutable prior to or after their 
crystallisation and fundamentally arise as a reflection of developing practice and consensual 
agreements or treaties. While jus cogens may be considered immutable in some respects, it 
still emanates from State practice and forms a part of customary law. There are also questions 
around the hierarchy of these sources and in the event of a conflict which should prevail. 
Apart from the fourth and final source which explicitly denotes its own status “as a subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law,”
332
 the current position of the Court is to 
consider all sources separately and simultaneously and only prioritise as a last resort when 
faced with an irreconcilable conflict between sources. In such instances, priority will be given 




II. Favoured Religions v. State Neutrality  
As we have already shown in Chapter 2, the often presumed scope of dhimma in Islamic law 
as including only Jews, Christians and Magians has been a misrepresentation of the actual 
breadth of valid juristic opinions on the subject. Consequently there has been a lack of 
appreciation of the rationales and attempts to reconcile in order to provide a perspective most 
relevant and analogous to the contemporary international context. Even established and oft-
referenced academics have erred on this issue citing incorrect or too narrow a view on the 
Islamic law position. For example, Arzt in her well-known article on the subject states: “Non-
Muslims in the dar al-Islam were treated differently depending on whether or not they were 
‘People of the Book,’ those whose faith was based, like that of Muslims, on revealed 
scripture (ahl al-kitab). Islamic law granted the protected status of dhimma (contract or 
guarantee) to communities of the other scriptural monotheisms, Christianity, Judaism and 
Zoroastrianism.”
334
 This as we established in Chapter 2, is not the view of the majority of 
classical jurists nor the view of three of the four schools of Islamic law.
335
 While it is 
undisputed that Zoroastrians or Magians are to be included as dhimma, the prevalent view is 
that they cannot be deemed to be People of the Book owing to their non-monotheistic beliefs. 
Such an insight is crucial as on it pivots whether dhimma status is limited to or can be 
extended beyond the People of the Book. Thus the three views on eligibility that in fact form 
the spectrum of validity under Islamic law are: i) only the People of the Book (inclusive of 
Magians), ii) People of the Book (exclusive of Magians) and non-Arab polytheists (such as 
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 Art. 38(1)(a-d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945). 
332
 Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945). 
333
 Dixon, The Sources of International Law, 25. 
334
 Arzt, “The Role of Compulsion in Islamic Conversion - Jihad, Dhimma and Rida”, Buffalo Human Right Law 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 15 (2002), 21. 
335
 See Chapter 2. 
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the Magians), and iii) all religious groups (People of the Book and polytheists). It may also be 
argued that the conventionally held view that the People of the Book are or should be treated 
more favourably than other religious minorities is open to challenge. 
Similarly under international law, while it may be arguable that the scope of the concept of 
‘religious minority’ is open to all religious groups who seek to be recognised as such, States 
cannot be ignored in contributing to accepted patterns of practice in compliance with 
international norms. Hence State practice contributes and affects the quality and strength of 
international law. Indeed State practice is indicative of a narrowing of scope through non-
recognition via the contested nature of scope and definition, specifically of ‘minority’. We 
have also seen how the definition of ‘religion’, albeit less so, may also be a means of 
exclusion of some groups. Thus under international law, the spectrum of validity is not 
merely a range of possibilities, but the broadest scope is available under UN instruments, 
most notably the UN Declaration on Minorities, constitute an aspirational rather than legally 
binding standard. The narrowest or most restrictive scope available is that which States seek 
to avail. It is also apparent that under the FCNM in Europe that the additional qualification of 
‘national’ acts as a further constriction of the scope of minority rights that may only be 
afforded to ‘traditional’ and long established groups who are perceived as part of the national 
fabric rather than originating from immigration. They also seldom happen to be religious 




In this regard, comparing to the most restrictive view under Islamic law, we can observe the 
similarity in the underlying basis for exclusion. The presumption in much of the literature is 
that the People of the Book such as Jews and Christians are the most proximate religiously 
with the Muslims and so are treated more favourably than other religious groups. Thus they 
are given more and better rights, exemplified by their recognition as dhimma. Gunn offers a 
model for understanding State-religion relations by suggesting that States often have a 
hierarchy of “religions”, which are favoured and disfavoured by the State to varying extents, 
ranging from State-endorsed religions, favoured religions to rejected religions.
337
 As such, for 
Islamic law to generally offer recognition and include within the scope of dhimma potentially 
all religions is noteworthy. It is a main  tenet of the present thesis that this dynamic in nation-
States occurs as a result of commonality threat posed by a religious group or the substance of 
their belief and practices. For example, if a national identity has religiosity at its heart, then 
that will be manifested as preference towards that particular religion (State-endorsed 
religion), aversion to those that believe the opposite (rejected religions) and toleration for 
those that are similar (favoured religions). Conversely the State could have a militant 
secularism at its heart meaning its belief is one of anti-religiosity, so making all religions 
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 Gunn, “The Complexity of Religion”, 197: “Thus ‘religion’ may be seen not simply as a neutral description of 
such things as theological beliefs or ritual practices, but as judgment on whether the particular beliefs or 
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disfavoured in the public realm such as France or in the case of Turkey anti-Islam owing to 
Atta Turk. 
Temperman, on the other hand, has argued for an emerging right to State neutrality in matters 
of religion. In the specific context of public school education, he posits: “State neutrality in 
the field of Education is first and foremost mandatory because primary school education is 
compulsory.”
338
 In light of the ECtHR Chamber judgement in the case of Lautsi v. Italy
339
, 
which concerned the display of Crucifixes in classrooms, he further notes that: “In sum the 
state has a compelling obligation to remain neutral when manifesting itself upon particularly 
impressionable youth who are compelled to spend time on public premises.” The absence of 
such neutrality would stem critical thinking and could lead to state indoctrination. This would 
impact and impair the right to freedom to chose or adopt a religion of one’s choice, which no 
doubt includes the right not to believe.
340
   
However there may not necessarily be an inherent conflict between the two perspectives on 
State-religion relations. Temperman elaborates on what the relationship ought to be and its 
development in that direction, while Gunn elucidates the current state of affairs taking into 
regard the political and cultural contexts of various States. Merely by adducing the right to 
State neutrality in State education and its affirmation by the ECtHR does not ensure that it 
will be implemented by even those upon whom the Court has jurisdiction, let alone those 
beyond it. Indeed the implementation of a judgement will be tempered and influenced by 
where the State stands in relation to a particular religion along the lines theorised by Gunn. 
Even if a State rectifies its non-neutrality in certain respects such as public education, it does 
not mean that it would then assume a position of neutrality on all religious matters in every 
sphere of public life. For example, there is yet to be case-law on whether the State is barred 
from preferring or providing financial incentives or tax breaks to State-endorsed religions. In 
cases where such incentives are extended to all religions, additional difficult questions may 
arise as to who are and are not considered eligible religions
341
, which would then again 
implicate Gunn’s model, and why neutrality in such matters is limited to being between 
religions and not all organisations, whether political, idealistic, philosophical or 
encompassing any other form of personal conviction.  
Ultimately not only are the multifarious attitudes of States towards various religions and their 
adherents coloured by the beliefs, identity and philosophy at the State’s core, the dynamic is 
codified and entrenched within international law and particularly the ECtHR as the principle 
of ‘margin of appreciation’.
342
 If unconditional neutrality was to be applied even de jure by 
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the Court, then it would not be possible for States such as France, Turkey and Switzerland to 
use their cultural, religious and historical contexts to have such an instrumental effect on the 
Court’s deliberation. Even Temperman concedes, while arguing for the emerging right to 
neutrality, in relation to Lautsi v. Italy that “Although it is not unimaginable that the Grand 
Chamber (which has not yet reached a decision at the time of writing) may yield to political 
pressure to revise the Chamber’s decision in the near future (by virtue of applying a wider 
margin of appreciation)”.
343
 The Grand Chamber did precisely this in ruling that displaying 
crucifixes in classrooms fell within the margin of appreciation afforded to Italy.
344
 It decided 
to hinge its reasoning on there being no evidence that “the display of such a symbol might 
have an influence on pupils” and that in any case it was a “passive symbol”, which did not 
have the same effect on pupils as proselytising or engaging in religious activities.
345
 While it 
rendered Italy’s majority religion visible in classrooms, it did not amount to indoctrination.
346
 
In summation, the Court’s application of the principle of State neutrality is not absolute and is 
balanced against the applicable margin of appreciation based on the substance of a given 
case. 
 
III. Implications of inclusion and exclusion  
Nevertheless before continuing our discussion on the bounds of inclusion within both legal 
systems, it is essential to first highlight what exactly is meant by and the implications of 
inclusion. The classical dhimma system is often characterised by the idea of an Islamic 
political entity bent on offensive military expansionism offering each conquered people in its 
path three options: Islam, jizya or the sword.
347
 The option of Islam is meant to signify the 
offer of conversion to Islam. The payment of jizya is the requirement to be treated as dhimma. 
The sword is clearly the reference to being fought and thus the permissibility of being killed. 
The fourth implicit option would appear to be to exile oneself or be expelled from the 
territory that the Muslims have gained control. This depiction of the options in the context of 
the scope of dhimma and recognition of certain groups gives the skewed impression that 
either a religious group falls within the scope of dhimma and if it does not, then they are 
subject to death or expulsion. However such mischaracterisations emanate from a context of 
enmity, hostilities and an international system of empires, where the default was a state of 
aggression and peace the exception as opposed to the present context, where peace is the 
default and aggression the exception. Even under Islamic law those not recognised as 
dhimmis were permitted to visit temporarily Muslim lands as musta’min for purposes such as 
trade. Some authors have mischaracterised this category as being only for polytheistic 
visitors. This technically incorrect characterisation may reflect the predominance of groups 
who were granted the status as opposed to an affirmation of the idea that polytheists were 
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excluded from dhimma. Their dhimma status was in contrast to musta’min an indication of 
permanent or temporary residence. While approaching cautiously, the idea of permanent 
residence 1400 years ago being tantamount to the modern notion of citizenship, permanent 
residence is clearly an essential element of modern citizenship.
348
  
As such, the discourse under Islamic law of scope and recognition should be framed as those 
excluded not being eligible for or having a right to modern citizenship, as there is seldom a 
situation possible where an individual has permanent residence, but cannot or will not have 
the right to apply for citizenship at some point. It is also worth mentioning briefly that purely 
by virtue of being considered musta’min does not mean that all rights attributable to dhimma 
are withheld. In fact the rights related to religious freedom available are discussed at length 
by some contemporary Arabic-language authors.
349
 While this is not the focus of the present 
study, it is of note that a similar approach to international law, especially in light of the view 
of the HRC, is applied where religious minority rights cannot be denied owing only to non-
citizenship. Hence if we perceive the positions under Islamic law of exclusion and inclusion 
as those being tantamount to being citizens or non-citizens owing to permanence and 
appropriate and relevant rights, then the comparison to international law and State-practice 
can be more readily made.  
Firstly, while the HRC does not preclude non-citizens from the scope of Art. 27 of ICCPR
350
, 
it still remains the case that the rights available to citizens belong to religious minorities may 
be different to those who do not hold citizenship or are visiting the territory temporarily. In 
other words the rights available have to match the needs of the individuals in question and 
where a minority right has no link to permanent residence it may not be granted. An example 
of this is the contrast between providing a place of religious worship, whether financially 
subsidised by the State or not. Permanent residents would certainly lay claim to such a right 
in order to collectively practice their faith with their co-adherents. However a temporary 
visitor could not lay claim to such a right or reasonably request for such a provision, 
especially if they adhered to a religion, which no one else prescribed to in that State. At the 
same time, the proper understanding of the HRC’s view would be that States may not 
withhold rights from minorities that are of relevance to them, such as interference in their 
freedom to believe or to manifest that belief in private or public. 
Secondly, the discussion of excluded groups from the scope of dhimma, as touched on above, 
is not where exclusion equates to expulsion or death just as in modern States non-recognition 
does not amount to non-citizenship, death or expulsion. It is not a statement of hostile 
relations and enmity to the individuals themselves but rather non-recognition of the religious 
element of their identity and the collective needs and aspiration of co-religionists. On the 
contrary, that is exactly how the scenario has been painted with regards to the classical 
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Islamic law position. This can only be alleged about the most restrictive interpretation of 
limiting inclusion to People of the Book. Even if we are to continue with the thought process 
with this one view, then the idea that exclusion meant death or expulsion has been 
problematised by the idea of the category of mustamin, which unequivocally included 
polytheists and has been characterised by some authors as being specific to polytheists. We 
also know that even mustamin were to be granted some of the rights of dhimmi albeit not all 
of them. Some complex issues around context here should inform our analysis. 
 
IV. Contextual Factors   
In the context of conquest and expansion of classical Islamic law, especially in the Arabian 
Peninsula, the encounter with religious minorities was limited to Christians, Jews, Magians 
and the polytheists. The problem in interpretation and comparison arise with this fourth 
category of polytheists. The use of the English translation ‘polytheists’ implies a generic term 
related to specifically religious belief or a type of religious belief. However the actual Arabic 
term used of mushrikeen, refers to and denotes a specific group who were also the Muslim’s 
political and military enemy, the Quraish of Makkah, the tribe of the Prophet himself, and 
those who were allied to them. Hence the term is specific to an enemy alliance with whom a 
war was being fought and refers to and identifies them by their common coincidental 
religious beliefs and in this context referred to a finite number of known groups. Largely the 
expansion of Muslim rule took place in opposition to and in this context of the wider conflict 
with the mushrikeen, the principal connotation of which was ‘the enemy’. Therefore the 
experience to other religious groupings was limited to mainly two specific religions, the 
Christians and the Jews and more nominally the Magians. With the fourth being that of the 
‘enemy’ referred to as polytheists, in relation to their beliefs. In other words, the experience 
of polytheists in this early context was inseparable from enmity and hostility. Thus on 
conquest, the polytheists remained hostile to the Muslims and there was not really a question 
of them staying or even wanting to exist as permanent residents in the wider context of the 
conflict, nor as law abiding citizens. They were either held captive, used as leverage in 
relations with the enemy or retreated to their strongholds while they existed.  
In the present international system, those belonging to religious minorities exist in predefined 
and fixed State boundaries, where the State is said to be sovereign and enjoying territorial 
integrity, which may only be compromised under some exceptional circumstances. The lands 
in which the religious minorities exist have done so for some time and are long established 
not only in the territory of the State but at times in a specific region where they happen to be 
predominant. They have not become subject to the authority of the governing power by way 
of conflict or conquest and there is no history of intrinsic or pre-existing enmity or 
resentment in most cases. This then offers a wholly different context to that described above 
in which the early discussion around Islamic law and dhimmis took place. The vast contextual 
gap may be bridged by posing questions such as how would Islamic law deal with 
polytheistic groups who were not hostile, did not engag in armed hostilities with a Muslim 
power and pre-existed in that territory? Would they not be eligible to the rights to dhimma? In 
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the early context, the question is an open one, depending on interpretation of the basis for 
exclusion of polytheists and whether it attached to a specific grouping or their generic 
religious belief or their conflict with the Muslims. However the hypothetical question became 
a real one historically as the Islamic empire continued to expand encompassing increasingly 
diverse subjects, including non-hostile polytheistic religions. In that emerging reality, 
dhimma protection was indeed extended to polytheists, drawing on the analogy of the 
Magians as polytheists rather than the tenuous position of considering them as People of the 
Book.
351
 Crucially, the developing practice of including those beyond the restrictive 
interpretation of People of the Book and the Magians was not merely a pragmatic practice to 
deal with the complexity of increasing religious (and ethnic) plurality of subjects, but actually 
supported by a valid interpretation of Islamic law on the matter, that is the eligibility to 
dhimma of all religious minorities whether polytheistic or People of the Book. 
We have touched on the two views at the two extremes of the spectrum of validity under 
Islamic law, from the most restrictive to the most expansive. There was however the view 
that sat in the middle of these two that Arab polytheists are the only type of religious group 
that cannot be eligible for dhimma implying that non-Arab polytheists are eligible. Once 
again this extrapolation emanates from the understanding the inclusion of the Magians as ahl 
al-dhimma. There may be a case for this to have been the most prominent view amongst 
classical jurists. This is because al-Shafi’i’s view that the Magians had to be considered as 
People of the Book due to Qur’an 9:29 being explicit and exhaustive, is certainly the minority 
opinion and not held by the other three schools of Islamic law. As such, following the route 
of the strongest and most prevalent views, we would conclude that the Magians were and 
should be considered as polytheists based on their ostensible beliefs and practices. Therefore 
the next line of reasoning would have to explain the basis of the inclusion of the Magians, if 
Shafi’i’s view is to be disfavoured. This indicated that it could not have been the Magian’s 
polytheism per se that excluded them from dhimma. Either polytheism had no impact on the 
scope of dhimma or it had to be coupled with another trait. Jurists thus deduced that the 
difference between the polytheists, who were not offered the dhimma and the Magians, was 
that the former were Arab and the latter were not. As to the precise meaning of ‘Arab’ and 
whether it referred to language, ethnicity or geography that was discussed in Chapter 2.    
How does this middle view compare with international law? We will take the heads of ethnic 
and linguistic together as they often coincide and treat the geographical head separately. 
Clearly under Art. 27 of ICCPR, the HRC or the Declaration on Minorities, it would not be 
justifiable to limit the scope of religious minority on an ethno-linguistic basis. To do so, 
would be arbitrary and discriminatory. It would also in no uncertain terms be contrary to 
minority rights principles of self-identity within the wide objective bounds in place. It is 
nonetheless interesting that the narrowest scope of minority rights protection potentially 
found in the interpretation of the FCNM by its member States of ‘national minority’ has some 
similarities, where it indirectly works along ethno-linguistic lines as it is normally applicable 
to long established minorities, which happen to be ethnically or linguistically distinct but not 
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religiously as well as not being significantly ethnically different as in the case of immigration 
from the developing world. It is though noteworthy that we had established that considering 
the ‘Arab’ element as linguistic or ethnic was a weak understanding and it was in fact more 
likely to be a reference to geography or conversely to the Arab polytheists present in the 
Arabian Peninsula at the time. In sum not only was the exclusion of polytheists specific to 
that time, but also specific groups in that region. 
The conclusion that Arab polytheists could not be eligible for dhimma was not only formed 
on the basis of the inclusion of Magians, but also the prevalent opinion that is sourced from 
the hadith of the Prophet, while on his death bed that there should be no non-Muslims in the 
Arabian Peninsula. It is also that hadith that is central to the difficulty that may arise even 
with the broadest scope found at the most lenient end of the spectrum of validity, that all non-
Muslims regardless of being polytheistic or People of the Book were entitled to be given 
dhimma status. The difficulty is that even with this opinion the exceptional status given to the 
Arabian Peninsula as requiring a homogenously Muslim citizenry and that an individual did 
not actively belong and have allegiance to groups who were at war or were sworn enemies of 
the Muslims. This meant that there was an exclusion of recognition and existence from a 
given territory of all non-Muslim permanent residents, owing to it being the international 
religious epicentre of its believers.
352
 The first point to note in this regard is that there may be 
analogous examples of this even in current State practice; such is the case with the Vatican or 
the Maldives. Both condition nationality on religious belief. 
Before delving too deeply into these two opinions of excluding from dhimma status on the 
basis of Arab ethno-linguistic identity or by virtue of existing within the bounds of the 
Arabian Peninsula, which was perceived as the geographical territory where Arabs are 
indigenous, we should explore their relationship to each other and how they relate to our 
present context. It will be argued that discussion on both these matters is, to a large extent 
mute and of no practical consequence as it either dealt with a specific context in the past 
which is irrelevant today, or the basis for those stances would not bear the same results today. 
First it could be argued that they are similar legal concepts: one excludes on the basis of Arab 
ethnicity and the other owing to Arab territory. So it may be submitted that in essence the 
exclusion in both instance is aimed at Arabs. Although strictly speaking they are to be 
distinguished as the ethnic exclusion applies regardless of location and so would be 
applicable in any State around the world. The geographical exclusion is actually aimed at all 
religious minorities, Arab or non-Arab. It seeks to make the land of the Arabs, the Arabian 
Peninsula, a territory where only Muslims, Arab or non-Arab, are eligible for permanent 
residence. Therefore oversimplifying, it seeks to turn the Land of the Arabs into the Land of 
the Muslims. 
The more salient point then regarding context and relevance is that the juristic view on scope 
and the policy of no dhimma in the Arabian Peninsula was implemented over 1400 years ago 
and with a backdrop of hostilities and enmity with certain religious groups. Presently, the 
situation does not exist in all its facets and dynamics. With regards to the view that Arab 
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polytheists were to be excluded from dhimma status on the basis that Magians were not Arabs 
was only applicable to Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula thus constituting a purely ethnic 
distinction to peoples only found in a limited geographical region. As such for clarification, 
while it was an ethnic distinction it was practically applicable to anyone outside the Arabian 
Peninsula as there was no coincidence of ethnic Arab migration to States where Islamic law 
was being implemented and hence the need to assess the applicability of dhimma by the 
governing authorities. Also for those who in being put into positions of governance as the 
Islamic empire expanded, while they may have been applying the more liberal view of 
including all polytheists within the scope of dhimma, they did not also fall foul of the middle 
opinion of if it being permissible to extend it to only non-Arab polytheists, as never was the 
religious minority that had to be given dhimma a group that had migrated or ethnically 
originated from the Arabian Peninsula.  
With regards to the view of geographical exclusion, the converse is true. The Arabian 
Peninsula has experienced significant and consistent immigration from a number of ethno-
national groups belonging to various States, in large part to being the epicentre of Islam. 
While this has resulted in an ethnically diverse population in the Arabian Peninsula today, 
immigration was for the sake of religion and by Muslims. Hence there is no case of anyone at 
present in one of the States of the Arabian Peninsula, who has a right to citizenship and been 
denied it by virtue of being a non-Muslim.
353
 This is not to say that there are not significant 
numbers of non-Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula. However their residence and associated 
welfare is wholly dependent on their employment in the region. The treatment of non-
Muslims in such a way is in fact more along ethno-national lines rather than religious. All 
non-Saudis, who come to Saudi Arabia for the purposes of work, are treated in the same 
manner. Regardless of how long they may reside and work in Saudi Arabia, they will not be 
eligible for citizenship, Muslim or non-Muslim. The same is true for the UAE, Qatar, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Yemen. The only distinction on religious grounds between 
residents who are non-Saudi Muslims and non-Saudi non-Muslim in Saudi Arabia is access 
to the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah. The reason behind this is a completely separate 
principle to the exclusion of dhimma status from the Arabian Peninsula and is wholly owed to 
theological and ritualistic reasons related to worship, holy sites and pilgrimage. Even if 
dhimma status was possible in the Arabian Peninsula, those non-Muslims would still be 
excluded from certain parts of Makkah and Madinah.   
The first issue we examined with regards to scope under international law was the meaning 
and definition of ‘religion’, and how it differed under the human rights to non-discrimination 
and freedom of religion. Under Islamic law, inherently there cannot be such a distinction 
between scope or substantial rights. This is because as a starting point, Islamic law recognises 
and treats religious groupings as collective entities, consisting of individuals with relevant 
rights, with a number of competencies. This recognition and resulting status precedes a 
discussion of rights. On the contrary international law as a starting point, recognises 
culturally unique individuals who happen to belong to a minority grouping and mainly vests 
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in them individual rights. As such, logically under Islamic law, scope in relation to rights of 
non-discrimination, freedom of religion and minority rights will all flow from recognition as 
a religious minority or as dhimma. Whereas under international law, the rights regimes are 
separate yet connected.  
Hence it may indeed be possible to be extended rights of religious non-discrimination but not 
of religious freedom or religious minority rights or alternatively to be allowed the freedom of 
religion but be excluded from minority rights law. Therefore the causation and the flow of 
rights is quite the opposite as to Islamic law. Under international law, once the highest and 
most difficult set of rights is extended, that of religious minority rights, then it would not be 
possible to deny rights of non-discrimination. Furthermore, rights which are deemed to be 
collective rights accruing to the group entity rather than to individuals of the group are 
alluded to and their indirect realisation made possible at the most progressive extreme of 
minority rights. The more explicit set of rights in this realm found in the contested traditional 
notion of self-determination and the emerging right to autonomy are indicative of 
international law’s aversion to collective rights of minorities. Islamic law however has little 
issue of adopting an approach that centres on collective rights and autonomy in a host of 
matters relating to religious minorities. This difference in approach to rights is quite crucial 
as it underpins and undercuts much of the comparative discussions and in turn affects the 
advantages and disadvantages of each system.  
Returning to the issue of scope of ‘religion’ relating to discrimination under international law, 
we understood it to be dependent on two main factors, self-identification and the perception 
of the perpetrator. The former because there are a number potential and real scenarios where 
States seek to deny recognition of a certain religious identity by themselves defining what 
may constitute a religion and even more so, if someone is able to claim to belong or practice 
that religion. The perception of perpetrators becomes important in situations where people 
may be discriminated or persecuted against due to mistaken assumptions based on appearance 
or other ostensible factors. However as we already discussed, there are no substantive factors 
which explain beyond self or other-perception of essentially identity what ‘religion’ might or 
could be and in turn what it may exclude under non-discrimination norms. For example if 
someone perceives of themselves as a Jew and/or others perceive of them as such, it becomes 
inconsequential whether they may be deemed to be Jewish by some objective means set by 
society, State or religious institutions for the purposes of religious discrimination to be 
present.  
The first point to note is one of context and relevance. At the time when discussions around 
dhimma took place the number of religious groups was finite and limited. The complex 
diversity and plurality that can be witnessed in some Western European States today resulting 
from globalisation, colonisation, mass migration and mass displacement, and near extinction 
of indigenous population was not the prevailing reality. Instead the ethnic, religious and 
linguistic identities of various groups were known and easily discernible as beyond common 
knowledge and ethnicities correlated with religion, with the exception of Islam. This is 
important as the idea that there could be those who self-identified as a certain religion to be 
denied that identity or were mistaken to be religion that they were not, were simply not likely 
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scenarios to take place in that context. Furthermore due to the nature of nation-States, diverse 
populations are required to share in the national identity and thus integrate socially and in 
terms of work.  
Classical Islamic law and the concept of dhimma was formulated in a context, where 
religious minority entities lived their separate autonomous lives socially and officially and 
there was no need or requirement to integrate or live amongst the Muslims, thus reducing the 
occurrence of types of discrimination contemporous with the present context. However where 
questions of discrimination do arise in relation to dhimma, are areas such as jizya, military 
participation and political participation including serving in executive or governmental posts. 
As here we are concerned only with scope, we will leave discussion of these particular issues 
for later in the thesis. What can be said nonetheless is that the debate on this has never been 
one of denial of rights of non-discrimination due to certain religious discrimination falling 
outside the scope of ‘religion’ but rather whether certain differences of treatment constitute 
unreasonable and arbitrary differences in treatment as laid out under international law. It 
being paramount to keep in mind that not all differences of treatment constitute 
discrimination if they are shown to be reasonable and objective.      
We have established that Islamic law for the purposes of scope treats all aspects of religious 
minority rights equally as it primarily concerns itself with whether it is dealing with a 
religious minority or not. This follows that instead of then looking at scope for non-
discrimination, religious freedom and minority rights separately, the comparison to Islamic 
law must look at the definition of terms through the prism of dhimma, which we have used as 
the closest comparator to religious minorities. We noted that conventional binding 
instruments and provisions on non-discrimination provided no substantive insight into 
‘religion’. Using Gunn’s polythetical approach to defining ‘religion’ we deduced from Art. 
18 of the Declaration on Religious Discrimination that ‘religion’ could be defined, 
understood and identified through a number of facets which included worship, community of 
adherents and leaders, places of worship and assembly, days of celebration, identity and a 
way of life. The same approach to freedom of religion yields the following facets from Art. 
18 of UDHR: manifestation of religion through “teaching, practice, worship and observance” 
and “either alone or in community with others and in public or private”. Finally Art. 27 of 
ICCPR mentions “profess and practise their own religion.”  
All these similar and closely related facets are not that divergent from Islamic law’s approach 
to understanding the nature and bounds of religion. It may not be an explicit discussion that 
took place amongst jurists chiefly due to the absence of the complex diversity and plurality 
already touched upon, meaning that it was never really disputed what was and was not a 
religion. Nonetheless under Islamic law, religion would have been understood in 
juxtaposition, similarity or opposition to Islam itself. Non-Muslims were either perceived as 
People of the Book or polytheists, with as we discussed at length earlier another perspective 
considering the People of the Book as a sub-category of polytheists. While there is seldom 
discussion of atheists, it may be asserted that they would also be subsumed under the 
category of polytheists, thus a highly essentialist view of the Islamic world view and thus its 
understanding of religion is that there is a binary division between those who are 
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monotheistic (Muslim) and those who are polytheistic (non-Muslim). The specific treatment 
and reference to the People of the Book becoming pertinent as to them exhibiting elements of 
monotheism and polytheism.  
Therefore it is certainly a sound deduction to surmise that the Islamic view of religion cannot 
be disentangled from the notion of God as that is the common denominator in the possibilities 
that it considers when identifying others by their religion. Monotheism being the belief in one 
God, polytheism being the belief in more than one God but also being synonymous with 
disbelief in one God, thus incorporating the notion of atheism, which is the belief in no God. 
It is also the case that discussion about the nature of religion is always coupled with what 
follows it. Much along the same lines as international law, it is presumed that a belief in God 
or Gods brings with it specific acts of worship and ritual that provide a means establishing 
and maintaining a relationship with such deistic entities. Under Islamic law, all groups, 
Muslim, Christians, Jews and polytheists have specific and elaborated methods of worship, 
practice and manifestation, which include and encompass all elements specified under 
international law above.  
The only exception to this is the atheist and atheism as it is a reaction and a rejection to 
religion. Its inclusion under international law is to protect the right not to believe in order to 
eliminate any possibility or hint of coercion. Under Islamic law, atheism would come under 
the rubric of polytheism (i.e. shirk) as it would be a rejection of monotheism (Islam) and an 
affirmation of the polytheistic belief that some other or no entity could be vested with Godly 
attributes. Alternatively essentially, atheism could be seen as polytheism as it is a belief in 
other than God, and so is an association (shirk) with the one God. It is evident also that the 
issue of atheism and its inclusion within the ambit of freedom of religion under international 
law posed some conceptual problems. It was not a religion per se as it was the belief and was 
not linked to the notion of God and exhibited no accompanying outwardly acts, practices or 
manifestations. However it stood in contradistinction to religion and while it was not a 
religious belief, for the purposes of international law was a ‘religious’ right as it was a belief 
about religion rather a belief in religion. It was also necessitated to prevent an abuse, 
misapplication or misinterpretation of the freedom of religion so as to only be extended to 
religious beliefs, thus potentially used as indirect justification for non-protection of the right 
to freedom of religion of atheists to not believe. Hence the inclusion of atheism within the 
scope of freedom of religion has been implicit from the inception of the right in the UDHR 
and became explicit in the elaboration provided by the HRC.  
Coupled with this, we deduced that the appendage of ‘and belief’ to the ‘freedom of religion’ 
reflected the above intricacies in that such a ‘belief’ need not be religious but be related to 
religion and was likely inserted specifically with ‘atheism’ in mind. It clearly did not include 
any generic belief in anything as was evident in the example of assisted suicide under the 
ECtHR. Therefore if under international law, atheists are not considered religious minorities 
but included within the scope of freedom of religion, then under Islamic law they are 
potentially included within the scope of dhimma as polytheists. Polytheism would be 
applicable to the atheist’s beliefs from a point of view of substantial belief, but also from 
another perspective being synonymous with disbelief (kufr). This is due to the fact that 
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Islamic law categorises its subjects primarily by their religious beliefs and furthermore in 
opposition or in relation to Islam. Thus the absence of religious belief is as much polytheistic 
and disbelief as idolatry and the allegedly altered Abrahamic faiths of Judaism and 
Christianity. As far as Islam is concerned, theologically all non-Muslims are to be considered 
kuffaar (disbelievers) as they disbelieve in Islam and mushrikeen (polytheists) as they attach 
Godly attributes to other than God or a plurality of Gods, hence associating others (literally 
shirk) with God.  
Essentially then all non-Muslims for the purposes of scope of dhimma are polytheists and the 
discussion around its limitation to the People of the Book only arises to them being an 
exception to the exclusion of polytheists as a subcategory as opposed to their religious beliefs 
being considered anything but polytheistic. Pertinently though it appears that even under 
Islamic law that dhimma status may be extendable to atheists as polytheists and as such 
inclusion in scope would be of beliefs about religion as opposed to in religion. This is almost 
identical to the international law position as per our discussion above. Similarly also under 
Islamic law, not all generic beliefs would be included as they would have to relate to religion; 
a belief in a religion or about a religion. This would immediately neutralise a potential 
significant criticism of Islamic law, that while international law protects freedom of religion 
and belief, Islamic law only extends protection to at its most to those of religion. Despite this, 
it is worth keeping in mind that the means of arriving at the same conclusion under both 
systems of law was quite different yet the result strikingly similar     
The discussion in terms of the availability of interpretive approaches under international law 
is strikingly similar to those relating to the scope of dhimma under Islamic Law. In Chapter 2, 
we noted that the crux of the issue around the scope of dhimma was the classification of the 
Magians. We observed that the Shafi’i School in contrast to the other schools of law held that 
the Magians must be from the People of the Book, as there is no dispute as to their eligibility 
to dhimma status. In his view, Qur’an 9:29 was exhaustive and restrictive in its reference to 
jizya being taken from only the People of the Book and no other groups. This was because 
Shafi’i and subsequently his school of law held firmly to the principle that the Qur’an could 
not be abrogated by ahaadith. On the contrary it was the view of the majority of jurists and 
the other three major schools of law, in light of the polytheistic beliefs of the Magians, that 
the verse had either to be interpreted as being abrogated by the hadith or as we sought to 
reconcile between the two by noting that the mention of the People of the Book was not 
abrogated but modified or supplemented by the hadith. As such the reference to the People of 
the Book was a non-exhaustive reference open to additions and expansion.
354
 
We find here in the potential interpretations of Article 27 a similar discussion where we seek 
to come to terms in particular with the meaning, scope of ‘ethnic’ and its relationship with the 
other types of listed minorities. While the case for considering ethnic identity as being 
inclusive of religious and linguistic identity may be a more progressive, ambitious and 
contested position to adopt, the inclusion of ‘religious’ and ‘linguistic’ as types and examples 
included within the scope of culture is far more indisputable.  The net result is that the ethnic 
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head allows for all matter of groups, not just religious or linguistic, to access minority rights 
as long as they have a distinct culture which they actively seek to identify with and enjoy 
aspects of. Given that the term ‘ethnic’ is included within the scope of ICERD, a number of 








V. Conclusion  
When we then come to the recognition of religious minorities as compared to dhimmis, we 
observe some surprising results. The aversion in international law and subsequently amongst 
States to define ‘minority’, specifically of the religious variety, and to recognise them 
emanates from a fear of attributing the associated minority rights as expressed in the UN 
Declaration on Minorities and the FCNM. These fears include, among others, at one extreme, 
separation and secession of the group and the territory in which they are predominant. The 
most common and general reason however appears to be the maintenance of a monolithic 
national identity. There is a sentiment that political power should not be conceded and further 
that there be no positive obligations upon the State with financial implications. Most 
importantly though while individuals’ religious identity may be readily recognised, the group 
of such individuals are not recognised as religious minorities and as such group rights 
associated to the manifestation of their religion are not acknowledged nor granted. 
In Islamic law, the situation is rather different. Once a religious belief is considered as 
legitimate, then all adherents are in fact treated as a group or minority in the first instance. 
Thus rights related to manifesting their religion in private and public are issues that are 
broached at the inset of deciding the appropriate treatment to be meted out to them. 
Furthermore they may even be allowed internal autonomy in relation to judging by their own 
religious laws and having a specifically defined territory akin to contemporary notions of 
autonomy. In summation under Islamic law, once it has been established as a matter of fact 
that a minority may or does exist; they then automatically become entitled to the rights owed 
to dhimmis, including those of manifestation of religion and autonomy. To the contrary in 
international law, the term has evaded legal definition and States have sought to exploit this 
subjectivity and discretion by refusing to recognise, as a matter of law, minorities, which 
beyond any doubt exist as matter of fact. This has politicised the recognition and attribution 
of rights of minorities to a greater extent as compared to other areas of human rights law.  
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Chapter 5 
The Internal Aspect of Freedom of 
Religion under Islamic Law 
 
I. Introduction 
In the first three chapters of Section 1 of the thesis, we elaborated and analysed the concept of 
the scope of religious minorities and dhimma to grasp if there are religious groups that may 
be excluded from the protections and rights afforded in each system of law and on what basis. 
In Section 2, our aim will be to explore the substance of the rights that may attach to religious 
minorities and dhimma, with a particular focus on the freedom of religion. The rationale for 
this is the assumption that the freedom of religion is the most vital right of religious 
minorities as it goes to the heart of and intersects their identity, convictions and way of life. 
The freedom of religion, philosophically, under international law and as we will illustrate 
under Islamic law entails two parts: the internal right to hold beliefs followed by the external 
right to manifest or practice those beliefs.
358
 The present chapter will seek to address the 
internal aspect of this right from an Islamic law perspective. The decision to devote an entire 
chapter to the topic under Islamic law is owing to both the fundamentality of the principle to 
Islamic law as well as the extensive critique it receives across disciplines and spheres.   
Therefore it is logical to begin the discussion relating to freedom of religion of non-Muslims 
under Islamic law, by a thorough analysis of the fundamental and crucial internal aspect of 
the right to freedom of religion. Despite the presumed association of Islam with violence, it 
has seldom been asserted as a means of religious coercion intended to induce forced 
conversion of non-Muslims to Islam. Rather the discourse around violence and Islam has 
been focused on the achievement of political ends, self-defence and grievances over disputed 
lands and interventionist foreign policies of Western Governments. This is not to say, 
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However from a doctrinal and legal perspective, the issue, on the one hand, could be 
perceived as simply not interfering at all with the internal aspect of an individual’s thought, 
conscience or religion owing to the emphatic and oft cited verse beginning: “There is no 
compulsion in religion [...]”.
360
 On the other hand, another verse which states in part “...kill 
the polytheists wherever you find them...But if they should repent, establish prayer and give 
zakah, let them [go] on their way. Indeed Allah is Forgiving and Merciful”,
361
 leads some to a 
different understanding of freedom of religion in Islamic law. They argue that this verse 
abrogates the earlier conciliatory verse and gives the choice to the polytheists of either death 
or Islam, thus forcing them to convert.
362
 As far as non-polytheists are concerned, namely the 
People of the Book (Jews and Christians), they have the third option of paying jizya and 
remaining in Muslim lands as discussed in Chapter 2. This would then in their eyes constitute 
a weaker, but nonetheless, a form of coercion relating to freedom of religion.  
Neither approach bears fruit when attempting to answer the original question of whether 
Islam grants an absolute internal right of freedom to hold beliefs. An attempt will be made to 
read the Qur’an and indeed Islam as a whole and within its various contexts. Thus the above 
well-known Qur’anic verses will be discussed in detail, their specific and general meanings 
unravelled by reference to both classical commentaries and contemporary juristic scholarship. 
Most crucially, the overarching message of Islam will be overlaid on to any textual analysis 
prior to arriving at final conclusions. In this regard, there are three common oversights that, if 
addressed, could bridge and reconcile opposing views. The first is the failure to distinguish 
between verses and rulings relating to a time of war or active hostilities and that of 
peace/ceasefire. The second is the failure to distinguish motives related to religious coercion 
and preventing threats to Islam’s political authority
363
 and preserving the religious nature of 
the State. The third is the failure to distinguish between warnings relating to punishment after 




II. Does Islamic law encourage religious coercion?  
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The starting point for addressing the question of whether or not Islamic law encourages 
religious coercion is necessarily Qur’an 2:256, which translates as follows:  
“There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has 
become clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in taghut and believes in Allah 
has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing 
and Knowing”. 
This has always been presented as the single most compelling Qur’anic evidence against 
those who argue that Islam does not allow for the freedom to hold a different religious belief. 
The peculiarity of the word ‘taghut’ not being translated directly is present in both the Saheeh 
International translation of the Qur’an as well as the abridged English translation of Tafsir 
Ibn Kathir. The former elaborates the potential meaning in a footnote as “False objects of 
worship, such as idols, heavenly bodies, spirits, human beings, etc.”
365
 The latter states the 
most probable meaning attributed by commentators here is ‘Satan’.
366
   It is noteworthy from 
the wording alone to deduce that with its most apparent meaning, it forbids compelling or 
adopting of a new religion by force. This is confirmed by Ibn Kathir’s classical commentary, 
which explained the verse as follows: 
“Do not force anyone to become Muslim, for Islam is plain and clear, and its proofs and 
evidence are plain and clear. Therefore, there is no need to force anyone to embrace 
Islam. Rather, whoever Allah directs to Islam, opens his heart for it and enlightens his 
mind, will embrace Islam with certainty. Whoever blinds his heart and seals his hearing 
and sight, then he will not benefit from being forced to embrace Islam.”
367
 
Therefore what is meant by the verse is that religious truth has become clear from falsehood 
to such an extent, that for those who sincerely and genuinely seek the truth, they would have 
no inhibitions through their own internal reasoning to follow Islam as a religion. Whereas 
those who choose to reject Islam, do so for innumerable other reasons, but vitally, not owing 
to a lack of clarity on what the ‘right course’ is. They would have turned their backs on the 
‘right course’ fully well knowing that it was the truth. This is followed by condoning those 
who disbelieve in the Taghut and believe in Allah. Here belief is not to be equated to the 
existence of belief but following and obeying God’s commandments. The notion mentioned 
by Ibn Kathir relating to “whoever Allah directs to Islam, opens his heart for it and enlightens 
his mind...” refers to the Islamic concept of predestination/fate and its relationship with our 
actions. This will be discussed further below.   
The final part of the verse, referring to two specific attributes of Allah being “all-Hearing” 
and “all-Knowing”, is not lacking significance either. They serve as a device to remind the 
reader that Allah hears all what you may say – when it may differ from person to person and 
even if nothing is uttered, He is fully aware of what resides in the hearts of men. A belief 
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adhered to in front of some people but not others (religious hypocrisy or nifaq) will be 
exposed on the Day of Judgement and a belief that is kept completely within oneself would 
also be manifest to Allah, whether it is belief or disbelief in Islam. Lastly and more 
pertinently, an outwardly utterance of belief or disbelief is valueless without the internal and 
genuine belief of the heart, always discernible to the all-Knowing and omniscient God. 
Hence, it serves as a double-edged sword, on the one hand warning those Muslims who go 
against this commandment that forcible conversion is not to be accepted if the state of the 
heart remains on disbelief and on the other, it may also serve to warn the religious hypocrites 
(munafiqeen) that they may feign outwardly belief but God is all-Knowing of their true inner 
state. 
Ibn Kathir goes on to elaborate the circumstances of revelation of this verse (asbab al-nuzul) 
as recorded in a hadith narrated by Ibn Abbas: 
“When (an Ansar) woman would not bear children who would live, she would vow that 
if she gives birth to a child who remains alive, she would raise him as a Jew. When 
Banu An-Nadir (the Jewish tribe) were evacuated [from Madinah], some of the children 
of the Ansar said, ‘We will not abandon our children’.”
368
  
It was then that this verse was revealed by God to indicate that those children could not be 
forcibly returned to their biological parents, nor forcibly converted to Islam. There is an 
alternate account mentioned in the non-abridged Arabic Tafsir Ibn Kathir according to which 
Ibn Abbas said: “it was revealed with regard to a man from the tribe of Bani Salim whose two 
sons converted to Christianity but he was himself a Muslim. He told the Prophet: ‘Shall I 
force them to embrace Islam? They insist on Christianity’.” Both Traditions point to quite an 
advanced notion of the right to freedom of religion pertaining to the children themselves and 
those of the adopted Jewish parents in the first instance and foregoing of the rights of the 
Muslim father in the second instance.
369
 Despite this specific context, the verse is to be 
applied generally according to Ibn Kathir.  
He also goes on to explain the hadith recorded by Imam Ahmed in which the Prophet said to 
a man: “‘Embrace Islam.’ The man said, ‘I dislike it.’ The Prophet said, ‘even if you dislike 
it.’”
370
 He affirms the authenticity of the hadith and then explains: “The Prophet merely 
invited this man to become Muslim and he replied that he does not find himself eager to 
become Muslim. The Prophet said to the man that even though he dislikes embracing Islam, 
he should still embrace it, “for Allah will grant you sincerity and true intent.”
371
 The hadith 
could also be seen as the Prophet distinguishing between what one likes and what one 
considers the truth. In other words, desires need to be disaggregated from reason at times. 
The Prophet is reasoning with him to accept the truth, even if there be hardship and difficulty, 
for it will only be temporary for an initial phase and temporary in the sense of being the 
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prelude to the eternal abode in paradise. Furthermore the fact that such a conversation is 
taking place implies that there must be some interest in Islam or that the man has come to the 
Prophet with some problem seeking its solution.     
Some translate and seek to understand Qur’an 2:256 as a factual statement rather than a 
commandment or a law: “There is no compulsion in religion” or “no compulsion is there in 
religion”. This then may leave the possibility to suggest that it refers only to the non-
feasibility of compulsion in religion rather than an outright forbiddance, seeking to pave the 
way and strengthen subsequent claims for exceptions to the statement.
372
 Ibn Kathir’s 
commentary is lucid that the verse is to be understood as the commandment, “Do not force 
anyone to become Muslim.” This is further corroborated by the asbab al-nuzul, which set out 
that the verse served as a commandment to the Prophet for the Ansari children not to be 
forcibly converted and returned to their biological Muslim parents or the sons who had 
converted to Christianity not to be forcibly converted back to Islam by their Muslim father. 
The Prophet could have forcibly returned the children to their Muslim parents without having 
to justify their conversion as the parents would exert their authority and influence to control 
them in any case.
373
 According to one juristic understanding, children are to be considered as 
not belonging to any religion apart from Islam until they reach adulthood (post-puberty) and 
profess to whatever religion they wish. This could serve as an example of treating the 
guardianship of the children as a matter of religious freedom for the Jewish parents. What 
should also be kept in mind was that this allowance – extremely painful to the biological 
Muslim parents – was at the time of Banu Nadir’s expulsion for severe treachery against the 
Muslims in Madinah (discussed in detail below). 
In any event the distinction between the verse being a statement or commandment is 
ultimately an artificial one. Why would God make a factual statement about an outright 
impossibility or an absolute incompatibility and then consider it an acceptable or permissible 
action in certain circumstances? The answer is clearly in the negative. However even taken at 
face value as a statement of infeasibility, it serves two purposes. The first is that for Muslims, 
God’s words are sacrosanct and are indisputably contained in the Qur’an. Thus an indication 
towards compulsion and religion being incompatible is inseparable from a Muslim 
understanding it as something they must exert effort towards actualising. As such for a 
Muslim to read these words implies not only that they should not force Islam upon anyone 
but that they should not allow other Muslims to either. The specificity of Muslims being 
ordered not to impose Islam upon others is supported by the asbab al-nuzul.
374
 A combined 
meaning is also derivable in that Muslims must prevent the forcible conversion of anyone to 
any religion. 
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The second is that despite the specificity given to the verse above, it carries general wording. 
The reference made is to religion not Islam and is in the form of a general statement not a 
commandment to Muslims specifically. Ibn Kathir, too, above notes the verse, while having a 
specific context of revelation, is of general application. Hence the general meaning can 
indeed be that ‘religion compelled’ constitutes an oxymoron and the principle is universally 
applicable regardless of which religion is the subject or object of compulsion. To surmise, 
no-one can compel anyone in or to any religion. Interestingly, with regards to non-Muslims, 
it could not be any more than a statement of fact and could not be seen as a commandment as 
they lack belief in Islam and as such the Qur’an as God’s word. The Qur’an can and would 
not command them to anything except belief in God and His Messenger. According to the 
principle of Qur’anic commentary, it is possible for Qur’anic verses to carry several 
concurrent but non-conflicting meanings as is the case here. It would evade common sense 
and plain rationality to assume that any of the above would render a conclusion that 
compulsion was not feasible in religion, but did not prohibit or even permitted Muslims to 
exercise force on non-Muslims so that they would become Muslims.  
It is also noteworthy that opponents of the idea that Islam espouses freedom to hold a 
religious belief conflate two contradictory arguments. The first is discussed above and relates 
to the wording of Qur’an 2:256 as a commandment or a statement and what effect, if any, it 
has on the meaning. The second is that Qur’an 2:256 is abrogated by Qur’an 9:5 as it calls on 
the Muslims to “kill the mushrikeen”. We have shown that the argument of the verse not 
being absolute and leaving some room for the permissibility of forced conversion lacks basis. 
Whereas the view that abrogation has taken place is one of the valid opinions on the issue. 
Although it must be added that there are numerous views with their own nuances and the 
associated question of partial abrogation arising is the more common one (discussed in detail 
below in Section VI). The relevant point at this juncture though is that the argument for the 
meaning allowing for compulsion and at the same time being abrogated cannot be made 
simultaneously as they contradict each other. No abrogation is needed of a principle, which 
was never absolutely stated. This further weakens the point of Qur’an 2:256 having any 
meaning apart from an absolute freedom to hold a belief. 
 
III. Islamic Conception of the Purpose behind God’s Creation of Man 
The infeasibility of a commandment prohibiting compulsion in religion is not only explicitly 
stated in Qur’an 2:256 but supported by the underlying basis of Islam and its essential 
message. Simply put, compelling Islam upon someone would wholly defeat and negate 
Islam’s purpose. The core of the Islamic creed is that Adam was created to worship the one 
true God and having been tempted by Satan was sent to the Earth along with Eve and Satan 
for a time in order to worship the one God and abide by his commandments.
375
 Thereafter, 
subsequent messengers up until the Prophet Muhammad were sent to call people to true 
monotheism. For those who accept, adhere and apply all related teachings and live their life 
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in the prescribed manner, would be granted eternal paradise and those who reject it would be 
destined for eternal torment in the hellfire.
376
 As such man’s eternal salvation or incarceration 
lies in his free choice to follow the truth or to reject it. Even Satan himself, when asked to 
prostrate to Adam, refused out of arrogance and pledged to misguide man until the Day of 
Judgement.
377
 Once again belief is not in merely the existence of God but adherence to His 
commandments. Satan not only believed but knew with surety of the existence of God and 
that He was his Creator, but still chose to go against His commandments because arrogance 
prevented him from prostrating to that which he was adamant was lesser than him (Adam).  
In light of the above, man must make this choice independently. Otherwise the basis of 
reward and punishment, in particular after death, would be redundant. If God does not seek to 
force his subjects to believe in Him, how is it possible for men to force each other? To do so 
would be an exercise in futility and self-deception. The compeller would have gravely erred 
for believing he is able to do something that God has prevented Himself from and he would 
have likely pushed the compelled further from true salvation and belief in the Truth. In fact, 
according to the Qur’an, free will is what elevated the first man, Adam, above the angels in 
status as the latter are in perpetual obedience and glorification of their Lord, while the former 
must struggle against their ego to do so. Free will is also a cause for the humiliation of others 
to the lowest of depths. These are both evidenced in the Qur’anic narrative when God 
informed the angels of the creation of man on Earth: 
“And [mention, O Muhammad], when your Lord said to the angels, ‘Indeed, I will 
make upon the earth a successive authority. They said, ‘Will You place upon it one who 




The response from God was “Indeed, I know that which you do not know”
379
 referring to 
their incredible potential to do good not just harm. This view is further strengthened by God 
favouring Adam over the angels in teaching him the names of all things and commanding all 
present, angels and Iblees, to prostrate to Adam:  
“And He taught Adam the names – all of them. Then He showed them to the angels and 
said, ‘Inform Me of the names of these, if you are truthful.’ They said, ‘Exalted are 
You; we have no knowledge except what You have taught us. Indeed, it is You who is 
the Knowing, the Wise.’ He said, ‘O Adam, inform them of their names.’ And when he 
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had informed them of their names, He said, ‘Did I not tell you that I know the unseen 
[aspects] of the heavens and the earth? And I know what you reveal and what you have 
concealed.’ And [mention] when We said to the angels, ‘Prostrate before Adam’; so 




The Qur’an and ahaadith are replete with emphasis on the true state of the heart and related 
notion of pure intentions (seeking success in the Hereafter and forsaking the material world). 
Simultaneously, the overall message of Islam points towards how belief in God works hand 
in hand with actions emanating from that belief. Both must coexist for Islam to be ideally 
practiced. Belief in itself without any actions leaves ones Islam lacking, as illustrated by the 
extreme example of Satan, who believed in God but disobeyed and refused to submit. 
Conversely Islamic actions without true belief in the heart also leaves one’s Islam lacking. 
Based on this, the Qur’an begins by describing the three categories of people that may result. 
The first are the true Muslims (mu’minoon) who believe and do righteous actions enjoined 
upon them.
381
 Islam resides in their hearts and is manifested on their limbs. The second are 
those who disbelieve (kafiroon) and reject the message of Islam, not just inwardly but also 
outwardly.
382
 The third are the religious hypocrites (munafiqoon) or those who are outwardly 
Muslim but inwardly disbelieve. Disbelief (kufr) resides in their hearts, but Islam is 
fraudulently enacted on their limbs.
383
  
Of the two groups of disbelievers, the punishment awaiting the munafiqoon is greater. They 
are said to be in the lowest depths of Hell
384
 and they are warned of ‘adhabun aleem’ 
(torturous punishment)
385
 rather than an ‘adhabun adheem’ (great punishment) reserved for 
the apparent disbelievers.
386
  One of the reasons for this tougher line is that they intended to 
harm the Muslims from within and colluded with their enemies due to their hatred of Islam. 
Another telling facet of Islamic law is that regardless of how convinced one may be of 
someone’s religious hypocrisy or suspect them, they would not qualify as a munafiq 
themselves. This is mainly because disbelief once known with certainty or expressed must 
then be considerer kufr. If it stays hidden or ambiguous only then can it be considered nifaq, 
which if died upon, is a matter for their judgement in front of God.  
One of the main proofs for this position is that although God revealed to the Prophet the 
names of all the hypocrites, he did not share or announce this list. Instead he only disclosed 
the names to one companion, Hudhaifah ibn al-Yamaan, who was sworn to secrecy by the 
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 He was tasked with keeping track of their movements and plans so as to alert the 
Prophet of any threat or danger emanating from them. This is illustrative of the sheer 
importance Islam lends to what is in one’s heart while also the inability of man to forcibly 
change what is in others’ hearts but equally his inability to discern with any certainty what 
the heart conceals. As such the risk of mistaking a genuine Muslim who one believes is a 
munafiq is too great for it to be left as a possibility. The Prophet was aware as to the 
destructive discord that could result amongst his followers if the door was opened for one 
ostensible Muslim to pronounce another a munafiq. Even for himself, the source of his certain 
knowledge was said to be divine revelation rather than deduction, he refrained from exposing 
the identity of the munafiqoon.  Hence, a munafiq in the present material life is always to be 
considered a Muslim, until the point where his disbelief becomes apparent through his own 
actions or by his own proclamation, at which point he becomes a disbeliever (kaafir). As such 
there can be no such thing as a publicly self-identifying munafiq.  
Some useful insights may be drawn from the status of the munafiq for the present discussion 
of whether there can be compulsion in religion, in particular of forcing someone to become 
Muslim. The munafiq is worse in the Sight of God and will be judged more severely in the 
Hereafter than the standard kaafir. This is because he deceived, lied and violated the trust of 
the Muslims. The one forced to accept Islam only differs from a munafiq in that he did not 
willingly ascribe to Islam publicly. He also differs in that he may not hold the same enmity 
towards Islam and Muslims as the true munafiq. Nonetheless he may develop it out of 
resentment of being compelled and coerced. In any case, why would a Muslim who is aware 
of the critical nature of what is in the heart force only outwardly adherence to Islam? They 
will never be able to forcibly embed Islam in another’s heart as well as know if it has entered 
or not. As such in the material life, the worst category of mankind, the wilful munafiq, is 
given the most lenient treatment and treated for all intents and purposes as a Muslim. 
Furthermore it would be nonsensical for Islam to permit or condone a practice which would 
likely increase nifaq, the most reprehensible state in Islam. 
The final point to be made in this section is that of God’s repeated assurances and consoling 
of the Prophet and many Messengers before him of the fundamental notion that they have 
been chosen to deliver the Message. This was most notably the case with Noah, Moses, Lot, 
Jesus and Muhammad. Noah preached monotheism and warned against idol worship to his 
people for 950 years.
388
 Moses repeatedly found the Children of Israel transgressing despite 
innumerable signs, miracles and favours bestowed upon them.
389
 Pharaoh (Firaun) was also 
unwilling to accept Moses’ invitation to true monotheism.
390
 Lot was unable to amend the 
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corruption of his people and his wife is one of the few specified female munafiqoon in the 
Qur’an
.391
 Jesus was rejected by the majority of Jews, even though they were the people to 
whom he was sent.
392
 As for the Prophet he too, was consoled at being frustrated with people 
rejecting his message, which included his kith and kin in Makkah, the Quraish; the people of 
Taif, who stoned and ridiculed him; and to his grave dismay his uncle, Abu Taalib, who had 
protected him throughout his life. The Prophet is repeatedly informed that he is only sent as a 
warner and bringer of glad tidings.
393
  
In Qur’an 2:6-7, the Prophet is told that “Indeed, those who disbelieve, it is the same for them 
whether you warn them or do not warn them - they will not believe. Allah has set upon their 
hearts and upon their hearing, and over their vision is a veil. And for them is a great 
punishment.”
394
 The first point to note is that the Message of monotheism transmitted by 
Messengers was always to be given to mankind through reasoned persuasion and not force. 
The second point, evident in the above verses, is that for some no matter how the truth is 
presented to them, the effort is futile. This served a number of purposes. The primary purpose 
was to convey to the Prophet that he was not blameworthy and should not take the rejection 
of the Message as his failure to fulfil his mission. This is reflected throughout the Qur’an in 
numerous verses. The first of two notable examples is Qur’an 3:20: 
“So if they dispute with thee, say: ‘I have submitted my whole self to Allah and so have 
those who follow me.’ And say to the People of the Book and to those who are 
unlearned: ‘Do you (also) submit yourselves?’ If they do, they are in right guidance, but 
if they turn back, your duty is to convey the Message; and in Allah's sight are (all) His 
servants.”  
And Qur’an 10:99-100: 
“And had your Lord willed, those on earth would have believed – all of them entirely. 
Then, [O Muhammad], would you compel the people in order that they become 
believers?  And it is not for a soul [i.e., anyone] to believe except by permission of 
Allah, and He will place defilement upon those who will not use reason.”  
Qur’an 2:6-7 also touches on two deeply philosophical and complex theological concepts, 
that of predestination (qadr) and God’s discretion on who may or may not be guided. Both 
are distinct and vast fields of study themselves, but we will only try to grasp the basic notions 
underpinning them, in brief, for the purposes of the present discussion on compulsion in 
religion. As for predestination, everything is said to be already ‘written’ or decreed. Thus 
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God is well aware of who will end up believing and disbelieving. Furthermore Islam holds 
that predestination can be affected by supplication (dua). The topic has been and continues to 
be some cause for consternation for those new to the faith or weak in it, and is considered one 
of the traps of the Satan. The thought may occur to some, how can everything be pre-decided 
but still be affected by free will of individual entities. The answer simply is that 
predestination is a result of free will. God in His omniscience is aware of all that will happen, 
as if it had already happened. This does not in any way absolve us of our ability given by 
Him to be free agents and affect change to what has been decreed. However the notion does 
serve to show to the Prophet that some people, God knows, will not accept Islam at any cost. 
The associated notion of God’s power and ability to guide people, serves here to convey to 
the Prophet that if God wanted he could make everyone Muslim but this is not the purpose of 
creation.
395
 Furthermore when the Qur’an mentions that their hearts were sealed, it is once 




IV. Utility of Surah al-Kafiroon397 in relation to “Non-compulsion” in Religion 
One of the main counter arguments employed against the principle of no compulsion in 
religion is that a number of conciliatory or ‘tolerant’ verses and ahaadith were from the time 
of early Islam in Makkah. Hence firstly it was a time when the Prophet was not in a position 
of authority to be able to exert political authority and secondly that any espoused notions of 
religious tolerance or freedom of expression were appeals from the Muslims not to be 
persecuted and left in peace to practice their religion. In this regard, it is essential to analyse 
Surah al-Kafiroon (Qur’an 109) from the Makkan context and compare it to the period after 
Hijra (migration) to Madinah, where the Prophet was the religious and political leader over 
Muslims and non-Muslims.    
For the Makkan period of Islam, it is safe to say that there was little or no freedom of religion 
for the Muslims. The Prophet began by preaching to only friends and family, with his wife 
Khadija
398
 and cousin Ali
399
, the first to convert. Abu Bakr’s conversion led a number of 
others accepting Islam, most notably, Uthman.
400
 The new religion was practiced in secret as 
were meetings among the Muslims and the Prophet initially. Adherents did not proclaim their 
faith publicly either. After three years of secrecy in the practice of Islam in the nascent 
community of believers, the Prophet was ordered to publically proclaim, profess and 
indentify with the faith
401
: “Proclaim what you have been ordered and turn aside from the 
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polytheists”, “warn thy family, thy nearest relations, and lower thy wing to the followers who 
follow thee”, and “say, I am the one who warns plainly”.
402
 
Rather, with an increase in the number of followers, the stance of the Quraish towards Islam 
hardened and became more severe.
403
 Thus the growing numbers accompanied by a boldness 
on the part of the new religious community drew the wry and wrath of the leaders of the 
Quraish. At this point, Muslims were tortured and attacked due to their belief and compelled 
to retract and reject their belief in Islam. Ironically that which Islam came to supersede and 
dismantle was a means of protection for some of the Muslims – the Arab tribal structure. The 
Prophet was protected by his uncle Abu Taalib.
404
 His four main companions Abu Bakr, 
Umar, Uthman and Ali all came from established families and so were protected as blood ties 
were considered to be stronger than those of religion.  
Of the unprotected and poor
405
 to face the brunt of resentment towards the Muslims were the 
family of Ammar bin Yasir,
406
 both of whose parents lost their life under torture, the first 
martyrs of Islam. Another case in point is that of Bilal, a slave who proclaimed faith resulting 
in public torture by his master Umayah bin Khalaf, so that he would renounce his faith. He 
was only saved because Abu Bakr bought him for an extortionate amount of money and then 
freed him.
407
 In the case of Ammar bin Yasir himself, who caved in to the physical torture, a 
verse was revealed that his renunciation of faith under force was not to be taken against him 
and that God would judge him on what was in his heart even if he negated his belief 
outwardly due to fear of life.
408
 If faith of a Muslim cannot be annulled through compulsion, 
then why would there be an acceptance of faith by God and the Muslims of a non-Muslim 
through force?    
It could then be asserted that the Makkans sought to some extent limit or not avail the right of 
freedom to belief to the Muslims, when the Prophet “spoke disparagingly of their gods...they 
took great offence and resolved unanimously to treat him as an enemy...they [Muslims] were 
a despised minority”
409
, as many were confronted with facing torture, being attacked, 
murdered or being driven out, for as much as merely publicly being identified as such and 
then being forced to revert to the polytheism of the Makkans. The situation reached such an 
acute level that the Prophet ordered a group of his followers to emigrate to the land ruled by 
Christian Negus, King of Abyssinia.
410
 Even when the emigration to Madinah took place, the 
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Prophet sent others ahead and himself stayed in Makkah to continue preaching.
411
 Most 
importantly the early Muslims were never allowed to freely profess their faith in public or to 
practice it or have meetings. In other words there was no official recognition of religion – it 
was tantamount to being illegal in fact - being impermissible to even hold these views.  
Rather than a plea to be left alone or evidence of double standards, Surat al-Kafiroon is a bold 
statement from a position of weakness that we will not give into your coercion, that the 
freedom to believe is a sacrosanct right and that the Muslims will not be swayed or pressured 
into changing their belief, through force or otherwise. In fact force has the opposite of the 
desired effect. It makes ones aversion to that which one is being forced further entrenched. 
The asbab ul-nuzul frame the context as when the Quraish attempted to reason with the 
Muslims by proposing that the Prophet worship their gods for a year and then they would 
worship his God for year and so on  hybrid religion as a means to resolve the tension.
412
 It is 
a clear, strong and defiant message to the Muslims not to flinch or veer in their unbending 
belief no matter what is thrown at them, whether it be death, torture, ridicule or ploys to 
dilute belief. This was the message from the oppressed Muslims to the oppressing governing 
authorities that they will not give into any attempts of coercion but also that in corroboration 
of Qur’an 2:256 that compulsion in religion is an infeasibility. The Makkans should desist 
from their attempts and that the Muslims have sought to do no such thing to the Quraish.  
It is in relation to this last point that it may be contended that it was a self-interested and 
temporary principle as it impacted on the religious freedom of the Muslims and that the 
Muslim conceptualisation of freedom of religion shifted considerably once they assumed 
power and become the governing authority in Madinah and the religious freedom under 
discussion was not of Muslims. Oft cited in its support are the expulsions of the two Jewish 
tribes of Madinah, the execution of the men of another and later the expulsion of all non-




V. The Jewish Tribes of Madinah 
An argument against the assertion that Surat al-Kafiroon was of a self-interested and 
temporary nature is the Constitution of Madinah
414
 instituted by the Prophet. Here the context 
is completely distinguished from that of Makkah where the Muslims were weak in strength, 
small in number and persecuted with intensity. On the arrival of the Prophet to Madinah, 
many residents became Muslims. His status was now that of political and religious leader of 
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Madinah. As such he could have imposed his political and religious will upon the population. 
Instead the Constitution of Madinah expounded the same freedom of religion as in Surat al-
Kafiroon in relation to the Jews of Madinah: “to them their religion”.
415
 Thus the contention 
that Surat al-Kafiroon was of a temporary nature is  negated by the above and in any case it 
has to be taken in its general meaning too, not limited by time, place or subject,  as well as its 
specific context.  
Opponents point out that despite Muslims having the position of the governing authority and 
power and hence superiority, it remained the early phase of such authority and it was in their 
interest to be tolerant at the very beginning to consolidate Islam’s political authority. 
Secondly they note the expulsion and execution of the Jewish tribes.
416
 In this regard the 
general point that needs to be made is that the expulsions and executions occurred as a direct 
result of going against the Constitution of Madinah and engaging in severe treason against the 
State and the Muslims. This decision was then as a result of serious concerns about state 
security, public good and responding to criminality. It had on the contrary nothing to do with 
the faith of the Jewish tribes or a shift in the attitude of the Muslims as to the freedom of 
religion that should be afforded to other religions. If this was the case, the Jewish 
communities would have been dealt with as a religious whole rather than as individual tribal 
entities. This is further substantiated by the asbab ul-nuzul of Qur’an 2:256, which note that it 
was in fact at the time of expulsion of one of these tribes that the verse was revealed in 
relation to the plea by the biological Muslim parents of children raised by Jewish families to 
be returned as discussed earlier above.    
Despite this, it is of value to have some detailed overview of what exactly took place in 
relation to the effected tribes to make the point conclusive. However before beginning, it is 
vital to understand the context and relationship between the Jewish tribes and the tribes of 
Aws and Khazraj. The Jewish tribes were said to have fled from Christian lands, where they 
were acutely persecuted due to their views on Jesus and Mary. In Madinah, according to 
some historians
417
, as they were unable to gain power and control due to numbers and 
weakness, they sought to cause infighting between the two main tribes, Aws and Khazraj. 
They succeeded and numerous armed confrontations ensued between the two tribes. This did 
not only serve to weaken the hold of the dominant tribes but also strengthen the Jewish tribes 
politically and financially.
418
 Furthermore it was with this backdrop that a group of Khazraj 
from Madinah sought to meet the Prophet in Makkah. They were keen to learn and hear more 
about the message of Islam, in particular it’s Messenger’s ability to reconcile between the 
                                                          
415
 Berween, “Al-Wathiqa”, 112: “The Jews of the Bani Awf are one community with the believers (the Jews 
have their religion and the Muslims have theirs), their freedmen and their persons, except those who behave 
unjustly and sinfully, for they hurt but themselves and their families.” 
416
 See Shahid, S., “Rights of Non-Muslims in an Islamic State”, in Spencer (ed.) The Myth of Islamic Tolerance: 
How Islamic Law Treats Non-Muslims (Prometheus Books, 2005). 
417
 Al-Ghazali, M., Fiqh-us-Seerah, Understanding the Life of Prophet Muhammad (International Islamic 
Publishing House, 1999), 166. 
418
 Ibid. 
PhD: Protection of Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and International Law   Murtaza Shaikh  
  
Page 120 of 222 
 
tribes of Aws and Khazraj. On their first meeting with the Prophet, the group accepted Islam 
and stated:  
“We have left our people, for no tribe is so divided by hatred and rancour as they. 
Perhaps God will unite them through you. So let us for to them and invite them to this 




Even prior to the Prophet’s own migration to Madinah, a huge number of Aws and Khazraj 
had accepted Islam. After the assumption of religious and political leadership in Madinah by 




The first to be expelled from Madinah were Banu Qaynuqa. Some among them had attempted 
to stoke old rivalry between the now mostly Muslim Aws and Khazraj tribes. A man from 
Banu Qaynuqa reminded a group of Aws and Khazraj about their old rivalries and 
humiliation and harm suffered by each at the hands of the other. They succeeded and there 
was a stand-off amongst the group which soon spiralled and came close to the brink of 
violent conflict again. However the Prophet heard of this and is reported to have said:  
“O Muslims! By Allah! Have you entered the state of pre-Islamic ignorance while I am 
still among you, after Allah guided you to Islam, honoured you with it, by it He cut the 




No action was taken by the Prophet against the Banu Qaynuqa. However it was notable that 
the attitude of all three Jewish tribes became more hostile and provocative and their enmity 
became publicly stated and known and more pronounced, particularly after the victory of the 
Battle of Badr against the Quraish of Makkah. In specific relation to Banu Qaynuqa, they 
began to mistreat Muslims, jeering at them and hurting those who visited their areas and even 
frightening women.
422
 As such the Prophet in order to warn Banu Qayquna from escalating 
hostilities and a potential armed confrontation warned and threatened them: “O you Jews! 
Enter Islam before you suffer what happened to the Quraish.”
423
 The attempt to quell their 
growing enmity against the Muslims did not bear fruit and they responded boisterously:  
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“O Muhammad! Do not deceive yourself, you merely fought a party of the Quraish who 
were inexperienced at war. But if you want to fight us then know that we are an entire 
people! And indeed you have not met up with anyone like us before!”
424
  
There was no response to this either by the Prophet. Not long after, a Muslim woman visited 
the market of Banu Qaynuqa and in an attempt to ridicule and humiliate the woman, a 
goldsmith fastened the border of her garment to the back of it, so when she stood to leave it 
uncovered her private area. Everyone began to laugh. She fixed herself and left. A Muslim 
man then came and killed the goldsmith. The crowd of local Jews then turned on the Muslim 
man and killed him.
425
 When the family sought the help of the Muslims, it initiated a conflict 
between the Muslims and Banu Qaynuqa. The Muslims laid siege to their fort for fifteen days 
resulting in their surrender. Before the Prophet came to Madinah and made peace between the 
tribes, Khazraj were allied with Banu Qaynuqa. As such Abdullah ibn Ubayy, who was a 
prominent munafiq and of the Khazraj, pleaded: “O Prophet, be kind to my clients”, while 
holding on to the Prophet’s armour. The Prophet was visibly angry and demanded twice for 
him to let go. On this Abdullah replied: “No I shall not let you go till you show kindness to 
my clients. Four hundred without armour and three hundred with armour: They have 
protected me from all and sundry. Now you are going to slaughter them in one morning? I am 
a man who fears the consequences, by God”. The Prophet responded “They are yours on 
condition that they leave Madinah and do not settle near us”.
426
 They were then expelled after 
handing over their arms.
427
 
On an individual level, the most hostile and outspoken against the Muslims following the 
Battle of Badr was Ka’b bin al-Ashraf. His mother was from the Banu Nadir and he lived 
near them.  He was wealthy, a poet and handsome. On hearing the news of Badr he 
exclaimed: “Is this true? Did Muhammad actually kill these whom these two mention [...] 
These are the nobles of the Arabs and kingly men; by God, if Muhammad has slain these 
people ‘twere better to be dead than alive.”
428
 He wrote poems defaming and satirising the 
Prophet and praising the Quraish, enticing them to avenge the defeat at Badr.
429
 He even 
travelled to Makkah in order to provoke the Makkans to avenge themselves. When he 
returned to Madinah, he first composed amorous poems about Muslim women
430
  and later 
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resorted to obscene poems and songs insulting and defaming Muslim women.
431
 
Consequently the Prophet ordered his assassination, which was carried out with intricate 
planning as he resided in a fortress on the outskirts of Madinah.
432
  
Following this, Abu Sufyan prepared a force of 200 horsemen but was reluctant to attack 
Madinah in the day. He instead came to Madinah under cover of night and was hosted by 
Salam ibn Mishkam, Chief of the Jewish tribe of Banu Nadir on the outskirts of Madinah. He 
was given full account of the situation including information about the Muslims within 
Madinah. They discussed how best to hurt the Muslims. Abu Sufyan then raided the suburb 
of Al-Arid, cutting and setting ablaze palm trees and the fences and murdering two 
Muslims.
433
 The Prophet took no action in response against Banu Nadir or Abu Sufyan’s 
host, Salam ibn Mishkam.
434
 
The failure of the Muslims to emerge victorious at the Battle of Uhud caused a further 
deterioration in the relation between them and the Jewish tribes. Whereas the success of Badr 
and emerging ascendency of the Muslims was a cause of resentment, the failure at Uhud 
presented an opportunity to capitalise on the perceived weakness of the Muslims. This anti-
Muslim sentiment extended beyond the Jewish tribes to the hypocrites of Madinah, the 
Quraish and the Bedouin tribes in the vicinity of Madinah. They all saw this period as one to 
form an alliance with each other to stem the ascendency of the Muslims and Islam. As such, 
following the expulsion of Banu Qaynuqa and death of K’ab bin Al-Ashraf, the Jewish tribes 
continued and increased their contacts with the hypocrites and the Quraish. As they were 
inexperienced in war, they resorted instead to open hatred and enmity, but not conflict.  
The Muslims suffered two painful and damaging ambushes. The first claiming the lives of up 
to ten companions
435
 at Ar-Raji and 70 of the best reciters of Qur’an at the Well on Ma’unah 
by Arab tribes who feigned interest in Islam only to trap the Muslims.
436
 When one of the few 
surviving Muslims from Ma’unah came across two members of one of the tribes that had laid 
the ambush, he killed both as revenge. He later found out that they had been allowed in to 
Madinah on the security of the Prophet. When the Prophet heard about this he said: “You 
have killed two men whose bloodwit I must pay.”
437
 He sought to raise blood money from the 
Muslims and its allies. When the Prophet went to Banu Nadir to request assistance in raising 
the money as per their treaty, they accepted but then on consulting each other attempted to try 
to kill him by dropping a rock on him, but their plan was unsuccessful.
438
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According to another report by Abu Dawud and others, the Quraish threatened to enslave 
their women if they did not kill the Prophet. So the Banu Nadir sent a message to the Prophet 
requesting that he send thirty of his companions to meet thirty of their rabbis. If they were 
convinced with what they had to say, their people would follow suit. Then some of the Banu 
Nadir had doubts as being able to fight thirty of the Prophet’s companions in order to kill the 
Prophet. So they sent another message asking for only three to meet from each side. However 
on their way, the Muslims learnt of their plans, to kill the Prophet. The Prophet surrounded 




In either case there was an attempt at the Prophet’s life. Consequently they were given ten 
days to leave Madinah.
440
 The leader of the hypocrites, Abdullah ibn Ubayy, advised Banu 
Nadir to ignore the warning of the Prophet and assured the support of 2000 of his own 
followers and said he would convince Banu Quraizah and Banu Ghatafan to join them.  
Based on this, Banu Nadir took the decision to fight. The Muslims laid siege for 6 or 15 days. 
Banu Quraizah remained neutral and Ubayy and Banu Ghatafan failed to meet their 
promises.
441
 They offered to surrender, asked the Prophet to spare their lives and deport them 
on condition that they could take as much of their property as their camels could take except 
the armour. The Prophet agreed.
442
 He also allowed them to take all their belongings with the 
exception of weaponry evident in the fact that even beams and gates of houses were taken.
443
 
The caravan amounted to 600 camels.
444
 According to Ibn Ishaaq, they went with such pomp 
and splendour as had never been seen in any tribe in their days...with women and children 
and property with tambourines and pipes and singing girls playing behind them.
445
 Surah al-
Hashr was revealed specifically relating to this incident of expelling the Banu Nadir.
446
 
Of those expelled, a group headed for Khaiber led by their chiefs, Huyayy ibn Akhtab and 
Salam ibn Abul-Huqaiq, while another group headed for Syria. There remained severe 
resentment amongst those of Banu Nadir in Khaiber due to their expulsion. The resentment 
was fuelled further by the continued ascendency of the Muslims following the humiliating 
retreat of the Makkans to not even engage the Muslims at the second Battle of Badr.
447
 
Consequently they felt compelled to manifest their animosity and resentment by dislodging 
the Muslims from their growing dominance and control over the region and for them to be 
defeated. However not having the ability or the confidence for the military undertaking in 
light of being disarmed and already defeated by the Prophet, they sought to once again to 
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incite the Quraish to recover their lost honour and also to provoke the neighbouring Arab 
tribes and Bedouins against the Muslims. Their first step was to send twenty of their chiefs to 
Makkah itself and convince the Quraish to take on the Muslims with full backing from 
themselves. With the humiliation of the retreat from the second meeting at Badr fresh in the 
Makkan’s mind, this seemed an opportunity to make up for that. Incitement, provocation and 
the backing of Banu Nadir bolstered their spirits. They then headed for Ghatafan and 
convinced them to also join the growing alliance of anti-Muslim forces.
448
 The delegation 
continued to visit and advocate war against the Muslims as an alliance to other tribes in 
Arabia. Soon they had also convinced the Kinnah and allies from Tihamah, Banu Sulaim, 
Banu Murrah, Fazarah and Ashja, until they constituted an army of 10,000 men.
449
  
This was the beginning of the Battle of al-Ahzab (Confederates) and it is where the Muslims 
frustrated the efforts of the alliance by digging trenches to prevent their entry into Madinah or 
head-on confrontation with the Muslims. What is pertinent regarding the battle here is the 
successful attempt of Huyayy ibn Akhtab to convince Banu Quraizah through their leader 
Ka’b ibn Asad to break their covenant with the Prophet and join the enemy in their fight 
against the Muslims.
450
 This was highly problematic and of major significance as Banu 
Quraizah were within the Muslim-governed zone blocked off by trenches. They began by 
providing supplies to the Quraish
451
 and also initiated armed hostilities from within. This 
posed a threat to the most vulnerable of the Muslims, the women and children at the rear of 
Madinah sandwiched between the Muslim men at the front lines and the dwellings of Banu 
Quraizah.
452
 Hearing of the betrayal, the Prophet dispatched some men to protect the women 
and children while continuing the fight on the front line. The Muslims were on the verge of 
being overcome, with only 3000 men to fight the Quraish and their allies and now the 
betrayal of Banu Quraizah.  
The Prophet sought the advice of his companions regarding attempting to break Ghatafan 
from the alliance by offering a third of Madinah’s fruit crops. However he was advised 
against this by his companions.
453
 At the same time, a man from Ghatafan, Nu’man ibn 
Mas’ud defected and accepted Islam secretly. He then was able to create discord and distrust 
between the Quraish, Jews and Ghatafan. He told Banu Quraizah they should not trust the 
Quraish as they would abandon them if defeat was imminent. As such Banu Quraizah should 
request hostages in order to safeguard against a revenge attack by the Muslims in the 
aftermath of a defeat. He told the Quraish and Ghatafan that Banu Quraizah regretted 
breaking their treaty with the Muslims and were in direct contact with the Muslims and 
sought to send them Quraysh hostages to show their allegiance. When the Quraysh and 
Ghatafan pressed Banu Quraizah to begin fighting the Muslims, they said they would not 
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fight on the Sabbath. The fate of their people, who had violated the Sabbath, was well-
known. Furthermore they conditioned fighting on being given hostages as security from both 
tribes.
454
 The Quraysh and Ghatafan became convinced of what Nu’man had told them and 
insisted that Banu Quraizah go to war without any condition of hostages.
455
 Banu Quraizah in 
turn also became convinced of what Nu’man had warned them against and refused to fight. 
This along with sudden onset of severe adverse weather made the Quraish and their allies 
retreat disheartened and defeated.
456
  
Immediately afterwards the Prophet laid siege to Banu Quraizah for twenty five days 
457
and 
they duly surrendered without a fight,
458
 although they did consider accepting Islam or killing 
their women and children before fighting the Muslims.
459
 The Muslims of Aws tribe 
interceded for them asking the Prophet for leniency on account of being former allies 
especially as the Prophet had granted the Khazraj their wish regarding Banu Qaynuqa.
460
 The 
Prophet appeased them by appointing Sa’d ibn Mu’adh from the Aws to deliberate and issue 
judgement against them. This was agreed by all parties including Banu Quraizah
461
 on 
assumption that the punishment would be lessened.
462
 Sa’d on account of being a former ally, 
knew them exceptionally well and what they were capable of. He was also very resentful 
against Banu Quraizah for bringing the Muslims so close to defeat by means of deceit, 
betrayal, violation of treaties and attacking the Muslims unaware, from behind and from 
inside Madinah. He had also suffered a severe injury during the battle. Despite pleading and 
begging on the part of Banu Quraizah, Sa’d ruled that all the fighting men should be executed 
and women and children taken prisoners.
463
   
Huyayy of Banu Nadir who had been stranded with Banu Quraizah was executed.
464
 Al-
Khazraj sought the Prophet’s permission to assassinate the other main protagonist leader of 
Banu Nadir, who plotted and schemed to get 10,000 men to go to war with the Muslims 
transpiring in the Battle of Al-Ahzab, Salam ibn Abu’l-Huqaiq. He had been chiefly 
responsible for gathering the troops and providing wealth and supplies.
465
 The Prophet 
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approved their proposal on the condition that women and children not be harmed. A group of 
five set out for Khaibar and were successful in killing Salam bin Abul-Huqaiq.
466
  
This cursory historical restatement of the relations between the Prophet and the Jewish tribes 
of Madinah, which eventually led to the expulsion of two and the execution of most of the 
fighting men of one, point to a number of important conclusions. Firstly, the relationship 
began on the basis of an agreement of peace which stipulated that religiously the Jews were 
free to do as they pleased in all matters, most paramount of which was their religion much 
along the lines of the general meaning derived from Surah al-Kafiroon. Politically speaking 
the agreement(s) sought non-aggression by either side as well as mutual assistance in times of 
attack as well as the prohibition of any contact with the chief enemy, the Quraish let alone 
inciting war or providing material resources to the enemy.  
Secondly the incidents took place at a time of war and constant battles between the Muslims 
and the Makkans. These battles also happened to be the formative ones which would 
determine the foreseeable future relating to the Muslims ability to hold their own or crumble 
very easily in the face of threats and challenges. This is important as it showed the critical 
nature of aiding the enemy when it can lead to defeat and destruction.  
Thirdly, the Muslims and the Prophet knew for some time as to the feelings and sentiments of 
some of the Jewish tribes. In fact their secret scheming, such as that of Banu Qaynuqa of 
inciting Aws and Khazraj against each other based on their old enmity, was not the trigger for 
them to be expelled. The same is true for Banu Nadir, no action was taken while they were 
openly speaking against the Prophet, only when they attempted to assassinate him, was the 
final decision taken to expel them. Even the fact that all three tribes were amassing arms and 
weapons throughout their time in Madinah was not itself enough for the Prophet to take any 
punitive action against them.
467
 As for execution of the Banu Quraizah men, it was not until 
they gave supplies to the enemy and considered fighting in violation of the agreement with 
the Muslims.  
The point here is that much was tolerated especially when it related to secret scheming and 
plotting even to the extent of amassing arms, before the punitive decisions were taken. In all 
cases especially in the aftermath of the Uhud disappointment, it was a time of internal war 
and strife. It was only when the enmity became public and manifested in contact and actual 
readiness to help the Muslims’ archenemy, were the drastic punitive measures adopted. As 
such, the Prophet laid siege to all three as opposed to fighting them. He treated them as tribes 
rather than as one religious community. They were all clearly in breach of the agreement and 
peace treaties with the Muslims. He expelled the first and second. However even though he 
was in some ways most lenient to Banu Nadir, in letting them leave with their lives even 
though they did not evacuate and took up arms against the Prophet and allowed them to take 
whatever they wished except their weaponry, they ended up holding the greatest enmity 
towards the Muslims and were near to causing the most damage through the rallying of a 
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great army that could have destroyed the Muslims once and for all. Banu Quraizah’s crime 
was the worst of the three, as they not only betrayed the Muslims but sought to aid the enemy 
during conflict and led also to near defeat, if it was not for arguably the covert intervention 
from the convert Nu’man bin Mas’ud.  
Of the utmost importance during this critical period is that none of these actions were taken 
due to religious differences, but rather concerned matters to do with political factors such as 
aiding and abetting the enemy, through deception and deceit. Any assertion that the 
expulsions and execution may have taken place owing to the religious affiliation of the three 
tribes is just not born out in the facts laid out above. 
 
VI. Has the Freedom to Believe been abrogated by the verses enjoining Fighting? 
Now that we have put forward the primie facie case for there being no compulsion in religion 
in Islam from both interpretative, creedal and historical perspectives, we must seek to address 
the verses, traditions and juristic opinions advanced in support of the counter-argument that 
Islam does permit coercion and compulsion in religion,
468
 even to the extent of forced 
conversions and committing massacres owing to religious belief. They are few and 
notoriously well-known amongst polemicists and more generally those who aim to portray 
Islam as a religion of violence and intolerance.
469
 As such we will have the opportunity to 
analyse and explore in some depth each one of them, so as to grasp the issue 
comprehensively.  
Before we begin, it remains important to point out that in the current context of those who 
seek to portray Islam negatively and those groups who seek to rely on it as a basis for 
harming civilians or non-Muslims in conflicts, selectively rely and emphasise on the verses 
and ahaadith enjoining fighting. While, on the other hand, those studying the topic and 
Muslim apologists focus and selectively rely on the verses and traditions enjoining a peaceful 
and reconciliatory approach. This has often manifested itself in countless debates featuring 
prominent self-proclaimed experts on the subject on questions such as ‘Is Islam a religion of 
peace’.
470
 The central premises of such debates are pointless and farcical. How would a 
similar question of ‘Is the West a culture of peace or war’ be debated? While Islam is 
ultimately a religion that strives towards peace, clearly it cannot remain passive when 
engaged in hostilities against aggressors. In that sense it certainly cannot lay claim to being a 
pacifist religion. More reasonable and nuanced questions would be ‘how does the Islamic 
ethos during armed conflict compare to that of modern international humanitarian law.’ 
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Unfortunately due to the insistence of Muslim apologists on the unconditional peacefulness 
of Islam and the denial of acknowledgement of its in-built mechanisms for the permissibility 
of force, if certain conditions are satisfied as in any other self-preserving political or 
governance system, the ones arguing it to be a violent religion often hold sway over those in 
the audience and likely public at large. 
Thus from a juristic perspective it is not possible to ascribe to Islam any one of its facets 
without reference to or at the expense of another seemingly divergent or opposing aspects. 
The holistic Islamic perspective must be a culmination of those views rather than selective 
reference to one at the expense or deliberate ignorance of the other. As such the juristic tool 
that has been suggested is at play here is that of abrogation. With some contemporary 
academics
471
 arguing that the verses enjoining fighting abrogate the verses relating to there 
being no compulsion in religion. However the view prevalent amongst classical jurists has 
been that there has been partial abrogation in relation to the polytheists. What needs to be 
established in this regard is whether ‘polytheists’ refers to a specific group such as the 
Quraish and their allies, whom the Muslims were at war with or generally all polytheists as 
well as knowing whether the abrogation was conditional and thus limited by certain 
circumstances like war or indefinite. Hence a the view may be taken that verses commanding 
there to be no compulsion in religion are general and default, while those relating to war, 
fighting are specific to time and place or a certain set of circumstances as well as limited in 
those who they are aimed at. It may also be possible to take a combined meaning of certain 
verses, if we do not limit them as exhaustive in their objects or aspects they are referring to.  
Let us begin with the Qur’an itself. The most famous verse in this regard is Qur’an 9:5, which 
is often quoted out of context:  
“And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find 
them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of 
ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on 
their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.” 
At times the more truncated excerpt: “kill the polytheists wherever you find them” is 
presented out of context. If we are to read the Qur’an as a standalone book, without resorting 
to its explanatory material of ahaadith and exegeses (tafaasir), providing an excerpt without 
referring to its wider textual context is not an effective way to derive accurate meanings or 
interpretations. In particular, due to the style of the Qur’an, certainly parts of passages 
discussing a particular issue cannot be divorced from the rest of it. Furthermore in popular 
discourse, it goes without saying that parts of verses cannot be presented without the whole 
context of the verse. There are wider contexts like the overall message of the Qur’an and 
other apparently conflicting verses. However at first we will restrict ourselves to the context 
of the verses on either side of the said verse. It should also be noted that the style of the 
Qur’an is one that oscillates between positive and negative. When there is mention of hell, it 
is often followed by mention of paradise.  
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The first and foremost aspect of this verse is that it was revealed with a backdrop of ongoing 
hostilities and armed conflict with the polytheistic Quraish and the specific event that 
triggered this verse is also related to the repeated violation of agreements and treaties by the 
polytheists with the Muslims. As such it is a re-initiation of hostilities after a lull due to the 
transgressions of others and also to seek to take control of Makkah for the sake of the Hajj 
pilgrimage rights to be done in accordance to Islam, meaning no polytheist would be allowed 
to perform pilgrimage or perform the rites of tawaf
472
 naked. This is supported by the 
preceding verse which only declares treaties null and void with those who have “been 
deficient toward you in anything or supported anyone against you.”
473
 Furthermore, the 
understanding that the verse is giving a choice, albeit in a state of armed conflict, to either 
conversion or death is misfounded as the following verse, Qur’an 9:6 states: “And if any one 
of the polytheists seeks your protection, then grant him protection so that he may hear the 
words of Allah [i.e. the Qur’an]. Then deliver him to his place of safety. That is because they 
are a people who do not know.”  
Also, Qur’an 9:7 states: “How can there be for the polytheists a treaty in the sight of Allah 
and with His Messenger, except for those with whom you made a treaty at al-Masjid al-
Haram? So as long as they are upright toward you, be upright toward them. Indeed, Allah 
loves the righteous [who fear Him].” This shows that not only were some groups of 
polytheists exempted from the renunciation of treaties but its basis was reciprocity and due to 
the honouring of treaties and agreements. Similarly Qur’an 9:8 and 9:10 emphasise the point 
of a non-viability of agreements owing to repeated violations and a breakdown of trust. 
Additionally they also show that if the polytheists were to gain dominance there is no 
expectation from them to show the Muslims any leniency or allow them to exist as religious 
minorities (dhimma): “How [can there be a treaty] while, if they gain dominance over you, 
they do not observe concerning you any pact of kinship or covenant of protection? They 
satisfy you with their mouths, but their hearts refuse [compliance], and most of them are 
defiantly disobedient...They do not observe toward a believer any pact of kinship or covenant 
of protection. And it is they who are the transgressors”. 
This is then followed by some examples of how some of the polytheists had violated their 
agreements and treaties with the Muslims and that such actions must no longer be tolerated: 
“And if they break their oaths after their treaty and defame your religion, then fight the 
leaders of disbelief, for indeed, there are no oaths [sacred] to them; [fight them that] they 
might cease.”
474
 Qur’an 9:13 further elaborates on the breaking of oaths but also that the 
Muslims are reacting in this way in retaliation for the aggression by the polytheists “Would 
you not fight a people who broke their oaths and determined to expel the Messenger, and they 
had begun [the attack upon] you the first time? Do you fear them? But Allah has more right 
that you should fear Him, if you are [truly] believers.” Later in the surah the same point is 
repeated that the Muslims are reacting to the actions of the polytheists rather than acting as 
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the aggressors: “And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you 
collectively. And know that Allah is with the righteous [who fear Him].”
475
  
As can be seen when Qur’an 9:5, so often relied upon by protagonists and polemicists to 
justify their argument of Islam as a war-mongering and violent religion, is read in context of 
the broader passage of text in which it appears, a wholly separate understanding of the verse 
is discernible from that often attached to it. The verse is not a command to kill all polytheists; 
only combatants engaged in active hostilities.
476
 Furthermore, it is an act of retaliation in the 
face of aggressions rather than an act of aggression on the part of the Muslims.
477
 This is 
shown in the fact that it is repeatedly stated that the cause of the pronouncement of war by the 
Muslims is in the face of repeated violations of the treaty and aggressions perpetrated by the 
polytheists, which must be addressed. Furthermore if someone ceases to be a combatant, or 
was not one to begin with, the Muslims are not only to desist from harming them but they 
must escort them to a place of safety ensuring they are not harmed in the process. The 
renunciation of treaties and declaration of war excludes those groups of polytheists who 
honoured their treaties. In summation read in its proper context, we learn of the intense 
enmity held by the polytheists towards the Muslims, the importance of upholding treaties, 
agreements and oaths to the Muslims even with their most prominent enemies, the 
importance of maintaining the principle of reciprocity and the complete breakdown of trust 
and confidence owing to repeated violations of agreed terms.      
The hadith that has been most referred to in these debates around the permissibility of 
coercion with similar wording to the above verse is narrated by Ibn `Umar who reported that 
the Prophet said:  
“I have been commanded to fight the people until they testify that there is no deity 
worthy of worship except Allah and that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah, 
establish the prayer and pay the Zakah.”
478
  
The critical point when analysing this hadeeth is that according to jurists who explained it in 
light of the principles of the Arabic language, the reference to ‘the people’ is not generally 
applicable to all people as it may appear in translation, but specific to the polytheists 
mentioned in Qur’an 9:5 above and thus in relation to a time of active hostilities with a 
specific group of polytheists, the Quraish. To begin with, the use of the definite article could 
be interpreted in a number of ways, including as referring to everybody, a particular group or 
to something known or in a particular context. In light of a study of the Seerah (the Prophet’s 
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biography), actions of the following generations after the Prophet as well as the possible 
linguistic understandings, it was clear to all jurists and the four schools of sunni jurisprudence 
that the reference here was specific to a particular group at a particular time.  
They stated that it came under the rubric of the principle of a general term used for something 
specific, there even being instances where ‘the people’ can refer to one person as well as a 
group of people.  After all, throughout this period there were treaties, contracts and 
agreements of peace. Clearly People of the Book as well as polytheistic groups were given 
dhimma status. In light of this, Ibn Hajar Asqalani, the famous commentator of Sahih 
Bukhari, noted that the phrase ‘the people’ had eight potential meanings, all specific to a 
certain group that the Muslims were engaged in active hostilities with, including the 
polytheists of Makkah or broadly of the Arabian Peninsula.
479
 Ibn Taymiyyah surmises it 
most succinctly: “It refers to fighting those who are waging war, whom Allah has permitted 
us to fight. It does not refer to those who have a covenant with us with whom Allah 
commands us to fulfil our covenant.”
480
  
The other aspect of the hadeeth that attracts controversy is that to “fight...until they testify” or 
paraphrased literally as ‘fight them until they except Islam’ where the intended conveyed 
meaning is that Islam allows for compelling others to become Muslim through violence 
leaving them essentially with a choice between death or Islam. The first and quite axiomatic 
point is that this is far from the actual meaning of the hadeeth. As already stated, 
interpretations cannot be derived divorced from contexts such as language, history and other 
primary source material. Of which, the most crucial is the Qur’an and its commentary as well 
as the overall thrust of the Qur’an derived from a holistic reading. We have already delved 
extensively in to the verse regarding there being no compulsion in religion. Thus the question 
that arises is whether it is contradicted by this hadeeth, abrogated by it or they are not in 
direct opposition and are reconcilable.  
The immediate point to make in this regard is the difficulty in arguing that a hadeeth 
abrogates a Qur’anic verse. Classical sunni jurisprudence holds that the Qur’an and the vast 
body of authenticated ahaadith have equivalent law making force in terms of constituting the 
two primary textual sources of Islamic law. This is despite the fact that the ahaadith had to be 
filtered by means of a rigorous process of authentication to be able to be given the status of 
being a source of Islamic law. However this does not negate the primacy of the Qur’an as the 
dominant and core constitutional source because one of the main criteria for authentication of 
ahaadith was compatibility with the Qur’an. Hence ahaadith cannot be considered authentic 
if they, in the first place, contradict clear Qur’anic verses and injunctions. Thus when we 
come across an authentic hadeeth, which appears to contradict the Qur’an, it would not have 
been considered as such if according to its commonly understood meaning amongst jurists, it 
was not deemed to be compatible or reinforcing existing principles and themes. Hence we 
find amongst some jurists, most prominently Abu Hanifa, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
assertion of the principle that hadith cannot abrogate Qur’an.      
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Bearing this in mind, let us continue our elaboration on the proper understanding of the 
tradition. Interestingly it may be that the use of the word ‘until’ as a translation of the Arabic 
word ‘hattaa’, while accurate in a number of situations, here may not be a wholly accurate 
translation given the possibility of other meanings being conveyed not reflected appropriately 
in the use of ‘hattaa’. The Arabic may be referring to a meaning that may be inclusive of 
‘except’. As such a potential meaning would be ‘I have been ordered to fight the people 
except those who say there is no God but Allah...’. This would convey the fact that the 
Prophet was engaged in hostilities against a number of entities in particular the polytheists of 
the Arabian Peninsula owing to their enmity towards the emerging Islamic entity. Military 
confrontation following the defeat of the polytheists of the Arabian Peninsula against other 
competing neighbouring imperial entities became inevitable as they perceived the new 
religion and its growing political power as a direct threat. This is reflected in Qur’an 9:29, 
which follows the command in 9:5 to fight the polytheists with the command to fight the 
People of the Book. It is understood that the circumstances of revelation were that of having 
defeated the polytheists of the Arabian Peninsula and the mutually anticipated imminent 
confrontation with the Christian Romans, who were in control over the Levant (al-Sham). 
Thus the meaning includes the idea that this was a command to fight all groups deemed 
necessary while excluding those who were Muslim. 
This is not to annul the meaning conveyed by the translation of ‘until’, but only to show that 
hattaa conveys a meaning broader than ‘until’ which may include ‘except’. Beyond this, the 
hadeeth can be explained in a way which marries the two meanings of ‘until’ and ‘except’ 
and takes account of the historical context. The tradition is referring to a time of war and 
perpetual active hostilities between the Muslims and the polytheists of the Arabian Peninsula 
led and instigated by the polytheists of Makkah, who happen to be the kith and kin of the 
Prophet. As such it is highly likely to be from a time close or identical to that of the 
revelation of Qur’an 9:5, which also commands the Prophet to fight the polytheists and as we 
have established ‘the people’ in the tradition is also a reference to the same polytheists. Due 
to this open enmity and being sworn enemies, it is clear that there is no mutual peaceful 
coexistence possible between the two groups. Furthermore there is no expectation or request 
from the polytheists for peace or protection. From the Muslims’ perspective even if 
something similar was offered from the polytheists on the back of repeated violations of 
agreements between the two, it would be perceived as an indication of weakness and an 
attempt to buy time to consolidate strength and build forces to launch an attack.  
Therefore as discussed briefly in Chapter 2, there being only the two options of death or 
Islam, do not indicate that they are interdependent, that is, accepting Islam will avert death 
and the motivation for the violence is to convert.
481
 Rather it is a practical fact applicable 
when engaged in a war that either one is fought for being the enemy or ceases to be an enemy 
when he forsakes the side he is on and joins the other. As long as one belongs and has 
allegiance to the enemy one cannot be accepted as a normalised subject with the political and 
social community of the group who he despises and seeks to destroy. Furthermore it also 
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serves to show that “the Moslems do not fight them for worldly reasons, like subjecting them 
and taking their property, but that their motive is a religious one, the strengthening of 
Islam.”
482
 This by no means indicates that just by being aligned to the enemy that Islam 
allows for taking life. According to Arzt, “Even in the most militant versions of jihad, 
unbelievers were not be attacked outright without first receiving a summons (da’wah) either 
to convert or to submit to the jizya tax”.
483
 Clearly the command is to fight not kill here and 
must be understood in light of Qur’an 9:4-6 in that only combatants are to be fought and 
killed, not those who lay down their arms. Due to their enmity they cannot be accepted as 
subjects amongst the Muslims as dhimma but must still be escorted to a place of safety. 
Furthermore a nuanced understanding of the Tradition also reveals that it clearly and 
unarguably refers to the legitimisation of external force against other military entities and not 
internally against its own individual non-Muslim subjects. Islam has never and cannot 
justifiably stipulate the waging of war and force against non-Muslim subjects under its 
control. Never were religious minorities, who were accorded dhimma status, forced or 
compelled to forsake their religion and outwardly accept Islam. Thus the engagement in 
military activities in defence or against regional rivals was a political endeavour which 
sought to gain control and govern over territories. It was aimed ultimately at consolidating 
the material strength and influence of the Muslims as opposed to compel the people into 
Islam. We can observe that in relation to the internal governance of non-Muslims who had 
been conquered or defeated or had been assumed under the control of the Muslims, clearly 
Qur’an 2:256 and 109:6 continue to be applicable and were discernible in the conduct of the 
Muslims and the Islamic law that was being applied to them based on these verses. It is also 
evident that the command to fight in Qur’an 9:29 desists on the submission of the enemy and 
their assumption of dhimma status, that is, they transitioned from being external foes to 
internal subjects.  Even in relation to the polytheists as mentioned in Qur’an 9:5, the fighting 
must desist once any one surrenders and must then be escorted to a place of safety. With 
regards to neither the tradition nor Qur’an 9:5 mentioning an option where the polytheists 
were offered an option of becoming internal subjects as were the People of the Book, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, this was specific to this particular group of polytheists and not all 
non-People of the Book. It is undisputed that other polytheists, most notably the Magians, 
were accorded dhimma status. The hostility between the two camps of the Muslims and the 
polytheists of the Arab Peninsula was such that neither entertained the idea of any member of 
the other existing as a normalised subject while still holding allegiance to each others’ arch 
enemy. 
Despite the above facets of the tradition and verse in question, the aim is not to negate the 
most ostensible linguistic meaning derived from the wording of both the tradition and the 
verse, which clearly draw a causal link between the political (fight/kill) and the spiritual 
(accepting and becoming true Muslims). How is it possible to bridge this gap where the 
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former legitimises the use of force while the latter forbids it? The first point to reiterate is that 
the third option of being dhimma status is not mentioned as it was not feasible in relation to 
this particular group of polytheists due to intense ensuing hostilities which had in turn been 
the result of a complete breakdown of reciprocity on the part of the polytheists and repeated 
violations of agreements and treaties. Connected to this is also the point that even when two 
possibilities are foreseen that is that a foe must be fought or they accept Islam, there is no 
causal link necessary. Rather it is a logical outcome of anyone switching sides that hostilities 
against them cease as they have joined the other side. Furthermore it is also clear that these 
are not the only two options even if it may appear that way on a isolated reading of some 
verses or traditions. Instead it is only applicable to combatants and not those who do not 
switch allegiance but lay down their arms and assume the status of civilians. Another reason 
for mentioning the possibility of the enemy accepting Islam, even in times of conflict, is the 
emphasis on conveying the true message of Islam and inviting others to it, even one’s enemy. 
Underpinning this is also the belief that Islam conveyed in its genuine form with emphasis on 
its core tenets cannot be refused by anyone who also seeks the truth earnestly.       
How can Islam permit the compulsion of others to Islam, when even in the midst of violent 
conflict with its adversaries, it commands its adherents to “grant him protection so that he 
may hear the words of Allah [i.e., the Qur’an]. Then deliver him to his place of safety. That is 
because they are a people who do not know” Herein lies the answer and the point of 
departure for reconciling the tradition in question with Qur’an 2:256. Those who seek and are 
amenable to the truth but have not learned of the truth of Islam, can only be told it and be 
invited to it, if an opportunity to do so is availed. It is an opportunity which would not be 
possible if the enemy was not being fought and there were not those who then sought 
protection from the Muslims. The salient point here is that in territory controlled by those 
hostile to Muslims, no space was allowed to or could have existed for the message of Islam to 
spread and be argued by the word. Only when the Muslims controlled territory, it was evident 
to the Prophet that people would accept Islam in their droves as its teachings would not be 
hindered or twisted by its detractors. It was firm belief of the Muslims that not only would 
inviting non-Muslims to the message of true monotheism and Islamic creed be common sense 
and evidently the truth, but that on the social, legal and political level too, the justice of Islam 
and the Muslims would have a powerful effect and show the fairness and justice inherent 
Islam. In other words the political is needed to open the space for the spiritual. This is as such 
would be the polar opposite of how the verse and tradition justify forced conversions. There 
are a number of illustrative points in this regard. The Prophet waited for a woman by the 




There are two further minor points that are worth also keeping in mind regarding this issue. 
The first is that the tradition clearly states ‘I’ and not ‘you’, which could imply that it was 
applicable only during the time of the Prophet. Secondly Abu Bakr during his khilafah went 
to war against a section of the Muslims immediately following the death of the Prophet. They 
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insisted that following the death of the Prophet, they were not obliged to pay the zakat 
(obligatory charity - 2.5% of total wealth). For Abu Bakr, this negated their faith and as such 
it was called the war against the murtadeen (apostates).
485
 In support of his decision, he cited 
the above Prophetic tradition. Nonetheless it was disputed by Umar and a number of other 
companions, who argued that as long as they testified to the oneness of God, they were to be 
left alone and still considered Muslims. While Abu Bakr held that zakat was an essential part 
of being a Muslim. The dispute was also partially a result of varying narrations of the same 
hadith, which carried a longer or shorter list of conditions for Islam. The cogent point here is 
that politically this occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet’s death, so Abu Bakr 
had to make sure that the message of Islam and its political authority would continue despite 
the calamity, thus focusing on adherence to the message of the Messenger rather than purely 
the person of the Messenger. Also in terms of fiscal policy of the embryonic Islamic State, 
there could not be a violation of the laws of the new State’s laws as they applied to Muslims, 
one of which was the payment of zakat.
486
   
 
VII. Conclusion 
The above analysis has attempted to present an analysis of the internal aspect of freedom of 
religion under Islamic law. The reason to dedicate an entire chapter to the topic was twofold. 
It is often an aspect of Islamic law most subjected to critique and it is essential to the 
discussion of the external element of manifestation of religion. To avoid to reactionary and 
defensive approach to the topic the chapter began and focused on initially compelling 
arguments for freedom of religion under Islamic law and then proceeded to the 
counterarguments, both polemic and juristic. We began our discussion with an indepth 
elaboration of the oft-cited excerpt of Qur’an 2:256: “there is no compulsion in religion”. 
While the commandment ostensibly straightforward, it was interesting to note that while 
some argued that it was not commandment and merely a statement of infeasibility, others 
focused on the juristic argument of abrogation by later verses and commandments. It was 
suggested in relation to the first that the distinction between a statement of infeasibility and a 
commandment of a prohibition was an artificial one, especially when the source of the 
statement is said to be God.  
In delving further into the circumstance of revelation surrounding Qur’an 2:256 some 
valuable insights were gathered. Among was the comparable aspect of freedom of religion 
under international law of parents in relation to their children. It was also deduced the scope 
of the verse may be far broader than apparent. It is commonly taken as a commandment 
towards Muslims to desist from compelling non-Muslims towards Islam. However it was 
argued that the implications of the verse may be to prohibit anyone compelling anyone 
towards any religion. The argument was made yet more compelling buttressed by the Islamic 
conception of the purpose behind the creation of humans and how it was incompatible with 
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the Islamic world view to force religion for it to be accepted disenguinisly. It was asserted 
that such an approach would not benefit the victim and be a sinful act by the perpetrator. 
Further corroboration was provided by the meaning and circumstances surrounding Surah al-
Kafiroon, which emphasised the Islamic principle to interference in the religious beliefs of 
others.   
The first counter argument discussed was regarding the status and treatment of three separate 
Jewish tribes of Madinah. A detailed study was conducted of the seerah (Prophetic 
biographical) literature to understand the context and sequence of events that led to two of the 
tribes being expelled and the fighting men of a third to be executed. The thorough analysis 
revealed that regardless of one perceives of the severity of the punishments metted out, what 
is unequivocal is that the facilitating factors were wholly unrelated to religious identity and 
belief of the tribes. It was in essence a political and military standoff which took place with 
each tribe separately over different circumstances. There was also the added factor of 
colluding with the Muslims’ arch enemy, the Quraish. In the case of the tribe that received 
the severest punishment, they had to great extent instigated a battle which came close to 
overcoming the Muslims while they were still under their governance. The final section of 
the chapter surveyed the juristic opinions on the idea of abrogation of Qur’an 2:256. However 
by reference to linguistic insights as well as to a number of verses commanding the Muslim 
to ‘fight’, it was ascertained that most were in the context of conflict. As such they were 
inapplicable outside of such times and did not abrogate Qur’an 2:256 nor negate as a whole 
the arguments presented earlier in the chapter regarding Surah al-Kaafiroon and the said 
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Chapter 6: 
Non-Discrimination and Freedom of 




Chapter 5 discussed the internal aspect of freedom of religion under Islamic law in the 
context of the competing principles of non-compulsion in religion and commandments to 
fight, in particular the polytheists. The implication of the former being the granting of an 
absolute right in relation to the internal aspect of freedom of religion, identical to as we will 
see below to international law. The implication of the latter being that non-Muslims 
especially polytheists may not be eligible to dhimma, thus leaving them with only two 
choices: Islam or death. In this chapter, we will elaborate the right to freedom of religion due 
to religious minorities under international law, once they are deemed to fall within the scope 
of minority rights protection. We will however precede this with a thorough analysis of 
religious non-discrimination in line with the asymmetrical comparative approach outlined 
earlier. Just as we opted to focus on the internal aspect of freedom of religion under Islamic 
law, here the discussion of non-discrimination is the first line of defence for members of 
religious minorities to attain equality under the law. Once this right is established and availed 
to those belonging to religious minorities, can the right to freedom of religion be meaningful 
by building on that equality by accommodating and non-interference with religious beliefs 
and their manifestation. 
This must be qualified by restating that discussion around the absence of State discretion is 
specific and limited to the issue of recognition of existence rather than the rights that may 
result from such recognition, which is the focus of this chapter. While it may make it possible 
for such a recognised minority group to claim and attempt to access relevant rights, there is 
substantial discretion available to the State to grant or deny such rights depending on public 
policy grounds or financial limitations and other practical considerations, including the 
population of the minority. However, the issue of non-recognition of existence as a means to 
avoid even the discussion of applicable rights, where there is significant discretion for State 
manoeuvring, is indicative of a lack of understanding of this issue by States, an inherent 
hostility to the minority group, or an intrinsic aversion to minority rights owing to their 
perceived threat to the State endorsed national identity.   
As already stated, international law requires that once the objective and subjective criteria are 
met, the minority group’s existence becomes a matter of fact and it becomes incumbent upon 
the State to lend formal recognition to the group. Once this point is reached, then a host of 
rights must follow. Apart from the right of individuals within the group to enjoy all 
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recognised individual human rights, they are also entitled to specific rights to be exercised in 
community with other members of their group. The first of these relevant to religious 
minorities, which could be said to be the strongest and least subject to State discretion is the 
right to religious non-discrimination followed by the right to freedom of religion and finally 
minority rights.  Religious minority rights include the aforementioned two sets of rights, but 
also add a third layer of specific religious rights with a group dimension albeit being vested 
solely in individuals.
487
 This is worded in Art. 27 of ICCPR as the right to practice and 
profess their religion in community with others. The Declaration on Minorities expands on 
this and adds rights that go beyond merely those of religious practice. The final layer of rights 
is that of collective rights vested in group entities. This is not included within the scope of 
minority rights. However whether such progressive interpretations have become more 
plausible are worth discussing. Conversely collective rights do exist but only in relation to 
‘peoples’ in the context of the right to self-determination and the nascent right of 
autonomy
488
, while minorities are said to be excluded from the former on legally weak but 
politically expedient basis
489
 and the beginnings of a similar trend may be observable in 
relation to the emerging rights and norms relating to indigenous peoples and autonomy.
490
 
Hence, I will be focusing mainly on the right of religious minorities under international law. 
This principally will be in relation to the right to non-discrimination and right to freedom of 
religion. 
 
II. Religious Non-Discrimination 
We discussed the scope of non-discrimination and the included heads in Chapter 3, noting 
that the right explicitly included religion as a head.
491
 As such ‘religion’ is clearly included 
within the protections relating to non-discrimination. As to how one would determine if the 
said person’s characteristic or an aspect of it fell within the scope of religious non-
discrimination, no doubt self-identification plays a vital role and significant deference is 
given to the victim’s own self-perception and self-identification. It may also be that in 
matters of discrimination equal or greater weight be given to the perception and intentions of 
the perpetrator.
492
 This is because the perpetrator may discriminate or attack owing to 
perceived rather than the actual identity of a victim. A striking example is the murder of Sikh 
people and hostility towards ethnic minorities in the US in the immediate post 9/11 period on 
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the perception that they were Muslims.
493
 Another example is xenophobic and racist rhetoric 
and attacks against immigrant communities under the guise of animosity, hatred and hostility 
towards Muslims.
494
 It is noteworthy that the right of non-discrimination is not restricted to 
minorities but applies to all under a number of heads, one of which is ‘religion’. However 
minorities constituting a category of vulnerable individuals are especially at risk of being 
victims of non-discrimination, vertically from State institutions as well as horizontally by 
other individuals.   
The commitment to non-discrimination and the inclusion of the religious head appears in the 
UN Charter, UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR. Art. 26 of ICCPR states:  
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 
In addition to Art. 26, the more well-known and established non-discrimination provision is 
to be found in Article 2 and could be said to be stronger in that it obligates States to also 
provide remedies through legislative means
495
 so as to address the structural problems as 
opposed to merely its symptoms. As such, remedies must be effective
496
 and their 
enforcement ensured
497
. However Art. 26 focuses on the compatibility of domestic legislation 
with non-discrimination principles. Domestic legislation that does not comply with Art. 26 
needs to be reviewed and it should be ensured that legislation being drafted is compatible 
with international law obligations. Nonetheless the most significant difference between the 
two provisions is that Art. 2 ensures non-discrimination in relation to the “rights recognized 
in the present Covenant”
498
, whereas Art. 26 is a stand-alone right that can be drawn on to 
remedy any form of discrimination not enumerated as a right under the Convention, that is 
“equal protection of the law”. As to the utility and necessity of Art. 2, the HRC offers the 
following explanation on the relationship between Arts. 2 and 26: 
 
“In the view of the Committee, article 26 does not merely duplicate the guarantee 
already provided for in article 2 but provides in itself an autonomous right. It prohibits 
discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public 
authorities. Article 26 is therefore concerned with the obligations imposed on States 
parties in regard to their legislation and the application thereof. Thus, when legislation 
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is adopted by a State party, it must comply with the requirement of article 26 that its 
content should not be discriminatory. In other words, the application of the principle of 
non-discrimination contained in article 26 is not limited to those rights which are 




It is submitted that this is not a convincing explanation of the necessity of Art. 2 protections 
when they may already be covered by the broader Art. 26. Reiterating that Art. 26 is an 
autonomous right does not shed any further light on what then is the utility of Art. 2. A more 
plausible answer may be found in the analysis above in the content and extent of the right. 
Art. 26 is autonomous and Art. 2 dependent on the violation of enumerated rights under the 
ICCPR with a stress on effective legislative remedies which are enforced. Another 
perspective could be that Art. 2 seeks to correct structural discrimination in relation to 
Convention rights as well as providing a remedy for the victim, while Art. 26 seeks to prevent 
discriminatory laws being passed or declaring existing laws discriminatory regardless of the 
right in question. The ECHR has seen a similar development recently by a shift towards 
having an autonomous right to non-discrimination not dependent on a violation of 
Convention rights already present under Art. 14. Additional Protocol 12 to the ECHR has 
attracted a weary response by States who have been reluctant to become parties. The case-law 
of the Court relating to the new autonomous right has also been limited.
500
  
Furthermore, the fundamental and profound nature of the right to non-discrimination is 
evident in that it underlies most, if not all, human rights. The first reference to human rights 
in the UN Charter was in the context of non-discrimination.
501
 The elaboration of non-
discrimination beyond the rights in the ICCPR and ECHR is indicative of its independent 
importance as opposed to being attached to Convention rights. Furthermore, the list of heads 
of discrimination are not only extensive but non-exhaustive. Hence in relation to Art. 2, 
despite discrimination having had to occur in relation to a Convention right, the grounds of 
discrimination are open-ended and include those not explicitly listed. The HRC has stated: 
“Indeed, the principle of non-discrimination is so basic that article 3 obligates 
each State party to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of 
the rights set forth in the Covenant. While article 4, paragraph 1, allows States 
parties to take measures derogating from certain obligations under the Covenant in 
time of public emergency, the same article requires, inter alia, that those measures 
should not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin. Furthermore, article 20, paragraph 2, obligates 
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States parties to prohibit, by law, any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred which constitutes incitement to discrimination.”
502
  
As such, discrimination is defined not as a difference in treatment, but rather one that cannot 
be reasonably and objectively justified. Another way to conceptualise the right is to treat 
people in similar situations in the same way. Recently, case-law has developed in particular at 
the ECtHR, which has gone beyond this and accepted that at times people in different 
situations may need to be treated differently in order for equality to be realised especially in 
relation to religious minorities.
503
 Despite little doubt as to the legal principle for religious 
non-discrimination being of a legally binding and central nature to the entire body of 
international human rights law, there is an inherent tension between the religious and 
ethnic/racial heads. In the above instruments no distinction is made between the various 
heads of non-discrimination and the order in which they appear is not indicative of 
importance or significance either. Nonetheless there is a stark contrast between racial and 
religious heads as indicators of self-presumed or other-perceived identity. Race remains an 
immutable characteristic despite its understanding transitioning considerably from a purely 
genealogical conceptualisation to one of ethnicity,
504
 while religion is a choice of ideology 
and a way of life. Consequently religious identity will manifest in rituals, acts of worship, 
prohibition of certain actions, dress and other actions more readily than an ethnic identity. 
Subsequently there may arise far more potentially reasonable and objective differences in 
treatment when dealing with religious minorities than ethnic minorities. It would and does 
also result in a far more expansive right to criticise, ridicule and mock religious beliefs as 
opposed to ethnic identity or race. One is subject to and open for debate while the other is 
not.     
The rights in the Declaration on Religious Discrimination are substantive and extensive. It 
affirms that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of religion or belief.
505
 Along the 
same lines as ICERD defines ‘racial discrimination’
506
, it defines ‘intolerance and 
discrimination based on religion or belief’ as:  
“any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief 
and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the 
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It also seeks to ensure “effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief”
508
 and that pursuant to this “All States shall make all efforts to 
enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and to take 
all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in 
this matter.”
509
 These detailed and elaborated measures in relation to non-discrimination and 
intolerance based on religion and belief attempt to bring religious non-discrimination to the 
same level as racial non-discrimination. However the weakness of religious non-
discrimination is evident most notably in the high level of international consensus that 
brought about the creation of the legally binding and widely ratified ICERD
510
, while in the 
realm of religious non-discrimination, we only have the non-legally binding Declaration on 
Religious Discrimination. Despite this weakness, States still saw fit to enter reservations.  
Due to such an imbalance of non-discrimination protections, it has become necessary in some 
cases for religious groups to identify as ethnic minorities rather than religious minorities. One 
means to achieve this is to argue that those who constitute religious groups almost always 
simultaneously constitute ethnic groups often due to their national origin. This would provide 
a basis for alleging indirect discrimination, whether it was in intention or effect.
511
 However 
we find that groups that are religiously distinct but also ethnically distinct and homogenous 
have claimed successfully to be recognised as ethnic minorities. The Jewish community 
constituting an ethnic and religious minority is an obvious case in point. Anti-Semitism is a 
criminal offence in a number of European States regardless if the discrimination is aimed at 
their ethnic or religious identity. Similarly holocaust denial is prohibited and a criminal 
offense in a number of European States.
512
 




 have succeeded through case law to be recognised as 
racial groups due to their ethnic homogeneity even though they principally self-identify as a 
religious community. They were able to include themselves within the meaning of ‘ethnic’ 
which is subsumed in the classification of ‘racial group’ under the Race Relations Act 2000 
and thus access rights to non-discrimination normally reserved for only racial or ethnic 
groups, but for their religious community. The Court’s main grounds for granting recognition 
as ethnic minorities to the two religious groups, who were primarily and principally religious 
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minorities was the sharing of certain factors
515
 and ethnic homogeneity. As such, all religious 
groups who were not ethnically homogenous in the UK were excluded from a similar 
stronger protection of racial non-discrimination. This included Muslims, Hindus and 
Buddhists. With regards to Muslims, there was a case which argued for their inclusion within 
the scope of ‘racial group’ for the purposes of the Race Relations Act 2000, but was 
unsuccessful on the basis ethnic heterogeneity, including people of many nations and colours, 




There are two observations with regards to this judicial development of UK law. The first is 
that in having two regimes of non-discrimination of differing strengths for groups that may 
have an ethnic and religious identity prevents them from identifying uninfluenced and 
unpressured to the type of identity they feel the closest affinity with. This may constitute a 
form of subtle coercion and a compromising of the right to self-identify not just as a minority 
but the type of minority that one may strongly identify with as opposed to a weaker element 
of identity such as ethnicity or language. 
The second is that the reasoning adopted by the British courts in itself appears to be sound, 
but its application to the case of Muslims and other minorities arbitrarily restrictive. The law 
accepts that the vast majority of people who identify as Muslims, Hindu or Buddhist, also 
constitute ethnic minorities based on national origin.
517
 Hence what distinguishes these three 
religious minority groups from Sikhs and Jews is that while the former are made up of a 
number of nationalities, the latter are made up of only one. A more reasonable and justified 
manner to apply the law would be to say that while Jewish and Sikh communities are 
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ethnically homogenous, the Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist communities are homogenously 
constituted of ethnic minorities albeit multiple ones. Furthermore those who discriminate 
against all these groups often do so owing to the cumulative effect of all aspects of identity 
rather than any one aspect. As such discrimination is directed at the compound identity of an 
individual making it difficult to accurately decipher what the rationale behind the 
discrimination may be. For example being Muslim is often conflated with being of Pakistani 
origin. Hence those who discriminate against Muslims may take issue with the ethnic identity 
and cultural practices of a person but understanding that as being associated with Islamic 
beliefs and practices. Hence such discrimination should not be able to evade the stronger 
standards or protection for ethnic minorities. In other instances, especially with right wing 
commentators and political groupings, using the language of religion allows them to exploit 
the loopholes/weaknesses in the international and domestic European laws to express their 
pre-existing hostility towards those who they essentially believe to be foreign and thus 
concealing an undercurrent of xenophobia and racism.    
At the international level, there has been a slow but gradual realisation of this wide gap 
between religious and ethnic non-discrimination especially in the context of the rise of 
xenophobia, intolerance and in particular Islamophobia. The strategies and avenues for 
advancing are finite and discernible. Either protection against religious discrimination is 
strengthened or the scope of ethnic discrimination is widened to become inclusive of 
religious discrimination. In between, we find a number of creative arguments for potential 
steps forward. They include giving greater attention to indirect discrimination and expanding 
its scope by looking at affect rather than the evidentially difficult test of intention
518
 Another 
is to draw on the idea of intersectionality and the complex nature of discrimination aimed at 
the identity as a whole to argue that elements of identity cannot just be differentiated on 
apparent causes of discrimination. Both routes are problematic as attempts to strengthen the 
prohibition of religious discrimination stalled with the Declaration on Religious 
Discrimination. Likewise the scope of ethnic discrimination clearly and explicitly excludes 
religious discrimination. 
Despite this there are pragmatic ways forward, which appear to be paying dividend such as 
arguing indirect discrimination and intersectionality as well as that Islamophobia presents a 
unique phenomenon with various elements. Islam by its adherents is seen as something 
beyond just a belief and so overlap is sought with elements of ethnic. In relation to the 
landmark UK case of Mandla relating to Sikhs, which held that Sikhs were an ethnic group 
thus included within the scope of the Race Relations Act 2000 identified the following  two 
factors: “a long shared history” and “a cultural tradition of its own, including family and 
social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance.” 
Following this five further relevant shared characteristics were listed: geographical origin, or 
descent from a small number of common ancestors; language, not necessarily peculiar to the 
group; literature peculiar to the group; a religion different from that of neighbouring groups 
or from the general community surrounding it; and being a minority or being oppressed or a 
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dominant group within a larger community, for example a conquered people.
519
 Bengoa in 
the same vein states: “Ethnic values, then, comprise a set of customs, traditions, cultural 
expressions and collective history that forms a network of links conferring a special identity 
on a particular human group. Usually those values are accompanied by a specific language 
and religion. Not infrequently there are also physical features, even if these are not merely 
racial. That is why this supposedly ‘objective’.”
520
 
As such, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards has 
recognised that “religious intolerance often constitutes an essential part of contemporary 
manifestations of racism” and also recommended the drafting of a General Recommendation 
specifically focusing on race and religion.
521
 In this regard the CERD after this author 
submitted a similar argument
522
 affirmed the potential inclusion of Islamophobia within its 
scope:  
“In the light of the principle of intersectionality, and bearing in mind that ‘criticism of 
religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine or tenets of faith’ should not be 
prohibited or punished, the Committee’s attention has also been engaged by hate speech 
targeting persons belonging to certain ethnic groups who profess or practice a religion 
different from the majority, including expressions of Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and 
other similar manifestations of hatred against ethno-religious groups, as well as extreme 
manifestations of hatred such as incitement to genocide and to terrorism.”
523
 
A related area is that of speech which may constitute incitement to hatred. ICCPR Article 
20.2 states: “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” This provides one specific 
way that discrimination may manifest, in the expression of hateful and hostile speech targeted 
at a specific minority group, the most common form of which to date has been racism. 
Prejudices such as racism may be expressed overtly and expressive of hateful, derogatory and 
hostile attitudes and even threats or execution of violent acts towards individuals belonging to 
certain social group for no reason apart from ascribing to that identity. It provides for an 
elaboration of a limit to Art. 19 of ICCPR on the freedom of expression. 
Once we have established that such hatred or violence against others ought to be prohibited 
or criminalised, and especially so, when aimed at vulnerable minority groups due to bigoted 
and prejudicial views, then we can also assess whether there is a difference and inequality 
between the different heads of prohibited hate speech. Article 20 lists the prohibition of hate 
speech on the basis of national, racial or religious. As such it is clear that the provision itself 
                                                          
519
 Mandla v Dowell-Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (House of Lords).  
520
 Bengoa, Existence and Recognition of Minorities, para. 45. 
521
 Human Rights Council, Complementary International Standards, Compilation of Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Study by the Five Experts on the Content and Scope of Substantive Gaps in the 
Existing International Instruments to Combat Racism Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance, 18 February 2008, A/HRC/AC.1/1/ CRP.4 and 27 August 2007, A/HRC/4/WG.3/6. 
522
 Shaikh, “Recognising Muslims as Ethnic Groups”. 
523
 CERD GR 35, para. 6.  
PhD: Protection of Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and International Law   Murtaza Shaikh  
  
Page 146 of 222 
 
does not differentiate between the three heads. However when Art. 20 is invoked in relation 
to the hostile and hateful speech directed at Muslims in the post-9/11 period, commonly and 
increasingly referred to as Islamophobia, extensive and detailed discussions and debates have 
been provoked on the balancing or conflict between Art. 19 and Art. 20. In other words how 
can one balance the competing requirements and reconcile between the freedom of 
expression and the prohibition of religious hatred? The first point to note in this regard is that 
the discussion is specific to religious hatred and not other forms of hatred. That is to say that 
debate is confined to the context of expression targeting Muslims and Islam as well as no 
comparative arguments being made relating to the need for greater freedom for criticisms 
based on racial or national basis. This is revealing of the fact that a conflict is not perceived 
or anticipated in relation to national or racial hatred as no issue is taken with such a 
prohibition and the laws in a number of States have strong legal frameworks in place against 
racism, which in most cases includes discrimination based on national origin within the 
meaning of racism. ICERD includes it explicitly in its Art. 1(1). The context and backdrop is 
one of not only growing Islamophobia but also the recent outrage and violence created in 
response to the attempt to depict the Prophet Muhammad in a derogatory manner.
524
  
Furthermore a number of the debates and discussion occur in a polemic fashion carrying 
significant rhetoric, often presenting it as a battle between forces of freedom/liberalism and 
those who seek to deny us such freedom. In doing so, the explicit or implicit assumption is 
that ICCPR Article 19 is absolute and may not be restricted under any circumstances. While 
it may be true that amongst individual States, the extent to which freedom of expression is 
allowed varies greatly, it is wholly and legally incorrect to state that it is an absolute right 
lacking any grounds from limitations. Under international law, the freedom of expression is 
subject to limitations based on public policy grounds under Art. 19.3. As such it can be and is 
limited beyond certain permissible bounds. For example it is not permissible or acceptable to 
call openly for the murder and rape of other people. Indeed the lesson is stark from the 
Rwandan Genocide of the sheer carnage possible from unrestrained freedom of expression.
525
 
Where an honest mistake may be possible is in conflating the high and fundamental status of 
the principle with its perceived absoluteness. No doubt in light of this, States should desist 
from and only in special and pressing circumstances consider it appropriate to intervene in 
people’s freedom of expression.
526
 It is fundamental to the function of a vibrant democracy, 
were ideas are openly and readily exchanged and proliferated. Opposing views should have 
the opportunity to be aired and a healthy debate must always be in motion in a healthy 
democracy. At the same time such a democracy must prevent hostility and hatred and 
ultimately violence from becoming prevalent amongst its subjects. In this regard, harmonious 
relations and community cohesion should be safeguarded whenever possible and balanced 
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against the fundamental and central nature of the right; for both are integral elements of a 
peaceful democratic society. 
As for the view of the HRC on this apparent impasse, far from being in contention, Arts. 19 
and 20 are in agreement with each other and the “acts that are addressed in article 20 are all 
subject to restriction pursuant to article 19, paragraph 3. As such, a limitation that is justified 
on the basis of article 20 must also comply with article 19, paragraph 3.”
527
 Art. 19 provides 
an essential right with inbuilt limitations and Art. 20 elaborates on one specific example of 
such limitation worthy of special attention owing to its deplorable nature and its common 
occurrence. In this regard the HRC stated that Article 20 should be read as indicating the 
“specific response required from the State: their prohibition by law. It is only to this extent 
that article 20 may be considered as lex specialis with regard to article 19.”
528
 The HRC goes 
on to say: “It is only with regard to the specific forms of expression indicated in article 20 
that States parties are obliged to have legal prohibitions. In every case in which the State 
restricts freedom of expression it is necessary to justify the prohibitions and their provisions 
in strict conformity with article 19.”
529
 Thus Art. 20 could be read alternatively as Art. 19(4). 
It could also be understood as providing a more specific limitation whereas generally 
speaking Article 19 while stipulating grounds of restriction/interference leaves it to States’ 
discretion and their situation to define the scope for the right to be exercised. Some States, 
like the US, provide expansive room for freedom of expression while others, such as some 
Middle Eastern countries or eastern European countries perceive the right very narrowly. 
As to where the threshold is drawn regarding what constitutes hate speech, Art. 20 defines 
incitement to hatred as incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. These three 
subdivisions can also be perceived as three different consequences of hateful attitudes of 
varying and incremental severity. Clearly, discrimination being the least severe and violence 
the worst. It would then also be implicit that violence is the end result in an escalating 
spectrum of hatred and what will be inevitable, if left unchecked. Therefore what is important 
to note is that not only is there no distinction made between the three categories of protected 
people, that is, national, racial or religious, but the threshold for an act of expression to 
qualify as incitement to hatred need only be proven to be an incitement to discrimination. 
Discrimination is commonly understood as a difference in treatment that cannot be held to be 
reasonable or justified. Hence according to international law, any encouragement or 
expression of views that may result in attitudes or acts, which would constitute an unjustified 
difference of treatment, would be prohibited. For example statements alleging certain 
religious groups should not be employed would constitute incitement to hatred without 
having to show or prove the presence of hostile or violent behaviour.  
With this in mind, it is useful at this juncture to briefly assess to what extent State practice 
reflects this international norm. It is certainly the case that there has been a concerted effort 
by States to bring their domestic laws in line with Art. 20 as far as incitement to racial or 
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national hatred are concerned. Any racist speech is often promptly dealt with as constituting 
incitement to racial hatred. However the same is not apparent in the realm of incitement to 
religious hatred.  Taking the example of the UK, the gap between laws on incitement to racial 
hatred and religious hatred is quite significant.
530
 Any expression perceived to be of a racist 
nature is penalised if it is deemed to be “threatening, abusive or insulting”
531
, but for 
incitement to religious hatred the threshold is excessively high requiring expressions deemed 
to be only “threatening” and thus imminent threat of violence.
532
 Another significant 
difference is that intent must be proven for religious hatred but for racial hatred the lower 
threshold of “having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up 
thereby.”
533
 Practically, this may mean that a prosecution for religious hatred only becomes 
possible once the threat has been carried out and intent proven. Even the existing weak 
protections against incitement to religious hatred in the UK took place owing to passage of 
EU Directives that required the strengthening of prohibition of religious discrimination.
534
 
Even with these developments, it is clear that the UK falls well short of the international 
standard that require the prohibition of incitement to religious hatred, which is understood as 
protected even against incitement to discrimination. It is hereby submitted that the UK fails to 
protect its religious minorities against incitement to discrimination and hostility, both of 
which constitute examples of hatred. It only protects against incitement to violence but its 
effectiveness is questionable in light of the introduction of the even more restrictive criteria 
or ‘imminent’ threat of violence.  
When it comes to hate speech laws against religious minorities, the approach of the UK is by 
no means isolated, and is widespread in Western European States and other liberal 
democracies. In fact a Panel of Eminent Persons for combating discrimination against 
Muslims, convened by the OIC in January 2013, to identify ways to address the growing 
phenomenon of Islamophobia concluded that international law offered sufficiently strong 
protection and basis,
535
 but there were gaps in “interpretation, implementation and 
enforcement” at the State level to address the issue of incitement of religious hatred.
536
 Thus 
the question arises as to why the gap in protection exists despite clear international law 
against it and what could potentially be done to address it. As already discussed above, 
religion and ethnicity (inclusive of race), while both being considered examples of identity, 
are fundamentally different in one aspect, that is one is an ideology and the other an 
immutable trait.  
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Ideologies and belief systems must be open to debate. Racial or ethnic identity, while 
potentially accompanied with common cultural traits, including religion and language is a 
matter of fact, and devoid of substance in terms of beliefs and choices. Therefore protections 
afforded it must inherently go beyond those afforded owing to religious identity. It is right 
that discrimination, abuse and insults on the basis of immutable differences tantamount to a 
notion of superiority of one race over another by virtue of only that differentiating factor 
should be prohibited. Similarly it would not make the same common sense to prohibit any 
discussion of claims to quality of the content of certain religions. As strengthening of 
protections against incitement to religious hatred
537
 have been caveated with explicit 
exception that “criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine or tenets of 
faith” should not be prohibited or punished.
538
  
Even religionists themselves would not support stems on limitations on freedom of 
expression to go to the extent where they themselves become unable to debate with other 
religionists, atheists and agnostics with regards to existential questions of existence and 
deities. At the same time a real effort is required by jurists and academics to identify the 
difference and attempt to draw a legally implementable line between maintaining and 
creating the conditions of open, frank and genuine discussion and debate on doctrinal, 
historical and theological issues, while at the same time giving the incitement to religious 
hatred the same level of protection as incitement to racial hatred, as, fundamentally, both are 
equally deplorable. The difficulty though is in being able to identify and differentiate between 
incitement to religious hatred and justified issues of debate. In other words, the extreme end 
of permissible free speech has often been characterised as the right to offend, mock and 
ridicule, in particular, relating to a free press. The HRC notes: “The scope of paragraph 2 
embraces even expression that may be regarded as deeply offensive, although such 
expression may be restricted in accordance with the provisions of article 19, paragraph 3 and 
article 20.”
539
 Where then is the line between such a right and the prohibition to religious 
hatred to be drawn? Rephrased, when does mockery, offence and ridicule become incitement 
to hatred?   
One potential and tentative proposal to reconcile this tension, pending a definitive answer 
following extensive discussions and deliberation by leading experts and policy makers, is to 
differentiate between criticism based on textual sources of a religion and criticism due to 
inherent hatred of the religion itself for no other discernible substantive reason. Such 
animosity when not based in religious text or beliefs is a cover for racist and religiously 
bigoted attitudes targeting ethno-religious minorities. Furthermore it should never be 
acceptable to make derogatory generalisations against an entire religious group and then 
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attribute it to a dislike of the religion, for the reason that it requires an objective basis and 
more importantly that homogeneous belief on a number of matters in any one religion is rare.  
 
III. Freedom of Religion (internal) 
The previous section highlighted the fact that the development of the freedom of religion 
under international law can be traced to the notion of eliminating intolerance and religious 
discrimination. There are two ways to view this evolution and relationship. The first; that 
freedom from discrimination and intolerance on the basis of religion are a priore necessary 
and render the freedom of religion a meaningful right. Thus the former enables and forms the 
basis of the latter. The view could also be taken that the general concept of religious tolerance 
of others entails, once expanded, not just their identity but also their religious beliefs and 
practices. The second; that intolerance and discrimination are comparable and related to the 
internal freedom of religion, that of thought, conscience and religion
540
 as well as possibly 
impairing the freedom to choose one’s religion.
541
 By this what is meant is that 
discrimination and intolerance place the victim at a disadvantage owing to their religion. This 
invariably has an indirect effect on the internal aspect of freedom of religion and potentially 
impairing the freedom to choose.  Freedom of religion was discussed in Chapter 3, but in 
relation to analysing the scope of the concept of religious minorities under international law 
vis-à-vis Art.18 of ICCPR and UDHR. In this section, we will analyse freedom of religion as 
one of the substantive rights of religious minorities under international law. 
 
The starting point for understanding freedom of religion is ICCPR Article 18, which has its 
beginnings in UDHR Article 18.   
“1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” 
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The Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 22 recognises the importance and 
centrality of Article 18 to the wider human rights system by describing it as “far reaching and 
profound”.
542
 This fundamentality is observable in it being one of the few underogable rights 
in the ICCPR even in time of public emergency beyond the in-built limitations clauses.
543
 
While this suffices to explain its profundity, its far reaching aspect can be put down to the 
“fact that the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience are protected equally with 
the freedom of religion and belief.”
544
 While asserting the equality between the three different 
types of belief, the terms used remain vague and ambivalent. A potential explanation follows 
that what may be alluded to is that “Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic 
beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief.”
545
 In its profundity and 
fundamentality, Article 18 is similar to and related to the freedom of expression in Article 19. 
Along with the freedom of association, these three provisions can be considered core human 
rights on which a number of other rights depend and as such are integral to any framework of 
human rights protection. One must be endowed with the volition to think and believe as one 
wishes. Resultantly, there should be sufficient openness for those ideas and beliefs to be 
expressed freely and without fear. Thus, following that the ability of likeminded persons to 
congregate, coalesce, organise and mobilise to propagate or to bring common ideals or beliefs 
to fruition. All are fundamental to democratic society.  
Furthermore, similar to Article 19, Article 18 has an internal absolute, uncompromisable 
aspect and an external aspect limited on the basis of public policy grounds. As already 
discussed in preceding chapters freedom of religion is often divided into two parts. The first 
is an absolute right, that of holding a religious belief and the second a limited right to 
manifest those beliefs conditioned on the necessity to be “prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others”. These are often understood to be reflective of the internal and external 
aspects of the right. There is never any justification for interfering with the actual religious 
beliefs of a person or attempting to put them at a disadvantage in any way owing to that 
choice. According to the HRC:  
“Article 18 distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief from the 
freedom to manifest religion or belief. It does not permit any limitations whatsoever on 
the freedom of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or 
belief of one's choice. These freedoms are protected unconditionally, as is the right of 
everyone to hold opinions without interference in article 19.1. In accordance with 
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This absoluteness and unconditionality is supported by, buttressed and connected to Art. 18.2. 
As such it is infeasible to compel someone to give up or adopt a certain belief as they can 
always choose to conceal their genuine beliefs. It is also impermissible to compel them to 
reveal them, if they do not wish to. Hence this area of the law is most often concerned with 
those who wish to proclaim their faith despite negative repercussions. This could be the 
renouncement of faith in public owing to force or threat of force. It could be that owing to 
self-identifying as belonging to a certain religious group, a number of benefits and services 
are withheld. Also as stated earlier, while the right is divided in this way, there are matters 
that do not easily fall on either side. For example, if one adorns specific garments that one 
considers mandatory in ones religion, would this be seen as expressing one’s religious 
identity or manifesting that belief? An associated question would be whether identification of 
a belief is only observable in speech or in other forms of expression too. As such, while 
manifestation always implies a certain belief, does belief necessary entail any form of 
manifestation? 
 
IV. Freedom of religion (external) 
The following section will delve and focus on the limited and outward aspect of the right, that 
of manifestation, in particular the type of acts or behaviour protected as well as the nature and 
scope of potential limit. Taking as our starting Art. 18 of ICCPR, we may observe that 
manifestation of religion may be in the form of “worship, observance, practice and teaching”. 
While the framing of the sentence suggests an exhaustive list the expansive nature of the 
terms employed is indicative of an attempt to give examples of activities that may be 
considered to be manifestation of religious beliefs. As such it is difficult to imagine how any 
act of self-perceived manifestation could fall foul of the broad meanings possible of worship, 
practice and observance.
547
 Although it may be that narrower meanings may be applicable 
dependent on the subjectivity of the individual or the doctrinal underpinnings of the religion 
in question. For example, worship may refer to ritual acts or to the entirety of the religion. 
Teaching nonetheless provides for a specific right that has clear limits of interpretation, but 
with the addition of three broad terms serves to highlight the importance of the teaching 
aspect through explicit enumeration. The Declaration on Religious Discrimination while non-
binding elaborates further on potential examples of manifestation as a) worship, assembly 
and places of worship; b) charitable or humanitarian institutions; c) articles and materials 
related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief; d) writing, issuing and disseminating 
relevant publications; e) teaching religion in suitable places; f) receipt of  voluntary financial 
and other contributions; g) selection of appropriate leaders; h) observing days of rest and 
celebration of holidays and ceremonies; i) communications with co-religionists at the national 
and international levels.
548
 The HRC states the following regarding possible manifestations of 
religion in line with the Declaration:  
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“The freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching encompasses a broad range of acts. The concept of worship extends to ritual 
and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, as well as various practices 
integral to such acts, including the building of places of worship, the use of ritual 
formulae and objects, the display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days 
of rest. The observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only 
ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the 
wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings, participation in rituals associated with 
certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a 
group. In addition, the practice and teaching of religion or belief includes acts integral 
to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as, inter alia, the freedom 
to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish 




Following the listing and elaboration of such varied and non-exhaustive examples of 
manifestation, it is axiomatic that the default position of the right is that once a religion or 
belief is recognised as such and falls within the scope of Art. 18, that it then automatically 
leads to the freedom to manifest that belief in any way an individual wishes unless it falls 
foul of the limitations prescribed in 18.3 in order to ‘protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of other’. Unravelling the limitations to 
Article 18 is key to understanding the extent of the right, its permissible scope and whether 
States can in practice and subsequently do overstep the inbuilt discretion. The four 
permissible heads of limitations are ‘public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental 
rights of others’. Of these, the broadest and potentially offering the most discretion to States 
is that of ‘morals’ followed by ‘order’. Both are bound to be subjectively interpreted by the 
State in question and especially in relation to morals, the associated values are also bound to 
vary from State and region. Nonetheless to counter this, the HRC states that “the concept of 
morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, 
limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting 
morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition.”
550
 
‘Health’ and ‘safety’ are far more objectively identifiable. The final condition too is 
objectively discernible given that it relates to the conflict and balance of rights belonging to 
different individuals.     
In terms of how the scope of permissible limitations should be interpreted, the HRC notes 
that there should be no element of discrimination that is an unjustified and unreasonable 
difference in treatment. The limitation should also not be so far reaching that it encroaches or 
jeopardises the unconditional, absolute and internal aspect found in Art. 18.1.
551
 Moreover, 
quite crucially the grounds of permissible limitations are exhaustive without any ambiguity or 
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doubt. The HRC observes that Art. 18.3 “is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not 
allowed on grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other 
rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security.”
552
 This is a strong statement as it 
confines States to the explicitly stated permissible grounds for limiting Art. 18.3. Even 
though on initial analysis the stated grounds being substantially broad especially vis-a-vis 
public morals and public order, the oft cited ground cited in numerous other provisions of 
national security is explicitly omitted. This is also reflected in the nonderogability of the right 
in states of emergency under Art. 4.2.
553
  
Regardless of this limiting of scope in relation to national security and the necessity that 
public morals be reflective of the society as a whole, the discretion available to States in 
application with regards to scope of permissible limitations still appears overly broad, 
seemingly placing already vulnerable religious minorities in a weak position with regards 
their rights to religious freedom. The element critical to the proper interpretation and 
application of this right is that of proportionality, without which a serious risk would be 
posed to most forms of manifestation, if not the freedom to hold beliefs, dependent on the 
sentiments of the State especially in relation to disfavoured religious minorities. 
Proportionality forms the crux of the consideration of the merits of cases alleging a violation 
of freedom of religion. This is the situation under ICCPR as is under the ECHR. The exercise 
of determining whether an interference was proportionate hinges on the pursuit of a particular 
aim. Once that aim is held to be legitimate by virtue of falling within the ambit of the 
permissible grounds for restrictions, it may not be deemed to be permissible without first 
establishing that it was proportionate. The HRC points out that “Limitations may be applied 
only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and 
proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated.” Art. 9 of ECHR stipulates 
that any interference in the manifestation of religion must be deemed ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’. A vital element of this balancing exercise, implicit in the principle of 
proportionality and in accordance with the profound and fundamental nature of Art. 18 but 
not yet established as a principle of interpretation under international law, is whether a 
prescribed legitimate aim can only be achieved through limiting a certain manifestation of 
religion. Furthermore, accommodation of certain manifestation of religions may be 
maximised through the provision of facilities, services or personnel that would avert the need 
for an infringement in the manifestation of religion. Such a simple exercise of first evaluating 
the dependence of the aim on the means employed, establish whether the stated means can be 
realised through a different means and whether accommodation can be made in some way 
and thus make the achievement of the aim feasible to avert the infringement of the right to 
manifest religion.  
An example is the recent controversy in the UK over the permissibility of a witness to wear 
the face-veil (niqab) as a manifestation of Islamic belief in Court and while giving 
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 The judge ruled that it was a permissible manifestation of religion until and 
except when she was to give evidence, adducing that it was a critical function of the judge, 
lawyers and jury to be given the opportunity to observe her facial expressions in order to 
inform the veracity of her answers. As such she was permitted to be concealed from the 
public audience. However in reaching his decision, the judge failed to ask the more 
fundamental question of whether the prescribed aim of avoiding the witness’s ability to 
deceive the jury by covering her face was in fact true from a scientific point of view. 
Although demeanour has traditionally been viewed as an important element of witness 
credibility, experimental results have indicated consistently that ‘this legal premise is 
erroneous’.
555
 Experts on the issue are of the converse opinion that it is a misperception that 
facial expressions expose the truthfulness of people.
556
 In fact evidence shows that facial 
expressions are more often employed to mislead others. Furthermore there were serious 
questions as to whether the witness was being treated in a discriminatory manner, in light of 
the fact that all witnesses have the right not to give evidence and instructions are made to 
jurors of how to perceive such a decision by defendant, in particular not to take it as a certain 




V. Preservation of the nature of the State 
We find that modern States in addition to individual human rights do not only seek to protect 
their own democratic nature, but also other historical and contextual aspects. For Britain there 
is a deliberate preservation of the monarchy similar to some other European States, while in 
France and Turkey, secularism is protected constitutionally and imposed through State 
coercion in various public spheres of life. It also goes without saying that any acts of treason 
or aiding and abetting the enemy are dealt with in the harshest possible manner. Hence it 
could be said that the recognition and accommodation offered to a particular religion in a 
State very much depends on the threat it poses to the existing nature of the State, from its 
cultural and historic experience to its existing political structure.
558
  
The spectrum can be divided into three rough categories. The first is where the majority 
religion is often accepted as the official religion of the State and it is to that religion that most 
deference is given and in some instances preferential treatment. It may even have an official 
status enjoying the competency to act as an agent of the State - a simple example being the 
officiating of marriage and other religious ceremonies without having to undergo separate 
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civil processes. However this point should be caveated by the fact that the historical and 
constitutional evolution of a State may have been such that the majority or predominant 
religion still does not assume an official or favourable status. Instead the ideology that 
occupies the core of the State is an aggressive and positive secularism. The examples often 
cited in this regard have been France and Turkey.  
In relation to France, the specific type of secularism at play in the Constitution and in State 
policies is mainly due to historically negative experience with the monarchy and the reliance 
and abuse of that particular institution in legitimising unfettered powers through religion. The 
present day French State has, as a result, assumed an anti-religious identity and where 
secularism is not just the official ideology, but one which is promoted and proselytised as the 
correct and true system for all who are French. Most recently this anti-religious stance has 
been epitomised in their treatment of Islam and Muslims’ belief and practice within their 
territory. The point pertinent to us here in relation to France is that, while in a number of 
States there is recognition imparted on some religions (usually mainstream) and not others, in 
the case of France the secular ideology at the core does not in fact recognise the overt 
practice of any religion in the public sphere. Turkey is a unique case and in many ways an 
anomaly compared to other States, in that it specifically seeks to limit the expression and 
practice of the majority religion, Islam. However it is similar to France in that this tendency 
towards secularism and aversion to overt religious practice in public or at play in the 
functioning of the State was entrenched in the Constitution by Atta Turk and mechanisms and 
safeguards were placed by him to safeguard that nature, namely through the Courts and the 
military as well as recently the media.  
The second type is where religion is not endorsed or preferred by the State, but is nonetheless 
recognised, accepted and accommodated to varying extents. This normally relates to the 
religion of various minority groups. Legally speaking as a basic level of protection such 
groups are afforded rights of non-discrimination and in some cases specific and special rights 
related to the manifestation and practice of their religion. As such we find that Jewish, 
Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist communities often fall into this category when discussing 
Western predominantly Christian-majority States. Policy-wise there may be an inclination 
towards multiculturalism, where cultural or religious practices are interfered with minimally. 
Such a policy accompanied by the theory that lies behind minority rights may result in the 
accommodation of structures for the settlement of disputes according to religious law such is 
the case with Beth Din Courts and Islamic Shari’ah Councils in the UK.  
If we place this type of recognition into our framework of asserting a correlation between 
acceptability and accommodation to not just security of the State but in fact the preservation 
of its ideological core/nature. Therefore we observe that if a certain religion does not, within 
its own ideology or in its manifestation by its adherents, pose a threat to the ideological basis 
of the State or conversely if the ideology of the State is not itself aggressively opposed to the 
religion, then they take on this role of an accepted religion. This is the case when a religion is 
closely related to the mainstream religion and or is limited to worship and ritualistic aspects, 
that is, confined to the private sphere. When manifestation becomes overt, interferes with 
public spheres (education, health and employment) conflicts arise that need resolution. 
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Problems are also created when it is expressed or manifested politically and thus becomes 
perceived as a greater threat to the nature of the State. 
Following on from this train of thought, logically the third kind of religion is then that is 
outrightly rejected by the State because it is averse or in opposition to the State ideology. 
Here by rejected, we do not mean that direct force is applied for people to give up their 
religious beliefs. However what is severely restricted is the expression or manifestation of 
that belief, even to the extent that by displaying corresponding religious symbols and other 
observable traits exclude them from access to education and employment. Hence the trend 
apparent in this regard is that those States, which have to some extent a religious identity. 
This is followed by religions which are similar and then religions generally. With regard to 
the former, it may be that Abrahamic faiths may perceive themselves as closer in proximity 
then other polytheistic faiths, such as Hinduism or Buddhism. The secular ideology rejects or 
limits manifestations of religion generally and in particular those that are overt and pervade 
all elements of adherents’ lives – private and public. Hence, the decision taken by a State on 
which religions are accepted (accommodation maximised) and rejected (accommodation 
minimised) is inherently based on whether they constitute an acute and severe threat to the 
existing political and religious system. Prior to this we also established that another criterion 
would be whether belief was considered to be moral/ethically deplorable. 
 
VI. Scope of permissible limitations on Freedom of Religion 
What follows rights of religious non-discrimination conventionally in the international human 
rights framework are rights related to the freedom of religion. As already mentioned above, 
this right has two broad aspects, one related to the holding of a certain belief and the second 
to its manifestation. The former is said to be absolute while the latter is said to be limited by 
public policy grounds. Despite the freedom to hold a belief being absolute, it is only so once 
the State recognises the belief as a religion. The two bases that its classification is rejected is 
when it does not meet some objective criteria for being a religion or that it is a religion but at 
complete odds with the nature of the State or poses a risk to the security of the State. 
Consequently three types of religion were identified in any State: the official/majority 
religion, accepted religions and rejected religions.
559
 As such, the freedom of religion often 
refers to the category of accepted religions which are attributable to various minority groups. 
It may also apply to the majority religion where it is not the official religion or secularism 
predominates the centre of the State.  
When it comes to Islamic law, the position is strikingly similar, with one significant 
difference; that Islam occupies the role of official religion. In relation to the treatment of the 
religious minorities, as already discussed at one end of the spectrum, we find the opinion that 
all non-Muslim faith groups to be considered accepted religions, in that all of them are 
eligible for dhimma status (as per Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim). The opinion found at 
the most restrictive end of the spectrum of validity is the one where only People of the Book 
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interpreted as solely Jews and Christians are included. Hence we find that similar to the 
model set out above, this would follow logic and indeed correlate with contemporary State 
practice, where those religions most closely associated with the official or majority religion 
are given maximum accommodation, being monotheistic in their origins/essence and of the 
Abrahamic faiths. These are then followed on a sliding scale by those concerning whom there 
is disagreement, if they are or are not People of the Book: the Sabians and Zorostarians, but 
little dispute that they are accepted religions, adherents of which are eligible for protection on 
the payment of jizya. The last group would then be the idolaters, amongst whom the Arabs 
are viewed at more harshly.  
In light of this range of opinions even if we took the one that causes the greatest discomfort 
from a human rights perspective, that of the non-permissibility of the existence of certain 
groups within an Islamic polity, we may understand such positions in the context of rejected 
religions due to not only their opposition but also their enmity to Islam and its teachings. This 
is clearly more acute when polytheism is under discussion as it is in fact the antithesis of 
Islam or conversely what Islam sought to eradicate and displace. In the case of Arab 
polytheists, a prominent reason, among others, has been the ease with which they are able to 
understand and comprehend the message of Islam as expressed through the Qur’an, yet they 
still reject the religion. It is important to keep in mind that even if the most lenient opinion is 
followed in relation to allowing all groups to exist and be recognised as a religious minority, 
that once we come to discuss the freedom to manifest ones religion, there could be varying 
accommodation allowed for different religious groups according to some opinions owing to 
the same concept of threat to the religious and political nature of the State as well as its 
security. In fact this is concurrent with modern State practice, where the freedom to hold a 
belief is not really interfered with, but when a religion takes on the label of rejected religion, 
its practice and manifestation is severely restricted.     
This discretion given to States is inbuilt into international law to safeguard their security, 
constitutional nature or any other trait they wish to protect. In any freedom of religion 
provision of a human rights treaty, the practice of religions is always subject to restriction on 
a number of public policy grounds. This discretion varies from treaty to treaty and did not 
exist altogether in the articulation of the right in the UDHR. This was nonetheless a pattern 
with a number rights in the UDHR, which when they were later expressed through the ICCPR 
and ICESCR had accounted for States’ concerns and fears. The ICCPR has arguably the 
widest discretion specifying the following grounds to limit the manifestation of religion: 
“public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” It 
is clear to see that such drafting is in favour of the State rather than religious groups. While it 
is plausible that all bar one are to an extent objective and the State can be challenged and held 
to account were it to abuse any of these grounds, their threshold and exact nature still remain 
reliant on the State’s discretion.  
The one that is most subject to abuse and would evade any objective definition or challenge is 
the ground of ‘public morals’. Theoretically this means even if a religious practice does not 
pose a threat to safety of others, or their health, does not cause civil disorder nor infringes on 
others rights, it may still be deemed by the Government as contrary to subjectively defined 
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‘public morals’. This once again is tantamount to the State reserving the right to veto the 
freedom of religion, and in particular its practice, when it is seen to threaten ideology at the 
centre of the State which would in turn determine what is and is not unconscionable to the 
morality of the public.   
The ECHR requires that any restriction on the manifestation of religion be ‘necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ The ECHR’s wording is 
almost identical to that found in the ICCPR with the addition of a further vague and legally 
indeterminate term, ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Though it may seem as a result that 
the discretion afforded to member States may be wider than the ICCPR, the term has 
undergone extensive elaboration through a large body of case law and wide breadth of issues. 
Implicit within the tests for being necessary in a democratic society is proportionality of the 
interference with the intended legitimate aim. The Strasbourg Court has also developed now 
the well-known doctrine of margin of appreciation, which for States’ progress in 
democratisation and other matters which relates to the specific context and experience of the 
State under question. The outcome is the Court allows a level discretion and deference on 
some issues as something to be left for the State itself, hence attending to procedural issues 
rather than those of substance. 
From these clauses allowing for exceptions to the freedom to manifest ones religion the 
wording provides for an extraordinarily wide discretion for the State to limit the public aspect 
of religious belief suited to their wishes, especially with the inclusion under the ground of 
‘public morals’. Despite this apparently wide scope, the vast jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
helps to shape the precise bounds and limits of the applicable scope of these terms, in 
particular to the principle of proportionality. Despite this though, the ECtHR has reached far 
reaching rulings finding in favour of the State due to the remaining discretion and the margin 
of appreciation in light of historical and constitutional experience of particular States. This 
being the reason why the ECtHR ruled in favour of Turkey when forbidding the headscarf 
and the beard for men in universities.
560
 This gave religiously observant youth in Turkey a 
stark choice between manifesting an aspect of their religion in public or acquiring further 





 citing the secular nature of the State and its historical experience as well 
as the associated margin of appreciation that must be afforded in such instances.  
The current face-veil ban in France, the most extreme of its kind in relation to restricting 
freedom of religion, mainly owing to its application to all public places, was decided against 
the claimant at the ECtHR recently.
563
 It was to be a litmus test for how far State discretion 
and the margin of appreciation can be stretched to undermine and render Article 9’s ability to 
ensure freedom of religion. Most commentators had anticipated and predicted that while the 
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Court had held the prohibition of religious symbols such as headscarves and crosses to be 
proportionate limitations in certain educational and employment contexts and thus within the 
permissible margin of appreciation in particular contexts such as employment and education, 
the general and blanket nature of the French ban would surely fall beyond the margin of 
appreciation. This would be down not to the legitimacy of the aim but in the lack of 
distinction applied to place and persons. A similar justification was given when deciding 
against the UK in relation to the blanket and general deprivation of the right to vote for 
prisoners.
564
 Another perceived point in favour of the claimant was thought to be that the 
strength of a prescribed aim. As French authorities and proponents of the ban had always 
cited oppression of women and equality as grounds for the ban in public discourse. However 
as neither could be proved without the women themselves showing themselves to be coerced, 
the only remaining publicly stated ground was the vague concept of French values and the 
more specific idea of integration through interaction with others. Such arguments were easily 
countered from a feminist and religious freedom perspective.
565
   
What is striking in relation to the decision is the reasoning given. The Court seems to have 
conceded and accepted the submission by the French Government relating to the policy 
having a legitimate aim even despite it not being explicitly stated as a permissible ground for 
limitation under Art. 9. The French Government submitted three aims underlying the law: 
gender equality, human dignity and “respect for the minimum requirements of life in 
society”. The Court rejected the first two and accepted the third on the basis of the necessity 
of community and social cohesion. In this regards it stated:  
“The Court takes into account the respondent State’s point that the face plays an 
important role in social interaction. It can understand the view that individuals who are 
present in places open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes developing there 
which would fundamentally call into question the possibility of open interpersonal 
relationships, which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an indispensable 
element of community life within the society in question. The Court is therefore able to 
accept that the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by 
the respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialisation 
which makes living together easier.”
566
 
While there may be no overt mention in relation to the ECHR regarding the list of 
permissible restrictions being exhaustive, we have shown that Art. 18.3 “is to be strictly 
interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even if they would be 
allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security.”
567
 
As such the Court also seems to have accepted the spurious claim that such an aim falls under 
scope of safeguarding the rights of others, without much explanation of how the right to be 
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interacted with is a right that can compete and override the profound nature of manifestation 
of religion while at the same ensuring the religious plurality obliged by minority rights, or the 
idea of women’s right to choose their identity and clothing.  Furthermore it remains to be 
seen whether the Court would treat differently a member-State that was not as preoccupied by 
the doctrine of secularity as others. Would the margin of appreciation afforded to such States 
be narrower than the aforementioned States?  
 
VII. Conclusion 
In this chapter, our main focus was the freedom of religion of religious minorities under 
international law. However prior to discussing the relevant substantive provisions, it was felt 
that a detailed elaboration of religious non-discrimination law was needed as non-
discrimination is a pre-requisite to both freedom of religion and minority rights. We observed 
that in that regard instruments for the protection of religious discrimination are lagging far 
behind, for example, protections at the national and international level for racial or ethnic 
discrimination. We highlighted the two substantive aspects of freedom of religion, the 
internal and external. The internal, we established was absolute and may not be interfered 
with under any circumstances, even states of emergency where derogations are normally 
permissible. Manifestations of religion however could be limited but only based on pressing 
public policy grounds as opposed to animosity to the religion per se. We then proceeded to 
analyse the practice of States in granting or limiting certain manifestations of religion and the 
response of supranational bodies to those practices. It was noteworthy that under ECtHR 
through the principle of the margin or appreciation, State’s could be held to varying standards 
depending on their historical, political and cultural context and development.  
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Chapter 7: 




This chapter will conduct an asymmetric comparison of the two previous chapters. They both 
had had a difference in focus to reflect the origins, development and evolution of freedom of 
religion of religious minorities under both systems of law. Chapter 5 was entirely devoted to 
addressing whether Islamic law granted the internal aspect of freedom of religion or what is 
referred to as the ‘freedom to thought, conscience and religion’ in Art. 18(1) of ICCPR. As 
much of debate around Islamic law is heavily influenced by the context of conflict and 
hostilities, the ideas of violence, coercion and force have been repeatedly visited when 
discussing the freedom of religion. That discussion was also specific to Islamic law in that it 
was a continuation of the issue of scope as a number of the claims and opinions about the 
absence of the freedom of religion within Islamic law related to the treatment of polytheists 
or non-People of the Book. Given that this was also the religious group that was most hostile 
and engaged in a prolonged military campaign against the Muslims added further complexity 
to the discussion. Nevertheless once we established the absolute nature of the internal right 
under Islamic law, it was also a logical progression to deduce that non-compulsion in religion 
necessitated the default granting of rights of religious practice and manifestation.  
The development of international law on the freedom of religion began with articulation of 
the rights of non-discrimination of religious minorities, but even before that its spirit was 
articulated in the UN Charter: “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one 
another as good neighbours”.
568
 As such, the Declaration on Religious Discrimination was in 
fact intended for religious minorities with its ultimate aim to ensure freedom of religion. 
However for that to be possible, intolerance, discrimination and hatred had to be eliminated. 
Hence why the Declaration was named as such and UNGA Resolution 48/128 was on 
“Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance”. We have already analysed in Chapter 6 
that the freedom of religion under international law is broadly divided into two elements, that 
is, the right to hold beliefs followed by a right to manifest those beliefs. The former being 
absolute, with the prohibition of the use of force implicit, and the latter being subject to 
limitations on public policy grounds and the protection on individual rights of others. The 
enumerated public policy grounds for limitation are safety, health, morals and order. The 
final ground addresses the potential conflict of freedom of religion with another individual’s 
fundamental rights or freedoms. These would be limited, in the case of the ICCPR, to the 
Convention rights themselves.  
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Islam has within it also a similar notion of a symbiotic relationship between belief (eeman) 
and consequent actions (a’mal). Having earlier elaborated on the internal aspect of freedom 
of religion and the (im)permissibility of force or compulsion under Islamic law in Chapter 5, 
in the present chapter, we will explore the extent to which the right to manifest religion is 
granted under Islamic law and international law and the permissible scope and grounds for 
limitations under both. As indicated in our analysis on the freedom of religion of religious 
minorities under international law in Chapter 5, manifestation of religion may be actions that 
extend beyond rituals and acts of worship to other aspects of public and private life that may 
be affected by religious belief. In other words ‘manifestation’ covers all external aspects of 
faith and religious belief besides profession or self-identification to a religion. 
 
II. Relationship between belief and manifestation 
According to basic Islamic creed, notions of inwardly belief, while distinct, may not be easily 
separable from outwardly manifestation. Overstatement of the divide would be artificial and 
impractical. In this regard, an individual’s Islamic belief is not discernible publically, if it is 
not acted upon or manifested, while similarly acts manifesting belief are negated, if they are 
not premised on genuine heartfelt belief. Islamically, the former is identified as a disbeliever 
(kaafir) and the latter as a religious hypocrite (munafiq), that is, a covert disbeliever. In other 
words, not only are both aspects two parts of a coherent whole that constitute adherence to 
Islam and being considered as Muslim, but that belief naturally and logically necessitates 
manifestation in the form of actions. Expanding such a view to other religions, but still 
perceiving them through the lens of Islamic thinking, a non-Muslim’s belief cannot exist in 
isolation from the need to practice elements of it. It cannot be separated from his non-Muslim 
religious practices just as the Muslim’s religious acts cannot be from his beliefs. 
We have already delved into the Islamic law position on the internal aspect of freedom of 
religion in Chapter 5 of this thesis. It would seem from our findings that accommodation of 
religious practices would be implicit in the recognition of the legitimacy of certain non-
Muslim beliefs. In other words, we cannot say that the freedom to hold beliefs is guaranteed 
absolutely and allow no form of manifestation whatsoever. This certainly does not appear to 
have been the approach of the Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime. The Prophet did not 
interfere with any aspect of the religious lives of the Jewish tribes of Madinah preceding or 
following their severe enmity and betrayal. The foundational document of the new Muslim 
State in Madinah, the Constitution of Madinah, elucidated the following principle: “Muslims 
have their faith, the Jews have theirs. The freedom of religion is recognized and the Jews of 
Banu Auf are declared as one community with the Believers.”
569
 It is worth noting that the 
Jewish tribes were not treated as conventional dhimmis nor referred to as such. They were 
also not made to pay the jizya, but there was agreement for them to militarily support the 
Muslims in case of hostilities. That dynamic was more akin to a loose federation with Jewish 
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tribes residing and conducting business in their own areas mostly on the outskirts of 
Madinah. The reason jizya was not taken from the Jewish tribes of Madinah was principally 
due to the revelation of Qur’an 9:29 to Prophet Muhammad at a later stage and has been 
discussed in detail elsewhere.
570
 However the Prophet’s tolerant attitude towards them and 
their religion is evident in the agreements he concluded and the wide berth he gave them 
despite their resentment leading to aiding and inciting the enemies of Islam, in particular the 
Quraish of Makkah, against the Muslims in Madinah.  
With the Christians of Najran, the Prophet is reported to have said that dhimma or protection 
would be guaranteed by him in relation to their property and religion.
571
 Zaydan derives from 
this that the freedom of belief is not only guaranteed to religious minorities but their status as 
dhimma is conditioned on their freedom of religion, which is implicit within it and includes 
manifestation. If the freedom of belief, including manifestation, is not allowed for, then such 
a dhimma contract would be invalid and thus illegal under Islamic law due to not satisfying 
the necessary conditions. In support, he cites the Islamic law principle regarding dhimma that 
“we leave them and what they believe alone.”
572
  
It is mentioned by Ibn Ishaaq that the Christians of Najran visited the Prophet inside his 
mosque after the Asr prayer. When the time for their prayer came, they started praying in his 
mosque. People wanted to stop them, but the Prophet said to leave them. They faced West of 
Madinah and performed their prayer.
573
 Elsewhere, it is narrated: 
“[B]efore the battle of Badr in 624 CE, a Christian deputation comprising 60 members 
from Najran came to meet Muhammad in Madinah to know his views about the 
personality of Isa b. Maryam
574
 (Jesus Christ) (AS)
575
. They met the Apostle
576
 
performing the afternoon [Asr] prayers. When the time of their own prayers came, the 
Prophet allowed the Byzantine Christians to have their service in his mosque in 
Madinah. The Prophet is stated to have told them: ‘conduct your service here in the 
mosque. It is a place consecrated to God’.”
577
  
Ibn al-Qayyim takes the incident as laying the precedent for the permissibility of the People 
of the Book to enter the mosques of Muslims and pray therein while in the presence of 
Muslims.
578
 The Prophet’s treatment of the Christians exemplifies the principle of freedom of 
religion that is demanded by Islam for non-Muslim minorities. A notable example relates to 
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the charter relating to the monks of the Monastery of St. Catherine, near Mount Sinai, and to 
all Christians in the sixth year of hijrah: 
“By it, the Prophet secured for the Christians important privileges and immunities, 
while the Muslims were prohibited under severe penalties from violating and abusing 
what was therein ordered. In the charter, the Prophet undertook himself, and enjoined 
on his followers, to protect the Christians, to guard them from all injuries, and to defend 
their churches and the houses of their priests. They were not to be unfairly taxed; no 
bishop was to be driven out of his bishopric; no Christian was to be forced to reject his 
religion; no monk was to be expelled from his pilgrimage; nor were the Christian 
churches to be pulled down for the sake of building mosques or houses for the Muslims. 
Christian women married to Muslims were allowed to practice their own religion; and 
not to be subjected to compulsion or annoyance of any kind on that account. If the 
Christians should stand in need of assistance for the repair of their churches or 




It is useful to compare this treatment with the underlying basis and purpose of minority rights 
as stated in the Commentary on the UN Minorities Declaration, which points out five 
different forms of historic State-minority relationships: “elimination, assimilation, toleration, 
protection and promotion.”
580
 In response it deduces: “Minority protection is based on four 
requirements: protection of the existence, non-exclusion, non-discrimination and non-
assimilation of the groups concerned.”
581
 The other terms stipulated therein are also quite 
advanced and far-reaching, bearing resemblance to the examples of manifestation mentioned 
in the Declaration on Religious Discrimination
582
 and HRC GC 22
583
. There is also 
significant overlap and agreement with the minority rights approach found in the 
Commentary on the Minorities Declaration, covering all aspects of the rights, from the 
minimum to the maximum. The minimum and most elementary right owed to minorities is 
that of protecting their physical existence. This is reflected in the warning to the Muslims 
from violating any of the terms and in the promise to “protect the Christians, to guard them 
from all injuries, and to defend their churches and the houses of their priests.” There is also 
protection from non-discrimination in the assertion “They were not to be unfairly taxed”. 
Furthermore there are guarantees against religious persecution in particular against religious 
leaders such as bishops and forced conversion. The latter is in line with Qur’an 2:256, which 
enjoins the principle of non-compulsion in religion and comparable to Art. 18.2 of ICCPR.  
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Furthermore the Commentary states that “protection of their existence goes beyond the duty 
not to destroy or deliberately weaken minority groups. It also requires respect for and 
protection of their religious and cultural heritage, essential to their group identity, including 
buildings and sites such as libraries, churches, mosques, temples and synagogues.”
584
 
Therefore the Prophet’s agreement on the treatment of the Monks of St. Catherine is in 
accordance with this contemporary principle of international law and perhaps even beyond as 
what is stipulated is not just a negative non-interference in the affairs and matters of the 
Christians, but a positive obligation to defend and assist in maintenance of religious 
buildings. Furthermore the order to assist is not limited to religious buildings but “any other 
matter pertaining to religion”. Hence the treatment in this case of the non-Muslim Christian 
minority has met the highest level of potential minority protection, moving from mere 
tolerance to protection and promotion. 
Above, we have tried to establish the underlying basis and justification for the presence of not 
just freedom of religious belief but also manifestation. This was derived from the fact that in 
Islamic thinking belief and actions are inter-twinned, interdependent and emanate from each 
other. This is comparable to the position under international law, which also extrapolates that 
granting the freedom to believe necessitates the right to manifest such beliefs. As such the 
right has two fundamental aspects, the internal and external.  Thus, under Islamic law, 
accepting a religious minority group as eligible for recognition and existence under Islamic 
rule also entails tolerance and protection for the religious practices of that minority to the 
greatest extent possible. According to one view, the principle even extends to conditioning 
dhimma status on the granting of rights specifically of manifestation, hence making 
manifestation of religion the object and purpose of recognising the existence of a religious 
minority.
585
 Put differently, it makes little sense to accept existence of a religious minority 
amongst the dominant majority group and then deny them the right to live their life according 
to the religious requirements to which they adhere and wish to practice.  
With regards to international law and State practice, we observe a comparable dynamic. In 
order to deny rights that automatically arise following recognition as minorities, States seek 
to identify ways to exclude them from the scope of minority rights by denying them even 
recognition as such. This is most starkly observable in the reliance on the concept of ‘national 
minority’ to exclude religious minorities that have resulted from post-1945 immigration. An 
extreme approach is to be found in the conduct of States, who reject the entire notion of 
minorities and thus minority rights, is reflected not just in their domestic law, but also non-
ratification and far reaching reservations to relevant instruments and provisions.
586
 As has 
been shown, with regards to freedom of religion and the wider rights regime found under 
minority rights, limitations are inbuilt and a necessary tool for the State to safeguard public 
interest and the rights of others as well as factor in practical and financial considerations. 
Nonetheless many States continue to persevere in denying minorities the proper recognition, 
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which as a matter of international law, imbues no discretion on States owing to apprehension 
of having to deal with claims, a hostility and animosity towards the minority, or ignorance of 
the state of international law.   
We have established that the right to manifestation of religious belief is implicit under 
Islamic law owing to the indisputable presence of freedom to hold beliefs derived from 
Qur’an 2:256. This is confirmed by the conduct of the Prophet and the examples above. Most 
notable among these is the invitation to a Christian delegation not just to practice and 
manifest their religion through worship but at the central place of worship of the Muslims, the 
mosque. Of course, we must keep in mind the motivation for allowing this as well as the fact 
that it was a delegation rather than a religious minority of permanent residents or citizens. 
Following that, under international law, a number of examples are discernible of 
manifestation of religion and thus the case for limiting them weak except with the provision 
of compelling reasons despite the seemingly wide scope of permissible limitations. They 
include the use of places of worship, their repair, maintenance and defence as prominent 
feature of the agreement relating to the Monastery of St. Catherine’s.  
Therefore we can see that both systems of law hold the freedom to hold beliefs and the right 
to manifest them as emanating from each other, in particular that the freedom to hold beliefs 
must give rise to the automatic right manifest such beliefs. Both reiterate the absoluteness and 
unconditional nature of the internal aspect of the right. In any case, such an infringement is 
simultaneously infeasible and what is prohibited are any discernible attempts at altering 
someone’s beliefs through forced testimony for example.  Both systems also explicitly warn 
against the use of force, compulsion or coercion in any shape or form and in relation to both 
belief and manifestation. Thus rights of manifestation which naturally arise from an absolute 
freedom to hold beliefs, unfettered by any form of force or disadvantage, are followed by the 
most common and integral examples in both systems of law and the discourse around them. 
The prominent overlaps are rights related to places of worship, religious education, days of 
rest and celebration. Finally both systems of law allow for limitations to be placed only on the 
manifestation of religion based on public policy grounds. The following section will look at 
some of these examples of manifestation and the nature and scope of permissible limitations. 
 
III. Permissible Limitations to Manifestation of Religion  
Islamic law holds that the default position is that all forms of manifestation and practice are 
permissible except those found, on balance, to be contrary to the public good or interest. 
Another way to understand this would be to assert that manifestation of religion may not be 
limited, for example, purely due to hostility or inamicability to the minority religion, which 
would constitute an arbitrary interference and an abuse of State discretion, which is not 
allowed by the law. As such, the injunction “there is no compulsion in religion” found in 
Qur’an 2:256 can be read in broader terms to be allowing freedom to manifest in addition to 
hold beliefs as opposed to merely the latter. To put it differently, the dhimmi has the right to 
remain on their belief and religion, which inherently includes outward manifestation. They 
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should not be compelled to enter Islam. Consequently the dhimmi is allowed to go about his 




Therefore strikingly, the overarching principle evident in Islamic law bears remarkable 
resemblance to that under Art. 18 of ICCPR and Art. 9 of ECHR. This is to say that in 
recognising a religion as legitimate and valid, the default would be that inherently all practice 
associated with it would be permitted except when there was overriding concern related to the 
public good/morals. In the case of Islamic system of governance would include and be 
predominantly focused around Islam itself. Furthermore by stipulating that worship and 
religious rituals can be carried out in ‘his house’ or ‘place of worship’ is reflecting the 
freedom of religion being made available in public and private as explicitly stated in Art. 18 
of ICCPR and Art. 9 of ECHR. Art. 6 of the Declaration on Religious Discrimination 
elaborates on similar examples of permissible and common manifestation that should be 





observation of days of rest, celebration of religious holidays and ceremonies.
590
 The presence 
of such principles and aspects of the life of religious minority that should be protected and 
promoted are encapsulated by Al-Tariqi writing in Arabic as well as indicating permissible 
grounds for limiting rights: 
“Regarding….them meeting each other, it is allowed whether it be in their houses, their 
schools or their places of worship and their days of celebrations according to their 
habits and traditions and they should not be stopped from such things unless there is a 
clear danger to the community.”
591
  
As already stated, there is much in common with the above description of the Islamic legal 
position on religious minorities and their freedom of religion as stated in ICCPR Art. 18 and 
ECHR Art. 9. The above principle even extends further than ICCPR Art. 18 and gives 
concrete examples of manifestation of religion almost identical to those found in the 
Declaration on Religious Discrimination.
592
 Establishing the permissibility of all forms of 
manifestation as a default is evident while the only conditionality of “a clear danger to the 
community” is in principle similar to the public interest grounds enumerated in Art. 18 of 
ICCPR and Art. 9 of ECHR. If manifestation of religion may only be limited based on 
pressing public interest, then elements of manifestation such as worship, that had no public 
element would be immune from any limitation. The private sphere thus includes what takes 
place in people’s houses, schools that cater specifically for that religious community or places 
of worship and areas where the religious minority is predominant. The effective concern in all 
these cases is to what extent the public activities of religious minorities may have an effect on 
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the religious beliefs of the Muslim majority. There is some similarity in the underlying 
thinking here to the notion of the destruction of the rights of others found in Art. 5(1) of 
ICCPR
593
 and Art. 17 of ECHR.
594
 
It is also notable that the framing of Art. 18(2) of ICCPR: “No one shall be subject to 
coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice” is almost identical to the said injunction found in Qur’an 2:256: “there is no 
compulsion in religion” and in line with its elaboration in Tafsir ibn Kathir. It adds further 
support to the notion in Art. 18(1) that the freedom to hold beliefs is an absolute right and not 
subject to limitation including being nonderogable under Art. 4. even in times of 
emergency.
595
 Nonetheless Art. 18(1) should be taken along similar lines as Qur’an 2:256 as 
being applicable to internal belief and external practice due to the explicit reference “...to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.” A further 
parallel can be drawn to the Islamic position in that Art. 18(1) attributes rights to both internal 
(belief) and external aspects (manifestation). Art. 18(2) prohibits coercion in relation to both 
aspects. Art. 18(3) then provides for limitations with respect to manifestation but not belief. 
Hence the default here too is that all manifestations are to be permitted except those 
“necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others.”  
We have identified that both systems of law allow for limitations on the manifestation of 
religion on broad public policy grounds. What is the nature of these grounds and can they be 
distinguished from each other? As we have already discussed in the previous chapter, under 
international law, the grounds for limiting the manifestation of religion are at the same time 
broad in their individual meanings as being limited and exhaustive in their enumeration. By 
this, it is meant that terms such as safety, order, health and morals lack specificity and 
seemingly allow the State a large space for manoeuvre and subjective application thus 
maximising State discretion. We will return to the generic nature of these terms and how their 
meanings have been elaborated in case law and by the HRC. However, at the same time it 
would be incorrect to assume that the discretion is unlimited given the profound and far-
reaching nature of the right to freedom of religion. Additionally the HRC has gone to the 
extent of confirming unequivocally that the stated grounds are finite and exhaustive; no 
others may be added under any circumstances including that of ‘national security’ (as found 
inter alia under Art. 19), even in a state of emergency.
596
 
With regards to Islamic law, what we may refer to is developing practice of rulers who sought 
to implement Islamic principles by reference to Islamic law. While the freedom of religion 
can be textually sourced, the need to limit specifically the manifestation of religion emerged 
from the necessities of governing a State and thus seeking to endow religious minority rights, 
while at the same time safeguarding the rights and sensibilities of the Muslim majority. Al-
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Tariqi expresses such a limitation above as a “clear danger to the community”. Thus it could 
be argued that the potential scope for limitations that could be imposed on the manifestation 
of religion under Islamic law is wider than international law as well as being non-exhaustive.  
From a different perspective, it could be asserted that as the interrelation between the Islamic 
governing authority and the majority with the religious minority comes down to religion, that 
the nature of the limitations is also thus confined to religion. In other words, to what extent 
are the religiosity or religious sentiments of the majority affected or undermined by the 
practices of the religious minority? Consequently Islamic law finds itself most concerned 
with the public manifestation of religion and how it may impact on the convictions of the 
majority. This works both ways in terms of the State’s desire to keep those who are Muslims 
Muslim, but also a wish by the majority themselves not to be exposed to displays of 
religiosity in public. This is why aspects of manifestation that have been subject to limitations 
have been the building of places of worship, public religious processions and sounding of 
church bells.   
Common sense and logic would dictate that while a purely textual reading of international 
law allows for the limiting of manifestation even in private, the case for doing so would be 
very weak or non-existent as the grounds for limitations are inherently related to the rights of 
the public and other individuals. Interestingly, under international law the common strategy 
due to the broad nature of the permissible grounds as opposed to a non-exhaustive list of 
grounds has been to work within the broad discretion of the terms. The HRC has sought to 
counter the broad terms by elaborating some content and parameters. For example with 
regards to the ground of limitation of ‘public morals’, the HRC has stated that such morals be 
reflective of the society as a whole as opposed to the State’s own subjective understanding of 
morality. However, it is not clear whether this elaboration of public morals or the lack of 
elaboration of the other heads of safety, health or order have done much in limiting their 
expansive and subjective nature.  
Despite this, in relation to practice and resultant case law, there has been an aversion to argue 
the highly subjective and broad grounds of morals, health, order and safety. At times, such 
broadness and subjectivity may be counterproductive for the State in justifying certain 
practices and policies, especially if a case is being decided upon by a domestic or 
international court and the burden of proof placed on the State. For example if the test for the 
limitation based on public morals needs to show that they reflect the view of all or an 
overwhelming majority, it may indeed be difficult to show this. Hence the ground which is 
most often relied on is that of the ‘protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others’. Such a limitation not only has a level of subjectivity and discretion in implementation 
on the part of the State, but is also not rebutted easily by the affected person nor supranational 
courts or bodies. Resultantly what follows is a balancing of competing rights.  
The crucial problem with all grounds, in particular this one owing to related case law, is that 
they are deferential to the majority sentiment and as such to the historical and cultural nature 
of the State in question. Majority sentiments especially in relation to religion and its 
relationship with the State will vary between States considerably. In the application of laws, 
PhD: Protection of Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and International Law   Murtaza Shaikh  
  
Page 171 of 222 
 
this leads to a lack of legal certainty and an increased space for States to escape the finding of 
violations by supranational structures. The factoring in of the nature of the State and majority 
public sentiment in adjudicating such cases ironically undermines the precise aspect of 
majoritarian rule that minority rights aims to counter and protect against. Hence the 
contemporary notion of democracy implies the majority to be represented, while at the same 
time minorities’ fundamental rights protected against excesses of the majority or the 
government.
597
 This is further reflected in the requirement that limitations on a minority’s 
right to manifest religion must be deemed ‘necessary in a democratic society’, implicit in 
which is the protection and granting of religious plurality.
598
 
At the ECtHR, the deliberate indeterminacy in relation to the contents of certain rights owing 
to a lack of legal, political and public consensus on an issue is known as the principle of the 
‘margin of appreciation’. Conversely on matters on which there is European consensus such 
as the prohibition of torture or racial discrimination the Court allows for no margin or 
appreciation and the same stringent and high standards are applicable to all State parties. 
However with some other rights, significant attention and consideration is given to the 
development and nature of the State, such as Art. 3 of Additional Protocol 1 and the freedom 
to manifest religion under Art. 9. In relation to the former, while democracy is the system of 
governance in Europe, the exact nature and framework under which it is established is largely 
down to the discretion of States. With regards to the freedom of religion, where the ECtHR 
has held in favour of the State and finding no violation due to the interference falling within 
the ambit of permissible limitations, it most commonly does so with regards to the protection 
of the rights and fundamental freedom of others.  
Most notably in the case of Sahin v. Turkey
599
, the purported object of protection were those 
members of society who chose not to wear the headscarf and as such the threat to the secular 
nature of State and the secular sensibilities of the majority. In the case of Refah Partisi v. 
Turkey
600
, an Islamic political party was thought to be motivated by dismantling democracy 
and implementing Islamic law as such their rights to exist as a political party and compete in 
the election was outweighed by the supposedly overwhelming interest of the rights of others. 
With regards to a case relating to the wearing of a head scarf in relation to a teacher, it was 
considered a valid concern that the children would be unduly influenced by the religious 
garment and so their rights to manifestation took priority over those of the teacher.
601
 In the 
most recent of such cases and the furthest reaching precedent to date of legitimate 
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interference with the manifestation of religion, SAS v. France
602
, the rights of others to be 
interacted with and feel comfortable was said to be a sufficient grounds to limit the freedom 
to manifest religion.  
Islamic law has a similar approach in its reliance on the protection of the rights of others as 
the principal limiting factor of manifestation of minority religions. The focus is on protection 
of religious rights of the Muslim majority. This is also similar to State practice relating to 
international law as the majority of cases revolve around the tension between freedom of 
religion and the freedom from religion. Although to what extent one interprets these notions 
to set the threshold of when an act of manifestation encroaches on the freedom of thought, 
conscience or religion of others remains difficult to decipher. Under Islamic law, as already 
stated, the only concern is that of religious acts of manifestation that occur in the public realm 
and thus may affect the Muslim majority and as we will see below, even such restrictions are 
lifted in areas where the non-Muslims are predominant. Furthermore, while extreme secular 
States refuse to recognise religious minorities and seek to excessively limit the manifestation 
of religion owing to ideological opposition; Islamic law only requires the protection of the 
religious beliefs of the Muslim majority. Hence, the Islamic approach to limitation of rights is 
really not aimed at damaging or undermining the freedom of religion (internal and external) 
of religious minorities, but rather to prevent influencing the Muslim majority population to 
potentially leave Islam. Thus, it is clearly not aimed at damaging and eliminating the 
minority’s ideology. Therefore we may adduce that the levels to which manifestation is 
permitted in the private realm, including institutions and areas of predominance is near 
unlimited. Restrictions on the face veil and head scarf under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
seem to emanate from a difference of belief and opinion around modesty and the role of 
women in society. However disagreement with majority sentiments should never be sufficient 
to restrict such opposing views. 
There may even be a case for such an extreme limitation, as observed in SAS v. France, as 
forbidding the face veil from all public places for to be contrary to the internal and absolute 
right of freedom to thought, conscience and religion and freedom from coercion
603
. 
International law is clear that “restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief are 
permitted only if limitations...are applied in a manner that does not vitiate the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion”.
604
 As the public policy grounds were stretched 
to such an extent, for some beyond the permissible scope of limitations under Art. 9, it is 
questionable which listed public interest head was engaged. For all intents and purposes, it 
seems that it was something along the lines of awkwardness and the right of others to 
communication – hardly a pressing social or public need necessary in a democratic society. 
The test is similar to Islamic law when applied to schools, where it is feared that children may 
be influenced. However it does not appear that France feared that veiling on the streets by a 
minority of people would likely influence and persuade members of a mostly hostile public to 
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convert to Islam. It is in fact related to idea of instituting a homogenous French identity, 
which is scornful of religious belief and public manifestation. It is perceived as a departure 
from the culture and values embedded in presumed national identity contrary to religious 
pluralism and multiculturalism.  
Islamic law, like the principles of international law rather than ECtHR’s misapplication of the 
margin of appreciation to this case, supports and promotes religious pluralism and 
multiculturalism. Limitations only become engaged when there is an encroachment of the 
rights of others in relation to them leaving Islam or to security. Going further, we may ask if 
Islamic law has no issue with other religious beliefs being held and manifested per se except 
when they threaten the religiosity of the Muslims, then what is Islam’s actual view of those 
religious beliefs intrinsically even if politically and legally there is no interference. Does it 
view them positively, negatively or neutrally? Conversely we may ask why does Islam not 
have any issues with other religions when it holds them to be fallacious - distorted in the case 
of the People of the Book and antithetical in relation to polytheism. The starting point is to 
affirm this ideological dichotomy, which is in common with other religions. That being, it 
considers itself to be the only correct religion and that those who believe and do righteous 
deeds will enter paradise after death and those who disbelieve upon death will enter hell. 
However if we posit that the reason for interference in the manifestation of religion is to 
prevent Muslims from converting away, then we can hypothesize that the ultimate aim is the 
attainment and maintenance of Islamic faith. But we also know that Islam is not specific to 
any particular ethnic or religious group; it is in fact aimed at humanity.
605
 The only 
distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims being acceptance or rejection of Islam.  
Thus Islamic legal policy must be motivated as much by the preventing the movement of 
Muslims away from Islam, as the bringing of non-Muslims closer to Islam. In line with 
previous chapters, it must be done genuinely so that Islamic belief is present in the heart 
rather than just uttered; it must be devoid of coercion or compulsion or even disadvantage. 
Hence there could even be a positive duty under Islamic law, beyond the negative duty of 
non-interference, of ensuring the enjoyment of their culture and profession and practice of 
their religion, so that they may have a favorable impression as to the tolerance, compassion 
and mercy of Islam and become open to dialogue and debate as to the substance of Islamic 
belief.      
As a related point, it is also worth unpacking the philosophical and theoretical complexity 
that arises when one asks a number of questions. How can internal beliefs be safeguarded, if 
they are never expressed and hence indiscernible? Can beliefs be forcibly changed? If a 
person indicates a change of belief, can the compeller ever know what is inwardly believed 
by those he is compelling? Surely the law only relates to what is discernible and apparent in 
public and thus cannot and does not concern itself with what takes place in the minds and 
hearts of individuals. In fact, the law here is not seeking to regulate what takes place in the 
inwardly thoughts, consciousness or religious beliefs of individuals, but rather to prevent 
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attempts at interference with them. In relation to the idea that true inner beliefs can never be 
interfered with, it remains practically the case that beliefs may only be forced upon others and 
thus protected, once they are manifested. As such the most basic form of manifestation of 
belief is expressing ones ascription to a certain religion, that is, to self-identify oneself as 
belonging to certain religious community or holding certain beliefs.  
It follows then that belief must be discerned in order to be coerced or protected, and it is only 
discernible explicitly through public profession/proclamation/self-identification or implicitly 
through what is conventionally considered manifestation, that is, practice of religion most 
often associated with ritual acts of worship. Self-identification would not have to be uttered 
either as it could be manifested in religious symbols, such as outwardly appearance and other 
aspects of the associated culture. If there is then an attempt to compel someone to alter a 
belief, it takes place on a level of what is publicly professed. The aim of the compeller would 
be to either seek that the compelled expresses or makes known in any way their religious 
belief rather than actually seeking or being able to attain any form of guarantee that the 
internal state of the compelled has altered. In the event that such a policy fails, the compeller 
may seek to disadvantage the compelled as long as they persist in expressing the disfavoured 
religious identity. 
A comparable notion found in Islam that may inform these discussions has been in the role 
and notion of speech in relation to belief and action. We discussed above the idea of belief 
and action in Islamic theology and how they together determine whether someone is a 
Muslim. Belief must manifest in actions and actions must be predicated by beliefs. The 
absence of either means one’s Islam falls short of the ideal standard. A different approach 
adds the intermediate element of speech to the concept. While belief is carried in the heart 
and actions on the limbs, what bridges them is speech conveyed by the tongue. Speech results 
from belief but also shows intention and promise for actions. In the absence of speech, belief 
is inferred through actions. In the absence of actions, speech indicates ones belief, but still 
need to ideally manifest as actions.   
This is useful in getting to grips with the complexity and uncertainty of international law 
discussed above regarding how to identify belief and subsequently when it is under threat or 
being infringed. Furthermore where does belief end and manifestation begin? This stems 
from the train of thought and dilemma above that freedom to believe, while an internal aspect 
of an individual, can only be protected if it is first expressed and then potentially violated. As 
such belief to be interfered with must be manifested in some form. What then is the 
difference between this action which is considered the right to hold beliefs as absolute while 
other actions which constitute manifestation subject to limitations? Islamic thinking offers 
one solution here, which is that those matters that relate in interference with the absolute of 
belief are those that are expressed through speech and statements. Therefore we note while 
international law does not refer to such a conceptualisation, it is implicit in its application and 
practice. For example adoption or changing religions cannot be interfered with, professing to 
a certain religion cannot result in disadvantage, force cannot be employed to make someone 
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utter adherence to a belief or a religion and force likewise cannot be used to make some 
reveal their religious beliefs.
606
     
A crucial problem arises in relation to identifying the line between those actions which 
interfere with an individual’s freedom of belief under Art. 18(1) and which with their right 
manifestation subject to limits under Art. 18(3). Where a certain manifestation of religion is 
limited but the ascription, profession and identification is not interfered with then it would 
seem that the freedom to hold beliefs is not affected. However can we not also say that any 
manifestation of religion implicitly carries as its purpose or effect an indication or expression 
of belief? Does that mean that by interfering with that act of manifestation we have interfered 
with the belief, which is absolute and unconditionally protected? The HRC has also said that 
limitations on manifestation may not be so extensive as to encroach on the absolute right to 
hold a belief.
607
 A simple way to circumvent the problem posed by such a question is to point 
out that that belief in itself may be held, kept secret, expressed and if so without fear of 
negative effect, despite a particular manifestation being limited due to public policy grounds. 
If an individual refuses to use other means to identify themselves as holding certain beliefs 
and insists on that form of manifestation being the only means of conveying a certain belief, 
then no blame can be apportioned on the said State, for an alternate means was provided  for 
expression of belief but was not taken advantage of.  However even such an assertion may 
prove problematic for while using the idea of speech as bridge between belief and action, it 
remains the case that proclamation, profession or self-identification may not be done only 
through speech. For example many express their affinity to a religion through clothing or the 
display of symbols. Would these be expressions of belief or manifestation of belief? 
Moreover when any form of manifestation is limited without any public interest grounds, its 
violation spills into a simultaneous violation of the freedom to hold beliefs.   
 
IV. Application of Public Interest 
Having affirmed that, similar to international law, Islamic law seeks in essence to only limit 
the freedom of religion, in the public sphere based on compelling public interest grounds, 
some marked differences in the application of the principle need to be set out. The specific 
approach of Islam, as has already been mentioned, is similar to International law in the 
aspects related to the public policy grounds. However public interest in an Islamic polity 
would have to cater for and safeguard the religious sensibilities of the Muslim majority, 
which would most likely be comparable to the highly subjective and contextual notion of 
public morals under ICCPR Art. 18 and ECHR Art. 9. Additionally while a State seeking to 
apply Islamic law would also be distinct to the areligious/irreligious/religiously 
neutral/secular State, that is the presumed subject, of international human rights law, such an 
Islamic State identity would be most comparable to countries, which implement a strict 
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understanding of secularism, where religion is excluded aggressively from all aspects of 




Due to the perceived harm that could be caused by certain elements of public manifestation 
of the religion of a religious minority to the religious sensibility of its Muslim subjects, 
classical scholars have varied their rulings in relation to manifestation of religion in the 
public sphere on basis of the regional (intra-State) concentration of Muslims in any given 
population centre. On a sliding scale, the public manifestation of a minority religion is at its 
maximum when the proportion of Muslim inhabitants is at its lowest and at its minimum 
when the proportion of Muslims is high.  Areas, which were predominantly Muslim, or 
considered Muslim strongholds, are referred to in classical literature as amsar al-Muslimeen. 
The term connoted a place which is to exhibit the positive facets of the Islamic way of life. 
Other potential indicators articulated for towns to be classified as such were those where Eid 
and Friday congregational prayers were convened.
609
 Historically, in amsar al-Muslimeen, 
restrictions on the public manifestation of religious belief were applied, such as the selling of 
wine and pork, processions of the cross and blowing conches. These practices with 
processions of idols were seen as objectionable by the majority religious community owing to 
their public nature.
610
 Doi states that a result of the dhimma contract would be that “we do not 
lay a hand on their churches, their wine, their pigs as long as they do not make a public 
display of them.”
611
 Muhibbu-Din points out: 
“Admittedly, things that were likely to disturb public peace were forbidden by the 
Muslim rulers. For instance, it was forbidden to carry the cross in a procession through 
Muslim crowds, to blow the church bugle at prayer hour of Muslims, to carry pigs 
towards Muslim quarters and so on. Nor can the attitude of the caliph al-Mutawakkil of 
the Abbasid era who made Christians and Jews dress differently from Muslims be cited 
as a model and a pattern of Muslim virtue. Besides, al-Mutawakkil did flout most 
cherished principles of Islam.”
612
 
These restrictions on these practices were lifted where the number of Muslims was small.
613
 
Non-Muslims are not to be restricted from any practice which is within the places designated 
as their own, whether it is their residences, places of worship or cities and towns where they 
form an overwhelming majority.
614
 As such the practice or manifestation of the minority 
religion in relation to communal festivals and performance of religious rites was allowed 
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without any restraints in their own towns and cities. The ringing of church bells was 
permitted in some situations except during the time of the five daily prayers so as not to 
interfere with the Islamic call to prayer. Processions with a cross were also permitted.
615
 The 
Millet system was based on this approach. For example the Armenians of New Julfa, a suburb 
of the Safavid capital of Isfahan in the 17
th
 century enjoyed religious autonomy in private and 
public spheres: “they elected their own mayor, or kalantar, rang church bells, had public 
religious processions, established their own courts, and had no restrictions on clothing or the 
production of wine.”
616
 However they are to be forbidden from committing actions in the 
private sphere which are prohibited by their codes too like adultery, even if the town has an 
overwhelming majority of them.
617
  
A similar concept can be found under international law in relation to the rights and protection 
of minorities. The strength and nature of rights of a minority may depend on their situations. 
Practically we see the categorisation of minorities in sub-sets such as ‘new’ minorities or 
‘national’ minorities. However there may also be minorities which are predominant in a 
particular region. This entails then the availability of rights directly related to political 
autonomy or access to resources in that region. Tensions and indeed a number of conflicts 
have emerged from such scenarios. The tensions in the sharing of revenue from oil 
production in Iraqi Kurdistan and natural gas in Pakistani Baluchistan are two pertinent 
examples. With regards to international law, the idea of predominance in a particular area or 
region of a territory of a State is present with regards to the nature and strength of certain 
rights. However the rights that related to resources are in most cases intended for the minority 
situation of indigenous peoples
618
 and other rights that may stronger related to the use of the 
minority language.
619
 No such rights related to religious minorities are enumerated under 
international law specifically. Although they may be inferred indirectly through general rights 
such as those relating to education.  
 
V. Places of Worship 
The most common and principal aspect of a religion, which requires preservation and 
protection often relates to non-interference in acts of ritual worship. This in turn necessitates 
places of worship. Hence there is extensive discussion amongst Islamic scholars on how to 
deal with the issue of whether to allow for places of worship to exist, be maintained or be 
built at all. However the issue is by no means a simple one. Instead it appears that there may 
be a number of potential rulings based on the circumstances and contexts. Cities or territories 
are split into three types. The first relates to those settlements that were built up by the 
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Muslims, and thus have a Muslim history and heritage (amsar al-muslimeen). The second are 
those that that are conquered by force or a result of conflict. The third are those that the 
Muslims begin to govern/administer through an agreement. There is furthermore the special 
case of the Arabian Peninsula which has its own ruling requiring it to be homogeneously 
Muslim in terms of citizenship or permanent residence.
620
 Owing to ijma’ on the general 
issue, consequently, there is ijma’ on the non-permissibility of any non-Muslim place of 
worship in the Arabian Peninsula.
621
  
According to classical opinions, towns or cities such as Baghdad, Kufa and Basra are given 
as examples of the first category, that is, towns built up by and thus historically Muslim. Such 
Muslim strongholds, where there is a preponderance and/or predomination of Muslims 
(amsar al-Muslimeen). Ordinarily the town would also have been built up by Muslims 
(ikhtata). In such areas, according to one opinion, non-Muslims may not initiate the building 
of places of religious worship.
622
 However according to the Zaidiya it is permissible if the 
Imam allows it for a benefit he sees in it.
623
 Maududi and al-Kalbi concur that the dhimmis do 
not have the right to build new churches in areas said to be amsar al-Muslimeen. In other 
places there is no restriction on them. This also includes cities which used to be amsar al-
Muslimeen. If they have ceased to be so, the restrictions on religious rites and processions are 
also lifted. Maududi bases this on Ibn Abbas who said: 
“[i]n towns founded by Muslims, the Zimmis have no right to build new places of 
worship or to blow conches in the market or on roads or to sell wine or pork openly. 
But in cities originally established by non-Muslims and only subsequently conquered 
by the Muslim, the rights of the non-Muslims will be decided in accordance with the 
treaty and it is obligatory on the Muslims to abide by it.”
624
  
In relation to the second category of a town conquered through conflict, similarly there is a 
view that no churches or places of worship may be built.
625
 Others have supported this view 
by stating that whatever town Muslims open by force, it is not allowed to build any non-
Muslim places of religious worship therein.
626
 This is the view of Ibn Juzayy al-Kalbi, who 
notes of the conquered category that “they should not build a church nor leave one built in a 
township which the Muslims have built or conquered by force.”
627
 Agreement can be found 
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with Doi, who says they should not build places of worship where the town has been taken by 
force.
628 
However Ibn al-Qasim al-Maliki said it is allowed if the Imam has allowed it.
629
  
In relation to the third category what was conquered by agreement, which refers to agreement 
or negotiation giving rise to a ceasefire or a peace treaty, then largely what is stipulated 
within it will prevail. The majority of jurists agree that if the agreement states that the land 
belongs to the Muslims and they pay the kharaj (land tax), then it is permissible.
630
 Similarly 
if the agreement stipulates that they may build their places of worship then this would also be 
permissible, while its absence would mean a reversion to the default position of no building 
of places of worship.
631
 However the Malikis state that whatever is overcome with 
agreement, it is allowed for them to build whether it has been conditioned or not, as long as 
there are no Muslims living with them.
632
 In such a situation where the land is appropriated 
by the Muslims then the jizya would also be due.
633
  Regarding the villages and areas that are 
not predominantly Muslim, the Hanafis have disagreed. Al-Kasani has said they should not 
be disallowed from building in these places.
634
 Imam Sarkhi said they should not be 
disallowed in villages where the majority of inhabitants are people of dhimma.
635
 Regarding 
the villages that are inhabited by Muslims, some Hanafis have disagreed on not allowing the 
building of anything in dar al-Islam, even if it be a village.
636
 The Shafi’is stated that it is 
allowed for them to build in villages and those cities which were built by Muslims or those 
that accepted Islam have a different ruling from those villages that become merged into the 
city due to expansion.
637
  
If however it is agreed for the land to remain in the hands of the non-Muslim inhabitants and 
kharaj is paid to the Muslims, then churches and places of worship may be built,
638
 whether 
explicitly stipulated in the agreement or not.
639
 As such it cannot be considered dar al-Islam 
(Abode of Islam/Islamic land) and its people thus are not considered ahl al-dhimma not being 




In relation to pre-existing places of worship, the Hanafis have said while the structures may 
continue to exist, they may only be used as residences and not as places of worship. The 
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reasoning presented by them is that if the Muslims acquire the land through force then they 
reserve the right to build their own symbols so it is not allowed for the dhimmis as places of 
worship.
641
 The Shafi’is have said that they should not keep such places of worship while a 
second opinion in the madhab states that it is permissible if there is foreseeable benefit.
642
 
The Hanbalis have two opinions. The first requires the destruction of old places of worship if 
the Muslims come to own the land and have conquered it through force as such a place is 
treated no differently than one that was built up by the Muslims, that is, amsar al-Muslimeen. 
Al-Kalbi’s statement above seems to imply that once conquered, the non-Muslims should 
dismantle their places of worship. Maududi adds that Muslims may confiscate places of 
worship if they storm a town.
643
 However Abu Yusuf writes that Umar never once did this.
644
 
While there is no conclusive ijma’, the majority of scholars nonetheless agree pre-existing 
places of worship can remain and should not be destroyed. They may also be repaired and 
otherwise maintained as well as rebuilding destroyed parts.
645
 This principle extends also to 
old churches and places of religious worship in areas which were taken by force with no 
interference with or destruction of such places.
646
 This view is preferred by Doi, who states 
that dhimmis have the right to retain their places of worship whether it is after conquest or 
treaty, and have the right to repair them if they are damaged or destroyed.
647
 The second 
Hanbali opinion holds that such places should be left alone on the basis that the companions 
of the Prophet conquered many countries through conflict and they did not destroy the 
churches or places of worship. Umar ibn Abdul Aziz wrote to his representatives to not 
destroy synagogues, churches or houses of fire, owing to ijma’ on these matters. They are 
present in the countries of the Muslims without a denial by anyone.
648
 In line with the second 
Hanbali opinion, if all places of worship are left to remain then they can serve the purpose 
they were made for, that is, as places of worship for ahl al-dhimma.  This is because the 
Hanbalis have not said it is disallowed to keep that as places of worship, if left alone and not 
destroyed like the Hanafis have said.
649
 
According to Zaydan, the stronger opinion (qawl rajih) is what Zaydiya and Ibn al-Qasim 
went towards; it is allowed to build churches and other places of worship in Muslim 
strongholds (amsar al-Muslimeen) and the lands in which Muslims have taken through force, 
if the Imam has allowed them to do so. This is because Islam affirms that ahl al-dhimma have 
their beliefs and from the obligations of this affirmation is allowing them to build their places 
of worship, if there is nothing to stop them doing so. He states his support for the second 
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Hanbali opinion to leave the old churches in the amsar al-Muslimeen that have been opened 
by force as a result of the strong evidences they have given for leaving these places of 
worship along with the affirmation of Islam that freedom of religion of ahl al-dhimma should 
be guaranteed and there should be no unwarranted interference with it. However building in 
the land of Hijaz like all the jurists have agreed is impermissible.
650
 
In this way the issue of places of worship is based on the same underlying principles as those 
of public manifestation of religion. They both concern safeguarding the religious sensibilities 
of the Muslim majority, by restricting religion in the public sphere. The interferences are 
unrelated to the content/substance of the belief system of the minority religion. Furthermore it 
becomes difficult to advocate a progressive approach of minority rights where the State is 
expected to provide public funds for the protection and promotion of the minority religion, 
for example the construction of religious buildings. However there is ample leeway given for 
religious minorities to enjoy extended autonomy even on a territorial basis, where they 
happen to constitute substantial regional majorities or predominance in a particular area. Thus 
we can infer that though Islamic law has no problem with the existence of rival belief 
systems, it is averse to its open propagation in the public sphere where all Muslim’s are 
susceptible to it.  
Islam is a proselytising religion and the underlying notion of da’wah
651
 is central to it: “the 
Prophet had underscored the need for Islamic da’wah at all levels and in all climes. He has 
also shown that there was no compulsion in matters of faith.”
652
 Nonetheless the proselytising 
that we know of today does not necessarily fit in to the traditional Islamic notion of da’wah 
which is much wider and includes persuading through actions of justice and kindness. It is 
reported that when a coat of mail was stolen from Ali, and he could not provide a witness to 
confirm that the item in question was his, the accused Christian was allowed to keep the coat 
for lack of sufficient evidence.  Consequently awed by the justice of Islam, which ruled in his 
favour against the Caliph, even though he was lying, caused him to confess and convert to 
Islam. Ali allowed him to keep the stolen object.
653
 There is also the story of the conversion 
of the Negus of Abyssinia owing to being impressed by the conduct and etiquettes of the 
Muslims who emigrated to his kingdom.
654
 Hence “it is obvious that the kind and 
sympathetic attitude of Prophet Muhammad (saw) towards ahl al-kitab, rather than high-
handedness, hostility and cruelty encouraged their conversion to Islam. Indeed, it is the 
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practical examples set by the Prophet and his companions of benevolence, love and service 
that have attracted peoples of other faiths to Islam through history.”
655
 
Therefore Islamic law seeks to maintain a fine balance of exhibiting its tolerance and justice 
without any discrimination as a way of extolling the Islamic way of life, while at the same 
time being weary of supporting the propagation of competing belief systems. As a result it 
would be reasonable to deduce that a State seeking to apply Islamic law would be willing to 
do whatever was necessary to keep its inhabitants fulfilled, but was not prepared to facilitate 
conversions away from Islam. Therefore as far as public funds go, it would be reasonable to 
assume that they could be made available for maintenance of religious buildings of the 
existent community, but restricted if it was deemed that it could result in the spread of that 
faith, in particular amongst the Muslim majority.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
We saw in this chapter that the notions of freedom of religion, in particular the right to 
manifest belief under Islamic law was not only more expansive than popularly perceived and 
even conveyed by some established academics, but that the similarities in the philosophy and 
principles comparable to that found under international law. So what can we say has attracted 
such negative views on Islamic law and caused its positive aspects to be overlooked, which 
could inform and improve international law? One answer may be the nature of Islamic law, 
especially when one comes to the fine details of public law which are derived through text 
and the necessities of effective governance. We are not able to refer to documents such as 
treaties or other instruments akin to statute law, which are representative of an international 
consensus of legally binding force. Instead we have examples from the classical tradition of 
interpretation and application by jurists and political rulers. So it must not come to us as a 
surprise that we are confronted with a range of potential modes of treating religious 
minorities in accordance with Islamic law as well as the needs of the Muslim majority and the 
Islamic State. 
Consequently, a number of different situations were dealt with in different ways by different 
executive powers. The problem arises when in our hunt for normative laws, we identify one 
such example and present it as the Islamic law position on a certain issue. A pertinent 
example would be the harsh terms of the ‘Pact of Umar’.
656
 Secondly we must keep in mind 
and attempt to deduce the underlying principle behind various scenarios rather than read them 
superficially as outcomes in a vacuum lacking context. We see that in our examination of the 
freedom of religion pertaining to places of religious worship, the range of opinions varied 
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depending on the situation and relationship of the parties preceding a conflict. Clearly the 
limitations on places of worship are harshest against those who had not long before been 
engaged in direct hostilities with the Muslims, less so for those who submit and even better 
for those who did not engage the Muslims in hostilities. Similarly the limitations on 
manifestation of religion are relaxed or lifted completely in areas where the religious 
minority is predominant, that is, they are not amsar al-Muslimeen. Elaboration of such a 
complex matrix that incorporates different factors, contexts and situations is indicative of a 
system of law that is dealing with each situation according to its merits and in line with 
overarching goals and principles. We could frame such a principle as the attempt to manage 
difference as well as balance accommodation and pluralism with threats, internal and 
external, physical and ideological. This also goes hand in hand, according to a strong opinion 
above, to the deference to the leader (imam) in a number of matters. On the controversial 
issue of the building of new places of worship, the said opinion holds that it is permissible if 
the imam sees a benefit in it. 
In terms of application of the law, two issues arise. The first relates to whether a number of 
examples given on treatment of religious minorities constitute precedences. To dismiss them 
as mere examples of the rights of dhimma, we give ourselves greater space to offer better and 
stronger rights. However it would also deprive us of the opportunity to refer to the highly 
positive and progressive examples of treatment and their bases. It is of greater utility to focus 
on the underlying principles as precedental rather than a specific practice. Secondly and 
regardless of the first point, the crux of the matter for application of law to the present context 
is whether any situations described in classical Islamic law are comparable and analogous. 
This should be in light of the fact that the era of conquest and empire where the absence of a 
treaty indicated a default position of hostilities to one where the default position in the 
absence of a declaration of war is that of peace and good neighbourliness. If it is not then do 
we abandon the dhimma model completely or refer to aspects of it? In the same vein would 
the duty to take the jizya fall away also? Is it in any case only incumbent as a result of 
fighting as framed in Qur’an 9:29 or paid in lieu of abstaining from military service? These 
are open questions and some diverge from classical Islamic law and can be found in the 
reform proposals of modernist writers.
657
 
While attempting to philosophise on such issues may be intriguing, ultimately it may not be 
of much utility. We have discovered above, much like international law, there will always be 
scope and discretion available to limit the manifestation of religion provided compelling 
public policy grounds. Further still comparable to international law is the idea that such 
limitations under Islamic law would centre on the rights and sensibilities of the majority 
Muslim population. While this may seem a point of divergence from international law on a 
superficial reading, a deeper analysis shows that the underlying principles are similar and 
would be compliant with international law. A balancing of the freedom of religion and those 
of the majority or their right to live in an Islamic society would qualify under Art. 18(3) as 
protection of the rights and fundamental freedoms of others. Furthermore this is similar to the 
                                                          
657
 Hashemi, Religious Legal Traditions, 143. 
PhD: Protection of Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and International Law   Murtaza Shaikh  
  
Page 184 of 222 
 
practice of secular States who seek to limit manifestation of religion to purportedly protect 
the secular views and ideology of the majority. The most far reaching precedent to date in 
this regards has been the banning of the face veil in France, which was held to be a 
permissible limitation on manifestation of religion on the specific grounds of being in 
contravention of community cohesion and integration as an example of rights and 
fundamental freedom of others.         
However it should be pointed out that it is not envisaged that contemporary Islamic law 
would treat its religious minorities with the same distain as extremely secular States deal with 
theirs. Under Islamic law minorities would have to be formally recognised, they could have 
extensive rights in relation to places of worship, choosing their leaders, establishing schools 
and even autonomy of their own legal systems to apply their religious laws. In the public 
sphere, applicable limitations would be those relating to proselytisation and processions, 
which would be inapplicable in areas where the religious minority is predominant and form a 
regional majority. What is evident as to the difference between the core principles motivating 
and determining treatment of religious minorities under Islamic law and in a secular State, is 
that while the former seeks to protect the majority Muslims, the latter seeks to weaken the 
religious minority’s manifestation in all forms due to an inherent ideological hostility to all 
religions generally. 
An intriguing point is however that on a theological level, the opposition of Islam to other 
belief systems especially polytheistic ones is vast. This is supported by repeated warning in 
the Qur’an of non-acceptance and non-adherence to Islam resulting in being destined for the 
hellfire. Those who accept Islam as their religion and act by it are promised paradise. Hence 
in the Islamic worldview the theological opposition to other belief systems is great, but the 
crucial point to note is that warnings of punishments and  perceived misguided nature of 
other belief systems is relegated to the relationship between an individual and God and the 
punishments and rewards specific to the life after death. A number of authors have made this 
mistake of conflating this aspect with the attitude and treatment that should be directed 
towards non-Muslim religious minorities in the present world. Both the Qur’an and the 
Prophetic Traditions make a clear distinction between what awaits believers and non-
believers after death and how all manner of individuals and Muslims should be treated 
benevolently while alive, that is, in the worldly life. 
How can Islam on the one hand invite all humans to salvation in the hereafter with warnings 
of hellfire for those who refuse, while at the same time permit non-Muslims to practice 
religions that are according to Islam false and misguided? The answer, which international 
law and international relations has learned recently, is that most effective and genuine way to 
come to common terms with those who we differ with, even bringing them over to our way of 
thinking, is through accommodation of their existence, beliefs, practices and other matters 
pertaining to their way of life except when it encroaches on the majority’s way of life. 
Furthermore when a dominant power allots freedoms to a non-dominant minority within its 
control, freedoms and rights that it is under no obligation or compulsion to provide, it leaves 
a positive effect with that non-dominant entity. Force, oppression and persecution only 
reinforce a minority’s identity and distances its identity, ideology and affinity from the 
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governing authority until it reaches the extremity of armed secession. Islam has sought to 
exhibit a high level of tolerance to those it is at theological odds with in order to show the 
compassion and mercy of the religion while at the same opening the way for exposure to the 
real content and substance of the religion free of negative biases. 
Similarly in international law, the protection of minorities has emerged from sobering lessons 
of mass loss of life owing to conflicts and genocides emerging from mismanagement of 
minorities. At its centre is the notion that restriction of minority identity and denial of the 
right to enjoy their culture, namely religion and language, leads to greater divergences and 
tensions to develop. When a minority is allowed to live by its own values and principles and 
beliefs, it is likely to feel a greater sense of solidarity with the State and the chances of a 
common identity developing become more plausible. Nation states have and some continue 
to force a singular and homogenous national identity at the expense of minority identities. 
Only through measures of accommodation and autonomy can genuine national unity be 
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The thesis has provided a doctrinal comparative analysis of Islamic law and international law 
on the protection of religious minorities, with the main objective of contributing to a better 
understanding of the perceived conflicts and impasses between the two systems of law and 
their associated world views. This, it is submitted, is of practical utility in a number of 
scenarios that go beyond the traditional discussion of Muslim-majority States navigating 
between their international human rights obligations and their self-imposed constitutional 
commitment to Shari’ah or Islamic law.
658
 Most notably, these scenarios would include the 
emergence of Islamically motivated political parties
659
 and non-State armed groups
660
 in the 
aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’. Schematically, there could only be a finite number of 
outcomes to a comparison between the two systems of law. There could be compatibility and 
two types of incompatibility, where either Islamic law or international law offered the higher 
level of protection to religious minorities. 
Before a comparative analytic exercise could begin, a complex set of contextual obstacles had 
to be addressed. These included the differing natures of the two systems of ‘laws’ in question. 
One is a system based primarily on religious sources, while the other is based primary on the 
practices of States. They also emanate from two vastly contrasting eras separated by over a 
millennium. Within each system, it is difficult to ascertain which law or view should be relied 
on as representative of the legal system as a whole. At the international level, there is not just 
the law that emanates from relevant UN instruments and oversight bodies but also from 
regional systems, in particular Europe. Under Islamic law, it is also apparent that on a number 
of pivotal questions there is a plurality of jurisprudential views. Even where a juristic view is 
deemed to be strong or attributed to the majority of jurists, it is often the case that by the 
jurisprudential methodologies of Islamic law, other opposing and differing views could not 
simply be easily discarded. Once we had attempted to resolve some of these conceptual 
issues, we sought to compare the rights of dhimma under Islamic law to those of religious 
minorities under international law, with particular attention to scope of inclusion, non 
discrimination, freedom of religion and religious minority rights. 
In this concluding Chapter we will collate the main findings from previous chapters on these 
issues and draw out the overarching themes that connect and help us make sense of the 
findings. Finally, we will ask pertinent questions as to the direction our analysis points us, so 
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as to suggest and offer some insight into future areas of research that may build on and 
expand on the findings of this thesis.      
 
II. Nature of the two systems of ‘Laws’ 
The differences between Islamic law and international law may be obvious, but the 
similarities may not. Islamic law is derived from a religious text and is applicable to Muslims 
through their own volition and self-imposition. As an inspiration for State legislation or 
policy, the governing authority requires a mandate either constitutionally or via popular 
democracy. Being a religious law for a religious community, the assumption may be that it 
treats non-believers with contempt and in terms of law and policy, discriminates against them 
and favours Muslims. International law on the other hand is the law of States formed in part 
through consensual processes and codified as treaties. As a corollary of international law, 
international human rights law provides a means of limiting the excesses of States with 
regards to the individual freedoms and liberties of their subjects. Much of international law is 
codified in various instruments and some adjudicated over by designated international and 
regional courts and tribunals. Conversely, Islamic law has not and cannot be codified into a 
formal singular view. Instead jurists issue legal views, which are then agreed or disagreed 
with by others relying on the same primary textual sources. The strength, authority and 
legitimacy of an Islamic legal opinion depends on the consensus of a community of juristic 
peers that extends not just in space but also back in time.  
However in terms of similarities, both do not fit the traditional paradigm of what ‘law’ should 
be through the prism of domestic law, which has the ability to compel and coerce compliance 
as well as to punish. Both international and Islamic law are in some aspects consensual, 
although the origins of their sources differ considerably. Islamic law has as its starting point 
sacred text that Muslims believe to have been revealed to Prophet Muhammad, and later 
compiled as the Qur’an in addition to the collection of authenticated ahaadith. In principle, 
the preserved, authentic and agreed upon Arabic text for these two primary textual sources is 
fixed, while their interpretation and application may be contextual. They cannot be disputed 
nor amended. This does not mean that their interpretation and agreement are not open to 
debate and discussion amongst jurists depending on factors such as context and language. It 
is these juristic opinions that undergo a consensual process to determine strength. 
Alternatively, international law is sourced from consensus. Following the end of World War 
II, the adoption of the UN Charter, the UDHR and followed, in particular, by the two 
International Covenants
661
, form the foundational basis of international human rights law. 
Once the consensus of States is entrenched in treaty text, it then may act in the same way as 
the textual sources from which all Islamic law must emanate. In other words while both differ 
in their sources and their nature, they, to a large extent, do apply in a similar way. While 
Islamic law is thought to originate and derive from the word of God, international law 
originates in an initial act of consensual treaty making, which then legally acts in the same 
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way as a religious text. This means once it is entrenched it is not the text itself that is disputed 
but its interpretations.  
International law exhibits tensions in interpretive approaches when there is conflict between 
treaty and customary law much in the same way that Islamic law grapples with issues of 
authenticity of Prophetic Traditions and conflicts in interpretations between Traditions and 
the Qur’an. This was evident in the debate and reasoning adopted by al-Shafi’i regarding 
whether the Magians should be considered as People of the Book or not, based on his 
interpretation of Qur’an 9:29. However that discussion was not easily separable from his 
view that reference to the People of the Book in the verse was a closed and exhaustive list. In 
that regard, a potential contribution of this thesis was to offer a reconciliation of al-Shafi’i’s 
interpretation, which was at odds with the other three prominent schools of Islamic law. It 
was suggested that al-Shafi’i’s interpretative methodology need not be compromised, if only 
he were to consider Qur’an 9:29 as non-exhaustive and the reference to the People of the 
Book as an example of groups to be afforded dhimma status. This may have been more 
feasible than having to deduce that the Magians must be People of the Book, when ostensibly 
and substantially there was little to support such a presumption.  
Similarly, such a minute technicality of exhaustive or non-exhaustive lists often plays a role 
in determining interpretation in international law also. For example, a parallel was drawn 
with the discussion of the above verse with Art. 27 of ICCPR and how it was possible to 
apply a dynamic interpretative approach by asserting the subject groups to be a non-
exhaustive list. Doing so would enable the inclusion of minority groups beyond just 
‘religious’ and ‘linguistic’ to be included within the scope of minority rights as long as they 
could be deemed to be ‘ethnic’ demonstrating a distinct culture. Such an interpretation is 
absent in the literature or the jurisprudence on the topic and may be used in submissions to 
international oversight bodies to assess its traction. Other examples with the same technical 
nuances include the ICERD’s heads of ‘racial discrimination’,
662
 which is meant to be a non-
exhaustive list and the sources of international law
663
 which are also said to be open to 
additions and non-exhaustive. The list of sources for Islamic law though is an exhaustive list 
and is limited to Qur’an, Traditions, ijma’ (absolute consensus) and qiyas (analogy). In terms 
of elaborations and explanations, Islamic law seeks to expand on overarching legal 
commandments and principles in the Qur’an and Prophetic Traditions through classical 
works of commentary (tafsir) on the Qur’an and explanations (sharh) of Traditions. Similarly 
international law has in-built within it General Recommendations and Comments by 
Committees that oversee the implementation and compliance to international human rights 
instruments. These offer much needed clarification and add detail in the face of context and 
developing practices.  
The significance of State practice in the context of this discussion is worth elaborating. While 
State practice and agreements involving States both emanate from the State entity, they must 
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be distinguished. The State’s participation in consensus building and negotiations with peer 
States is pursuant to the aim of drafting a treaty that all agree to and thus render themselves 
subjects of and to. International law and the process that accompanies it do not negate State 
sovereignty but develop it and position it at the centre of the authority and legitimacy of 
international law. States by collectively drafting and subsequently ratifying treaties are made 
subject to those principles via their sovereign power rather than in contravention of it. This 
makes State practice all the more essential in the formation of international law prior to 
formal agreement in the form of a treaty and after in affirming its status as ‘law’ that is being 
complied with. In other words, international treaty law is often a reflection of common State 
practices and following the adoption of the treaty, its ratification, implementation and 
compliance with the requirements of oversight bodies also constitute State practice that 
contributes to the strengthening of a said norm. In the absence of a treaty on a particular 
matter, patterns in State practice determine implicitly what is international law through the 
formation of informal international customary law. Therefore when comparing international 
law to Islamic law, it is instructive and unavoidable to refer to State practice as well as to 
international treaty law, not to mention varying standards and norms in regional systems. As 
already mentioned it is not just that State practice is an essential element in the formation and 
discernment of international law but is often justified by reference to the State’s international 
obligations relating in that sphere. As such, it is indicative of permissible interpretations of 
international law depending on how oversight bodies respond to them and non-enforceability 
by international bodies of decisions and rulings, even in the case of the strongest enforcement 
mechanism of the ECtHR.  
In the formation and articulation of classical Islamic law, it would not be wholly appropriate 
to talk of ‘State’ practice. The world order prevalent at the time was not one of sovereign 
nation-States or where boundaries and borders were fixed or sacrosanct. It was an age of 
military aggression, expansionism and empire, where the implicit default was war and the 
explicit exception peace. Therefore what did exist were disparate and varied political entities 
or polities that vied and jostled as well as formed alliances with each other for dominance vis-
à-vis territory and resources. Islamic law was also dissimilar in that it was not the law that 
governed the conduct of these entities from above nor was it formed or interpreted by them. It 
was derived from the deduced will of God through Islam’s textual sources to be applied to all 
aspects of life by independent jurists and legal scholars. It sought to deal with how a 
governing authority should behave towards and manage its subjects, whether Muslim or non-
Muslim.  
Hence both Islamic law and international law effected and influenced how States or such 
entities behaved. International law was implemented from above, once agreements were 
reached as a way to check compliance. Islamic law was interpreted and implemented from 
within the State entity with no supranational oversight. The poignant point here is that 
international law originates and heavily influences the interpretation and strength of certain 
norms that may be soft or hard and absolute or aspirational. The practice of Islamic State 
entities may be sourced from Islamic law and they may provide elaborations of certain 
precepts of Islamic law by applying them to specific contexts but they cannot amend 
PhD: Protection of Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and International Law   Murtaza Shaikh  
  
Page 190 of 222 
 
unequivocally the primary elements of Islamic law. Islamic law is wholly the arena of the 
jurist, while Islamic State entities may seek to apply aspects of those interpretations. But in 
other cases, States completely departing from those valid views with clear textual basis or 
formulating policies that may be explicitly forbidden under Islamic law, do not affect the 
concrete nature of those principles and laws, even if they are widespread and common. 
However it would be important to keep in mind that given how international law is formed, it 
was unlikely that law would be formed around a matter, which all States acted divergently in. 
In other words, Islamic law is informed and enriched by practice, while international law is 
dependent and altered by practice.        
 
III. Spectrum of Validity Theory 
A contribution of this study has been a model of analysing Islamic law and comparing it to 
international law by reference to a plurality of possible views on any one given issue. This is 
an inadvertent facet of Islamic law given that it is interpreted by jurists and their views never 
have the ability to attain the status of formally applicable law at the official level. It is neither 
statute law nor international treaty law. It is informal and seeks to map all possible 
interpretations and rule out impossible ones. As such, the variance emanates from 
interpretative approaches, context and assessment of the authenticity of ahaadith. Rather than 
textual law, it is simply a huge body of legal views and opinions of what the law is and 
should be. The contributory utility of this spectrum of validity theory is unique in that it 
unearthed views that are largely absent in the English language literature. Additionally, much 
of this literature only refers to one view as being representative of Islamic law. That could in 
some cases be from other English language authors. In others it is by reference to now much 
discredited polemicist writers, who are selective in their representation of Islamic law and in 
their explanations of it.
664
 Furthermore even classical and contemporary Arabic writers will 
often present the view that they preference rather than the full range of views. In their case, it 
is not to discount other possible interpretations but to indicate which they feel to be strongest 
view. Therefore the issue with contemporary authors is not that they quote a liberal or 
restrictive interpretation of Islamic law, but that there is little cognisance of other equally 
valid possibilities in the classical literature. This may be done out of convenience or an 
insidious and biased agenda, but it is common amongst those seeking to vilify Islamic law 
and Muslims as well as those hoping to portray Islam and Muslims in a positive and peaceful 
light. However both approaches fail the academic endeavour of elucidating the nature and 
substance of Islamic law and comparing it to international law.  
As already stated, beyond the theory, the general approach of the thesis is to be found in 
much of the scholarship on the topic, that of comparing international law and Islamic law, 




 Hashemi devotes a third of a monologue to 
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dhimma while Baderin has authored a Chapter on the topic. The only monologue dedicated to 
a similar comparison has been Emon, who refers to a similar and connected idea but refers to 
it as the idea of ‘rule of law’ under Islam. The substance of his theoretical comparative 
approach is similar in that it proposes and seeks to compare Islamic law by reference to the 
range of interpretations available rather than selecting one or limiting himself to one.
667
 
Nevertheless in the progression of the present thesis, it was evident that international law was 
similarly also not a monolithic system of law with singular legal views on various matters 
pertaining especially to the right of religious minorities. There appeared to be a plurality of 
not only interpretations but also laws themselves ranging from regions, international 
organisations and of course national laws of States. Others when discussing the issue of 
religious minorities in isolation have taken the position of international law by reference to a 
particular instrument or provision, rather than ask the question of what international law 
states as an entity. International law, thus is perceived by this author as not merely a law that 
governs all States as could be argued by those who resort to UN instruments as their 




Further still, given the unconventional nature of international law that in large part requires 
voluntary State compliance, it does not just exhibit a spectrum of validity in its potential 
laws, but demonstrates a parallel ‘spectrum of legality’, in which laws or principles may be 
legally binding or not. Even of those legally binding, there may those that have oversight 
mechanism and bodies and others that do not.
669
 Lastly there are those that are legally 
enforceable
670
 or may even be directly applicable in the national law of the State.
671
 It may 
also be there is always a disparity between the extent of the same protections in various 
regional jurisdictions given the context and experience of those regions.
672
 A difficult and 
pertinent question that could follow is whether UN standards of human rights protection or 
regional systems offer higher levels of protection. From one perspective, the UN system 
should offer the minimum possible protection in a particular area and regional systems may 
then go beyond but not below it.
673
 From another perspective, as UN standards may be less 
enforceable than European ones, States may be less reluctant to make themselves subject to a 
system that is more likely to require stringent compliance.
674
 In this study, focus was 
maintained on European institutions and instruments.  
The subsequent question that arises is the relevance of State practice under international law 
and whether it should have been taken as being part of this spectrum of validity of 
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international law or beyond its scope. The elaboration in the above section about the 
relationship between State practice and international law contrasted with that under Islamic 
law indicated that it should be included under international law and not so under Islamic law 
to the same extent. This is the reason that in our preceding analyses, we referred readily to the 
practice of certain States, in particular France and Turkey. The assertion made above was in 
regards to understanding the relevance and role of State practice in the formation and 
strengthening/weakening of international norms. Nonetheless international law displays a 
spectrum of permissibility with regards to the conduct of State under the same human rights 
principles and norms under the concept of the margin or appreciation, best illustrated in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The margin of appreciation shows for our purposes that the 
spectrum of validity is applicable not just across regions but also in a said regional system, 
such as the ECtHR, in its determination on the lawfulness of legislation or policies taking into 
account the political, cultural and historical contexts of States.
675
 To surmise, State practice 
under international law definitively forms part of the spectrum of validity of the legally 
permissible and the legally binding. If an international law is sufficiently general and vague, 
State practice contributes to populating the elaborated legal space. If it is fixed and legally 
binding and States flout it or comply by it, then their practice erodes or strengthens that norm, 
respectively. Finally at times, the application of a certain norm is dependent on the context of 
the State in question whether political or cultural. The ECtHR in such instance applies a 
margin of appreciation.    
If we are then arguing for the inclusion of State practice under international law in our 
comparable spectrum of validity, then why seek to exclude for the most part the practice of 
Islamic polities in the past and present from the spectrum of validity of Islamic law. In the 
discussion above the question has at least been partially answered. The distinction between 
the nature of the two ’laws’ and the role of State practice in the formation of law is significant 
aspect of better understanding the issue. Although it is not to say that we completely discount 
State practice as informing our view of the spectrum of validity for Islamic law. As already 
stated we certainly referred to certain State practices such as those of modern Muslim-
majority States and a number of authors have pointed out the practises of Islamic polities in 
the past, such as the Ottoman Empire and other modern States embodying elements of 
repressive classical Islamic law of dhimma.
676
 The crucial divergence to grasp though is that 
State practice in the past and present may be resorted to as an example of interpretation of 
Islamic law rather than as contribution to its formation. As such, it does not contribute to its 
negation or weakening. If it does affirm one of the valid opinions, it similarly does not negate 
the existence of others in the spectrum of validity.  
The distinction may from one perspective seem an arbitrary one as examples of interpretation 
may contribute to understanding a law. What is meant however by the proposed distinction is 
that those examples of interpretations have no effect on the textual sources and the range of 
available interpretations of classical jurists especially in relation to their meaning. State 
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practice can draw on the textual sources and the associated bank of juristic views and seek to 
apply one to its context. While State practice may refer to and draw upon Islamic law, both 
exist in parallel yet separate autopoietic systems.
677
 In clearer terms, Muslim-majority State 
practice or alternatively States that call themselves Islamic do not contribute to the formation 
of Islamic law even though they may draw inspiration from it. When they claim to be 
manifesting Islamic law through State structures, that also does not necessarily mean that it 
falls within the pre-existing spectrum of validity. Two points emerge from this: the first as to 
the relevance of this discussion around State practice to the present study and the second how 
one should go about comparing the spectrum of validity of the two systems of law and its 
results. We will address the first in the next section and the second later. 
 
IV. Contextual Flexibility 
The relevance of the above is born out in fact, a number of authors refer to State practice and 
the views of certain classical jurists interchangeably and without distinction.
678
  This means 
they overlook a number of considerations. Do the rules regarding dhimma constitute laws and 
if they do, are they for that specific context? If they are related to context, then can such a 
context be discerned today? Are certain State practices justified by reference to Islamic law 
that can be situated within the spectrum of validity? The most notable example in this regard 
is the ‘Pact of Umar’
679
, which is constantly quoted throughout the literature as being 
indicative of the rules that all dhimma must be subjected to. This is especially the case when 
the rights of religious minorities were discussed as opposed to scope. Two elements seem to 
have been overlooked which are of absolute necessity when comparing two such situations. 
The first of context and the second of the principles and underlying philosophy behind such 
rules. Apart from this, the views of Mawardi and other classical jurists
680
 are of great utility 
emphasising the nature of dhimma as essentially an agreement, pact or treaty between a State 
and non-State entity, which may be in compliance to regulations associated with dhimma or 
may negate them: “If not explicitly stated in the treaty, the ‘recommended conditions’ for 
dhimmi behaviour in Muslim society are not obligatory on them. Even when prescribed, the 
infringement of these conditions does not constitute a breach of contract. Nevertheless, they 
are to be forced to comply and are to be reprimanded.”
681
  
In terms of textual sources, the reference to dhimma and the substance of their rights is 
indeed scant. The concept is deduced and elaborated from a single verse of the Qur’an (9:29) 
and a number of Traditions address the scope of inclusion. With regards to freedom of 
religion also, the central element is derived from Qur’an 2:256. Thus rules that range 
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according to context such as conquest, political leadership and can be negated or 
supplemented by express agreement can embody harshness or leniency, can such rules be 
attributed the quality of law sufficiently enough to draw comparison with international law or 
other systems? And if so can they be seen as binding law? The answer is resoundingly no to 
the idea that a number of harsh rules could be seen being representative of Islamic law or that 
they were binding on others who followed. What must be extracted from all scenarios present 
where Islamic law had to deal with religious minorities is the essence or fundamental 
principles at play, so as to extract them and assess them disconnected from context so as to be 
universally adaptable to all contexts.  
Haddad in reference to Mawardi’s famous text, Ahkam al-Sultaniyah provides some valuable 
insight in to this contextual flexibility and ad hoc nature based on the discretion of the 
political leadership at a given time playing a part in addition to the context he is responding 
to.
682
 As such the political leadership’s decision constitutes an example of practice rather than 
affirmative law binding all those who follow. For example we know that the amount of jizya 
was never fixed and instead determined by the political leader.
683
 Mawardi also gives two 
rulings on each issue, which is alleged by some to be contradictory but in the analytic 
framework relying on the spectrum of validity shows it be a more cogent elaboration of 
Islamic law for State entities than offering a singular view. This would also go hand in hand 
in explaining the required differing policy response for drastically different situations. This is 
epitomised by the repeated reference to how dhimma should be treated dependent on whether 
they are conquered or not, fought or submitted peacefully.
684
 Thus as already stated 
generalisations from the very specific ‘Pact of Umar’ with the Syrians are not helpful. 
However it does assist us in understanding that the harshness in that treaty whose terms were 
a result of an agreement between Umar and defeated Syrians. Albeit it was between a 
dominant victor and over-powered defeated party, nonetheless it was agreed by the parties in 
the aftermath of defeat and more crucially was specific to that situation and was not intended 
to have binding effect at all. The harshness is also related to the fact that it was the result of a 
conflict and armed hostilities. Thus the precautions and punitive measures to ensure passivity 
were more severe.
685
   
Likewise the discussion around jizya which is legislated in Qur’an 9:29 is surrounded by a 
mosaic of differing views around context, conditions and objective. It has been argued that 
the verse specifically commands Muslims to “fight...those who were given the Scripture until 
they give the jizya willingly while they are humbled”. One interpretation offered has been 
that the jizya is applicable to only a situation where there is fighting followed by submission. 
If no fighting took place as in the religious minority finds itself in the territory of the State 
due to being established there for hundreds of years or in the classical context conquest has 
occurred as a result of fighting but not with the minority, then does the requirement of jizya 




 Ibid. at p. 171. 
684
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still apply. Furthermore some have also argued that jizya is paid in lieu of not serving in the 
Muslim military, thus raising the question of inapplicability if they join the army.
686
 Similar 
connected discussions in the classical texts also take place regarding kharaj and how the rules 
concerning may differ on the basis of the religious group being conquered or not.
687
 Thus it is 
far from clear whether jizya would be applicable today if it was related to and conditioned to 
being conquered, there being hostility and enmity between it and the Muslims, it being 
related to participation in the armed forces and there being no international norm of 
expansion amongst powers as well as conquest in the present world order being unlawful and 
there being fixed borders, international law and pre-existing minorities in nation-States. 
Two connected discussions that take place around jizya and its basis is that it was an 
oppressive policy that sought to degrade, humiliate and demean the dhimma and even in the 
event that it was not, it still constituted a discriminatory fiscal and taxation policy based on 
religious belief and identity. With regards to the view that it was a means by which to 
humiliate the dhimma, the view is certainly espoused by some classical jurists, who saw that 
the dominance of Islam had to be made clear to the dhimma and their subservience affirmed. 
This essentially political discussion of how to treat religious minorities is informed and 
fuelled by the debate around the interpretation of Qur’an 9:29 in particular the final word, 
which according to lenient translations has been ‘humbled’ and by harsher ones ‘humiliated’. 
It is then difficult to reconcile with international law if we were to entertain the possibility of 
the harsher interpretation as even being one of the possibilities on the spectrum of validity. 
Nonetheless as already stated, the context must be unpacked to see what may be going on 
below the superficiality of certain laws or policy. Also reference to contextual facilitators 
should not be used as a means to escape acknowledging unsavoury or unfavourable views 
that may nonetheless have legitimacy and authority.  
However reference to context coupled with reference to other precepts within the same 
system as well as the overarching purpose of the system (maqaasid) can prove an instructive 
and compelling evidence to decipher the purpose of a law from its apparent intent. Hence it 
would be appropriate to assert that both the purposes above of degradation and fiscal 
penalisation, beyond discrimination, could constitute forms of indirect coercion which would 
more fundamentally encroach the internal and absolute aspect of freedom of religion. This is 
because it would put religious minorities in an unfavourable position vis-à-vis their dignity 
and wealth. This could lead them to consider claiming substantial equality by at the very least 
feigning conversion to Islam. However as we have already noted the context was often one of 
conquest following armed hostilities, so in part the harshness can be attributed to that as 
opposed to the purpose of converting them. With regards to the overarching maqsad 
(purpose), any form of coercion with the aim of infringing the internal aspect of freedom of 
religion would be irreconcilable with Islamic law. In this sense, harsh treatment would be so 
that they are subdued and accept being subjects to an Islamic State entity as well as 
dissuasion to threaten the entity from within. In relation to the varied interpretations of 
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Qur’an 9:29 and the views on the purpose of jizya, it may also be possible to reconcile 
between the many views without having to necessarily discount a substantial number of them 
by asserting that the interpretation and thus translation of the verse was flexible and depended 
on context. What was required in essence was that there subservience to the law and authority 
of the Islamic State entity. What specifically was required to attain that clearly depended on 
the relationship and interaction between two parties prior to the assumption of dhimma status. 
Submission to the authority of the State is a basic ingredient of citizenship or permanent 
residence even in modern States. 
In relation to the second possible point about it being a discriminatory fiscal policy, the idea 
often becomes strengthened when connected to the above said harsh interpretation of Qur’an 
9:29. However when looked at in isolation, the jizya as mode of taxation need not be 
discriminatory or implemented with view to disadvantage and coerce the dhimma. In its 
apparent mechanics, it could have been considered in lieu of zakat which was only collected 
from Muslims and was fixed at two and a half percent of unspent savings over year. Jizya on 
the hand was at the discretion of the political authority and more often than not was of a small 
amount and was largely as symbolic. It was also means and capacity dependent so that many 
were excluded from it and so was applied to men of fighting age, hence why it was linked by 
some to exemption from military service. Given its amount and the fact that it excluded those 
unable to pay it, goes against the idea that it was meant to disadvantage religious minorities 
so as to make them outwardly at least more amenable to Islam. The contextual dynamic of 
conquest is also applicable to the discussion around the places of worship, where jurists 
developed different limits of rights dependent on whether the religious group had been the 
result of conquest or not. Once again this directly related to what relationship preceded it and 
the presumed level of threat from within. Where there is trust, the enmity shown prior to and 
during assumption of authority, the rights given are greater.  
Therefore a vital question results: if conquest is what in a number of situations determine 
treatment to dhimma, then what does that tell us about the basis of dhimma treatment in 
relation to the external element of freedom of religion, that of manifestation? Beyond that 
what is the discernible basis for the granting of minority rights and more so the more 
advanced notion of collective rights? The first crucial point to begin with is that the notion of 
conquest no longer exists and is forbidden under international law. The prevalent context is 
one of friendly neighbourly relations and non-aggression with the basis of international law 
and relations State sovereignty and its associated responsibilities relating to human rights to 
those within its jurisdiction. As such boundaries and border are fixed and with the exception 
of (religious) minorities resulting from mass (economic) migration flows in the post-WWII 
period, religious minorities are to be found to pre-exist in the territories of the States in which 
they reside. Those who have resulted from migration have been for the most part economic 
migrant, and regardless have in most cases become citizens of those States. Of course there is 
serious concern which we looked at in detail regarding the exclusion of such groups the scope 
of religious minority rights in Europe, which we will return to later. The relevant point being 
that notwithstanding how a religious minority has come to be within the jurisdiction of the 
State, there has been no preceding enmity or hostility (armed or not).  
PhD: Protection of Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and International Law   Murtaza Shaikh  
  
Page 197 of 222 
 
Thus once these political contextual factors are lifted, then it seems that the same approach 
cannot be the proper one. In that where jizya is taken with the purpose of humiliation and 
penalisation of past enmity or where restrictions are placed on place of worship due to fears 
of a threat from within. Such an approach also makes sense of the confusion in the view of 
verses that relate to conflict and those that do not such as Qur’an 5:5 and more importantly 
around the internal aspect of freedom of religion. The specification and deciphering of these 
political factors shows that religion may have little to do with the policies that affected 
religious minorities or in other words it was not the principle overarching concern in the 
treatment of dhimma. Instead what seems to be at stake is the context and security threat 
posed in relation to applicable harshness or leniency. Apart from the fact that the context that 
gave rise to some these modes of harsh treatment are no longer present, it is also important to 
remain cognisant that the simplistic model hitherto presented where the religious identity or 
belief per se determined the treatment and rights attributed to them may be flawed. 
For example we conducted an extensive discussion on scope of the concept of the dhimma in 
which we found three prominent views existed as to who could be included in addition to the 
People of the Book and Magians: no others, only non-Arab polytheists or all polytheists. If 
we assume that all polytheists may be included and thus by analogy all non-Muslim groups, 
the conventional view of a special status being attached to the People of the Book would no 
longer be applicable as far as the status of dhimma was concerned. This is because if all 
groups were to be included there would also then be no distinction as to the content of their 
rights. All religious minorities would be equal in a sense and there would logically have to be 
a form of neutrality and impartiality practiced under Islamic law towards those groups as in a 
sense of public law there would be no distinction between them. Instead of just arguing 
against the position of Islam’s favourability to the People of the Book as dhimma, it would be 
more instructive to pin point the misunderstanding that may led to such a oft cited yet 
mistaken position. Islam clearly views People of the Book in mixed sense. It appreciates their 
commonalities in belief and origin to Islam, but views negatively their perceived alteration of 
original monotheistic religions. As we asserted they are often referred to as People of the 
Book when the connotation is positive and as disbelievers (kafireen) and polytheists 
(mushrikeen) when a negative connotation is intended. In Ibn Taymiyah’s terminology they 
are not viewed as absolute polytheists but polytheists nonetheless.  
However the crucial distinction is that this was how Islam viewed the People of the Book in 
religious terms. The dhimma system was essentially a political system aimed at managing 
religious diversity and plurality, keeping in mind the security and religious nature of the 
Islamic State entity. Even the original context of Qur’an 9:29 is that of fighting. As such from 
a religious perspective the People of the Book were seen as closer to the Muslims and 
furthermore also more likely to incline towards Islam.
688
 However they were still disbelievers 
and polytheists from another perspective and as such had the same freedom of religion in the 
legal and political sense as other religious minorities. The only element of Islamic law that 
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directly relates to a difference of treatment to the People of the Book and polytheistic 
religious groups is the permission to marry from them and eat their food.
689
 This again purely 
in a religious sense as it addresses private relations between individuals rather than public 
law. The assertion is made yet more conclusive by the inclusion of the Magians even in the 
most restrictive interpretations favoured by al-Shafi’i as People of the Book. The Magians 
even it is argued that they at some point indiscernible in history may be People of the Book, 
clearly practiced polytheism and monotheistic elements were not be seen at all. However 
their inclusion in the scope of dhimma is undisputed. What is even more noteworthy for those 
who do include them as People of the Book, do not hold Qur’an 5:5 to be applicable to them, 
that is, the permissibility of marriage or the consumption of their food. Once again showing 
that Islamic law on dhimma was one related to political and public considerations rather than 
those of religious belief or ritual or inter-religious relations.  
Ultimately the dhimma system was a political one with a religious basis rather explicitly 
defined religious principle or set of rules. So to use it as a guide on how to treat non-Muslims 
generally regardless of context would prove a futile exercise if to begin with the political 
scenario of a governing authority who sought to apply Islamic law and subject non-Muslim 
religious minority was absent.
690
 Furthermore to not revisit the examples of practice as 
jurisprudence rather than law or even ad hoc political decisions is lacking in any such 
analysis. As such it does not suffice to hand pick the examples of practice that most suit a 
pre-determined conclusion in order to provide an authoritative analytic framework. Rather 
than merely look at such practices in isolation of their contexts hundreds of years in the past; 
what is clearly missing from a number of studies is an effort to uncover the principles 
underpinning the law so as to question the extent and nature of their applicability to the 
present world’s context.
691
 Of these unprecedented facets is an international order of nation-
States, international law and UN treaties and fundamentally a paradigmatic shift from default 
enmity to default non-aggression: “For the modern Muslim jurist, those conditions have 
changed as political communities have shifted from imperial models to state-based ones, and 
to complex modes of domestic and international regulation”
692
 
Conversely for Islamic law to be a system of public law, which distinguished purely on the 
basis of religious belief per se, would mean that it was antagonistic towards other religions 
and their adherents. Thus it was against the religious identity itself and showed a preference 
for its co-religionists, followed by those who were closest to them, such as the People of the 
Book, and ending with those who were furthest away from them. To put it slightly different, 
it was disdainful to those beliefs and in terms of policy sought to weaken and alter their 
religious identity so as to create a homogenous national religious identity. However we have 
begun to see that religious identity did not play such a role nor was it the target of Islamic 
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public law. Islamic law once dhimma status was given, never sought to interfere with 
religious identity nor the internal element of freedom of religion. In fact it dealt with them as 
collective group entities allowing them various layers autonomous spaces/competencies to 
not only hold beliefs and identities in line with their religions but also to practice and 
manifest them as a collective. The only point at which Islamic law sought to interfere with 
the religious life of dhimma was when it encroached the sensibilities or threatened the 
religiosity of the Muslim population. Hence there are appropriate limitations of public 
expressions of religion and even more so manifestation that could lead to direct or indirect 
proselytisation. 
 
V. Scope of Religious Minority 
We found under Islamic law that the scope of dhimma could be interpreted in three ways, but 
also that under international law there was spectrum of validity deduced from a complex web 
of legality in relation to regions and institutions. This spectrum under international law was 
also accompanied with the complicating factors of a number of instruments being non-
binding soft laws. Those that were legally binding had an in-built element of discretion and 
incremental realisation.
693
 Resultantly there were also three main approaches observable 
under international law with a particular focus on Europe on the scope of ‘religion and 
belief’, ‘religious minority’ and ‘national minority’. Similarly to Islamic law, the category of 
‘national minority’ as agreed and interpreted by States under the FCNM was the most 
restrictive as it potentially excluded all religious minorities from its scope indirectly by virtue 
of defining ‘national’ as exclusive of minorities resulting from immigration. This did not 
automatically mean those individuals belonging to religious minorities were denied the rights 
to non-discrimination or religious freedom granted under the ECHR. International law dealt 
with the issue of scope separately and independently when determining religious freedom and 
minority rights. Islamic law however has its starting rather than end point as recognition of 
group entities and collective rights. It does not distinguish its approach to scope between 
freedom of religion and minority rights.    
On the issue of scope of ‘religion’ under both systems, there was remarkable similarity with 
regards to the applicable principles. These included non-interference in the internal 
legitimacy or content of others’ religion. The scope of freedom of religion was to be limited 
to beliefs about religion so as to cover atheism but not all beliefs in the generic sense. We 
deduced this through the polythetic approach to the definitional question as opposed to an 
essentialist approach as outlined by Gunn.
694
 While it was established and known that 
international law explicitly included atheists within its scope, it was also clear that not all 
beliefs were to be included despite the generic wording of the HRC. Under the ECtHR, there 
are clear examples of exclusion such as assisted suicide and that the beliefs must attain a level 
of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.
695
 Hence there was utility in applying the 
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polythetic approach to the open ended wording of the HRC that the right should not be 
limited to traditional religions and the ECHR outlined general principles of what can and 
cannot be a religion, in line with facets or manifestations of religion, chief amongst them 
being worship.  
It may be commonly presumed that as atheism is antithetical to Islam, it would be viewed 
disfavourably or excluded from the scope of dhimma under Islamic law. To the contrary, we 
found that theologically, atheism could not be disaggregated from and should be included 
within the rubric of polytheism. Thus if we followed the view that all polytheists should be 
included then atheist would be included. The polythetic approach rendered a similar 
conclusion that what is or is not a religion may be ascertained through its various facets. It 
seemed that as long as what is being dealt with is a belief in God and has connected to it acts 
of worship may be included. Clearly the problem arises with regards to atheists not having 
any acts of worship. Given they are captured by the facet of it being a belief about the 
existence of God, it would not be necessary to also satisfy the second condition. Furthermore 
it would appear at least under Islamic law that were they to be given dhimma status, then 
there would be no impediment to laying claim to any of the rights permitted to religious 
minorities. Despite lacking acts of worship, others would be applicable. Whether they would 
avail such religious minority rights when they are naturally likely to be against the notion 
itself would remain to be seen.   
With regards to definition of ‘minority’ it was established that it remains highly contested and 
unsettled under international law. Islamic law as already stated does not address the scope or 
definition of what groups may or may not constitute minorities separately from the discussion 
around the scope of ‘religion’. It addresses the issue as a whole relating to a religious group 
entity with all other rights subsequently following. With regards to definition, international 
law has been held back by States’ reluctance to give the concept any fixed meaning, owing 
largely to an aversion to group rights due to perceived threats to national identity and 
ultimately territorial integrity. Nonetheless despite there being no agreed definition of 
‘minority’ under international law, reference is often made to the Capitorti’s working 
definition. Developing practice and evolution of international law on minorities however has 
since advanced. A first aspect of that definition related to the conventional idea that minority 
be “a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant 
position”. While non-dominance is likely to be essential when characterising and identifying 
minorities, it may occur in a context where they in fact form a numerical majority. Examples 
of this were given of South Africa and Bahrain. This dynamic prioritising dominance rather 
than numbers, is evident under the practice of Islamic law as well. It would likely be in 
increasing cases, especially as the Islamic empire expanded to non-Arab lands that the 
Muslim, at least at first, would constitute dominant numerical minorities governing over non-
Muslim numerical majorities.    
We also established that the requirement of “being nationals of the state” to access minority 
rights was one that international law, even in the absence of universal State compliance, was 
not to be used as a basis to exclude groups from the scope of ‘minority’. However 
international law dealt with this element with nuance when addressing the precise content of 
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rights. As such not all rights attributable to minorities need be availed to non-national 
minorities such as for example of political participation, whether it be standing for office or 
participating in elections. Islamic law, too we found to did not exclude from the scope of 
religious minority rights non-Muslim subjects just by virtue on non-permanent status as our 
closest comparator to citizenship. Although the term dhimma was not attributed to this 
category of religious minority, who were resident on a temporary basis. They were instead 
referred to as mustamin and were vested with rights, but similarly to international law, the 
extent or nature of certain rights was tailored to the fact that they were not permanent 
residents or citizens. What is certain though on a basic level strikingly similarly to 
international law, their freedom of religion was not to be interfered with or restricted except 
under appropriate public policy grounds.  
Capitorti continues to mention the types of minorities who may included, those who “possess 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the 
population”. Capitorti’s limiting of the definition to these three groups is echoed in Art. 27 of 
the ICCPR. Islamic law is dissimilar to international law in this as dhimma is only applicable 
to religious minorities. This does not mean that Islamic law thus excludes recognition or the 
attribution of rights to other forms of minorities such as linguistic or ethnic. Given that it is 
derived in origin from a religious text, it is of paramount importance to it and us, as to how it 
views and seeks to treat those who disagree and differ from its adherents, when in a position 
of dominance and holding political authority. That group of differing people would be 
assumed under the wide berth of those who disbelieve Islam and hence the extended 
discussion of specifically non-Muslim minorities under Islamic State entities. In principle 
though as Islam and Islamic law do not differentiate on the basis of ethnicity, race or 
language there is no principle identifiable under Islamic law that would hinder a political 
authority from availing non-religious minorities rights derived from minority rights 
principles. From one perspective the treatment of ethnic or linguistic minorities is a matter 
that Islamic law would not be concerned with as it is an areligious matter. An Islamic State 
entity or Islamic law itself is devoid of ethnicity or language and as such matters would 
render wholly political in nature and at the discretion of the political authority. From another 
perspective, if liberal interpretations regarding how to deal with non-Muslim religious 
minorities, those who would arguably be most naturally inclined to be antagonistic to an 
Islamic authority, are used as an inspiration or guidelines, then the attitude or treatment of 
non-religious minorities under Islamic authorities should be one that is highly enlightened 
and progressive, where appropriate importance is given to group and collective rights and 
offering a space for such pluralisms to be expressed as freely as possible.  
A similar appreciation of the underlying basis of international law also reveals why it would 
seek to protect and attribute rights to these three types of minorities specifically. Apart from 
Art. 27 of ICCPR, minority rights have developed at a purposeful pace as a post-1990s 
phenomenon. The contextual circumstances were the grim realities of the Yugoslav breakup 
and later Kosovo. Thus just as genocide had to take place for there to be a law against it, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes for there to be ad-hoc tribunals, likewise massacres 
and ethnic cleansing of whole groups of people owing to their distinct identities, comprising 
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ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural facets for there to be impetus behind the development 
of minority rights. In part what such drastic and brutal situations could be traced backed to 
appeared to be the attempt of one nation of people to impose their dominance politically and 
territorially by force on dissimilar to them, thus manifesting in murder, massacre, genocide or 
forced displacement of all those who belonged a group other than theirs, irrespective of if 
they posed a political threat, or were combatants, women or children.  
Furthermore it was also apparent that in a number of such situations the use of force and 
violence could also be adopted as a means of self-defence and political and territorial 
separation, thus leading to armed or political struggles for secession. What was at the heart 
and origin of these intractable situations was the attempt of a nation-State to impose a 
national identity on minorities who were unique and distinct or in extreme case seek the 
elimination of the whole other group. In other words what was being sought was not the 
aversion of threats to its own identity but rather an interference with all identities difference 
from itself. Therefore religious, ethnic and linguistic elements were seen as constituting a 
national identity. A nation-State with a certain predefined identity at its centre of power may 
be inclined to behave negatively towards groups that are furthest from that identity. Its 
aversion and hostility would be dependent of which elements dominate its centre. To surmise, 
just as nation States may hold to be most different to themselves who don’t share the 
dominant national identity, which may comprise of one or a combination of ethnic, religious 
or linguistic identities, Islamic State entities hold to be most different from its dominant 
identity all non-Muslim subjects who may or may not be numerically inferior.  
International law seeks to limit the nation-State’s excesses in this realm just as Islamic law 
can be drawn on to limit and hold to account similar excesses by Islamic State entities against 
its non-Muslim subjects. This is why exclusion from scope under international law occurs of 
groups who are seen not to have a cultural identity and so beyond ethnic, religious or 
linguistic. Under Islamic law, the discussion around exclusion is around which specific 
religions or types of religious beliefs are included or excluded. Hence while the focus of 
comparison is limited to religious minorities, it is notable that minority rights of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious minorities has developed in the same way under international law as 
the discussion of dhimma and how to deal with them has developed under Islamic law. Both 
are perceived as constituting the greatest threat to the identity at the heart of emanating of 
authority, power and dominance. For Islamic law, it is in theory fixed and so the ideological 
threat is always perceived to be from non-Muslim groups. However for nation-States it can 
vary between different sorts of identity, and as such the State’s attitude towards specifically 
its religious minorities will depend to what extent religion contributes to its own constructed 
national identity. In most States of Western Europe religion plays a minimal role in the 
construction of the national identity. Where it does, it does not necessary do so to work 
against other religions. For example in the UK, the relationship between the Church and the 
State manifests itself in general tolerance and the availing of religious freedom rights for all 
religions. On the other hand the secular nature of some other States, such as France are more 
likely to see minority religions as a threat to their essentially anti-religious national identity in 
light of their own political historical context. 
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We also saw how the interpretive approach to debates around scope were similar in both 
systems of law. The issue of scope in reference to Qur’an 9:29 like Art. 27 of the ICCPR 
could be condensed to the use of exhaustive and non-exhaustive clauses. Both provision carry 
explicit mention to certain groups, but the real debate is whether this means no other groups 
can be brought within their scope. Qur’an 9:29 refers to the People of the Book, which 
included Jews and Christians as well other religions who could lay claim to monotheistic 
elements in their belief or a revealed text. Art. 27 of ICCPR included within its scope 
religious, ethnic and linguistic groups. However both could be interpreted dynamically as 
non-exhaustive and open to all other similar groups. Qur’an 2:29 according to prevalent view 
under Islamic law shared by three of the major schools of Islamic law, could include other 
religious groups beyond the People of the Book, but differed  as to whether this was all other 
polytheists or only Arab polytheists. Art. 27 of the ICCPR could also include within its scope 
groups that went beyond what was conventionally under the ‘ethnic’ head. From it being 
originally intended to be reference to ‘race’ to now include various groups who satisfy the 
essence of the provision and are included under the developed wide scope of ‘ethnic’ which 
has come to signify more the idea of ‘culture’. The Roma, certain indigenous people and the 
Dalit have been included as a result.   
The culmination of our findings regarding definition of ‘minority’ under international law 
and subsequent discussions that arise around self-identification, existence and recognition are 
largely absent from Islamic law as it does have an issue with group or cultural rights. In that 
sense similar to international law, the idea of the existence of a minority being a matter of 
fact is shared. Denial of recognition under Islamic law may not take place because there is 
non-acknowledgment of existence or a denial of the right to self-identify. Rather it takes 
place in the content of the beliefs itself. Furthermore as Islamic treats scope and recognition 
of religion, minority cumulatively, it is simply not possible deny recognition on basis of non-
acknowledgement of existence, as it would mean no other rights could be attributable to such 
groups. Under international law as the scope and rights associated with non-discrimination, 
freedom of religion and religious minority rights can differ, the first regimes will be 
unaffected by the denial of the third.   
For similar reasons related to approach and scope, Islamic law also does not differentiate 
between scope of collective rights and minority rights. Under International law however, they 
are once again distinct because minority rights are said to be vested in individuals and the 
right to self-determination and autonomy in group entities. Under Islamic law, dhimma would 
subsume both religious ‘peoples’ and religious ‘minority’ as understood under international 
law. Under international law it seems groups cannot both be identified as ‘peoples’ and 
‘minority’ in light of the jurisprudence of the HRC. Furthermore it also seems increasingly 
clear that the notion of classical self-determination was one associated and tethered/tied to the 
colonial context as well as being status post-colonial era acquired through force and 
secession.
696
 However there has been a lively discussion and the idea of the emergence of a 
contemporary right to autonomy. This has also been expressed differently as the idea of 
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internal self-determination rather than external self-determination. Internal meaning the 
inhabitants of a given territory or a religious group have a say in matters that concern them as 
well as the State in which they reside. Thus autonomy need not only be political, but also 
religious, legal or linguistic. This approach is principally how Islam deals with its dhimma in 
that they may avail territorial autonomy, but also in matters of religious life, personal/private 
law and education be put in charge of their own private matters. In matters and institutions of 
the State, according to Mawardi, there is no impediment legally or anecdotally to them 
occupying high positions in government and according to Maududi, any executive posts that 
are not related to the religious nature of the State.  
When we discussed the notion ‘national minority’ as interpreted under the FCNM, it came to 
light that the scope of the FCNM was considerably limited to only those minorities who were 
long established and traditional minorities. The practical effect of this exclusion was that 
minorities resulting from immigration post-1945 were in essence excluded from the scope of 
the FCNM and denied access to the associated rights. The indirect effect of this was that the 
majority of religious minorities were the result of the immigration. Therefore even though the 
inclusion was intended for national minorities and the exclusion for non-national minorities 
as in those who arrived recently or ‘new’ minorities the practical effect was the inclusion of 
specifically religious minorities, who also happened to be in most cases ethnic and linguistic 
minorities. However it was the religious aspect of their identities that carried with it the most 
cultural substance to be expressed through the regime of minority rights.  
Under international law, we found that the scope for ‘religious minorities’ was broadest when 
looking at the definition of ‘religion’ for the purposes of non-discrimination and to an extent 
religious freedom. However it was narrowed with regards to ‘religious minority’ and the 
narrowest in relation to ‘national minority’ under the FCNM. Even narrower perhaps would 
be the scope of collective rights such as self-determination and autonomy beyond the scope 
of minorities and not even within the jurisdiction of any judicial mechanism.
697
 Under Islamic 
law we found three possible interpretations. However while we know that the spectrum of 
validity under international law is across regions, institutions and instruments, it is more 
difficult to get to grips with the spectrum of validity under Islamic law. Are all equally 
legitimate? On what basis can one decide to opt for one and discard the other opinions? Can 
they be used interchangeably given the context in which they are to be applied?   
What they have in common in light of the spectrum of validity theory would be that they are 
equally valid, and thus reference to any one of them is sufficient for it be considered to be a 
tangible expression of Islamic law. We have discussed at length the known explicit inclusion 
of the Magians and the disputed implicit basis for that inclusion. The view attributed to al-
Shafi’i regarding restricting dhimma solely and stringently to People of the Book is at odds 
with the majority of the views of other classical jurists. This is down to his reading of Qur’an 
9:29 closing the door for others to be included even though the verse does not explicitly by its 
wording exclude others. Coupled with this was the idea that the Magians religious beliefs 
were known and to consider them as People of the Book was a stretch of the imagination, 
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when their ostensible beliefs and practices were axiomatically polytheistic. Therefore it 
would be reasonable to classify the view that the Magians were People of the Book and 
dhimma was limited to the People of the Book is weak in the context of classical discussions 
around the classical context. This means that the two views which are prominent and have 
sufficiently significant authority and legitimacy are that that Arab polytheists should be 
excluded or no one should be excluded, that is all polytheists should be included regardless of 
being Arab or not. Although the former view may be the slightly stronger in classical 
literature, a contextual approach and unpacking the bases rendered the latter the more 
relevant to our present day context.  
This is because we know the reason for this opinion emerged from the context of the Magians 
who were by in large considered polytheistic being considered as dhimma while other 
polytheistic groups in particular the Quraish were not. Thus the simple comparison between 
the Magians and these other groups who were both polytheistic showed that the apparent and 
most obvious difference between these two groups was the excluded groups being Arabs 
ethno-linguistically and the Magians were of a Persian ethno-linguistic identity. Thus it did 
not seem possible to deduce from this difference of treatment that it must mean that only the 
People of the Book and Persian polytheists should be included as dhimma. Hence some 
decided to adduce the reverse that it was specifically Arab polytheists that were excluded 
from dhimma. However the circumstances along with the context could be read in a number 
of other ways. For example the exclusion was purely against this particular group of Arab 
polytheists who were engaged in armed hostilities against Muslims and the deep seated 
enmity towards them.  
Alternatively it could have been not the polytheism itself or their Arab identity but rather that 
were pitted against each other. As such if peace was achieved between the two groups, the 
exclusion would be lifted. Such possibilities were supported by the view of classical jurists 
that ‘Arab’ in this exclusion referred to only those in the Arabian Peninsula. In summation 
the view that the inclusion of Magians necessitated the inclusion of all polytheists is the 
strongest and most prevalent for our context. As such the exclusion of Arab polytheists is a 
reference to the exclusion of the specific historic group of people who were at war with the 
Muslims in its nascent period, who also happened to be the kith and kin of the very first 
Makkan Muslims. In any case even if the opinion was sought to be applied to the present 
context, there are no applicable circumstances as there are no polytheists in the Arabian 
Peninsula or ethno-linguistically Arab and indigenous to the region, nor are their Arab 
polytheists who have emigrated to other Muslim non-Arab States.   
We also found even if we were to favour the most liberal interpretation being the most 
relevant to our context, then there was still the issue of it being agreed amongst classical 
jurists that there be no non-Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula. This geographical area that is 
meant to be in a sense free of non-Muslims causes problems in justifying such policies under 
international law norms. It appears to suggest that the population of a certain State must be 
religiously homogenous thus not accommodating religious diversity or plurality in the 
slightest. However we learnt that this was not the position of Islamic law to be generally 
applied but specific to a particular geographical region which was home to its two holiest 
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sites. In other words the opposition was not to diversity per se but in a particular region which 
was seen as the home/epicentre of the religion. We discussed that there was comparative 
modern States which conditioned nationality on the basis of religion. This could be countered 
with the idea that even so, non-nationals are not barred from visiting the countries. However 
we noted that the assumption that the population be homogenous religiously did not imply 
that non-Muslim could not enter the territory under any circumstances and those present 
within the territory were to be expelled or killed. Rather what became forbidden was akin to 
nationality in the form of permanent residence.  
This was supported by the fact that mustamin were allowed to enter the territory of the 
Arabian Peninsula on a temporary basis for a number of reasons as well as being availed 
some of the rights due to dhimma. The example of Saudi Arabia was given where it has 
interpreted this exclusion in this manner, while also stretching it to allow non-Muslims to 
reside on the basis of work for as long as their employment persists. Thus the issue is not the 
physical presence of non-Muslims but their access to nationality and hence to have a say in 
the matters of governance or have the right permanent residence and the rights owed to 
citizens. Interestingly though it was pointed out that the Saudi nationals themselves are not 
able to practice political rights of standing for office nor taking part in elections due to the 
monarchical system. Additionally all non-Saudi nationals are treated as non-Muslim 
mustamin by linking their temporary residence to their employability. Hence it is not just a 
monarchy but one that is based on a ethno-religious identity rather than a purely religious 
one. It was also mentioned in brief that from a religious perspective two areas considered to 
be Holy and the main destination for pilgrims, Makkah and Madinah were not open to non-
Muslims under any circumstances.  
 
VI. The Right to Freedom of Religion of Religious Minorities 
We discussed at length the areas of non-discrimination, freedom of religion (belief and 
manifestation), minority rights and collective rights. Special attention was paid to the 
freedom of religion. Due to relevance of certain areas to one system of law, they were 
discussed more in depth. For example non-discrimination was discussed at length under 
international law as given its focus on individual rights and it being one of if not the most 
fundamental human rights. Similarly a whole chapter was devoted to the internal aspect of 
freedom of religion under international and the (im)permissibility of compulsion or coercion 
under Islamic law due to assertion and repetition of numerous critiques to the contrary.  
With regards to the internal aspect of freedom of religion, that is of holding a religious belief, 
we found both systems of law to be unequivocal in it being an absolute right that may not be 
interfered with at all under any circumstances. Central to this under Islamic law was the two 
fold reason of the explicit commandment found in Qur’an 9:29: “There is no compulsion in 
religion” and the overarching general thrust of Islam or maqsad of free will being a means to 
Paradise or Hell. With regards to the verse, extensive reference was made to classical 
commentaries and linguistic and syntax analysis to settle any ambivalence there might be 
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about the meaning of the verse. This led us to even possibly deduce that the meaning of the 
verse may even be more far reaching than the most favourable interpretation, in that it 
implied the compulsion was forbidden in changing anyone’s religion to any other rather than 
being specific to Islam. It was suggested by Friedman that the verse may not be a 
commandment as much as statement of infeasibility or fact. However we found this to not be 
the case and even if so, it was asserted that the distinction may ultimately be an artificial one. 
The statement of infeasibility by in this case God would be tantamount to a commandment to 
desist from something.   
Under international law, the absolute nature of the right to hold beliefs was to be found in 
Art. 18(1) of UDHR, Art. 18(1) of ICCPR and Art. 9(1) of ECHR. It does not provide a 
clawback by which the right may be limited and also has at its heart the idea of the 
infeasibility of interfering in the internal convictions of humans. Practically, we discussed 
that were certain impermissible beliefs to be concealed, then no compulsion could be 
practiced. However such concealment constitutes the result of compulsion as does the forced 
utterance of belief other than in ones heart or the punitive measures as a result of proclaiming 
one’s true belief.
698
 Interestingly under international law too there is a relationship and inter-
reliance between the infeasibility of actually affecting internal beliefs through force and the 
illegality of attempting to do so. We also saw that the association of compulsion, violence, 
force and coercion that we unpicked in relation to Islamic law was also present under 
international law as found in Art. 18(2) of UDHR and ICCPR, prohibiting the use coercion.  
Both systems of law proceeded from this absolute internal right to the right of outward 
manifestation limited on public policy grounds. However under Islamic law, it was a natural 
progression and implicit consequence of the idea that “there is no compulsion in religion”. 
For if there is no compulsion in religion, the converse ‘freedom’ in religion had to extend to 
practice and manifestation for that is how ones freedom to believe is given life and articulate 
expression. While the logic under international law was identical, it was stipulated in separate 
part of Art. 18(3), which specified four public policy grounds for the limiting of 
manifestation of religion. It was noted that the grounds of ‘safety’ and ‘health’ were to an 
extent objective, thus the discretion of States narrow. On the contrary those of ‘morals’ and 
‘order’ were far more subjective and thus the discretion afforded to States greater. With 
regards to the interpretation of morals and order significant deference was given to the 
historical, cultural and political context of the State in question to the extent under the ECtHR 
a margin of appreciation was often attached to matters especially of manifestation of religion. 
Thus it was established practice to seek to preserve the nature of the State when applying 
such limitations on the manifestation of religion. If such manifestation was seen contrary to 
the nature of the State then the scope to limit was sizeable. Under Islamic law, also it seemed 
that the Islamic nature of the State could also be preserved when ascertaining where to draw 
the line in relation to manifestation of religion. Of paramount concern when surveying 
situations where manifestation was limited was when it was likely that the Muslim population 
would be exposed to it and maximised when it took place in territories where the religious 
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minority were predominant and exercised autonomy to a certain extent as opposed to amsar 
al-muslimeen (Muslim strongholds).    
 
VII. Conclusion 
In summation, the thesis began with the aim of finding common (and uncommon) ground 
between Islamic law and international law in relation to the protection of religious minorities. 
However for the comparative analysis to be feasible and of practical utility, a number of 
contextual obstacles and appreciation of the complex natures of the laws were to be 
overcome. Overarchingly one was a law of States, while the other thought to be the law of 
God. States determined the content of one through treaty texts and custom, while jurists 
opined as to the interpretation of the other by reference to religious texts including Prophetic 
Traditions. Despite this, the legal reasoning and philosophy underlying both were remarkably 
similar. With regards to context, classical Islamic law was formulated in an imperial era 
where expansion and conquest were norms and the prevailing force was of might rather than 
law. It was not the aim of this thesis to argue or seek to justify an aggressive imperial 
approach to relations between sovereign entities. It was simply the reality of international 
relations at that time. Conversely, the current system of international relations is one that is 
inseparable and punctuated with a living, breathing and evolving international law and 
morality with non-aggression, friendly relations and default peace at its heart. Special 
attention to the drastically different contexts of each legal system can provide a poignant 
insight into the bases of actions of entities that exist operate within them. Pursuing a policy of 
aggression and appropriation of territory through conquest in the present international order 
would be impossible to pursue as it would lead to being fought by coalitions, subdued and 
neutralised. Likewise a policy of non-aggression would have been impossible in the classical 
context as it would have led to being overcome and invaded.   
The weaknesses and strengths of the legal systems were unavoidably reflective of the 
contextual milieus from which they emerged. The post-WWII and later the post-colonial 
context predictably gave rise to an international system of nation-States underpinned by the 
philosophy of individual rights and preoccupied with safeguarding territorial integrity, 
constructing national identity and preserving sovereignty. Hence the rights of minorities 
suffered and were neglected. Beyond this, minorities as group entities with their distinct 
identity were seen as a threat to a unified, centralised, monolithic State-endorsed national 
identity, with the ultimate fear that such deviation from the constructed national identity 
would pave the way to secessionist tendencies, thus undermining the territorial integrity of 
the State. Also owing to the sanctity of State sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference, traditionally mistreatment or even ethnic-cleansing of minority groups was very 
reluctantly interfered with by other States.  
The emergence of minority rights and its development with the background of the cases of 
Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Rwanda, was in part out of admittance of the failings of the 
individualistic international human rights system and its inherent blind spot with regards to 
the rights of minorities. In that sense, the UN Declaration on Minorities, OSCE HCNM and 
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the FCNM were positive developments elaborating in some detail the content of the general 
and brief Art. 27 of the ICCPR in relation “to the enjoyment of their culture.” However 
weakness remained in the international minority rights protection owing to both the content 
of the rights and their strengths as laws (binding force). All minority rights protection fell 
short of ascribing collective rights to group entities. This meant that international law became 
tangled and confused internally and reached a conclusion as non-sensical as denying the 
rights of self-determination to minorities as they were not to be deemed as ‘peoples’. Out of 
the two most detailed instruments, one remains a non-binding declaration while the FCNM, 
though legally binding was only agreed by rendering that binding nature excessively 
discretionary by the language being programmatic and aspirational rather than definitive and 
unambiguous. Hence Art. 27 of the ICCPR remains the only legally binding provision at the 
international level, but lacks detail, still suffers from the ambivalent wording “shall not 
deny”, and is restricted to individual rights only.    
The context that classical Islamic law emerged from was one where Muslim power expanded 
exponentially in the post-Makkah conquest period and Islamic law expressed through Islamic 
State-entities was an example of God’s presumed will in the realm of politics being expressed 
and manifested by a governing authority over its subjects. Islamic law did not create the 
international order of the time but found itself interacting with the existing order of 
aggression, pre-emptive force and conquest and empire. An Islamic State-entity thus existed 
is a situation that was underpinned by the philosophy of collective group entities, whether as 
minorities, foes or allies. The individualistic basis of international law was wholly absent. 
Territorial integrity was not sacrosanct and boundaries and borders constantly shifted, were 
violated and redrawn. Any national identity that did existed was based on Islam. There was 
similarity to international law in that the State was inclined to a tendency of safeguarding its 
Islamic national identity. Therefore unlike in international law of nation-States where the 
threat or fear to identity and territory comes from any alternative national (ethnic, linguistic 
or religious) identity, under Islamic law relating to an Islamic State it comes from non-
Muslim subjects.  
In contemporary State-minority relations, there is a tendency to work against opposing 
identities to the constructed national one. Within an Islamically inspired State, there is a 
tendency to counter the threat to the Islamic national identity by non-Muslim minorities. 
However both laws try to counter governmental excesses by their developments in the realm 
of minority rights and ahl al-dhimma. While the State was inclined against minorities and 
more so where there was a direct conflict with the national identity, it is also to distinguish 
the religious head from the others in its unique status. It was said that it was the only identity 
ostensibly that has substance and ideology behind it as well as being accompanied by a 
manifestation of that belief through a way of life that may include among other things acts of 
worship and association with certain religious symbols. Thus we found that non-
discrimination protections under international law stalled at the Declaration of Religious 
Discrimination and could not be elevated to the adoption of a treaty for State ratification. 
Furthermore where the national identity is said to exist in contradistinction to any or a 
specific religious identity, religious minority rights especially in relation to the manifestation 
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of religion are subjected to the most limitations. Hence minority rights sought to instil the 
necessity for minorities to enjoy their culture and in particular in relation to religious 
minorities to profess and practice their religion. This was not merely established as a legal 
right as a check against the excess of a majority backed State. It was also advanced as an 
evolved model for a nation-State to manage diversity. Plurality needed to be encouraged and 
minority identities allowed to co-exist and flourish in parallel to or as part of an inclusive 
national identity. To do so was the route to preventing conflict and eventual threats to 
territorial integrity and State sovereignty, rather than assimilation and disadvantaging 
minorities.  
Under Islamic law, difference and diversity amongst humans are seen as factual and positive 
facets of life
699
 with the commonality of all as humans being also affirmed. This shows that 
Islam’s purpose is not to eliminate difference by force, compulsion or coercion, but to 
manage it with the underlying principles of peaceful relations, co-existence, dialogue and 
exchange of ideas. Moving from the macro to the micro, we noted that there were spectrums 
of validities for both systems of law. The reasons behind the discernment of a spectrum were 
however different. Under international law they were across regions, institutions and 
instruments. They also signified a spectrum of legality. With Islamic law, due to the lack of 
formal structures, understanding and choosing between the spectrums was more difficult to 
grasp. It could be argued that the spectrum was actually in fact a linear development of law or 
alternatively different solutions for different contextual settings. It was the preferred 
argument of the present thesis that the scope of dhimma was applicable to all non-Muslims in 
the present context. The debate and discussion of classical scholars is symptomatic of a 
gradual process of grasping the source material and the appropriate analogies to be drawn. 
Sincere assessment and appreciation of both contexts past and present can only render one 
conclusion that the scope of dhimma may not be limited based on belonging to a specific or 
type of religious group. The discussion around scope and resulting rights ultimately was a 
political discussion aimed at preserving the nature of the Islamic State and the religious 
sensibilities of the Muslim-majority. Thus this also goes against the conventional idea that the 
People of the Book held a special status as far as dhimma rights were concerned.      
Under international law, the spectrum of validity and legality provided a space in which a 
State may manoeuvre and avail discretion or in some respects have none. In relation to the 
fundamental right to non-discrimination, certainly States have almost no leeway to pursue 
discriminatory policies against minorities. With regards to freedom of religion, while the 
internal aspect is absolute and underogable, manifestation may be subject to limitations 
subjective to the nature of the State. In relation to minority rights only one brief and vague 
provision is on offer, that of Art. 27 of ICCPR. The enforcement mechanism of the UN being 
far weaker than that of the ECHR or EU. The two most elaborate and similar in content 
articulations on the topic are non-binding and highly discretional, and so provide aspirational 
standards as opposed to inviolable legal maxims.      
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The thesis has attempted to show that reference to the classical Islamic law notion of ahl al-
dhimma is far from irrelevant and inapplicable in the present context. Certainly much of the 
consternation and confusion emanates from not comprehending that the rules associated with 
the notion are neither immutable
700
 nor limited to examples of negative treatment. On the 
contrary it can offer a route to deriving equivalent and progressive solutions to the problem of 
religious minority management. This can only be achieved if the correct methodology is 
employed by extracting the underlying principles (usūl) for understanding and application to 
the present. Clearly Islamic law may have much to contribute to international law, in 
particular in the realms of religious freedom, minority recognition and religious autonomy. It 
is also argued as a result pursuant to such a methodology that Islamic law in this area is far 




What is of paramount importance is to come to grips with what ultimately is the attitude of 
each system of law towards religious diversity and religious minorities so as to understand 
the essence of the laws and more so the illah or effective cause of each system. We 
established under Islamic law that freedom of religion was not to be interfered with in the 
internal aspect. Interference could only take place in relation to manifestation of religion. The 
basis of this was given as preservation of the religious sensibilities of the Muslims. In other 
words Islamic law only seeks to step in when it perceives that the religiosity of the Muslims 
might be under threat. However it is also important to establish how Islam views other 
religions were they to pose no threat to the religious beliefs of the Muslims. Clearly they have 
the right to exist but should they be advantaged or disadvantaged? Does Islam not hold itself 
to be the ultimate and only correct religion?  
The issue has been that there has often been conflation of this desire to convert others to 
Islam and the treatment of religious minorities or dhimma. As we already established any 
difference of treatment that may affect or constitute interference with the internal aspect of 
the freedom of religion or seek to affect negatively or punitively non-Muslim beliefs would 
be contrary to Islam. Islam holds the right to freedom to believe as fundamental and 
unequivocal. The driving reason behind this is that Islam does in fact seek to spread itself 
across the whole of humanity. This is to be coupled with two conditions. It can only be a 
genuine belief if it resides in one’s heart and secondly that Islam itself repeatedly affirms that 
religious homogeneity can and will never be achieved. Thus if we presume that the 
overriding thrust of Islamic law in relation to non-Muslims must be their conversion to Islam 
and through a genuine heartfelt will and desire, then it would also follow that the treatment of 
religious minorities should be as favourable as possible, so as to allow them to see the 
positivity of the religion, in its tolerance and mercy towards members of other religions. In 
simple terms, happier religious minorities are more likely to be open to listening to the 
message of Islam and eventually accepting it.  
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Under international law, minority rights essentially emerged from the need to prevent the 
reoccurrence of violent conflict as well as the most heinous crimes known to humanity such 
as genocide and ethnic cleansing. It was thought that what lay at the root of such problems 
was an inability to manage difference. Minorities who were culturally distinct in their 
identity, beliefs and ethnicity were oppressed and sought to be assimilated or worse driven 
out or killed in the pursuit of a constructed national identity. However repeated conflicts and 
atrocities indicated that in order to prevent conflict and threats to national identity, minorities 
had to be allowed ample space to express and live by their distinct religious beliefs and 
cultures. Only when such policies were pursued did the minority have no resentment or 
grievance towards the State for being allowed to live in the manner they wished and have a 
say in matters that concerned them. This would in turn lead to better relations and an 
expanded idea of national identity that accommodates and is inclusive of difference. In 
simple terms happier minorities are the best route to the prevention of conflict, atrocities and 
territorial integrity.  
There is no doubt that both systems of law are drastically different in many respects however 
what lies at their hearts is compassion and love towards humanity as a whole. What 
differentiates them are the specifics and inner mechanics. The love and compassion towards 
humanity under Islam is owed to it being a message to all humans to accept its message as a 
means of entering paradise after death. Thus all invitations and persuasive efforts to convert a 
non-Muslim to Islam must be inadvertently motivated by this altruistic desire for them to be 
rewarded rather than punished after death. International human rights law on the other hand 
out of the experience of war, conflict and suffering, seeks to endow individual human beings 
with the virtues of dignity and resulting rights. Thus it affirms that it is in cherishing and 
valuing all individuals’ common and intrinsic humanity through human and minority rights 
that we can avert similar wars, injustice and suffering in the future 
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